TECHNICAL APPENDIX

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Appendix A: Overview of independent variables

**Gender:** Male = 1 (47.7%); female = 0 (52.3%).

**Age:** Measured in years ($M=48.3$, $SD=15.98$).

**Education:** Seven levels of education (from lowest to highest): (1) elementary education (3.8%), (2) middle level secondary (lbo/vmbo) (17.3%), (3) middle level secondary (mavo) (10.6%), (4) higher level vocational (33.2%), (5) higher level secondary (6.5%), (6) undergraduate level (17.7%), (7) graduate level (10.8%).

**Political interest (index):** Two item index scale reaching from 1 (low interest) to 3 (high interest): (1) “How much are you interested in politics in general?”; (2) “How much are you interested in European politics?” ($M=1.82$, $SD=.54$, $r=.67$; $\alpha=.82$).

**Political orientation:** Respondents were asked to indicate their political orientation on an 11-point left-right scale and were coded as either leaning to the left (1-4) or leaning to the right (8-11). Two dummy variables were built representing respondents with left political ideology (18.1%) or right political ideology (24.1%) as opposed to centrist orientation.

**Political efficacy (index):** Four-items index scale reaching from 0 (low level of efficacy) to 1 (high level of efficacy): (1) “Politicians do not care about opinions of people like me”, (2) “Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion”; (3) “People like me have no influence on politics”; (4) “Politicians quickly loose contact with citizens”; ($M=0.29$, $SD=.33$, $\alpha=.71$).

**Satisfaction with domestic democracy and EU democracy:** Two items measured on a scale reaching from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied): Satisfaction with domestic democracy: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the Netherlands?” ($M=2.70$, $SD=0.68$); Satisfaction with democracy in the EU: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the EU?” ($M=2.30$, $SD=0.66$).

**Interpersonal communication about referendum:** 1 (almost never) to 4 (very often) rating scale: “How frequently have you discussed about the referendum with your friends, family or colleagues?” ($M=2.88$, $SD = 0.80$).
**Campaign evaluation:** Two items reaching from 1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree): (campaign evaluation 1 / ‘sincere’) “The discussion about the EU Constitution was straightforward and sincere” \(M = 2.95, SD = 0.97\); (campaign evaluation 2 / ‘informative’) “The campaign clarified the contents of the EU Constitution well” \(M = 2.05, SD = 0.94\).

**Exposure to campaign news coverage:** Exposure to each newspaper outlet was measured by asking respondents if they turn daily or almost daily to an outlet and coded as either 0-no or 1-yes: Telegraaf: \(M = 0.19, SD = 0.40\); Volkskrant: \(M = 0.08, SD = 0.27\); Trouw: \(M = 0.03, SD = 0.18\); NRC Handelsblad: \(M = 0.05, SD = 0.22\); Algemeen Dagblad: \(M = 0.09, SD = 0.29\); Metro: \(M = 0.16, SD = 0.36\). Individual scores for Telegraaf, Metro, and Algemeen Dagbald have been summed up and divided by three to build an overall exposure index for tabloid newspapers \(M = 0.15, SD = 0.20\). Individual scores for Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad, and Trouw have been summed up and divided by three to build an overall exposure index for broadsheet newspapers \(M = 0.05, SD = 0.13\). Exposure to the main public TV news show NOS Journaal, the main private news show RTL Nieuws, and the main current affairs program was measured on four-point scales reaching from 1-less than once a week to 4-almost daily (NOS Journaal: \(M = 3.44, SD = 0.95\); RTL Nieuws: \(M = 2.67, SD = 1.20\); NOVA Den Haag vandaag: \(M = 2.24, SD = 1.11\)). How often people visit websites on political or social subjects was measured on a 5-point scale reaching from 0-never to 4-almost every day \(M = 0.66, SD = 1.02\).
Appendix B: Positive tabloid condition (negative condition in parentheses)

MORE EUROPE! (LESS EUROPE!)

From our correspondent
BRUSSEL – Not so long ago the European Union (EU) became a lot stronger and almost nobody noticed. What exactly happened? Last December the leaders of all EU member states came together and signed the so-called Treaty of Lisbon.

More than 90% of the content of this Treaty is still identical with the former EU Constitution draft. It is now already more than two years ago that the Constitution went down the drain after the Dutch voted “Nee” in a referendum.

What does the Treaty of Lisbon mean for us Dutch? One thing is for sure: Europe gets stronger! And a lot of things will change. “It’s really fantastic!” (“It’s really terrible!”), says Henk Schipper from the organization Democratic Europe joyfully (angrily). “It was about time for this! Finally the EU is becoming more influential. We Dutch should all be happy about that!” (It is really not the time for this! The EU is becoming too influential. We Dutch should really not be happy about that!).

So, what is going to happen now? Quite a lot! In the future there will be two new kinds of European politicians: a kind of European President and also a common European foreign minister. National veto’s will disappear almost entirely. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty transfers power from the national level to the EU. However, the Treaty is not yet definite. It first has to be signed by the parliaments of all EU member states.

Although it will still take some time, Henk Schipper is already in a joyful mood (distressed mood): “I think we have to be really happy with this Treaty. Finally the EU will have more of a say!” (This really works out the wrong way for us. The EU will have too much of a say!” So, is Europe moving closer together with the new Treaty? “For sure and that’s good” (“For sure and that’s exactly the problem”), says Henk Schipper. “The Treaty of Lisbon will be a real boost for more and faster EU integration. The EU will become much more present in our daily lives. That can only be good. We will all benefit from this!” (“Now is certainly not the right time to take the EU integration process even further. The EU will become much too present in our daily lives. That can only be bad. We will all have to suffer from this.”
Appendix B: Positive broadsheet condition (negative condition in parentheses)

The EU Treaty of Lisbon – *Europe gets stronger (Europe gets too strong)*

*From our correspondent*

BRUSSEL – Unnoticed by many, the heads of government of all 27 European Union (EU) member states came together last month and signed the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty will become effective only after it has been ratified by the parliaments of all EU member states.

The Treaty of Lisbon is meant to reform and strengthen the role of the EU. It picks up many elements of the former EU Constitution draft, in fact more than 90% of its content has been carried over to the new document. The question now is what the consequences will be for the EU’s half a billion citizens and for the Netherlands in particular. *“The Treaty of Lisbon is an important step into the right direction”* (“The Treaty of Lisbon is a big step into the wrong direction”), says Henk Schipper from the organization Democratic Europe. *“The EU will become stronger and more influential and that will be of benefit for everyone.”* (“The EU will become too strong and too influential and that will have disadvantages for everyone”).

There will be quite some changes coming along with the new Treaty. In the future, there will be one common foreign representative of the EU and, next to the heads of the individual member states a European president will be appointed. National vetoes, which in the past have put a limit to the decision-making power of the EU, will largely be abolished. Most decisions will be taken by majority vote and do not require the consent of all member states anymore. Thus, the new treaty transfers some power from the national to the European level.

*“There is good reason to celebrate”* (“There is good reason to worry”), says Henk Schipper. “Important core elements of the old Constitution have been preserved. That has been a good decision. The EU will now finally be able to work more efficiently and move forward more quickly”. (“That has been a bad decision. The EU will still work as inefficiently as before and it will move forward much too quickly”). Michael Donnelly of the British Federal Trust thinks that the new treaty is a *good move (wrong development)*. Donnelly: “It certainly is time to take the next step in the EU integration process and I expect that the Treaty of Lisbon will definitely contribute to that”. (“It certainly is not the time to take yet another step in the EU integration process as the Treaty of Lisbon will do it”). Schipper adds: “Europe will become more powerful and influential in the future. That can only be good. Especially a small country such as the Netherlands is better off with a strong Europe in order to profit from the cooperation with others.” (“Europe will become too powerful and too influential in the future. That can only be bad. Especially a small country such as the Netherlands is better off without such a strong Europe so that it does not get entirely dominated by other countries.”)
Appendix B: Control condition (English translation of Dutch original)

The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon

*From our correspondent*

BRUSSELS – Unnoticed by many, the heads of government of all 27 European Union (EU) member states came together last month and signed the Treaty of Lisbon. The signing took place in an old church in the Portuguese capital. The Treaty will become effective only after it has been ratified by the parliaments of all EU member states. Once approved of by all member countries the Treaty will become valid on January 1st 2009.

The treaty pursues the goal to make the EU more efficient. It picks up the contents of previous EU treaties and adds new rules as well as a couple of separate protocols and explanations. In the future, there will be one common foreign representative of the EU and, next to the heads of the individual member states a European president will be appointed. National veto’s, which in the past have put a limit to the decision-making power of the EU, will largely be abolished. Most decisions will be taken by majority vote and do not require the consent of all member states anymore.
Appendix C: Output from a SPSS macro for conducting a mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008a) [http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes]

Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables:
DV = referendum support
IV = condition
MED = negative future expectations

Sample size
107

IV to Mediators (a path)

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Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b path)

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Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)

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Direct Effect of IV on DV (c' path)

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Model Summary for DV Model

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BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS

Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)

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<td>negative exp</td>
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Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals

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<td>TOTAL</td>
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******************************************************************************
Level of Confidence for Confidence Intervals:
95

Number of Bootstrap Resamples:
5000
Appendix D: Output from a SPSS macro for conducting a mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008a) [http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes]

Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables:
DV = referendum support
IV = condition
MED = anger

Sample size
118

IV to Mediators (a path)
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{ anger} & \text{Coeff} & \text{se} & \text{t} & \text{p} \\
\hline
\text{ anger} & 9126 & 2893 & 3.1549 & .0020 \\
\end{array}
\]

Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b path)
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{ anger} & \text{Coeff} & \text{se} & \text{t} & \text{p} \\
\hline
\text{ anger} & 2808 & 1181 & 2.3782 & .0190 \\
\end{array}
\]

Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{ condition} & \text{Coeff} & \text{se} & \text{t} & \text{p} \\
\hline
\text{ condition} & 3293 & 3752 & 0.8778 & .3819 \\
\end{array}
\]

Direct Effect of IV on DV (c' path)
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{ condition} & \text{Coeff} & \text{se} & \text{t} & \text{p} \\
\hline
\text{ condition} & 0730 & 3833 & 0.1906 & .8492 \\
\end{array}
\]

Model Summary for DV Model
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\text{ R-sq} & \text{Adj R-sq} & \text{F} & \text{df1} & \text{df2} & \text{p} \\
\hline
.0532 & .0367 & 3.2286 & 2.0000 & 115.0000 & .0432 \\
\end{array}
\]

****************************************************************************************************************************

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS

Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{ Data} & \text{Boot} & \text{Bias} & \text{SE} \\
\hline
\text{ TOTAL} & 2563 & 2506 & -.0056 & 1258 \\
\text{ anger} & 2563 & 2506 & -.0056 & 1258 \\
\end{array}
\]

Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{ Lower} & \text{Upper} \\
\hline
\text{ TOTAL} & .0714 & 5885 \\
\text{ anger} & .0714 & 5885 \\
\end{array}
\]

****************************************************************************************************************************

Level of Confidence for Confidence Intervals:
95

Number of Bootstrap Resamples:
5000
Appendix E: Overview of Variables

**Gender**: Male = 0 (52.3%); female = 1 (47.7%).

**Age**: Measured in years ($M = 49.31$, $SD = 15.42$).

**Education**: Six levels of education from lowest to highest (Dutch originals): (1) basisonderwijs (5.8%), (2) vmbo (28.2%), (3) havo/vwo (13.4%), (4) mbo (19%), (5) hbo (22.4%), (6) wo (11.2%).

**Political interest (index)**: Two items index scale reaching from (1) low interest to (5) high interest: (1) “How much interest do you have in politics in general?”, (2) “How much interest do you have in political subjects that have to do with the EU?” ($M = 2.71$, $SD = .91$, $r = .67$, $\alpha = .80$).

**Political efficacy**: One item reaching from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. Low scores represent low levels of efficacy, high scores represent high levels of efficacy: “The political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion”; ($M = 2.59$, $SD = 1.00$).

**Left political ideology**: Self-placement on left–right scale where 1 = left and 11 = right ($M = 5.95$, $SD = 1.96$); recoded as 1 to 4 = left = 1; otherwise = 0.

**Right political ideology**: Self-placement on left-right scale where 1 = left and 11 = right ($M = 5.95$, $SD = 1.96$); recoded as 8 to 11 = right = 1; otherwise = 0.

**National identity**: One item reaching from (1) only European, (2) first European and then Dutch, (3) first Dutch and then European, to (4) only Dutch ($M = 3.37$, $SD = .60$).

**Fear of immigration**: One item reaching from (1) strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree: “The Netherlands have to accept more asylum seekers” ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.04$).

**Fear of globalization**: One item reaching from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree: “Because of globalization many jobs will be lost in the Netherlands” ($M = 3.58$, $SD = .84$).

**Economic expectations**: One item reaching from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree: “The Dutch economy will get worse over the next 12 months” ($M = 3.10$, $SD = .94$).

**Government disapproval**: One item reaching from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree: “Today’s CDA–D66–VVD government is doing a good job” ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 1.11$).
**EU skepticism:** Multiple items index scale reaching from (1) low level of skepticism to (5) high level of skepticism: (1) “People have different opinions about Europe: What is your opinion about the EU?”; (2) “It is bad that the Netherlands participates in the Euro”, (3) “EU enlargement is progressing too quickly”, (4) “Turkey should become member of the EU” (reversely coded) \( M = 3.30, SD = .78, \alpha = .75 \).

**Interpersonal communication about referendum:** One item reaching from (1) almost never to (4) very often: “How often have you talked about the referendum with your family, friends or colleagues?” \( M = 2.62, SD = .85 \).

**Personal campaign involvement:** Multiple items index scale reaching from (1) never to (4) often: (1) “During the course of the campaign how often did you take part in a public event about the constitution/referendum?”, (2) “During the course of the campaign how often did you read in a manifesto of a political party about the constitution/referendum?”, (3) “During the course of the campaign how often did you look up information on the internet about the constitution/referendum?” \( M = 1.44, SD = .51, \alpha = .54 \).

**Exposure to public information campaign:** Three items index scale measuring the extent to which three key publications of the public information campaign have been read by respondents on a scale reaching from (1) not at all to (4) completely: (1) “Referendumkrant”, (2) “Samenvatting van een Grondwet voor Europa” (green–white), (3) “Informatiefolder Europese Grondwet” (red–blue–white) \( M = 2.25, SD = .88, \alpha = .75 \).

**Cynicism about campaign:** Two items index scale reaching from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree: “The campaign made it clear what the European Constitution is about; “The Yes and No camps were generally discussing the European Constitution in an open and honest way” \( M = 3.59, SD = .81, \alpha = .60 \).

**Attention to referendum news:** Measured on a scale from 0 (no attention) to 10 (strong attention) \( M = 6.46, SD = 2.36 \).

**Campign news exposure:** Exposure to each newspaper outlet was measured on a scale of 0–6 and exposure to each TV news show was measured on a scale of 0–7 indicating exposure in an average week. Means and standard deviations for single exposure measures: *Telegraaf*: \( M = 0.78, SD = 1.85 \); *Volkskrant*: \( M = 0.58, SD = 1.70 \); *Trouw*: \( M = 0.25, SD = 1.12 \); *NRC Handelsblad*: \( M = 0.40, SD = 1.40 \); *Algemeen Dagblad*: \( M = 0.39, SD = 1.33 \); *Metro*: \( M = 0.62, SD = 1.40 \); *NOS Journaal*: \( M = 4.82, SD = 2.41 \); *RTL Nieuws*: \( M = 2.85, SD = 2.49 \); *Hart van Nederland/SBS6*: \( M = 1.63, SD = 2.15 \); *NOVA Den Haag vandaag*: \( M = 1.70, SD = 1.98 \).
For the overall campaign news exposure measure we sum up individual exposure to each news outlet, weighted by the amount of referendum coverage, and add the score for the attention measure ($M = 16.40, SD = 9.44$):

$$[(exposure \ NOS \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ RTL \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ NOVA \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ SBS6 \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ Volkskrant \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ NRC \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ Trouw \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ Telegraaf \ast (amount/100)) + (exposure \ Metro \ast (amount/100)) + attention \ to \ referendum \ news]$$

Vote intention No (time 1): Very likely or likely to vote No at time 1 = 1 (44.8%); very likely or likely to vote Yes at time 1 (32%) = 0; undecided about vote intention at time 1 = 0 (23.3%).

Vote intention Undecided (time 1): Undecided about vote intention at time 1 = 1 (23.3%); likely or very likely to vote No at time 1 = 0 (44.8%); likely or very likely to vote Yes at time 1 = 0 (32%).

Vote choice No (time 2): Voted No in referendum = 1 (55.5%); voted Yes in referendum = 0 (43.1%); voted blanco in referendum = 0 (1.4%).

Party preferences: Respondents were asked which party they would vote for in case a national election would be held at this moment. We created dummy variables for voters who expressed preferences for (1) opposition parties in favour of the EU Constitution ($PvDA, \ Groenlinks$), (2) opposition parties against the EU Constitution ($all \ other \ opposition \ parties$), and (3) voters without party preference. Preferences for government parties campaigning in favour of the Constitution were coded as the reference category ($CDA, \ VVD, \ D66$).
Appendix F: Stimulus material positive frame (negative frame in parentheses);

(English translation of Dutch original)

Referendum about European Constitution
The difficult negotiations around the Nice Treaty in the year 2000 can be seen as the starting point for the work on a common EU Constitution. The Nice Treaty was seen as unnecessarily complicated and quickly got outdated after the 2004 EU enlargement. That was why a special convention under the leadership of former French president Giscard d'Estaing was installed. The Convention consisted of both members of the European Parliament and national parliaments and worked on developing a constitutional treaty. The Constitution contains one part about civil rights for European citizens, the functioning of the EU and rules for the ratification process of the treaty. Some EU countries, among them also the Netherlands, will decide over the Constitution via a national public referendum. But what is the relationship between the European and the Dutch Constitution? As a guideline, European law is above national law. But this does not say it all since the Dutch national Constitution for example sets rules that specifically concern the Dutch national state. 'The European Constitution is very good for the Netherlands' (The European Constitution is very bad for the Netherlands), says Henk Koeveermans from the Initiative “Democratic Europe”, 'because the Netherlands remain independent and at the same time become part of a stronger Europe.' (because the Netherlands become more dependent on a Europe that has become too strong.) As much as every national Constitution also the European Constitution guaranteees a certain number of civil rights. A declaration of civil rights has been integrated into the constitutional treaty. With the Constitution this declaration will become legally binding. All national institutions have to stick to the rules and regulations within this catalogue. The Constitution is a good deal for European citizens thinks Henk Koeveermans: 'Dutch citizens will receive more rights. Thus, there is absolute need for a European Constitution.' (The Constitution is a bad deal for Dutch citizens thinks Henk Koeveermans: 'Dutch citizens do not receive any more rights than they already have. Thus, there is absolutely no need for a European Constitution.) With the European Constitution the EU now also will have a common foreign minister and a common foreign service. The foreign minister has two important functions: To represent the EU to the outside world, and as a initiator and coordinator within the EU. Thus, the Constitution leads to more unity in the field of EU foreign affairs. That sets an end to the confusion about responsibilities and competences. The new minister will be appointed by the national governments but will also be member of the EU commission and as such also can be
hold accountable by the European Parliament. That is a strong and clear position. *(But the Constitution does not lead to more unity in the field of EU foreign affairs. There will still not be an end to the confusion about responsibilities and competences. The new minister will be appointed by the national governments and is member of the EU commission and as such also will be hold accountable by the European Parliament. That is a vague and unclear position.)*

The first part of the Constitution contains the rules about the democratic functioning of the EU. With the Constitution, the European Parliament can decide on more laws and regulations but does still not have the same power like the Dutch national parliament. *(The Constitution extends the rights of the European Parliament. With the Constitution citizens will have more of a say in the EU. That is a breakthrough for the democratic functioning of the EU’, explains Henk Koevermans.)* *(The Constitution limits the rights of the European Parliament. With the Constitution citizens have less to say in the EU. That is a set-back for the democratic functioning of the EU’, explains Henk Koevermans.)* The European Constitution also installs a common immigration policy that gives a uniform status to asylum seekers in the whole of Europe and to the procedure of how asylum seekers have to be treated. The goal of this is to distribute the number of asylum seekers in a fair way, in a Europe without internal borders. *(The Constitution makes it easier for the Netherlands to achieve agreements about immigration on a European level.)* *(The Constitution makes it more difficult for the Netherlands to achieve agreements to decide itself how many immigrants it wants to accept within its national borders.)*
Appendix G: Overview of independent variables

**Gender:** Male = 1 (52.3%); female = 0 (47.7%).

**Age:** Measured in years ($M=49.41$, $SD=15.25$).

**Education:** Six levels of education from lowest to highest (Dutch originals): (1) basisonderwijs (5.9%), (2) vmbo (27.6%), (3) havo/vwo (12.8%), (4) mbo (19.5%), (5) hbo (21.7%), (6) wo (12.5%).

**Political knowledge (index):** Four factual knowledge questions: (1) “What party is Henk Kamp from?”, (2) “How many countries are member of the EU at this moment?”, (3) “What is the name of the Dutch EU commissioner?”, (4) “What office does Karla Peijs hold?”. Final scale reaches from 0 (all wrong) to 4 (all correct) ($M= 2.14$, $SD= 1.30$, $\alpha = .56$).

**Political interest (index):** Two item index scale reaching from 1 (low interest) to 5 (high interest): (1) “How much interest do you have in politics?”, (2) “How much interest do you have in political subjects that have to do with the EU?” ($M= 2.72$, $SD= .89$, $r= .69$, $\alpha = .81$).

**Political efficacy:** One item: (1) “The political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion”; Item reversely coded on five-point Likert scale reaching from 1-low level of political efficacy, to 5-high level of political efficacy ($M= 2.61$, $SD= 1.00$).

**EU support (index):** Multiple item index scale reaching from 1 (low support) to 5 (high support): (1) “People have different opinions about Europe: What is your opinion about the EU?”; (2) “It is bad that the Netherlands participate in the Euro” (recoded), (3) “EU enlargement is progressing too quickly” (recoded), (4) “Turkey should become member of the EU” ($M= 2.73$, $SD= .78$, $\alpha = .69$).

**Political cynicism:** Two items index scale reaching from 1 (low level of cynicism) to 5 (high level of cynicism): (1) “The campaign about the European Constitution made it clear what the Constitution is about”, (2) “The proponents and opponents were open and honest in their discussion about the European Constitution”; original scale reaching from (1)-strongly agree to 5-strongly disagree ($M= 3.60$, $SD= .81$, $\alpha = .61$).

**Exposure to news coverage:** Exposure to each newspaper outlet was measured on a scale from 0-6 and for each TV news show on a scale from 0-7 indicating exposure in an average week. Means and standard deviations for single exposure measures: Telegraaf: $M= 0.79$, $SD= 1.86$;
Volkskrant: $M= 0.59$, $SD= 1.65$; Trouw: $M= 0.28$, $SD= 1.21$; NRC Handelsblad: $M= 0.45$, $SD= 1.50$; Algemeen Dagblad: $M= 0.34$, $SD= 1.25$; Metro: $M= 0.62$, $SD= 1.42$; NOS Journaal: $M= 4.84$, $SD= 2.36$; RTL Nieuws: $M= 2.96$, $SD= 2.50$; NOVA Den Haag vandaag: $M= 1.69$, $SD= 1.94$. The frame index scores for each individual news outlet in the below formula are based on the subtraction of the negative frame index score from the positive index score. The full formula based on our content analytic findings ($M= 1.14$, $SD= .61$) is:

$$((\text{exposure NOS} \times 0.08) + (\text{exposure RTL} \times 0.09) + (\text{exposure NOVA} \times 0.17) + (\text{exposure Volkskrant} \times 0.10) + (\text{exposure NRC} \times 0.06) + (\text{exposure Trouw} \times 0.04) + (\text{exposure Telegraaf} \times 0.10) + (\text{exposure Metro} \times 0.04) + (\text{exposure Algemeen Dagblad} \times 0.01))$$
Appendix H: Output from a SPSS macro for conducting mediation analysis
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008a) [http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes]

Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variable:
DV = turnout intention
IV = condition
MED = risk

Sample size: 42

IV to Mediator (a path)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>1.485</td>
<td>2.248</td>
<td>.0306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct Effect of Mediator on DV (b path)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>1.5389</td>
<td>3.353</td>
<td>.0019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>condition</td>
<td>1.8659</td>
<td>2.6483</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct Effect of IV on DV (c' path)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>se</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>condition</td>
<td>1.1218</td>
<td>1.6801</td>
<td>.109</td>
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</table>

Model Summary for DV Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R-sq</th>
<th>Adj R-sq</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>df1</th>
<th>df2</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.3381</td>
<td>.3041</td>
<td>9.9588</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39000</td>
<td>.003</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

******************************************************************************

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS

Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Proposed Mediator (ab path)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Boot</th>
<th>Bias</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>1.7441</td>
<td>.7427</td>
<td>-.0014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk</td>
<td>1.362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

******************************************************************************

Level of Confidence for Confidence Intervals:

95
Number of Bootstrap Resamples:

1000
******************************************************************************
Appendix I: Output from a SPSS macro for conducting a moderated mediation analysis
(Preacher et al., 2007) [http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes]

You specified model number:
5

Variables in System:
IV: condition
DV: turnout
Med Var: risk
Mod Var: efficacy

Sample size:
198

--------

MEDIATOR VARIABLE MODEL

| Coeff | SE    | t     | P>|t| |
|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Constant | 4,2468 | 1,267 | 33,5258 | 0000 |
| condition | -1,294 | 1,986 | -6515 | 5155 |
| efficacy  | -2,107 | 0,566 | -3,7195 | 0003 |
| Inter1   | 1,1496 | 0,070 | 1,7199 | 0871 |

--------

DEPENDENT VARIABLE MODEL

| Coeff | SE    | t     | P>|t| |
|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Constant | 5,0094 | 1,9244 | 2,6031 | 0100 |
| condition | -1,0749 | 7174 | -1,4983 | 1357 |
| efficacy  | -1,5403 | 7423 | -2,0751 | 0393 |
| Inter1   | 4,576 | 3217 | 1,4225 | 1565 |
| risk     | 1,786 | 4824 | 3702 | 7117 |
| Inter2   | 3,372 | 1,975 | 1,7069 | 0895 |

--------

Interaction Terms:
Inter1: condition * efficacy
Inter2: risk * efficacy

--------

Conditional indirect effect at specific value(s) of the moderator(s)

efficacy 7 Ind Eff 7 SE 7 Z 7 P>|Z| 7
1,9121 ,0034 ,0800 ,0426 ,9660
1,9949 ,1438 ,0949 ,1,5163 ,1294
3,0778 ,4025 ,1986 2,0267 ,0427

Moderator values listed are the sample mean and +/- 1 SD

--------

Conditional indirect effect standard errors are second-order estimates.
Appendix J: Output from a SPSS macro for conducting a moderated mediation analysis
(Preacher et al., 2007) [http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes]

You specified model number:
5

Variables in System:
  IV: condition
  DV: turnout
  Med Var: risk
  Mod Var: efficacy

Sample size:
198

--------

MEDIATOR VARIABLE MODEL

| Coeff  | SE   | t    | P>|t| |
|--------|------|------|-----|
| Constant | 4,2468 | 1,267 | 33,5258 | 0.0000 |
| condition | -1,1294 | 1,1986 | -1,6515 | 0.5155 |
| efficacy | -1,2107 | 0,566 | -3,7195 | 0.003 |
| Inter1 | 1,1496 | 0,870 | 1,7199 | 0.0871 |

--------

DEPENDENT VARIABLE MODEL

| Coeff  | SE   | t    | P>|t| |
|--------|------|------|-----|
| Constant | 5,0094 | 1,9244 | 2,6031 | 0.0100 |
| condition | -1,0749 | 7174 | 1,4983 | 0.1357 |
| efficacy | -1,5403 | 7423 | -2,0751 | 0.0393 |
| Inter1 | 4576 | 3217 | 1,4225 | 0.1565 |
| risk | 1786 | 4824 | 3702 | 0.7117 |
| Inter2 | 3372 | 1975 | 1,7069 | 0.0895 |

--------

Interaction Terms:
  Inter1: condition * efficacy
  Inter2: risk * efficacy

--------

Conditional indirect effect at specific value(s) of the moderator(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>efficacy Boot Ind</th>
<th>Boot SE</th>
<th>Boot Z</th>
<th>Boot P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,9949</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>0,967</td>
<td>1,5815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,0778</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>1,9620</td>
<td>0,0498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moderator values listed are the sample mean and +/- 1 SD

Indirect effect statistics are bootstrap estimates.

Bootstrap p-values assume normal bootstrap distribution.

Number of bootstrap samples: 1000