UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post-conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education

Poppema, M.

DOI

[10.1080/14767720903412218](https://doi.org/10.1080/14767720903412218)

Publication date

2009

Published in

Globalisation, Societies and Education

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Poppema, M. (2009). Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post-conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 7(4), 383-408. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14767720903412218>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

This article was downloaded by: [UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek SZ]

On: 10 December 2009

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 906467814]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Globalisation, Societies and Education

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713423352>

Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post-conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education

Margriet Poppema^a

^a IS Academy on Quality Education, AMIDST, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Online publication date: 09 December 2009

To cite this Article Poppema, Margriet(2009) 'Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post-conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education', *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 7: 4, 383 – 408

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14767720903412218

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14767720903412218>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Guatemala, the Peace Accords and education: a post-conflict struggle for equal opportunities, cultural recognition and participation in education

Margriet Poppema*

IS Academy on Quality Education, AMIDST, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

The Guatemalan educational system has been the most unequal system in the Latin American region ever since the 1950s. The indigenous Maya people, who constitute around half of the population, experienced the state mainly through repression, exploitative labour relationships and exclusion from education. The return to democracy and the peace process instilled great hopes for real change in many civil society organisations, including the Maya movement. Through their participation in national commissions, many of their demands were included in the Peace Accords of 1996. As regards the educational system, the main focus was on the greater participation of civil society, the expansion of educational opportunities, and an overall multicultural educational reform that sought to include the Maya culture and languages in the curriculum. A decade later, most of the agreements have been discredited. Powerful national and international actors have marginalised and undermined nearly all the civil society initiatives through a parallel decentralisation programme that puts the greatest burden on the shoulders of the poorest and the indigenous people. The paper critically analyses the history of the struggles since the Peace Accords, the divergent agendas and the debateable educational outcomes.

Keywords: Peace Accords; post-conflict Guatemala; Maya indigenous groups; multicultural education reform; decentralisation; civil society participation

Introduction

Education has been an important issue in post-conflict situations ever since the end of the Cold War: nearly 70% of the 43 full peace agreements that were signed between 1989 and 2005 included education in some way. Education is generally considered to play a critical role in the reconstruction process: the state should promote and guarantee the right to public, high-quality education for all, address all levels of schooling provision, and guarantee equality, inclusiveness and non-discrimination (Dupuy 2008; Rose and Greeley 2006; Smith 2005; Tomasevski 2004). The kind of education policies that were included depended on the peace negotiations, the history and the causes of the war, as well as on the conflicting interests of the actors involved. Education can support new opportunities in post-conflict situations and assist in making a new start by changing the structures and strengthening the positive role of education through the promotion of expansion, equality and a different content of education. Unless there are substantial changes, the unequal distribution of education

*Email: M.F.Poppema@uva.nl

will continue to preserve positions of economic, social and political privilege that often represent the underlying causes of conflicts (Bush and Saltarelli 2000). This process requires more than a short-term, practical reconstruction of the educational system: in order to achieve social justice, a more complex approach that comprises the complete transformation of educational systems is needed (Novelli and Cardozo 2008; Paulson and Rappleye 2007).

The Guatemalan Peace Accords (PAs) include a strong focus on the transformation of the educational system in order to redress both historical discrimination and deprivation, and the underlying generative framework (PAs 1996). The various accords that were signed in the period 1994–1996 constitute a landmark in the history of Guatemala, since never before had the voices of subaltern groups achieved such prominence in the country's public space. Their ideas about how to reform the educational system were passionately advocated by the indigenous and popular movements and became important components of two accords that explicitly deal with the transformation of the educational system. The PAs include strong claims for social justice, and the most prominent commitments in the field of education relate directly to the issues of recognition, redistribution and parity of participation. In that sense, the PAs reflect the categories developed by Nancy Fraser (1995, 2003) in her theory of social justice, in which she analyses the different forms of oppression and proposes three basic dimensions of justice, as she considers redistribution and recognition as equally fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice. In Fraser's view, maldistribution intertwines with misrecognition, as subaltern groups not only suffer socio-economic injustice but lack recognition for their sociocultural contribution. Moreover, she argues that a politics of representation must be created by granting members of misrecognised groups the right to participate on a par and as full members of society. Parity of participation with equality of power and finances in the democratic debate and political decision-making is crucial to overcoming the unjust social and institutional arrangements that sustain misrecognition and maldistribution in society. The PAs clearly exemplify substantial commitments in the areas of recognition, redistribution and parity of participation. Hence, this study provides an example of how these three categories of social justice have played a role in the transformation of the Guatemalan educational system.¹

This article will evaluate the educational transformation a decade after the signing of the PAs. Although transforming an educational system is always a complex, long-term process, the current situation will reveal how this process is proceeding, and how the programme for educational transformation has been translated into policies and practices. In what way have educational opportunities for all children expanded? How has the notion of multiculturalism been implemented? In which ways have cultural and social groups participated in the decision-making processes? And what further changes are necessary in order to comply with the commitments in the PAs?

Before these questions are answered, a short review of the history of Guatemala and the causes of conflict will be presented, as the current educational changes cannot be understood without taking into account the history of colonial and post-colonial exploitation, discrimination, violence and injustice towards the indigenous Maya inhabitants. This history has divided Guatemalan society just as apartheid divided South Africa, even though the division in Guatemala was never institutionalised in the legal systems. The Maya still constitute more than half the population, while the other major group in the country is the Ladino population, which is white or *mestizo* and Spanish speaking. The paper will start with a short overview of the history of

Guatemala, the internal war and the events that led to the PAs. The negotiations and the content of the two most important PA agreements on education will subsequently be addressed. The implementation of the PAs and the multicultural educational reform will then be discussed, as will the sudden rise of a parallel educational programme that was financed by the World Bank and had no connection with the PAs. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the complex developments in the realm of education a decade after the PAs, followed by some final remarks.

This study is based on fieldwork in Guatemala during the period April–June 2007 in Guatemala City and the indigenous departments of Sololá, Totonicapán and Baja Verapaz. Twenty-three bilingual schools (public, PRONADE and Maya) were visited in the three regions, interviews were carried out with the director and one of the first-grade teachers at each school, and classroom observations were made. At the PRONADE schools, some members of the parent committees (Coeducas) were interviewed. Further research consisted of interviewing the main actors of educational civil society organisations (17), staff at the central, departmental and local levels of the Ministry of Education (16), staff at other official institutions (3) and researchers (4). Previous visits to Guatemala as an educational consultant were made in 1996, 1998 and 2002.

Historical aspects

The exploitation of the indigenous peoples has been part and parcel of the societal make-up of Guatemala since colonial times. The expropriation of communally held land combined with forced seasonal labour for indigenous people has led to vast concentrations of land ownership and a highly unequal agricultural economic system.² Although the country became independent in 1825, an internal form of colonisation continued along the same lines of exploitation. The situation of the indigenous people became even worse during the last half of the twentieth century, when the whole country was ravaged by an internal war that lasted four decades and brought extreme brutality to the indigenous departments³ (CEH 1999, 2000; Dawson 1965; Hale 2002; Jonas 2000; Lovell 2000).

The Guatemalan internal conflict was the longest and bloodiest war suffered by a Latin American country in the twentieth century. It finally ended on 29 December 1996 with the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. The war had started in 1960, six years after the CIA-backed military overthrow of the democratic nationalist government of Jacobo Arbenz, which brought to an end a ten-year period of democracy (1944–1954). The military coup was a violent response to a moderate land reform that was aimed at redressing highly unequal land distribution. But at the height of the Cold War, the US branded the government as communist and Guatemala as a ‘Soviet beachhead’ (Jonas 1996). Since then a long series of rightwing military governments have restricted all forms of democratic participation while retaining power through fraudulent elections and internal warfare.

The turn in politics in the Central American region started somewhere in the mid 1980s when the US began promoting a neoliberal agenda, economic restructuring and the replacement of the military through the institution of formal democracies with some legitimacy and more consensual modes of control (Robinson 2000; Torres-Rivas 2006). The first democratic elections in Guatemala were held in 1986; shortly after, the guerrilla movement represented by the United Revolutionary Forces (URNG) started to propose a national dialogue and peace negotiations. However, the negotiations proved to be a very arduous process due to strong opposition from the armed

forces, the government and the powerful elites. It would take until the end of the Cold War for it to become clear to the conservative forces in society that there would be no further support from their former ally, the USA (Fischer 2001; Jonas 1996, 2000; McCleary 1999).

The first peace negotiations with the main actors were held outside the country. At the national level, a reconciliation commission started its activities under difficult circumstances. The negotiations were first moderated by the Catholic Church and then by the UN verification mission (MINUGUA).⁴ The main negotiations took place in the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) with the participation of multifarious social sectors. For the first time ever, the Coalition of Mayan People's Organizations in Guatemala (COPMAGUA), which comprised over 200 groups, became officially involved⁵ (Borrell et al. 1997). During those years, 13 consensus documents were discussed in the ASC, and although they were very influential they were non-binding, as the accords were signed only by the representatives of the government and the URNG (Krzmaric 1999). The first agreement on human rights was signed in 1994 along with one calling for the establishment of a UN-monitored truth commission. Two accords included education as a substantial part of a wide-ranging programme for change. The negotiation process in the ASC was a tough exercise not only because of the different interests of the various stakeholders, but also because of the continuing opposition from and the various forms of psychological warfare waged by the hard-liners in the government and the army, which intimidated many of the participants. More than once, the donor countries threatened to withhold all funding until the final peace accord was signed⁶ (Jonas 2000, 46). Hence, the signing of the final accord in 1996 was received with great enthusiasm both nationally and internationally.

At the same time the armed conflict had left a wounded, atomised and devastated country. The UN monitored Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) estimated that more than 200,000 people had been killed and disappeared, 83% of the victims were Maya civilian population jointly with thousands of popular and indigenous leaders. The army and other security forces were deemed responsible for 93% of the human rights violations.⁷ According to the report 'Memory of Silence' it was the doctrine of racial superiority that explains the brutality with which the military repression, massacres and scorched earth operations were carried out against more than 600 Mayan communities (CEH 1999). During the war the army became the dominant political force constituting a military bourgeois class and controlling nearly all aspects of life (Torres-Rivas 2006).

The developments after the PAs have of course been scrupulously documented by a myriad of studies on the different aspects of social, economic and political developments since 1996 (Chase-Dunn et al. 2001; Jonas 2000; Sieder 2002; Sieder et al. 2002). However, only a few of these studies have dealt with education (CNPRED 2006; PDH 2006; MINUGUA 2001). This article wants to contribute to the analysis of developments in the field of education.

The history of education in Guatemala shows strong inter connectedness with changes in the broader society. Although education was declared compulsory after independence in 1825, and to be 'compulsory, lay and free of costs' during the liberal reform in 1869, educational opportunities for the majority of the population remained restricted. With the exception of democratic period from 1944 to 1954, right-wing military dictatorships were not much interested in education and literacy. They saw education for the indigenous population mainly as a threat and the school as a place where 'wrong' ideas could be transmitted. Consequently, education remained

restricted to the cities and the main road villages, privileging merely the Ladino population.

During the internal war, one third of the scant rural educational system was directly affected by violence, especially in the indigenous areas. 'Rural areas were hardest hit as schools came under direct attack, teachers and pupils were killed, communities were terrorised and teachers refused to take jobs in rural schools' (Marques and Bannon 2003). By 1985, the educational system was in ruins and general enrolment rates barely reached 65% in primary and 17% in secondary education. The literacy rate of 45% was the lowest of Latin America except for Haiti. Most of the rural schools would not even comprise the whole primary cycle and as a consequence less than 25% of the schoolchildren would finalise six grades (World Bank 1983). The educational situation for the rural indigenous people was even worse, but no figures are available.

With the return to democracy in 1985, the abandonment of social and educational development continued with the promotion of neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank. Public expenditures on education diminished from 2.4% of GNP in 1980 to 1.6% in 1990, and government investment in education fell from a 16.6% of to an all time low percentage of 6% in 1990 (World Bank 1997b).⁸ At the time of the signing of the PAs, the situation had not improved much. Poverty was still rampant with more than two thirds of Guatemalans being poor, 58% of whom lived in extreme poverty. The indigenous people constituted over 90% of the poor and were mainly concentrated in the rural high lands of the North and the North West of the country. Literacy among the indigenous population would barely reach 28%, and their level of schooling continued to be extremely low, males having an average of 1.8 years of schooling and indigenous females 0.9 years, compared to 4.5 and 4 years of schooling for the non-indigenous population (World Bank 1997c, 14).

Due to the absence of a significant educational supply by the government and the continuing discrimination towards the Mayan people, Mayan academics and activists allied with local communities and voluntary teachers started the Maya educational movement articulating a process of indigenous revival and *concientización* about Mayan cultures and languages in education. At the local level many communities started to challenge the fear left by the war and created their own 'Mayan community schools' with lots of energy and modest funds, although some were able to obtain international funding.⁹ Simultaneously, the National Council of Mayan Education (CNEM) was created to defend and support the process of revitalisation of the Mayan cultures and languages. In August 1994 more than 250 people from some 80 institutions, representing all language and ethnic groups, joined for the First National Congress of Mayan Education (Asturias, Grigsby, and Oltheten 2000). What Mayas, according to that and other meetings, wanted or at least what Mayan leaders and activists expressed – albeit with different emphases – was to be entitled to their culture, to investigate and revitalise it, to live in harmony with it and to share it among the often isolated Maya communities, as well as making it part of the studies of their children and the national educational system. They enthusiastically participated within the ASC negotiations to make their demands known.

The Peace Accords and education

Seven years of peace negotiations in the ASC resulted in 13 different agreements containing more than 300 commitments and recommendations. The accords as a

whole can be considered as an ambitious programme for development, cultural pluralism, human rights, participation and the commitment to fully democratise the Guatemalan state, and as an important step in the construction of a multiethnic, pluricultural and multilingual nation. The most important accords in the fields of education and of indigenous rights are the 'Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (AIRIP 1995) and the 'Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation' (ASEAAS 1996).

The AIRIP Accord was proposed by the indigenous coalition COPMAGUA and it took nine-months of strong discussions at the ASC. The accord focuses on the ways of redressing discrimination, exploitation and injustice suffered by the indigenous peoples because of their origin, culture and language, and for the recognition of indigenous culture and linguistic rights. The discussions of the ASEEAS accord took even longer as it focused on highly controversial socio-economic issues related to land distribution that were the root cause of the armed conflict four decades earlier. At the end, this Accord was intervened and unilaterally reformulated by the very influential agricultural and industrial business association CACIF.¹⁰ Consequently the proposed agricultural reforms remain minimal and the accord bears an ambiguous character combining norms on social justice, human rights, participation and democracy with a more technical and market driven orientation (Krzmaric 1999; Palma-Murga 1997; Rettberg 2007; Stanley and Holiday 2002).

In spite of the interferences, the accords were widely acclaimed as a working compromise to be further elaborated in time through involving civil society participation. In the field of education both accords are considered as complementary by addressing the two main dimensions of justice needed to redress the historical ethnic and cultural discrimination, the socio-economic maldistribution, as well as the need for participation (Fraser and Honneth 2003). These included a broad range of proposals to transform the educational system, as shown in Table 1 on page 389.

This article will further reflect on these three areas: the area of recognition and support, by the design of an overall multicultural educational reform reflecting the Maya identity and cultural diversity, linked with the support for the Maya community schools and their organisations; the area of redistribution focusing on increases to the national educational budget, the expansion of education and the guarantee of the right to education for all up to secondary education, as well as additional forms of education and training; the third area entails the commitments to decentralise and regionalise the educational system to permit greater and sustained forms of parity of participation in the decision-making processes at all levels.

The implementation of the Peace Accords and the educational reform

One of the most important elements in the PAs is its emphasis on participatory mechanisms of decision-making to be able to fundamentally change the country and, *mutatis mutandis*, the educational system. Through the signing of the PAs the government committed itself to install two educational commissions for an overall educational reform, the Parity Commission for Educational Reform (COPARE) to draw up the proposal for the Educational Reform, and the Consultative Commission for Educational Reform (CCRE), which should oversee its realisation and implementation, and which was to warrant broad civil society participation (23 delegates from 17 institutions and organisations).¹¹ Although these entities had been assigned a central role for the further development of the educational reform they faced many obstacles.

Table 1. Demands in the field of education in the AIRIP and ASEAS accords, related to Fraser's concepts of social justice.

	AIRIP: commitments	ASEAS: commitments
Recognition	<p>Educational reform</p> <p>Promote Maya culture and identity, indigenous languages and values in educ.</p> <p>Create a National Directorate (DIGEBI), and expand intercultural bilingual education</p> <p>Remove all cultural and gender stereotypes</p> <p>Strengthen existing initiatives: Maya schools and the National Council for Maya Education (CNEM). Contract indigenous bilingual teachers</p>	<p>Educational reform</p> <p>Promote human rights, cultural diversity, bilingual education and literacy</p> <p>Equal opportunity for women and overcome the urban-rural divide</p> <p>No discrimination</p> <p>Education and training as a central strategy to equality, national unity, econ. modernisation and international competitiveness</p>
Redistribution	<p>Comply with the right of education for all, and reverse the highly unequal educational system</p> <p>Expansion of education, improvement of socio-economic conditions, especially for indigenous communities</p> <p>Scholarships, professional opportunities and training</p>	<p>Free and compulsory education. Boost coverage and completion up to secondary.</p> <p>Starting with the achievement of 3 years prim. by 2000</p> <p>Promote social justice through combating inequality, poverty, discrimination and privileges</p> <p>Increase spending of 50% by 2000</p>
Participation	<p>Parity participation in educational reform</p> <p>Decentralise and regionalise, according to cultural and linguistic necessities</p> <p>Institutionalise mechanisms of consultation and participation in decision making in all matters of interest to the indigenous peoples: 'with, by and with them'</p>	<p>Realisation of the educational reform</p> <p>Decentralise and regionalise</p> <p>Democratisation via the creation of institutions, mechanisms and conditions for participation at all levels</p> <p>Training for participation</p>

The parity and the consultative commissions for educational reform

The COPARE commission was created a few months after the signing of the PAs and reflected the parity representation of five indigenous representatives and five delegates from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC). The COPARE launched broad calls to civil society and community-based organisations to present proposals for changes of the educational system. Many such proposals were received and many lively discussions were held to evaluate them. The negotiations weren't always easy due to the difference in time availability and professional capacities between the indigenous representatives and the MINEDUC staff (Cojtí Cuxil 2002). Nonetheless the main principals for the Educational Reform were presented on 20 July 1998 to President Arzu and handed over to the CCRE for further implementation (COPARE 1998).

The main problem both commissions encountered was the lack of support from the government and the dual agenda of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC). The MINEDUC did not take seriously the proposal for the Educational Reform of the

COPARE commission and tried to obstruct their further implementation by limiting the tasks of the CCRE to only assessment and advisory functions. Most of their proposals were blocked, especially those favourable to the indigenous people, while at the same time a parallel organised programme of self-managed schools (PRONADE) financed by the World Bank received strong governmental support. The agreement for the PRONADE¹² project was signed in 1997 without the involvement of the two official commissions, even though the main focus of the PRONADE project was on the poorest departments with the majority of indigenous population and as such of great interest for the COPARE and CCRE. Due to the completely parallel organisation of the PRONADE programme, further involvement of civil society organisations within the programme was avoided. The CCRE continued with their proposals for the educational reform, but ended up feeling manipulated, as they were not taken into account (pers. comm. with CCRE members, 2007). Whereas at the same time their existence as the educational commission for the implementation of the PAs, was used to legitimate the other government plans (Cojtí Cuxil 2002).

The 'truth' reports and the polarisation of the educational debate

These debates on education took place during a highly convulsive political situation, which took on a very tense nature with the release in April 1998 of the report "Guatemala: Never Again" by Bishop Juan Gerardi, the coordinator of the 'Recovery of Historical Memory' project (REMHI 1999). Based on around 7000 interviews with victims, the report confirmed the extent of the brutal human rights violations carried out by the armed forces. Two days after the publication, the bishop himself was brutally murdered. Some months later the United Nations sponsored 'Commission for Historical Clarification' (CEH 1999), mandated by the PAs, presented their report 'Guatemala, Memory of Silence' with the same kinds of accusations towards the armed forces. Although both reports brought light into the darkness surrounding the past crimes and the racist character of the war, both Human Rights commissions lacked the power to name or prosecute the individuals responsible. Impunity still reigns in the country and there has been no official acceptance of the conclusions of both Truth Commissions. Surprisingly, it was President Clinton during a visit to Central America who recognised the vast human rights violations and the US involvement in it, admitting that 'the support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake' (Doyle n.d.).

During this period, elite opposition towards the PAs increased and consequently the debate around the educational reform became highly polarised.¹³ Influential conservative sectors, the armed forces and the mass media opposed the multicultural and intercultural aspects of the reform, arguing that this would lead to fragmentation and that national unity could only be preserved by 'uniform' and universal educational policies.

A renewed search for consensus and legitimization: the 2001 'Dialogue and consensus for the educational reform'

In spite of the increased hostility, the CCRE convinced the new Portillo administration (2000–2004) to open up the dialogue for a renewed consensus on educational reform. A national participatory process called 'Dialogue and Consensus' (D&C) was organised and it turned into a massive national dialogue on education, which was largely

organised from the bottom-up, fostering substantial popular participation.¹⁴ The whole process was backed up by a 'Great Campaign for Education', an initiative of 52 organisations demanding the authorities to take into account all their promises and to gradually increase the yearly educational budget from 2.5% of GDP to 7%.

The main conclusions of the D&Cs once again confirmed the legitimacy and broad support of many of the demands articulated in the PAs: the expansion of access without distinction and the guarantee of equal opportunity for all; respect for and promotion of the different cultural and ethnic identities, and the elimination of discrimination, racism and sexism; the development of multicultural, intercultural and bilingual education, and the improvement of the quality of education; the support for a participatory curricular transformation, as well as more sustained participation of the whole community in educational affairs.

Most civil society interviewees mentioned the PAs and the D&Cs as the most important participatory exercises for the educational reform. Both processes reconfirmed the support for transformations in the educational field over and over again. Both demonstrated the popular support for a participatory strategy to realise an educational reform that would lead to equal educational opportunities for all, with full recognition of cultural diversity. The interviewees, however, also stressed the limitations and the exclusionary mechanisms present in the political system that had prevented the realisation of these dreams. They all mentioned the many different forms of opposition, both inside and outside of the Ministry of Education, against real change. They criticised the continuing intimidation and strong influence of the traditional elites, the business sector and the (former) army commanders. Moreover, they mentioned the interference of powerful international actors like the World Bank, accusing the entity of supporting the elites, while undermining the effective participation of civil society. They all judged the parallel development of the decentralised PRONADE educational programme as a 'counter reform', in line with international dictates but against the national agreements: 'PRONADE violates the PAs and it violates the dialogue on the educational reform' (personal communication with a CCRE member, 2007).

As argued above the PAs, the COPARE and CCRE commissions, as well as the D&Cs, were the result of strong civil society participation. The overwhelming majority of civil society in Guatemala considered these changes as essential prerequisites for the further strengthening of democratic participation and the transformation of society towards a more pluralist and just society. However, many of the great hopes of the PAs have faded in view of the enormous gaps between the PA commitments on paper, and the realities of post-war Guatemala. While simultaneously, an educational reform that was imposed and uncalled-for, prevailed.

The educational reform that took place: the World Bank agenda and the PRONADE programme

The conceptualisation and the piloting of the World Bank supported programme started during the period of negotiations and the full PRONADE project was approved a few months after the signing of the final Peace Accord in December 1996 (World Bank 1997a). There was no discussion on the project within the ASC, nor did it involve the official PA commissions, and neither were other CSOs and the teacher unions invited. My interviewees voiced the opinion that they were intentionally kept-out. The main stakeholders involved were the educational experts of the World Bank jointly with

MINEDUC officials, staff of the neoliberal think tank CIEN¹⁵ and some academics that shared similar educational visions with the World Bank.

The rationale of the PRONADE project shows clear differences with the PA demands as it is formulated towards processes of economic globalisation and designed 'to respond to demands of an open global economy; the Government of Guatemala has proposed a strategy for improving human capital based upon the expansion of the skill level of the labour force' (World Bank 1997a, 2).

Expansion and decentralisation through the PRONADE programme

The PRONADE Programme of Self-managed Schools is a World Bank financed project initiated jointly with MINEDUC and with financial back up from the KfW German Development Bank.¹⁶ The specific objectives of the PRONADE programme are to increase access for at least three grades of primary education in underserved and isolated rural areas inhabited mainly by indigenous population groups; via a decentralised system of self-managed schools, through which the administration of the schools is directly delegated to the parents. Even though the project would only address access to primary education, the high repetition and dropout rates led to the inclusion of pre-primary in the programme. In 2007, PRONADE operated 4677 schools with 450,000 children. More than 70% of the schools are concentrated in the poorest departments with a majority indigenous population.

The PRONADE education system is organised completely separate and parallel to the public education system. The central PRONADE office coordinates the total programme and manages the earmarked funds. The management at the department level is subcontracted out towards the privatised Educational Service Institutions (ISEs), which are either NGOs or private companies. Consultants of these ISEs identify the communities and organise parent committees in Coeduca,¹⁷ consisting of seven parents of whom at least two have to be literate, and they become entrusted with the administration of the program on behalf of the PRONADE central office. With a minimum of 25 pre-registered children, the Coeduca can establish a school. The acquisitions of the terrain and the resources for the construction of a school have to be found within the community, or through project applications with other financing agencies.

The responsibilities of the Coeduca include hiring and paying teachers and monitoring their attendance on a daily basis. These parent-run committees also have the right to fire teachers or to hold back the monthly wages. In addition, the Coeduca is responsible for buying and distributing school snacks and the purchase of teaching and learning materials.¹⁸ To be able to fulfil these tasks the Coeduca members receive administration and management training from the ISE.

All PRONADE teachers get a one-year contract; they receive payment for 10 months, plus a bonus for the other two months (around €200 per month). Every three months PRONADE provides the salaries for the teachers, as well as funds for the working materials for the students (five euros) and teaching materials for the teachers (approx. €20). In addition, it supports a daily school snack for a total amount of two euros per month per child.¹⁹ Totalling a contribution of around €26 a year per student

The World Bank, the Ministry of Education, and other actors have celebrated PRONADE as a great success. According to the World Bank Guatemala's primary net enrolment rate has increased from 72% in 1996 to 89% in 2003. Moreover, the

PRONADE schools accounted for nearly the total increase with 15.2% of the primary enrolment nationwide in 2003. According to the World Bank, the programme has even exceeded the target of enrolment and 'isolated rural communities have been truly empowered to administer and manage the schools' (World Bank 2005, 1).

The PRONADE programme is presented as being part of the PAs by enhancing access to education for the poorest population, even though it has not taken into account any of the other promises/commitments. According to international statistics, Guatemala is now on its way to full educational coverage, yet the repetition and dropout rates remain very high. The programme gives political legitimisation to the Guatemalan state as being on track for the Millennium Development Goals; however, the reality behind this apparent success presents a much more complex and gloomier picture.

Participation and equal opportunities within the PRONADE programme

Through the self-managed school programme parents become the managers of the school, taking over the local financial and administrative functions of the state. All parents of the Coeduca I interviewed felt this responsibility as a burden rather than an advantage. They only engage with this 'voluntary' work because of the necessity of sending their children to school. Nevertheless, the price is high, they spend around one day a week complying with these school-related tasks. Research undertaken in 41 PRONADE schools confirmed that the average time investment of the parents involved in the Coeduca is about 48 days per year (Camerós 2006). Parents are responsible for the acquisition and the maintenance of the building, for the administration, for the hiring, firing, payment and control of teachers, the meetings with the ISE supervisors, the buying of the food and for organising the distribution, drawing up the accounts, and they travel (sometimes many hours) to present all the documentation at the departmental ISE. Finally, they have to attend a three-day training session, taking place three times during the school year.

These parents are the only ones active within the educational system who are *not* paid for their work and they are the poorest ones. All parents pointed out that they lose income for one day per week (around three per day). As a result, there are many complaints: the poverty of the parents makes them vulnerable to corruption, some Coeduca ask money for considering the teachers job applications or demand some pay-off when paying out the salaries, or they coerce teachers to pay for the rent and the electricity of the school. Some female teachers denounce 'machismo' related forms of harassment or an abusive intermingling in their personal affairs. Overall, the model fosters animosity between the Coeduca and the teachers, leading to an adverse relationship. Only at one school, in an immigrant-sending community, with an all women Coeduca, there was a sense of partnership between the Coeduca and the teachers. All Coeduca find the PRONADE payments completely insufficient to deal with the educational and nutritional needs of the children and they complain about the frequent delays in the payments. Textbooks are most of the time unavailable, insufficient or distributed with delay, and the financial capacity of parents is insufficient to compensate for the lack of schoolbooks or other educational resources.

The form of participation parents experience is very limited. They complained about the many norms and regulations of PRONADE. 'PRONADE requires... PRONADE expects... PRONADE demands...'. PRONADE imposes the norms and the

means, and the Coeducas are reduced to becoming the executors of top-down demands and regulations. One father explained:

They say and we carry out, we have to comply with the norms although this costs us a lot, we buy everything, we have to keep the bills, and travel to the offices to deliver everything well organised... and much more. (Personal communication with a Coeduca member)

There are no established channels to voice dissatisfaction and at the same time parents are cautious to be critical, as they fear that retaliation could lead to stop the financing and would leave their children without education. As one parent said, 'I prefer to remain silent, otherwise my children suffer' (personal communication with a Coeduca member). The so-called 'ownership' for the schools is considered a burden, and most of them express that they would prefer the Ministry to build, finance and provide for the school, and then their participation could be more supportive. In some communities with more than one PRONADE school, parents complained about the need to compete for the scarce resources for the construction and the maintenance of the school building.

PRONADE teachers face a difficult teaching environment, with infrastructure worse than in the public schools. PRONADE schools are located in the more isolated and poverty ridden communities and often consist of no more than one or a few multigrade classrooms in bad conditions. Toilets are either unavailable, in bad shape or lacking water. There are no playgrounds, and in such bad condition that children inhale lots of dust. The average age of the teachers is 25, with most of them having little experience while they teach the most difficult group, first generation learners.²⁰ Considering the demands of the PAs, their training is insufficient, focusing only on active methodologies and multigrade teaching without consistent training in Maya, intercultural and bilingual teaching.

PRONADE teachers have one-year contracts, very restricted social provisions and no formal pension.²¹ Many new indigenous teachers have entered the system and their salary is lower than the starting salary for regular teachers (mainly Ladino) and they lack any periodic increments. All contracts are provisional so teachers have no job security and they are not allowed to join the existing teacher unions. In general, teachers articulate a great degree of discontent and resentment about what they call demotivating working and labour conditions. All these factors lead to a great degree of volatility and turnover of teachers, which is three times higher than teachers in public schools (Gropello di 2006). All teachers interviewed expressed their ambition to become part of the public school system.

Due to the lack of textbooks it was sometimes not clear what the students were learning. Although many indigenous teachers have entered the PRONADE system, bilingual education was not a priority, and when they used a Maya language, it was merely as a communication language. Maya culture related to the local context and intercultural education was virtually absent. There was no school policy on these issues and teachers expressed a lack of knowledge about how to implement it. The majority of PRONADE schools visited showed good attendance by teachers but not much learning. Some of the schools visited gave the impression of being day-care centres.

The amount of money available for the daily snack is minimal, and in general, children only receive a glass of maize milk and a cookie, in spite of the fact that the

majority of children come to school without breakfast. More and better food could make a large difference for the educational participation and the learning capabilities of children. A UNICEF publication on the state of the children shows that the situation of malnutrition has not changed since the PAs. Undernourishment of the indigenous population is dramatic with 70%, as compared to the Ladino population with 36% (UNICEF 2007). Tragically, the report shows that the percentage of chronic malnutrition among the indigenous population has not changed over the last two decades.

This is even more appalling when considering that 70% of the PRONADE schools are concentrated in the poorest and mainly indigenous departments of the country. It concerns the same communities that have suffered repression, discrimination, poverty, violence and a historical lack of most social services. When the indigenous map, the map of massacres during the internal war (Steinberg et al. 2006) and the poverty map²² are superimposed it becomes clear that the PRONADE education has been developed precisely for those regions and people that have always been considered second class citizens throughout history.

This puts the PRONADE project in a different light. It does not comply with the educational demands of the PAs, and it only partially complies with the international prerequisites connected to the 'Education for All' goals and the MDGs. There are no structures of representation and no possibilities to articulate discontent, let alone to influence politics. It implements an obedient and technocratic form of participation, keeping parents busy while retaining them in a subordinate position. At the same time it does serve as a mechanism to control and mitigate social discontent through the provision of a minimum of education-like activity. This is probably best expressed by the text on the English home page the German KfW Development Bank, the other lender of the PRONADE programme:

By supporting the participation of discriminated groups in the formation of political will and taking their interests into consideration the KfW *seeks to defuse this conflict potential*. As illustrated by the primary education programme PRONADE in Guatemala... It promotes the democratisation process within the village communities because they are now responsible for the school education of their children. (KfW n.d.)

The text suggests that it is the poor indigenous people who might turn out as a conflict potential, whereas all the documentation on Guatemala has clearly stated that the Maya indigenous population were the main victims, not the instigators of violence.²³

Increasingly organised civil society sector and the teacher unions are putting the PRONADE scheme on the political agenda. While on the other side the government, MINEDUC, most private educational foundations and the World Bank has disregarded their criticism.²⁴

The educational situation one decade after the Peace Accords

To evaluate what has happened with the educational goals and objectives during the last decade, the major changes in the main three areas of the PAs will be analysed. These issues are the multicultural education reform, the recognition of the Maya cultures and languages as well as the support for their organisations, the expansion of educational opportunities with equality to overcome the indigenous, gender and rural/urban divide, and finally the issue of decentralisation and participation in decision-making.

The implementation of Maya, intercultural and bilingual education and the support for the Maya organisations

Within the signing of the AIRIP accord, commitments were made to engage in a participatory educational reform that would eradicate all forms of discrimination and would strengthen the cultural identity of the indigenous people, by the incorporation of Maya cultures within the curriculum, by promoting the indigenous languages, and by expanding intercultural bilingual education. The new educational policies should build on the existing initiatives like the Maya community schools, and it should solidify the supporting structures, like the National Council for Maya Education (CNEM) and create a national programme responsible for intercultural and bilingual Education (DIGEBI). The (parity) participation of indigenous people in decision-making processes at all levels should accompany this process. The accord also demands more opportunities that are professional for the indigenous people through the recruitment and training of bilingual teachers.

In this scenario for educational transformation, the practical experiences developed within the Maya schools should have a large role. These schools mushroomed at the end of the 1980s, and continued to develop with the help of many voluntary teachers, the support of communities, CSOs and different forms of international support. Most of them were community-based schools organised by, with and for the people of the community but also some PRONADE and bilingual public schools with innovative teachers were involved. In the beginning of 2000, around 126 Maya schools were in operation.²⁵ Their main aim was to create new opportunities for indigenous children to perform at the same level as other children, without sacrificing their language and cultural identity. This includes the introduction in the curriculum of Mayan languages and cultures, their daily way of life and their arts, as well as the revival of the ancient Mayan culture, and the introduction of the indigenous *cosmovision* as part of the curriculum. While at the same time, Spanish and the non-discriminatory parts of the national curriculum were taught. Hence, the Maya schools were considered the pioneers in educational innovation, constructing culturally sensitive educational practices from the bottom-up (Salazar and Grigsby 2004). Many of these studies served as background information or as curricular texts.²⁶ An endeavour supported by national CSOs like the CNEM²⁷ and international aid.²⁸

A decade after the PAs the situation of the Maya schools has become harder instead of easier; many Maya schools have disappeared or are becoming untenable due to financial problems. They suffer the consequences of the withdrawal of international aid and the continuing lack of government support. Moreover, most schools are located in very poor communities, and the continuing lack of funding for teacher salaries has undermined the initial enthusiasm and activism of teachers.

Besides supporting the Maya schools, the PAs also assign an important role to the 'National Council for Maya Education' as the coordinator of the multifarious initiatives. Founded in 1993, the CNEM participated in the commissions for educational reform, the COPARE and the CCRE, and they were vital for the organisation of four national congresses of Maya education between 1994 and 2007. However, they hardly ever saw their proposals translated in official policies. All interviewees of Maya organisations voice a great discontent with the educational developments up to now. After a decade of proposals, MINEDUC has only introduced some showcase applications of the Maya calendar and counting system in the curriculum. Hence in

actual practice all other forms of Maya or intercultural education are absent in public and PRONADE schools.²⁹

Currently the CNEM and other Maya educational CSOs have lost their initial impetus that flourished during the period of strong international funding and the high hopes based on the PAs. Currently they lack the professional staff to articulate and support the educational innovations from Maya schools.³⁰ Consequently their action radius and contacts with local educational organisations and schools has diminished. Looking back, international aid has been pivotal to support subaltern groups yet it has proven to be unreliable and short term, as the government did not take up the PA commitments to support and strengthen these organisations.³¹ The National Directorate for Bilingual Education (DIGEBI) was established in 1995 as a specialised department within the MINEDUC, and has developed a number of bilingual materials and in-service trainings for teachers until third grade. Although important, these initiatives have failed to reach most bilingual teachers and by the end of 2007 the subdivision is greatly under financed and seems to be on the verge of disappearance.

Maybe the major – although still dubious – advances in this area have been some legal agreements that were formalised during the period when Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil, a renowned Mayan scholar, was administrative vice-minister (2000–04). Like the 2003 Law on the National Languages, which establishes the role and status of the indigenous languages and cultures in the curriculum, and the governmental agreement on the generalisation of bilingual and multicultural education (2004). While another Accord 2 (2004) establishes a 10% incentive for bilingual teachers to promote bilingual education (Cojtí Cuxil 2007). Notwithstanding the legal approval of these agreements, bilingual training is still highly insufficient and bilingual education is used only sporadically in the first grades and there is still no incentive for bilingual teachers. This in spite of the situation that 43% of the children in indigenous areas are reported to speak one of the Mayan languages (McEwan and Trowbridge 2007).

In brief, the three governments that held power since the signing of the PAs have not complied with the requirement to introduce Maya cultures and to expand intercultural bilingual education, or with the obligation to support the different Maya initiatives. They have not created the political structures and opportunities, and the many initiatives in the field of education have been marginalised, or undermined by the PRONADE programme. With the lack of training and official support, any progress in this field remains dependent on individual decisions and abilities of the teacher; in all bilingual schools visited, teachers paid only scant attention to the Maya languages. Spanish remains the language of prestige and more often the only language of communication.

Some additional remarks should be made about the many international actors and their support for the development of Maya education. Notwithstanding the diverging agendas it is evident that the UN, as well as some bilateral and INGOs offered an important temporary support, opening up many spaces during the period of peace negotiations and some years after the signing of the PAs. External donors supported the different initiatives and strengthened the technical capacity of indigenous teachers and professionals. They helped to legitimise their proposals towards an unreceptive MINEDUC, yet the aid period was too short and most donors in the field of education withdrew from 2003 onwards, before achieving any structural changes. While the most important lending agency in education, the World Bank, has maintained a strong, continuous and very influential involvement in educational sector since 1968.³² A critical look should be taken at the dual position of donors, exemplified by German

aid that supported the PAs with a project for Mayan bilingual and intercultural education through the German Technical Assistance (GTZ) Pembi programme. While at the same time, the KfW Development Bank collaborated with the PRONADE programme that undermines the respect for the indigenous population through the offer of second-rate education.

The expansion of education and equality of opportunities

The PAs made a strong call to the government to comply with the Constitution of 1869 through the expansion of coverage especially for the indigenous communities, jointly with the improvement of the socio-economic living conditions. The ASEAAS accord states some more specific goals, the increase by 50% of public spending on education by the year 2000 and the increase of coverage to guarantee pre-primary, primary and the first level of secondary education for all children. Starting with three years of schooling as a minimum goal. It demands as well social justice, the elimination of inequality, discrimination and privileges, claiming equal educational opportunities and for mending the divide between the urban and the rural areas.

The share of public educational expenditures did increase around 50% from 1.6% in 1996 to 2.5% of GDP in 2000, however since then the budget remains at a low level of 2.7% of GDP in 2006. Guatemalan's primary net enrolment has substantially increased from 72% in 1996 to 89% in 2003, but full enrolment in primary education was not achieved in the post PA-decennium. The PRONADE schools account for nearly all the increase with 15.2% of the primary enrolment in 2003. At the same time access to secondary remains extremely low (34.7% at the first level and 20% at the second level) and 80% of these schools are private and mainly situated in the urban areas (United Nations 2008, 2009).

There are however no specific data on progress, repetition and dropout. Calculations of the MINEDUC assume a survival rate of 60% (70% of the boys and 61% for girls), showing an increase of 20% since 1994 (Segeplan 2007). Meaning that in the poor rural and indigenous areas much less than 50% of the children will reach fifth grade and that many school-aged children are out of school. At the same time the quality of education remains very low (UNESCO 2009). This is confirmed by the OREALC/UNESCO second regional study on the achievement of Latin American students, where Guatemala is among the lowest performers in the region, be it mathematics or reading and literacy in third or sixth grade (OREALC and UNESCO 2008). The illiteracy rates in the country still remain high.

Therefore, even if the PRONADE schools have increased attendance for rural/indigenous children,³³ this expanded access does not make up for the historical educational disadvantages of the rural and indigenous population. Increased access has not meant the same results or quality of education, nor has it opened up possibilities to reach equality of opportunities for the children of the poor. The differential schooling still remains sky-high as the 'poorest 40% of the population accounts for 3.5% of total school attendance, while the top 10% of the distribution accounts for 31%' (Porta and Laguna 2007). The indigenous people have an average of 2.5 years of schooling and the non-indigenous of 5.7 years (McEwan and Trowbridge 2007).

It is even more surprising that in these times of statistics and continual evaluations, there are no specific evaluations comparing the quality and outcomes of the PRONADE system with the public system.³⁴ Moreover, it is hard to find figures distinguishing the indigenous and non-indigenous students, despite the fact that the majority of

schools are highly segregated. An attempt to interpret the large achievement gap in Spanish (80%) and mathematics (50%) between indigenous and non-indigenous in rural schools ascribes 24–45% of the difference in performance to the ethnic difference between indigenous and non-indigenous, and 50–70% to the varying quality of schools that are attended by these different groups³⁵ (McEwan and Trowbridge 2007). Most probably this low indigenous achievement relates directly to the difference between the PRONADE and the public schools.

The above can lead to the conclusion that although the parallel PRONADE system contributes to the expansion of education, it does not comply with the challenge of improving the quality of education nor the equality of opportunities. It offers merely a *differential* educational system for a *different* population. The low-cost of the PRONADE system for the government, is compensated by the very high costs to the parents and teachers. The parents pay through the system of ‘voluntary’ labour and infrastructural investments, and teachers receive inferior salaries and less social benefits.³⁶ This influences not only the quality of education but also the day-to-day survival of families. The whole programme fails to provide an adequate answer to the educational necessities of the poor people, and it boils down to maintaining a large population in a situation of extreme poverty and with only access to a second-rate education, while privileging the better-off in society with a better and cheaper educational system.

Decentralisation and strong participation of civil society in decision-making

The AIRIP and the ASEAAS strongly focus on the need to decentralise and regionalise the educational system to overcome the (extreme) poverty, exclusion and discrimination as well as social and political marginalisation, and as a way to transform society and achieve social justice. They stress that the government should guarantee democratic participation of the educational community including the indigenous people and their organisations in all stages of policy-making and at all levels of society, be it at the local, regional or national level. Communities should also be able to participate and decide on their own priorities with regard to education. The concept of participation has a vast presence in both accords, coming up around fifty times, supported by the demand of training for participation.

Most of my interviewees defined the implemented form of decentralisation as ‘functional’ and ‘instrumental’, responding basically to the hierarchical delegation of tasks. Considering that it undermines the public educational system, it delegates tasks to private intermediaries, and it does not reflect the broad democratic and participatory spirit of the PAs.³⁷ The same has happened with participation. The differential use of both concepts leads to great conceptual ambiguity. In the PAs participation is conceived to enable historically discriminated people to have a voice and to gain political agency in their struggle for social justice and recognition. It has a strong political meaning as it calls for the creation of mechanisms and conditions for participation in decision-making at all levels, influencing the power relations and political structures. This is completely different from the way participation has been adopted and reconfigured by mainstream development policies. In the discourse of the powerful international organisations participation has become merely a technocratic and apolitical development recipe (Cornwall and Brock 2005).

The PRONADE system is an example where this technocratic form of decentralisation and participation was employed. The goals and targets were set by the

MINEDUC jointly with the World Bank, and it concentrates the 'power of definition' at the central level coinciding with the authoritarian and hierarchical traditions that are still overwhelmingly present in society. This top-down delegation makes parents active 'participants' of projects developed by others, constituting a controlled and obedient form of 'participation' directly to the lowest levels of society. Moreover, it forces poor people to compete for local funds with other similar groups of parents, resulting in further fragmentation within the communities and the undermining of the already fragile social fabric. Many parents participating in the Coeduca are very critical of this form of decentralisation, but there are no channels to voice their dissatisfaction and they remain unconnected to national educational organisations and to the educational debate. Being part of a generation with little or no education, they often lack relevant knowledge about education. However many parents expressed the need to learn more about education so they can support and have a real say in the education of their children. Acknowledging the need of training for participation as included in the PAs. However all parents found the responsibility to manage and administer the schools without any compensation abusive. More detrimental is that it builds on the tradition of forced 'voluntary' labour that has been part of the history of exploitation of the indigenous people. Parents expressed that they want the state to assume its responsibilities as with public schools, while opening-up possibilities for participation in support of the school and the education of their children. However, parents are very cautious to voice their criticism openly as they fear that retaliation could stop all the financing and this would leave their children without education.

Poor subaltern people are not 'empowered' through this type of delegation of services. These mechanisms turned out to be ways of taxing the poorest and while keeping them busy in a subordinate position and neutralises possible political opposition (Cornwall and Brock 2005). At the same time it is a mechanism to control and mitigate social discontent through the provision of a minimum of an education-like activity. Anderson calls this inauthentic participation which refers to disguising forms of legitimisation, control, competition and collusion, while authentic participation refers to strengthening the habits of direct democratic participation leading toward the achievement of greater learning outcomes and increased social justice for all participants (Anderson 1998)

When analysing other levels of participation, as the PA mandated COPARE and the CCRE commissions as well as the D&Cs, it becomes clear that all participatory developed proposals towards the implementation of new multicultural educational reform have been undermined by the MINEDUC, either directly or indirectly through the parallel PRONADE programme. According to many interviewees, the Ministry tolerated the participation of the PA commissions merely for symbolic purposes and for its legitimacy role towards society and international donors. The same goes for the inclusion of innovative practices of the Maya schools.

In this way decentralisation has been a top-down down process without real participation and in contradiction to the participatory spirit of PAs. Many scholars before have recognised that the vagueness of both concepts allows for easy manipulation depending on who proposes and implements them (Bray 1999; Carnoy 2000; Daun 2006). In this case, it has created a large space for the manoeuvring of the powerful elites in society in accordance with the World Bank, to reformulate the same concepts of the PAs to suit their own neoliberal policies and programmes. Ultimately, the idea of participation in the PAs aims at promoting forms of democracy, at local,

regional and national level, and to pursue social equality in a pluralist society. However in the Guatemalan post-PA period these forms have been ostracised. Substantiating the argument of Torres-Rivas that 'the non-compliance of the PAs is not because of the complexity of the demands, but is due to the fact that conservative governments have in their interior anti democratic forces that despise the principles of change' (Torres-Rivas 2006, 14).

Concluding remarks

It is easy to conclude that the three governments in power since the PAs have not implemented the broad educational agenda. The three main aspects of redistribution, recognition, and participation that should have played key roles in redressing the long history of discrimination, exclusion and authoritarian relationships have been marginalised and undermined. One decade after the signing of the accords the main educational achievement is the expansion of primary enrolment rates by 17% as a result of the PRONADE programme. Thanks to these figures, Guatemala seems to be on its way to comply with the enrolment figures and reach the MDGs in 2015. However this article argues that the reality behind these figures is profoundly disappointing. The educational results are gloomy as the survival rate remains very low, as less than 50% of the poor rural and indigenous population will reach fifth grade, and the quality of education is highly inadequate showing a large achievement gap between the poor rural indigenous population and the non-indigenous. The PRONADE programme did not only erect *different* schools for *different* populations, it is offering a *second-rate education* for people that have been considered *second-class citizens* throughout history. This will not help the majority of poor and indigenous children to improve their situation, while their parents are paying a high price for a sub-standard form of education. It is even more alarming as it concerns the same indigenous communities that have suffered repression, discrimination, poverty, violence and a historical lack of most social services. This is clearly demonstrated by the intersection of the indigenous map, the map of massacres, the poverty map and the regions where the PRONADE schools are located. Coinciding with the same areas where 70% of the indigenous children still suffer malnutrition, a rate that has not changed during the last two decades.

Besides the issue of redistribution, recognition remains one of the most desired aspirations of the indigenous and Maya organisations in their attempt to overcome the extended historical discrimination and the unjust treatment of the indigenous people. The Ministry of Education has neglected the AIRIP demands. The proposals for the multicultural educational reform outlined by the two official COPARE and CCRE commissions have been opposed and marginalised by the MINEDUC. A decade later the recognition and inclusion of the cultures and languages of the indigenous half of the population within the educational system remains a distant dream. The strong focus on the PRONADE programme has marginalised many civil society initiatives. Especially the Maya schools are on the verge of extinction due to the retreat of international donors and the lack of national financial support. Nevertheless most stakeholders still articulate their main objective 'to create new opportunities for indigenous children to perform equally without sacrificing their language and cultural identity through the introduction of Mayan languages and cultures'. The UNDP 2005 report on Guatemala recognises that there is still a long way to go as 'the great inequality in education has not been reduced and discrimination remains and racism is still

prevalent and deeply rooted in the attitudes and practices of common people and of public and private institutions' (PNUD and UNDP 1998).

The concepts of democratic decentralisation and participation at all levels are mentioned numerous times and they constitute a substantial part of the accords, being the result of the strong civil society participation at the end of the internal war period. However, the concepts of decentralisation and participation have been co-opted and transformed by the government in accordance with the dictates of the World Bank. This has turned the concepts of decentralisation and participation into rhetoric and become meaningless for the desired situation. Participation was meant to change authoritarian power relations and to ensure that the disenfranchised sectors of society would have a voice against traditional elites that have monopolised decision-making since colonial times. Thus far the opposite has happened; the PRONADE programme has given a privileged influence to the World Bank and their global educational policies. The outcome is a decentralised educational system managed entirely in a top-down way, and allowing only hierarchically controlled and obedient participation of parents. More directed at maintaining control and preventing social unrest than at giving parents a say in policies and politics. All popular and indigenous organisations expressed dissatisfaction with their current possibilities of democratic participation, and with the support for their organisations. Many organisations are still struggling, albeit with much less strength than a decade ago, and accumulating lots of discontent about their possibilities to influence educational decision-making.

Some small improvements should however be mentioned, like the increased indigenous presence in different areas of public life. Indigenous staff have entered the local and departmental educational system in the indigenous departments, nevertheless they lack real decision-making power as well as the budget. The same accounts for the teaching force, formerly made up mainly by Ladinos, today an increasing number of indigenous Maya teachers teach in the PRONADE schools. Their presence is however marked by second-class salaries, inferior working conditions and the prohibition of labour union organisation. They lack any regulated representation and the possibility to influence educational decision-making. However, this new generation of educated indigenous might be able to continue or renovate the struggle for the demands neglected until now.

In conclusion, most of the demands of the PAs still await realisation. Poor, subaltern and indigenous Guatemalans have been deprived of what was promised to them in the PAs, and what they fought for in the PA negotiations. They have not been able to cash in the promised funds; they are, apart from some superficial changes, pretty much in the same predicament as they were when the war ended. The PAs remain a distant dream, as neither the educational nor the material changes have created fairer opportunities, and the assurance that civil society would obtain a greater say in political affairs, has not been delivered. Three Guatemalan governments in conjunction with entities like the World Bank have manipulated the educational demands of the PAs, and have marginalised national commissions and alternative proposals. These outcomes pose fundamental questions about the viability of peace accords in a post-conflict society like the Guatemalan state with a long history of social and ethnic injustice and highly unequal power relations. Ten years have been insufficient for the newly organised civil society to deliver change after a long period of military dictatorship and authoritarian rule. CSOs were left pretty much alone as more progressive international donors only gave short-term support to educational CSOs and Maya schools and they left the country long before any structural changes were achieved.

The paper shows that a transformation of an educational system towards more social justice, not only needs broadly negotiated and accepted PAs but also the capacity, funds and the international support to counter the traditional forces within the Guatemalan government, powerful elites and the neoliberal educational policies of the World Bank.

Acknowledgements

This text has greatly benefited from the insightful comments from Mario Novelli, Ton Salman and Anke van Dam as well as from the anonymous reviewers. All of them offered helpful criticisms and good suggestions.

Notes

1. For further debates on the meanings of social justice in the field of education, see Gewirtz (1998), North (2006).
2. Guatemala has one of the world's most unequal land distributions: approx. 2% of the population owns 70% of the arable land (Saldivar Tanaka and Wittman 2003).
3. The definition of 'internal armed conflict' is used by the CEH (1999) considering that the state's repressive response was totally disproportionate to the military force of the guerrilla movement. Torres-Rivas, a Guatemalan sociologist, states that most of the victims were civilians who were murdered and 'disappeared' by a terrorist state. He terms it 'a war against civilians', rather than a civil war (2006, 3).
4. The UN verification mission of the Peace Agreements (MINUGUA) lasted 10 years, namely from 1994 to 31 December 2004.
5. A liberal conception of civil society was used. A broad spectrum of sectors were present in the ASC: the indigenous, the religious, trade unions, human rights, popular and women's organizations, NGOs, research centres, the business sector, political parties and the press. The powerful agricultural and industrial organization CACIF was invited but withdrew, as it had other ways to influence the process.
6. Like the message from the June 1995 meeting in Paris of the Consultative Group of Donor Countries (a group of US and European donor organisations).
7. The guerrilla being responsible for 3% of the violence and the rest is unknown.
8. The expenditures per student fell by 40% between 1980 and 1990. Data are from Acefia (1996) and Chinchilla (1996) cited in World Bank (1997c, 7).
9. Either through international and national NGOs, or by bilateral financed projects like the German-financed PEMBI/GTZ and the PROMEM/UNESCO project.
10. Showing the strength of the powerful elites to undermine the participatory process of the ASC.
11. Ranging from the MINEDUC, to teachers unions, indigenous organisations, the main universities, private schools, CACIF, the Episcopal Conference and the Evangelical Alliance.
12. Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo (PRONADE)
13. In May of that same period a package of constitutional reforms is turned down during the Popular Referendum, as a majority voted against pro-indigenous reforms. Jonas (2000) attributes this outcome largely to a last-minute, well-financed 'no' campaign launched by opponents that relied heavily on racist, anti-indigenous arguments.
14. With the participation of more than 330 municipal councils of education, as well as 22 departmental dialogues and two national sessions, the 'Dialogue' can be coined as broad and massive.
15. Centro de Investigaciones Economicas Nacionales (Center for National Economic Research).
16. The World Bank loan amounts to 30% and 70% of the total project costs are born by the MINEDUC.
17. Comité Educativo de Autogestion Educativa (Educational Commission for Self-managed Schools).
18. The textbooks should be provided directly by the Ministry.

19. With around Q 1.1 per child per day. This amount has decreased since 1996 and was only increased again during election time in 2007. (Quetzal exchange rate against the Euro was around 10 to 1 in June 2007).
20. These children have already a disadvantaged position for educational achievement, due to the poverty of community and educational level of their parents.
21. A limited form of health care was only introduced in 2006, like pregnancy leave for 2.5 months.
22. Guatemala, 2002 Extreme poverty map, by the poverty mapping project of CIESIN, Columbia University <http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/povmap/datasets/imageGallery/mapSearch.do>.
23. 83% of the victims during the period of violence were indigenous (CEH 1999).
24. Since the government of President Colom who took power in 2008, the situation of the PRONADE schools has been changed, but it is too early to evaluate this change.
25. In different publications they are called Local Units of Mayan Education (ULEM).
26. Dealing with issues of Maya culture, philosophy, languages, values, literature, mathematics and the calendar (PRODESSA 2008).
27. As well as other CSOs like CNPRE, CEDIM, Fundación Kaqchikel, PRODESSA Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago, Rigoberta Menchu Foundation.
28. E.g. PEMBI/GTZ German financed, PROMEM/UNESCO financed by the Netherlands development aid, as well as numerous INGOs. USAid has mainly supported bilingual education and scholarships for indigenous students.
29. Even though the 2006 national teacher training curriculum leaves some space for intercultural bilingual education for schools that define themselves as bilingual and intercultural (MINEDUC 2006a).
30. CNEM now has now only four professional staff members, next to the coordination committee.
31. Only one coordination organisation ACEM receives state financing of four euros per student per month for 30 secondary and diversified schools.
32. The World Bank has incessantly supported the authoritarian regimes, even in times of strong repression, human rights violations and when the assassinations of students and teachers took place.
33. In 2007 PRONADE operated 4677 schools with 450.000 children.
34. According to some of my interviewees the evaluation of the quality of the PRONADE system was suspended in 2002 by World Bank due to poor results. I only found one publication where the academic performances in different schools were compared and where the PRONADE scored significantly lower than official public schools (Landivar n.d.)
35. Based on the Guatemala's PRONERE (Programa Nacional de Evaluación del Rendimiento Escolar) survey (2001).
36. This is probably one of the factors why Romeo Tiú, director de la CODISRA (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), can declare that indigenous workers receive a salary of sometimes 50% lower in relation to non-indigenous, and the salaries of indigenous professionals is around 30% less than that of non-indigenous (El Mundo 2008).
37. The demand for regionalisation according to cultural and linguistic characteristics, has just been neglected by the three governments.

Notes on contributor

Margriet Poppema is senior lecturer in education and international development at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. She is a member of the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt) and of the IS-Academie on Quality of Education. Her areas of interest are educational reforms and the consequences for social justice and cultural pluralism. More specifically policies of decentralisation, school-based management, and issues related to multicultural and bilingual education.

References

- AIRIP. 1995. Agreement on identity and rights of indigenous peoples, signed 31 March 1995, UN ref. No. A/49/882-s/1995/256. <http://www.c-r.org/accord/guat/accord2/identity.shtml>.

- Anderson, G.L. 1998. Toward authentic participation: Deconstructing the discourses of participatory reforms in education. *American Educational Research Journal* 35, no. 4: 571–603.
- ASEAAS. 1996. Agreement on social and economic aspects and agrarian situation, 6 May 1996, UN ref. No. A/50/956. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/socio-economic-accord.php>.
- Asturias, L., K. Grigsby, and T. Oltheten. 2000. Mayan participation in educational reform in Guatemala: Changing the policy environment. *Prospects: quarterly review of education* 30, no. 4: 461–741.
- Borrell, V.G., C.D. Fuentes, E.E. Choy, and I. Rodas. eds. 1997. *Que sociedad queremos? Una mirada desde el movimiento y las organizaciones indígenas*. FLACSO, Guatemala.
- Bray, M. 1999. *Control of education: Issues and tensions in centralization and decentralization*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Bush, K.D., and D. Saltarelli. 2000. *The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: Towards a peace-building education for children*. Florence: UNICEF; Innocenti Research Centre.
- Cameros, D. 2006. Derecho a la educación: El precio que pagan las y los pobres. El modelo PRONADE en la educación rural de Guatemala: Colectivo de Educación para Todas y Todos – ActionAid Guatemala. <http://www.albedrio.org/htm/documentos/PRONADE1107.pdf>.
- Carnoy, M. 2000. Globalization and educational reform. In *Globalization and education: Integration and contestation across cultures*, ed. N. Monkman. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- CEH. 1999. Guatemala, memoria del silencio. In *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico*. <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish/>.
- CEH. 2000. *Guatemala: Causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno. De la comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico*. Ciudad de Guatemala: F&G Editores.
- Chase-Dunn, C.K., S. Jonas, and N. Amaro. eds. 2001. *Globalization on the ground: Postbellum Guatemalan democracy and development*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- CNPRE. 2006. *Retrato de la injusticia: El sistema educativo en una sociedad racista y discriminadora*. Guatemala: Comisión Nacional Permanente de Reforma Educativa, Guatemala.
- Cojtí Cuxil, D. 2002. Educational reform in Guatemala: Lessons from negotiations between indigenous civil society and the state. In *Multiculturalism in Latin America indigenous rights, diversity, and democracy*, ed. R. Sieder, p. 280. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cojtí Cuxil, D. 2007. Hacia un enfoque anticolonial y social de educación bilingüe e intercultural. In *Laberintos: Educación bilingüe e interculturalidad*, ed. Á. Aragón. Guatemala: FLACSO.
- COPARE. 1998. *Diseño de reforma educativa runukik jun káká tijonik*. Guatemala: Comisión Paritaria de Reforma Educativa (COPARE).
- Cornwall, A., and K. Brock. 2005. What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical look at ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘poverty reduction’. *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7: 1043–60.
- Daun, H. 2006. How does educational decentralization work and what has it achieved? In *School decentralization in the context of globalizing governance international comparisons of grassroots responses*, ed. H. Daun. Dordrecht: Springer/Kluwer.
- Dawson, F.G. 1965. Labor legislation and social integration in Guatemala: 1871–1944. *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 14, no. 1: 124–42.
- Doyle, K. n.d. Guatemala documentation project. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/latin_america/guatemala.html.
- Dupuy, K.E. 2008. Education in peace agreements, 1989–2005. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 26, no. 2: 149–66.
- El Mundo. 2008. El racismo y la discriminación cuestan a Guatemala 780 millones de dólares al año. <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/04/24/solidaridad/1209032357.html>.
- Fischer, E.F. 2001. *Cultural logics and global economies: Maya identity in thought and practice*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Fraser, N., and A. Honneth. 2003. *Redistribution to recognition? A political–philosophical exchange*. London: Verso.
- Fraser, N., A. Honneth, and J. Golb. 2003. *Redistribution or recognition? A political–philosophical exchange*. London: Verso.

- Gewirtz, S. 1998. Conceptualizing social justice in education: Mapping the territory. *Journal of Education Policy* 13, no. 4: 469–84.
- Gropello Di, E. 2006. *A comparative analysis of school-based management in Central America*. World Bank Working Paper no. 72. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDIA/4371432-1194542398355/21543243/ComparativeAnalysisofSchoolBasedManagementinCentralAmerica.pdf>.
- Hale, C.R. 2002. Does multiculturalism menace? Governance, cultural rights and the politics of identity in Guatemala. *Journal of Latin American studies* 34, no. 3: 485–524.
- Jonas, S. 1996. Dangerous liaisons: The US in Guatemala. *Foreign Policy Summer*, no. 103: 144–60.
- Jonas, S. 2000. *Of centaurs and doves: Guatemala's peace process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- KfW. Entwicklungsbank. http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/EN_Home/Topics/Reconstruction/Aidingdisc.jsp.
- Krznaric, R. 1999. Civil and uncivil actors in the Guatemalan peace process. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18, no. 1: 1–16.
- Landívar, U.R. n.d. Landívar, U.R. n.d. *Análisis de experiencias educativas exitosas generadas en las escuelas Guatemaltecas*. Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar, Facultad De Humanidades and Educación, Ciudad de Guatemala.
- Lovell, W.G. 2000. *A beauty that hurts: Life and death in Guatemala*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Marques, J., and I. Bannon. 2003. Central America: Education reform in a post-conflict setting, opportunities and challenges. In *CPR working papers*. Social Development Department, World Bank.
- McCleary, R.M. 1999. *Dictating democracy Guatemala and the end of violent revolution*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- McEwan, P.J., and M. Trowbridge. 2007. The achievement of indigenous students in Guatemalan primary schools. *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 1: 61–76.
- MINEDUC. 2006. *Curriculo nacional base de la formación inicial de docentes del nivel primario*. Ministerio de Educación – La Dirección de Calidad y Desarrollo Educativo – DICADE. http://www.mineduc.edu.gt/recursos/index.php?title=Curriculum_Nacional_Base.
- MINUGUA. 2001. The indigenous peoples of Guatemala: Overcoming discrimination in the framework of the peace agreements. Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala. http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/french/prev_dip/americas_europe/guatemala/reports/informe_indigena.pdf.
- North, C.E. 2006. More than words? Delving into the substantive meaning(s) of “social justice”. *Education Review of Educational Research* 76, no. 4: 507–35.
- Novelli, M., and M.T.A.L. Cardozo. 2008. Conflict, education and the global south: New critical directions. *International Journal of Educational Development* 28: 473–88.
- OREALC, and UNESCO. 2008. Segundo Estudio Regional Comparativo y Explicativo (SERCE). Los Aprendizajes de los Estudiantes de America Latina y el Caribe, 210. Santiago, Chile. <http://lece.unesco.cl/esp/publicaciones/impresas/12.act>.
- Palma-Murga, G. 1997. Promised the earth: Agrarian reform in the socio-economic agreement. Negotiating rights: The Guatemalan peace process. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/contents.php>.
- PAs. 1996. Agreement on a firm and lasting peace, signed 29 December 1996, UN ref. No. A/51/796-s/1997/114, annex ii. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/firm-lasting-peace.php>.
- Paulson, J., and J. Rappleye. 2007. Education and conflict: Essay review. *International Journal of Educational Development* 27: 340–7.
- PDH. 2006. Bases estratégicas del congreso nacional de educación. Desde una visión de reforma a la educación desde los acuerdos de paz y del derecho humano a la educación (2006), ed. Guatemala, PDH - Sectores Educativos – Sectores Sociales., Procurador de los Derechos Humanos de Guatemala. <http://www.pdh.org.gt/html/apartados/congresoeduc/index.html>.
- PNUD, and UNDP. 1998. *Guatemala: Los contrastes del desarrollo humano Guatemala*. Guatemala: Sistema de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala.

- Porta, E., and J.R. Laguna. 2007. Guatemala country case study 2007. Country profile prepared for the Education for All global monitoring report 2008. Education for all by 2015: Will we make it? <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001555/155575e.pdf>.
- PRODESSA. 2008. Documentos generales sobre educación bilingüe intercultural, reforma educativa, cultura Maya. <http://www.proyectodialogo.org/ebi-2008/index.html>
- REMHI. 1999. *Guatemala never again! Recovery of historical memory project. The official report of the Human Rights Office. Archdiocese of Guatemala*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books
- Rettberg, A. 2007. The private sector and peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39: 463–94.
- Robinson, W.I. 2000. Neoliberalism, the global elite, and the Guatemalan transition: A critical macrosocial analysis. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 4: 89–107.
- Rose, P., and M. Greeley. 2006. Education in fragile states: Capturing lessons and identifying good practice. Prepared for the DAC Fragile States Group. <http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectid=FA0B89B3-5056-8171-7B0ACC03D79C45B4>.
- Salazar Tetzagüic, M., and K. Grigsby. 2004. Curriculum change and social cohesion in multicultural Guatemala. In *Conflict and Social Cohesion*, eds. S. Tawil and A. Harley, 85–158. Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education.
- Saldivar Tanaka, L., and H. Wittman. 2003. The agrarian question in Guatemala. In *Country background paper, 2002: Land Research Action Network (LRAN)*. <http://www.acciontierra.org/display.php?article=54>.
- Segeplan. 2007. Lograr la educación primaria universal: Una tarea posible y necesaria In *Informes de Metas del Milenio: Gobierno de Guatemala Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia*. http://www.segeplan.gob.gt/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=41&func=select&id=53.
- Sieder, R. 2002b. *Multiculturalism in Latin America indigenous rights, diversity and democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sieder, R., M. Thomas, G. Vickers, and J. Spence. 2002. Who governs? Guatemala five years after the peace accords. Hemisphere initiatives. <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/whogoverns.pdf>.
- Smith, A. 2005. Education in the twenty-first century: Conflict, reconstruction and reconciliation. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 35, no. 4: 373–91.
- Stanley, W., and D. Holiday. 2002. Broad participation, diffuse responsibility: Peace implementation in Guatemala. In *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*, ed. S.J. Stedman, and E.M. Cousens. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Steinberg, M.K., C. Height, R. Mosher, and M. Bampton. 2006. Mapping massacres: Gis and state terror in Guatemala. *Geoforum* 37: 62–8.
- Tomasevski, K. 2004. *Manual on rights-based education: Global human rights requirements made simple*. Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education, UNESCO: Bangkok. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001351/135168e.pdf>.
- Torres-Rivas, E. 2006. Guatemala: Desarrollo, democracia y los acuerdos de paz. *Revista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales*. <http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2658175>.
- UNESCO. 2009. Overcoming inequality: why governance matters. In *Education for All; EFA global monitoring report*. Geneva: UNESCO.
- UNICEF. 2007. La niñez guatemalteca en cifras. Compendio estadístico sobre las niñas, niños y adolescentes guatemaltecos. Guatemala: PNUD, INDH y UNICEF. <http://www.desarrollohumano.org.gt/contenido.php?id=2007:La-ninez-guatemalteca-en-cifras> (accessed August 17, 2008)
- United Nations. 2008. Relator especial sobre el derecho a la educación culmina su visita a Guatemala. Press release. [http://www.oacnudh.org.gt/documentos/comunicados/20093181818310.ComunicadoRelatorEducacion\(28jul08\)final.pdf](http://www.oacnudh.org.gt/documentos/comunicados/20093181818310.ComunicadoRelatorEducacion(28jul08)final.pdf).
- United Nations. 2009. Promoción y protección de todos los derechos humanos, civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, incluido el derecho al desarrollo. Informe del relator especial sobre el derecho a la educación, sr. Vernor Muñoz. Misión a Guatemala (20 a 28 de julio de 2008). <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/130/11/PDF/G0913011.pdf?OpenElement>.

- World Bank. 1983. Staff appraisal report. Guatemala of a basic education project 4386b-GU. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/11/000178830_98101901021951/Rendered/INDEX/multi_page.txt.
- World Bank. 1997a. Guatemala-basic education III. Report no. PIC703. <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=51351038&piPK=51351152&theSitePK=40941&projid=P007223>.
- World Bank. 1997b. Staff appraisal report. Guatemala on a proposed loan of US\$33.0 million to Guatemala for a basic education project. April 30, 1997, no. 16534 GU. <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=51351038&piPK=51351152&theSitePK=40941&projid=P007223>.
- World Bank. 1997c. Guatemala Investing for Peace: A public investment review. No. 16392-CU. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/1997/07/15/000009265_3971104184245/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
- World Bank. 2005. Decentralizing education in Guatemala: School management by local communities. In *Education notes*. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/07/06/000011823_20050706164048/Rendered/PDF/328590GU0EduNotes01public1.pdf.