King Kong in China

The first of these narratives regards stories related to online protest, which at times triggers offline protests. For example, the protest in the summer of 2007 against the building of a chemical factory in Xiamen was generally perceived as a consequence of protest postings by blogger Zuola. The second story is related to issues of censorship and digital human rights.

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Citizen voices?

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American White House, he explains: ‘Those .gov and .mil sites are always our targets. For the White House site, we have spent most of our time to find the loopholes.’ The attention they get is much to the dismay of hackers like Goodwell, a Beijing-based hacker who looks down upon ‘scriptkiddies’ like Sharpwinner who simply copy codes to hack other sites. ‘I think [the hacking war between China and] Japan and the US is] just a awkward and boring. The real hackers have no sense of boundaries, they have nothing to do with politics, politics should never infect technology.’ To Goodwell and his friends, the spirit of hacking revolves around curiosity: ‘As a hacker, I think you should never give up, you should always study on, whether you fail or succeed, so as to develop new technologies.’ While relentless curiosity should be a driving force that binds hacking cultures, China, in the view of Goodwell, is a bad place for hackers: ‘In America, hackers may have their own culture and ideology, in China people have no sense of hacking culture and ideology. In China, you first need to secure your income. (…) Chinese have no sense of cooperation, no team spirit, if they developed a certain program or system, they may share it. Following Sharpwinner and Goodwell, it seems that the grey hacking zone in China is criss-crossed with fault lines of [apolitical longings as well as] (un)willingness to share and cooperate. The lack of shared cultural practices makes it, indeed, difficult to speak of a hacker culture in China, a stark contrast to my research experience in New York among the hacker communities there, where sharing (manifest, among others, in their meeting places, conferences and gatherings) was largely the norm.

King Kong reconsidered

What, then, can we learn from these observations on bloggers and hackers? Let me return to the King Kong syndrome, which combines a monster to be feared and brought to the civilized world. What we eventually witness, at least in King Kong films, is buildings crumbled, windows smashed to pieces, and the order of the day radically disrupted before the primitive monster ends up being killed by modern weaponry. I will therefore make two appeals from this brief account of Internet in China. First, such chaos and fragmentation that King Kong brings with it is precisely what we need to acknowledge and accept when we try to make sense of China and its Internet.

References

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Kloet reveals the two interlocking narratives which continue to preoccupy Western academic and popular discourse on the Internet in China.