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**Publication date**

2010

**Document Version**

Final published version

[Link to publication](#)

**Citation for published version (APA):**

Uitermark, J. L. (2010). *Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

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Integration politics in the Netherlands has changed dramatically between 1990 and 2005. Whereas ethnic and religious differences were hitherto pacified through accommodation, a new and increasingly powerful current in Dutch politics problematized the presence of minorities. Celebrity politicians like Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Pim Fortuyn disrupted the pragmatic political culture that had traditionally characterized the Netherlands and argued for confrontation rather than consensus. Culturalism – a discourse organized around the idea that our (enlightened, liberal, Dutch) culture should be defended against (ethnic and Islamic) minority cultures – grew into a powerful force. This development represents a challenge to sociologists and political scientists: how to map and explain drastic changes? Arguing that extant approaches are better at explaining continuity than change, this dissertation develops a distinct approach to the study of dynamic power relations through a dialogue with various social theorists, including Jeffrey Alexander, Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias. An empirical analysis of opinion articles in broadsheet newspapers shows how a relatively small number of culturalists managed to dominate the debate on integration. At a local level, Culturalism interacted with other discourses and inherited institutions in surprising ways. In the city of Rotterdam, dominated by culturalists, minority associations retained their autonomy. In Amsterdam, where culturalists were virtually absent, minority associations were either marginalized or instrumentalized. Accounting for these unexpected results, the dissertation not only sheds new light on minority politics in the Netherlands but also provides a theoretical contribution to the study of changing power relations.

Dynamics of Power in Dutch Integration Politics

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Justus Uitermark

Justus Uitermark

# **DYNAMICS OF POWER IN DUTCH INTEGRATION POLITICS**

## **ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT**

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor  
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam  
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus  
prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom  
ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties  
ingestelde commissie,  
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel der Universiteit  
op donderdag 23 september 2010, te 12:00 uur

door

**Justus Leander Uitermark**

geboren te Amsterdam

**Promotiecommissie:**

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**Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragwetenschappen**

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## Acknowledgements

First of all, and most of all, I want to thank my *promotores*, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Maarten Hajer. Their intellectual influence on my work will become apparent on the following pages but I also want to thank them for their support and encouragement in times of doubt and confusion.

The Amsterdam School for Social Sciences at the University of Amsterdam financed this research and offered a stimulating and exciting working environment – the PhD students, the faculty, the management: everything was perfect (but not in a sterile or over-organized sort of way). I started writing this manuscript during a fellowship at the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University. I want to thank Ron Eyerman and Phil Gorski for hosting me and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for providing a travel grant. The manuscript was completed while I was starting a new job at the Sociology department of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Godfried Engbersen gave me all the time I needed to complete the manuscript; I wish to thank him for his patience and trust. I also want to thank my new colleagues for their warm welcome at the department.

In various settings and at different stages, I received helpful comments and criticisms on ideas or draft texts from Miriyam Aouragh, Ward Berenschot, Christian Broër, Peter Cohen, Bram de Swaan, Mustafa Emirbayer, Ron Eyerman, Nancy Foner, Marcel Ham, Silke Heumann, Maarten Loopmans, Marcel Maussen, Walter Nicholls, Katharina Paul, Kateryna Pishchikova, Willem Schinkel, Christian Scholl and Imrat Verhoeven. Takeo David Hymans helped me in the last stages of the process with correcting and editing the manuscript.

A number of people helped me with gathering, processing and analyzing the data presented in Parts II and III of this study. First of all, I need to mention my respondents. This study is based in part on 120 interviews with participants in integration politics. I promised them that I would protect their anonymity as much as possible, which is why I do not mention their (real) names. The data on discursive struggles in Part II were processed with the help of several student assistants, including Tito Bachmeyer, Aicha Fadel, Frank Heuts, Josip Kesic, Lester van der Pluijm and Wendy Wittenberg. Vincent Traag of the University of Louvain and Jeroen Bruggeman of the University of Amsterdam provided invaluable help in processing the network data and developing the network measures. The chapters on Amsterdam in Part III build upon and extend certain arguments that were first developed in a joint research project

with Ugo Rossi and Henk van Houtum. Part III also uses data on subsidy relationships that Frank van Steenberghe gathered as part of his research assistantship and master's thesis.

I wish to thank these colleagues and friends for helping me in so many different ways. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to work with – and learn from – you. I of course take full responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation that remain.

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and to our weekly dinner meetings. Our get-togethers did not just give me a pleasant break from work but also taught me valuable lessons on love, empathy and the art of conviviality.

I have so often told my love, my friends and my family that I could not spend time with them because I had to work on this project. I will be happy to thank them in person for their forbearance and support at a nice post-doctoral party.

# **PART I**



# 1. Introduction: integration politics and the enigma of power

Movements for cultural protectionism have proliferated in recent years throughout Europe and many other parts of the world. The idea that immigration and multiculturalism are the natural and inevitable side-effects of globalization has been discredited. The arrival of poor migrants is no longer seen as the logical consequence of an internationalizing labor market, but as an invasion of aliens. Multiculturalism is no longer seen as the epitome of liberal democracy, but as an ideology that undermines society's ability to respond to the reprehensible ideas and practices of minorities. Parties on the left reluctantly accede that immigration causes problems, while right-wing parties adamantly argue that liberal democracies have been too soft, too accommodating, too understanding. I refer to these notions as *Culturalism*, a discourse organized around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and that our enlightened, liberal culture should be defended against the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideologies.

The Netherlands is often considered an exemplary case of a country where multiculturalism has been abandoned in favor of policies that demand and enforce integration. In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the right-wing Liberals, argued that the culture of the West was very different from – and vastly superior to – Islam. He claimed that the integration of minorities had failed and that this was due to the too-accommodating stance of multiculturalists and welfare workers. Since Bolkestein made his intervention in 1991, discursive assaults against multiculturalism, Islam, welfare workers, and the left have proliferated. After Frits Bolkestein came Paul Scheffer, after Paul Scheffer came Pim Fortuyn, after Pim Fortuyn came Ayaan Hirsi Ali and after Ayaan Hirsi Ali came Geert Wilders. What matters now is not the background of these individuals or the particulars of their ideas (we will come to that) but the fact that they were, without exception, culturalists. It is therefore not surprising that Baukje Prins argued in 2004 that “Bolkestein’s plea against taboos, for the defense of Western values and for the necessity of tough measures ... has achieved a definite victory” (Prins, 2004, p. 13). Many other observers have come to the same conclusion, even if they have not used the same terms. Ellie Vasta (2007) speaks of a transformation of the “minorities policy” into a “majority policy”; Han Entzinger (2003) chronicles the “fall of multiculturalism.” Willem Schinkel (2008) argues that a discourse that he refers to as “culturism” has been dominant since the 1990s. Han Entzinger (2003) discusses the “fall of multiculturalism” and Peter Scholten (2007) speaks of the “rise of assimilationism.” These

scholarly observations echo journalistic accounts which portray the Netherlands as a country that has moved from tolerance to intolerance or, if they tended more towards Culturalism, from naïveté towards realism.

The question that immediately impresses itself upon the analyst of integration politics is: *why*? Why did Culturalism come to dominate in a country that was so accommodating of minorities? This question concerns me here as well, though I will have reason to rephrase it. But before answering or even rephrasing the question, we need to attend to a claim that usually appears so trivial that it remains unexamined. When commentators claim that Culturalism (or any other discourse, ideology or sentiment) “dominates,” they rarely, if ever, elaborate on what this domination entails. I would like to problematize this very idea of Culturalism’s dominance in the Netherlands – not to deny Culturalism’s strength, but to better probe the manifestations and limitations of its power. What, exactly, is a discourse? What do we mean when we say that a discourse is “strong” or “dominant”? How do we measure the growth or decline in the power of a discourse? And how to explain such dynamics of power? These questions have relevance far beyond the case of integration politics in the Netherlands as they touch upon problems that have plagued (and inspired) social science from its inception, such as the interplay of the material and symbolic dimensions of politics and the causes of social change. Because of its volatility and dynamism, Dutch integration politics provides an interesting and challenging case to think through some of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological questions that emerge when we want to better understand the dynamics of power.

Since policy concerns motivate much of the research on integration, it is perhaps helpful if I indicate straight away that my goal is *not* to develop a view on integration or to propose measures to promote it. Neither is my goal to criticize Culturalism or any other discourse. If we want to understand why a discourse generates support, the last thing we want to do is to qualify or correct the arguments of its proponents. However frustrating it may be for analysts to postpone judgment, the key to explaining why actors promote certain discourses is to understand why they do so, not why they should not. This also implies that we should not analyze discourses as emerging from uncivil motives, as antagonists in integration politics routinely do when they posit that their opponents support a certain position because they are prejudiced, naive, scared, ignorant, racist, opportunistic and so on. My goal is not to take sides but to understand how actors take sides and to explain why they win or lose.

But how, then, to explain the emergence of Culturalism or, for that matter, other developments in integration politics? Conventional approaches, I argue in the next chapter,

have difficulties answering this question because they assume continuity rather than change, domination rather than contention. Although I draw heavily on Pierre Bourdieu, his work, too, sometimes lapses into an absolutist and static understanding of power relations. His notion of symbolic power, for instance, is defined in such a way that it refers only to power relations that are accepted by the dominant as well as the dominated. The major benefit of such a conceptualization is that it enables the researcher to identify one – crucial, foundational, essential – logic of power. But especially when we consider a case as dynamic and contentious as Dutch integration politics, we should start from the assumption that there is no single logic governing conflict. It is exactly the struggle *between* different ideas and notions – articulated through integration discourses and embodied by antagonists – which this study examines.

The purpose of this study is therefore to foreground the *politics* of integration and to develop an approach that captures the contentious *dynamics* of struggles over religion and culture. Politics is, as Harold Lasswell famously said, about “who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell, 1936). But it is also about how people see and how they are seen. Interpretative scholars have shown that politics does not consist exclusively of the ordering and processing of endogenous preferences, but is also about the interpretation of reality, the demarcation of symbolic boundaries and the mobilization of sentiments. While politics has never been entirely instrumental, it has become more ostentatiously symbolic now that the media communicate images and sounds with increasing intensity and velocity (Hajer, 2009). The media, in turn, is not a unified apparatus but a complex constellation of stages, producers and publics. The questions that Lasswell associated with the political sciences are now inextricably interwoven with the questions he associated with communication – “who says what, to whom, in what channel, and with what effect?” (Lasswell, 1948, p. 37).

Precisely for these reasons, a political science or political sociology of integration cannot do without discourse analysis. Discourse analysis shows how classifications, categorizations and labels serve to maintain or transform power relations, how settings of communication influence interactions and how the meaning of events becomes subject to discursive struggle. Discourse analysis has advanced political science and political sociology by opening up to investigation the ways in which actors negotiate their understandings, not just their interests. I feel, however, that its practitioners have too often presented discourse analysis as an *alternative* to more traditional approaches that aim to uncover objective relations. Whereas the systematic, quantitative analyses of traditional researchers are systematically blind to the meaning and drama of politics, discourse analysis, with some

notable exceptions, has focused on the interpretation of images, performances and texts. To avoid the easy but lethal criticism that discourse analysis presents “just another take” on reality, it is necessary to ground interpretative analysis in an approach that acknowledges and identifies the objective relations that structure subjective interpretations. This study therefore incorporates the analysis of social inequalities and institutional structures into discourse analysis. To understand why discourses originate and why they prevail, we need to systematically research the figurations in which they are mobilized and through which they accrue meaning. This implies that we should not study Culturalism as a singular discursive order that engulfs the totality of society but rather as a force that emerges from, and transforms, political fault lines. To understand its rise to power and to appreciate the ambivalences and limitations of that power, we need to develop a relational perspective and probe the interactions between (actors promoting) this discourse and (actors promoting) other discourses. The central question that this dissertation thus seeks to answer is: *How and why did power relations transform in Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006?*<sup>1</sup>

The plan of the current study is to first elaborate, in Chapter 2, my approach for answering this central question. The question is then divided into two parts. Part II focuses on the integration *debate* and analyzes opinion articles on integration that were published in three broadsheet newspapers. Part III investigates the *governance* of integration and focuses specifically on the relations between the government and minority associations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Part IV draws together the main findings, provides answers to the research question and explores the study’s relevance beyond Dutch integration politics.

## 2. The struggle for civil power

This chapter presents the main concepts used throughout this study while leaving issues of operationalization and measurement for the introductory chapters of Parts II and III. The main challenge here is to develop conceptual lenses that allow us to ask empirical questions about the dynamics of power in integration politics. The chapter begins with a discussion of Jeffrey Alexander's work on the civil sphere and how it can be used to study integration politics. It then posits Bourdieu's field analysis as a fruitful avenue for examining power relations in the civil sphere. I subsequently argue that discourse analysis and network analysis can increase the explanatory leverage of field analysis. The result is an approach that provides a relational understanding of civil power, enabling us to examine transformations of power relations in a variety of different settings. Towards the end of the chapter, I argue that other approaches to the study of integration politics – while providing insight into power relations – do not sufficiently account for its dynamism. Finally, I indicate how this study's research question will be answered.

### **Integration: a national fascination**

After it became clear that labor and post-colonial migrants were here to stay, West European countries developed comprehensive institutional practices and discursive frameworks to determine if and how these outsiders would be recognized as citizens. The response to the presence of migrants reflected each country's conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. In the United Kingdom, migrants were classified mainly in terms of "race." In France, they were labeled as "citizens" in the tradition of the Republic. Migrants in Germany were excluded from citizenship as a result of the ethnic understanding institutionalized in its citizenship regime, while in the Netherlands ethnic diversity was accommodated according to the indigenous logic of "pillarization" (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2001; Joppke, 1996; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005).<sup>2</sup>

While national idiosyncrasies endure, there seems to be a convergence in citizenship regimes across Western Europe. Most national governments now explicitly aim to reduce the immigration of low-skilled (family) migrants and have developed comprehensive programs to turn those who do immigrate into self-sufficient and autonomous citizens (Joppke, 2007). The desired outcome is individual and societal *integration*. As Adrian Favell puts it, "integration"

... is about imagining the national institutional forms and structures that can unify a diverse population; hence imagining what the state can actively do to “nationalize” newcomers and re-constitute the nation-state under conditions of growing cultural diversity. ... [The] endurance of “integration” as the goal of most *practical* policy thought on the question in Europe – including amongst the leading independent academic authorities – gives us a clue to the vested interests and applied imperatives of the ... nation-state building paradigm: the more-or-less coercive absorption of minority populations and regions through centralizing processes of modernization (2003, p. 18, 19, original emphasis).

Joppke is quite right when he suggests that talk of ‘national models’ smells of yesteryear (Joppke, 2004, p. 452). Left and right-leaning parties now also seem to agree on the basic ingredients of successful integration policy: the immigration of poor migrants must be curtailed, discrimination should be combated, and a set of incentives and disincentives put in place to induce migrants to enter society (Joppke, 2007).

This international convergence and cross-party consensus on the necessity of integration does not, however, preclude contention. While there is certainly convergence between countries and parties when it comes to integration *policies*, integration *politics* has grown more contentious. To understand this paradox, we need to realize that integration is now about *civil* integration. In the Netherlands, policies targeting minorities have existed since the 1970s. But it is only since the 1990s that they have focused on integration, explicitly aiming to turn ethnics into citizens and to unify a society threatened by disintegration. Migrants are not only expected to operate within existing institutional structures; they have become objects – and to some extent subjects – within ongoing struggles over what binds society together. Integration politics has burst out of its specific policy domain and entered into what Jeffrey Alexander (2006) refers to as the civil sphere: those institutions and communicative channels where actors negotiate the conditions and nature of civil belonging. The assassinations of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn and the film maker Theo van Gogh (see Chapter 5) are just two of the most extreme examples of a constant stream of mediatized incidents somehow associated with the presence of migrants and especially Muslims. Newspapers and television programs constantly cover integration issues and the struggle to define what incidents and events mean: what does an assassination mean for the integration of Muslims, how should we interpret high crime rates among migrants, what do we think of the

fears among natives, what can or should the government ask of migrants regarding their adaptation or assimilation? The answers to these questions define and redefine civil solidarities, determining who is in and who is out.

### **Discursive struggles in the civil sphere**

Jeffrey Alexander's conceptualization of the civil sphere – comprised of institutions and communicative channels that “generate the capacity for social criticism and democratic integration” (Alexander, 2006, p. 4) – allows analysis of struggles over inclusion and exclusion. “Such a sphere,” Alexander posits, “relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience, because of our putative commitment to a common secular faith” (*ibid.*). As with any faith, however, sacredness implies the existence of profanity. The civil sphere is akin to religion in that it has institutions and rituals through which some actions, motives or relations are rendered pure, and others polluted. Alexander identifies a distinctive symbolic code of the civil sphere that

supplies the structured categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential member, of civil society is made to fit. ... Members of national communities firmly believe that “the world,” and this notably includes their own nation, is filled with people who either do not deserve freedom and communal support or are not capable of sustaining them... they do not wish to include them, protect them, or offer them rights, for they conceive them as being unworthy and amoral, as in some sense “uncivilized” (2006, p. 55).

Much has been written about the procedures through which nations define and defend their formal membership.<sup>3</sup> But here my concern is with *integration* politics, i.e. with the struggles through which differences and inequalities are constructed between individuals and groups that share the same nationality, namely the Dutch one. More specifically, I want to examine how some identities and acts are construed as civil, while others are not. As Alexander argues, civil politics is

a discursive struggle. It is about the distribution of leader and followers, groups and institutions, not only in terms of material hierarchies but across highly structured symbolic sets. Power conflicts are not simply about who gets what and how much. They

are about who will be what, and for how long. Representation is critical. In the interplay between communicative institutions and their public audiences, will a group be represented in terms of one set of symbolic categories rather than another? This is the critical question.

The meanings ascribed through discourses are by no means neutral: they not only define certain identities and problems but also ascribe *civil value* to some identities, actions or behaviors while degrading others. Civil discourses define who belongs to a *civil community*. A civil community is analytically and empirically distinct from a national community. While people with passports and full citizenship rights are formally full members, many are regarded as being outside society – which is why they have to be contained (prisoners) or integrated (migrants, the unemployed) (see also Schinkel, 2007). Integration discourses stipulate how the civil community will be protected and who or what will be sanctified or sacrificed in the process. Integration discourses also suggest ways to design state institutions so that they better sanction civil identities and practices. Through laws, regulations and material support, the ideas and notions that compose integration discourses can be inscribed into the state. Researching civil politics as a process of continuous discursive struggle means studying how actors categorize one another and why they succeed or fail to impose their definition of the situation.

#### *The limitations of Alexander's strong program*

While this study employs many of Jeffrey Alexander's concepts to analyze integration politics, it does not adopt his explanatory strategy. Alexander's analysis in *The Civil Sphere* (2006) is emblematic of his "strong program" in cultural sociology developed over recent years with several colleagues at Yale University. The type of cultural sociology Alexander advocates requires, first, that other, "non-symbolic social relations" are "bracketed out" in order to reconstruct "the culture structure as a social text" (Alexander & Smith, 2001, n.p.). The analyst then examines the impact of "culture structures" on social practices by anchoring "causality in proximate actors and agencies" (*ibid.*). In his analysis of the civil sphere, this means that Alexander identifies some types of actors as agents of civil repair. Through metaphors and performances, social movements and other actors can entice "core groups," i.e. historically dominant groups, to view previously stigmatized groups as full members of the civil community. Even though Alexander acknowledges that the drive for exclusion is as foundational for the construction of the civil sphere as the drive for inclusion, he designates

only progressive movements as “civil.” But as several reviewers of Alexander’s work have pointed out, nativist movements of the past as well as the contemporary new right articulate their demands in a civil vocabulary (e.g. Wolve, 2007; Hurenkamp, 2009). Alan Wolve provides a counter-example to Alexander’s example of feminism as a movement for civil repair:

Pro-life activists claim that the rights of the fetus are equal to the rights of the mother and that someone needs to protect the future autonomy of a living creature lacking decision-making capacity now. These claims may be right or they may be wrong. But such claims cannot be judged by consigning those who disagree with the goals of feminists or egalitarians to the dreaded precincts of backlash movements (Wolve, 2007, n.p.).

Much the same is true for movements that mobilize against Muslims and other minorities. While Alexander would undoubtedly consider them “backlash movements”, this is not how they view and present themselves. Chapter 5 shows, for instance, that culturalists employ a symbolically rich discourse in which they frame their own interventions as a force for reason, truth and freedom. To claim that culturalists have grown stronger because civil or uncivil forces have prevailed does not offer an explanation but merely helps to politically locate the analyst who bestows such labels.

In short, Alexander’s work – while providing rich descriptions of the struggles over the status and incorporation of women, blacks and Jews – glosses over power. His framework explains how but not why social movements proliferate or falter at particular moments; nor does it enable us to gauge the impact of power *within* the civil sphere since civil relations are, by (Alexander’s) definition, characterized by equality and solidarity. Though Alexander recognizes the impact of social inequalities on the distribution of civil power (see below), his strong program in cultural sociology demands that he “brackets out” these relations. In short, Alexander’s concepts are useful to describe what integration politics consist of, but are insufficient to identify and explain dynamic power relations.

### **Field analysis and inequalities in the civil sphere**

Whereas Alexander’s project is to identify the “possibilities of justice” (Alexander, 2003) in liberal democracies, Pierre Bourdieu’s work demonstrates the limitations of liberal

democracy.<sup>4</sup> Bourdieu focuses on how seemingly universal institutions – religion, education, democracy – come to serve the interests of particular groups and can work to legitimate and conceal social inequalities (Bourdieu, 2005). His work can thus help us to incorporate the analysis of inequality in the study of the civil sphere – a necessary step to analyze integration politics. Synthesizing the work of both theorists, I argue, yields considerable theoretical returns as the weakness of one author is the strength of the other. Alexander provides a vocabulary to explain the formation of solidarities between actors with divergent interests; Bourdieu shows how particular interests motivate universal claims (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1990). But how to achieve this synthesis? My argument is that the concept of the “civil sphere” can be borrowed from Alexander’s cultural sociology and inserted into Bourdieu’s field theory so that the civil sphere can be analyzed as a field. This theoretical move is possible because the civil sphere, as identified by Alexander, has two structural properties that Bourdieu associates with fields.

First, like fields, the civil sphere has a measure of *autonomy*: it has a distinct logic through which hierarchies are constructed between different actors who partake in struggle. Like science, religion or art, the civil sphere has a vocabulary that all who wish to partake must speak. They must speak in the name of democracy, freedom and justice, and against those groups and discourses that threaten these values.<sup>5</sup> Actors engage in struggles over classification as they try to impose their particular visions of the social world while devaluing those of their opponents (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170; Wacquant, 1992, p. 14). A culturalist, for instance, might argue that Islam has not yet experienced enlightenment and that its believers therefore suffer from irrationality and a distorted view of society. A critic of Culturalism, in contrast, might argue that fear of Islam amounts to hysteria and that civil integration is possible if all parties calmly look for solutions. In the specific vocabulary of the civil sphere, antagonists portray their opponents as a threat to the civil community, its democratic relationships and its capacities for rational reasoning (Alexander, 2006, pp. 57-62).

Second, like fields, the civil sphere only has *relative* autonomy: it refracts the power relations and inequalities of the surrounding environment. This point is crucial for Bourdieu since he argues that the struggle for legitimation within fields is determined by the mobilization and conversion of different forms of capital. While Alexander’s “strong program” precludes analysis of the effects of such inequalities on power relations within the civil sphere, he acknowledges that its autonomy is relative. The outcome of struggles within the civil sphere “depends on resources and inputs from other spheres... In this sense it can be said that civil society is dependent upon these spheres” (Alexander, 2006, pp. 54-55).

Alexander's account of the performances and symbolism of the civil rights movement, for instance, complements rather than contradicts explanations that center on the growing economic power of the Southern black population or the organizational strength of the black churches. Cultural capital is crucial for actors to formulate effective rhetorical strategies, economic capital to invest in organizational infrastructures that institutionalize and disseminate discourse. While Alexander's strong program of cultural sociology demands that we "bracket out" such relationships, his conceptualization of the civil sphere does not require us to do so.

For these reasons, I think it is both possible and opportune to use Alexander's vocabulary to analyze the civil sphere and Bourdieu's field theory to explain how actors accrue capital and mobilize such capital in struggles to define what is civil and what is not. The concept of civil sphere thus understood is very close to Bourdieu's understanding of the "field of power"<sup>6</sup> – "the public sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the bureaucratic field" (Wacquant, 2007, p. 1). This concept, designed to overcome the substantialist notion of a "ruling class," allows the relational analysis of struggles between elites rooted in different locations of various fields (Wacquant, 1993). I thus conceive of the civil sphere as a space of struggle where actors compete and cooperate to define who belongs to the civil community and what its problems are.

Bourdieu's focus on the class component of integration politics – where class should be understood in a broad sense as resulting from the unequal distribution of economic *and* cultural capital as well as the division of material *and* symbolic labor (Bourdieu, 1985) – is crucially important in the Dutch context where class inequality is written into integration politics from the start: government policies only label migrant groups as *ethnic* minorities when they are *economically* weak (Chapter 4). The coincidence of class and ascribed ethnicity has a profound impact on the distribution of civil power since the consumption of media, involvement in civil society associations, participation in the electoral process and policy-making all require economic and especially cultural capital. In all the fields where integration politics plays out, minorities are likely to suffer from a relative lack of resources.

Nevertheless, integration politics is not a struggle between the native majority and the migrant minority or between Muslims and non-Muslims. The competitors in integration politics are actors promoting divergent views of the civil community and its problems. The civil sphere is a meta-field where logics from different fields collide or coalesce (Couldry, 2003). Actors from different fields (academia, parliamentary politics, journalism, civil society associations, literature) try to promote their particular visions of the social world in public

debates and to inscribe these visions into state institutions. Integration politics therefore does not primarily revolve around the relations between different ethnic or religious groups but between actors who promote different views *of* minorities and integration issues. Bourdieu's research shows that differences of opinion or preferences are rooted in different social conditions and become embodied in the actors' habitus (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1984b, p. 170). At stake in the struggles is the value of embodied views and perspectives. We will see in Part II, for instance, that sociologists in the integration debate<sup>7</sup> advocate empirical research and appreciation of local contingencies against the tendency of culturalists to think in terms of civilizational or cultural conflict. Since sociologists have historically played an important role in advising the state on how to solve integration problems, it is hardly surprising that they advocate calm assessment to produce effective policy. In contrast, philosophers in the Dutch integration debate tend to focus on the fundamental principles that should inform integration politics and argue that the sacred texts – rather than the social practices – of Muslims should be subject to scrutiny. They usually do not detail how policies should be implemented, but instead argue, with reference to exemplary cases, the need to protect or reject a general principle. Representatives of both disciplines thus do not simply advance arguments about minority integration; they also try to show the value of the schemes of perception over which they have expert control. Divisions within academia are thus refracted and renegotiated in the civil sphere where actors translate views cultivated in particular fields into discourses on how to understand and govern diversity.

### **Discourses, networks and the limitations of Bourdieu's analysis of symbolic power**

Bourdieu's work provides the basic concepts and strategies to analyze struggles within the civil sphere and to undertake the sort of political sociology that Alexander's principled neglect of things non-symbolic prevents. The idea that integration politics is essentially about classificatory struggles and the inscription of these classifications into bodies and institutions is central to this study, as is the idea that actors mobilize different quantities and types of capital in their struggle to make their particular discourse dominant. Although Bourdieu has often been characterized as a reproduction theorist, his work offers ample analytical tools to map and explain historical change (Gorski, 2010a). Nevertheless, the criticism that Bourdieu does not account for transformation – though not entirely accurate – does apply to his concept of symbolic power. While many of Bourdieu's key concepts are designed to map the gradations, differentiations and dynamics of power, his writings have continued to rely on an

overly structuralist conception of symbolic power. This section identifies lacunas that need to be addressed in order to fully realize the explanatory potential of Bourdieu's work. Considering discourses and networks, I argue, complements Bourdieu's conception of symbolic power and allows us to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations.

### *Discourses*

"Symbolic power," for Bourdieu, "is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even they themselves exercise it" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 164). The dominated are complacent in their own subordination because they do not have the capacity to think outside of the discourses that historically powerful actors have imposed on them. In Bourdieu's view, the state is the harbinger of such power because state institutions can inculcate subjects with schemes of perception which cue them to view the arbitrary power of the state as authoritative (Bourdieu, 1997, pp. 175-176). This conception of symbolic power, however, is too absolutist: it does not help to identify power where there is open discursive conflict, as is the case in Dutch integration politics. The same criticism applies to the discourse analysis of Willem Schinkel who, inspired by Bourdieu, analyzes *the* integration discourse (Schinkel, 2008). Schinkel argues that while actors in integration politics may *appear* to be virulently opposed to each other, their positions in fact emanate from one and the same discourse. In this type of analysis, actors' positions are over-determined by a discourse that so curtails the range of available options that the differences between actors become mere surface appearances. Without being able to account for the substantive differences between actors, it becomes impossible to analyze the relations of power between them.

My conceptualization of discourse is designed to serve this purpose. I define discourse as a *coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities*. Let us examine these terms one at a time. I speak of a *coherent ensemble* to indicate that we cannot speak of a discourse if the attribution of meaning is (entirely) random (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Discourse implies that there are discernible patterns: a position on one issue corresponds to a position on another. For instance, people who argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible are also likely to believe that immigrants should be obliged to learn Dutch, that integration policies have failed, that Israel occupies Palestinian territories out of self-defense, that there should be less attention for the atrocities committed in the Netherlands' colonial past, that Turkey should not join the

European Union and that Dutch elites are imprisoned in a culture of political correctness. The correspondence of positions on these seemingly disparate issues justifies speaking of a discourse (a culturalist discourse in my terminology) in the same way that correspondence between scores on different variables indicates the presence of a shared dimension.

The notion of *framing* is used extensively in the social movement literature to highlight the importance of signification. A frame is “an interpretative schemata that signifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences in one’s present or past environments” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 137; Goffman, 1974). In my understanding, a frame is composed of ideas, notions and symbols. “Ideas” refer to explicit assumptions and causal reasoning. We may call this the intellectual element of discourse as ideas stipulate how the world works and suggest certain ways to identify and explain patterns of social behavior. “Notions” refer to immediate conceptions or impressions. Notions very often remain implicit but can be expressed as statements that immediately reveal the position of actors. When actors remark that “the West has experienced enlightenment” or posit that “integration requires mutual respect,” they immediately reveal their adherence to a certain discourse (respectively a culturalist discourse and a pragmatist discourse in the terminology I develop in Chapter 3). “Symbols” are visual or verbal representations of values or collectives, such as the Christian cross, the Quran or the constitution. The meaning of these symbols is not stable but depends on how they are mobilized. The Quran, for instance, figures prominently in the discourse of both Muslims and culturalists but in very different ways.

Depending on the frame through which they ascribe meaning to reality,<sup>8</sup> actors not only see but also *feel* different things. Hochschild’s notion of “feeling and framing rules” captures nicely how emotions are implicated in processes of signification. Framing rules stipulate how we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations; feeling rules “refer to guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 566). I frequently use words like “feel” or “sense” to indicate that what actors “think” is not merely a matter of cognition but also a sensual process. The routine ascription of meaning-emotion normally referred to as “common sense” is different for actors embodying different discourses. As the experiments of John Bargh and other psychologists and neuroscientists have shown, embodied schemes of perception serve to assign positive or negative sentiments to persons, actions or statements in an instant reflex (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Research on neural activity demonstrates how embodied discourses subconsciously influence how actors perceive others. For instance, tests show how subjects

with Democratic or Republican sympathies regulate their emotional reactions when confronted with images of candidates from opposing parties by activating cognitive control networks and suppressing positive feelings (Kaplan *et al.*, 2006, p. 55). Apart from these instantaneous emotional responses, different discourses also stipulate how emotions should be managed (Hochschild, 1979). For instance, one influential promoter of Culturalism, Paul Scheffer, incessantly criticizes politicians and administrators for failing to communicate a “sense of urgency” about the unfolding “multicultural drama” that poses “the biggest threat to social peace” (Scheffer, 2000).<sup>9</sup> Others warn against too much anxiety over integration issues and argue that we need to suppress prejudice to allow calm deliberation (see Part II).

Discourses are produced in settings located in particular parts of a field or at the intersection of different fields. To grasp such situational differentiation, we need to think of the civil sphere not only as a symbolic universe or an abstract space but as a physical space with a distinct geography.<sup>10</sup> Integration discourses are formed in and through social practices in different settings (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1980). The particular demands of the situation in these different settings induce actors to adopt discourses that serve some instrumental, material or emotional interest (Swidler, 1994). For instance, diversity management professionals tend to adopt a particular integration discourse designed to capitalize on diversity within businesses or communities. These diversity managers, Chapter 9 shows, portray the city as a vibrant and diverse metropole where citizens are united in their pride of place. This integration discourse is cultivated in a different ecology of settings than, say, Culturalism. Culturalism is cultivated within right-leaning periodicals, right-leaning political parties and other specific settings discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Every discourse has its strongholds, its *milieus*, where participants share symbolic and class interests and are able to articulate a civil discourse from their perspective. Beyond these milieus, discourses clash and collide in *arenas*, i.e. settings where promoters of different discourses clash before a remote audience. All fields have settings that resemble milieus and settings that resemble arenas. Generally speaking, the central settings of the civil sphere (the parliament, the media) have large, diverse audiences and function as arenas, while the more marginal settings of the civil sphere (civil society associations, university departments) have smaller and more select audiences and function more as milieus. The distinction between milieus and arenas, while crude, allows us to specify the nature of discourse production in different settings and to indicate how different actors generate or mobilize discourses within them. With these conceptualizations of discourse in place, we can provisionally define discursive power as the capacity of a discourse, or the actor mobilizing it, to ascribe meaning and emotion to material and social realities. Struggles in the

civil sphere then revolve around civil power – the power to define who belongs to a civil community and what its problems are. But how to conceptualize power?

*A relational conception of power*

Bourdieu's understanding of symbolic power not only absolutizes discourse, it also absolutizes power. For Bourdieu, power expresses itself most forcefully in the absence of conflict. While I accept this argument, a case as contentious as Dutch integration politics requires not only looking beneath the surface of political life for shared *doxa* but also analysis of actual conflict (compare Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 57). When Bourdieu maps power differentials between actors, he tends to equate power with capital. Rather than focusing on actors' interactions or strategies, Bourdieu proposes to study the distribution of capital which, in his view, constitutes the objective relations that structure a field.

Bourdieu's principled unwillingness to examine interactions<sup>11</sup> reduces his capacity to understand the dynamics of collective action (*cf.* Crossley, 2003; Girling, 2004). Though the distribution of capital obviously shapes social action, the networks formed through interaction have an independent effect on power relations (Wellman, 1988). Norbert Elias' study on community relations in the suburb of Winston Parva illustrates this point (Elias & Scotson, 1994). Even though the suburb's two working-class neighborhoods were similar in terms of class and ethnic composition, the residents of one formed a coherent community; they were able to enforce civil norms internally and to exclude residents of the other area who were, even in their own eyes, considered less civilized. This was possible because the former cultivated their feelings of superiority through strong internal ties while the latter suffered in isolated resignation. Elias' point has been confirmed time and time again by network analysts: the power of groups depends in part on their capacity to function as a group – that is, to channel resources and to coordinate action (Bruggeman, 2008).

To account for these figural aspects of power relations, I conceptualize power as an emergent property of relations that emanates from, and structures, social interactions (Elias, 1978). Power is the “outgrowth of the positions that social actors occupy in one or more networks ... Far from being an attribute or property of actors, then, power is unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the very way in which figurations ... of relationships are patterned and operate” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 292). Actors “have” (or rather, concentrate) power to the extent that others in their networks feel forced, induced or seduced to infuse them with attention, funds, practical help or other power resources. Central actors are powerful because they serve as brokers and mediators of the resources available within

figurations. Exactly what sort of power is at stake depends on the context: the sources and workings of power differ between, say, intellectual conflicts, military conflicts and struggles within bureaucracies. While such differences add complexity, in all these figurations power emerges from asymmetrical interactions that concentrate resources in central actors while withholding them from marginal actors.

If we apply these general ideas to power in governance relations, “the state” is no longer the harbinger of power. Instead, power lies in the interdependencies between governance actors and their network structures. This relational understanding of power has implications for discourse analysis. Discourse is thoroughly relational in that individual positions, words or symbols cannot be understood outside the matrices of power relations in which they accrue significance. Discourses reflect and mediate the power of groups that imbue them with meaning; they are the interface through which actors come to understand their relation to others and the vehicle through which they try to redefine these relations.<sup>12</sup> In Dutch integration politics, we see that culturalists attempted – quite successfully – to cleanse their group of the stigma of racism and prejudice. They engaged in counter-stigmatization by painting their opponents as dogmatic multiculturalists who censor truthful and sincere critics. The introduction of new words (“multiculturalist” entered the Dutch debate in the mid-1990s as a slur) and changes to the meaning of existing words (accusations of “racism” became taboo in the 1990s) thus signify a changing *balance of power*. This latter concept allows us to see “shades and grades in the power differentials of human groups. Tradition has confined us too long to static polarities, such as ruled and rulers, where one obviously needs the imaginary of a gliding approach, the ability to say ‘more’ or ‘less’” (Elias, 1998, p. 189).<sup>13</sup>

## **Research strategy**

How can we employ this relational conception of power to analyze change in integration politics? Parts II and III investigate the dynamics of power in two different civil sphere settings: the opinion pages of three broadsheet newspapers and the governance networks of the Netherlands’ two largest cities. Although the settings are very different, Parts II and III both analyze moments in the formation and transformation of power relations within fields (*cf.* Gorski, 2010b).

*The genesis of fields.* The starting point for my analysis is the genesis of the fields in which integration politics has historically played out: the civil sphere and the state bureaucracy. To

explain the inception and early development of a policy field for minority integration within the state bureaucracy, I locate its genesis within the broader development of the Dutch civil sphere (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1992). I show how power relations within the civil sphere at large were refracted in particular ways in the policy field and how the field developed its distinct power relations and contradictions.

*The identification of positions and oppositions.* After delineating the genesis and formation of a field, we can identify the actors within it and the positions they take. Interpretative analysis can be used to identify the positions of individual actors and to uncover the civil hierarchies implicit in discourse. How do actors define integration? How do they think it should be achieved? What problems do they identify, who do they blame and what kind of solutions do they suggest? Part II answers these questions through a qualitative examination of the trajectory of key actors through social space. Vignettes describe the milieus in which actors cultivated their dispositions and how they took a position in relation to others. Part II uses two quantitative techniques – correspondence analysis and community detection – to identify oppositions, while Part III relies on qualitative data to map positions in governance figurations. Through vignettes, interviews and secondary data, Part III analyzes the milieus where discourses and actors originate and reconstructs the formation of alliances and conflicts between actors from different settings.

*The identification of power relations.* Once we have identified positions and oppositions, how do we measure the relations of power between them? How do we determine whether a discourse is weak or strong? The abundance of integration discourse makes it possible, and indeed tempting, to substantiate preconceived ideas about the power of discourses. It is, for instance, easy to find evidence for both the strength and weakness of anti-racist discourse. To address this problem, my interpretative analysis is embedded in a quantitative analysis that unearths the *relative* power of actors by examining their positions within figurations. To remain with the example of anti-racist discourse, the question is not whether anti-racists have a presence in broadsheet newspapers or receive subsidies. The question is whether the promoters of Anti-racism are more or less central than the promoters of other discourses. To investigate the balance of power between discourses and actors through time, Parts II and III draw upon databases that contain quantitative indicators of civil power (see Chapters 3 and 7 for details).

*Three possible causes of transformation.* After reconstructing the development of fields, we can ask why changes did or did not occur. While the causes of change in power relations can only be identified empirically, here I anticipate some of my findings and use Bourdieu's work to identify three causal mechanisms (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1984a, 1991, 1992; Gorski, 2010b). I first introduce examples from Bourdieu's work and then discuss their relevance for explaining the formation and transformation of power relations in the civil sphere.

The *first* possible cause of transformation is the reconfiguration of relations between different fields so that the rules of the game in the civil sphere change. In his later work, Bourdieu criticized the subjugation of the logic of different fields to the neoliberal logic of the market (Bourdieu, 1998b, 2003). Similar processes have taken place in integration politics: while in the 1980s it was largely contained in a policy field, media attention intensified in the early 1990s and especially in the first half of the 2000s (see especially Chapters 4 and 5). The logic of integration politics thus became increasingly determined by the logic of the media (Bourdieu, 1998b; see also Hajer, 2009; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008a). The involvement of the media and the concomitant dramatization of integration politics played into the hands of actors with the will and ability to act in the public spotlight and to perform civil drama. Extravagant politicians like Pim Fortuyn could challenge established elites and routines with spectacular performances in new or increasingly important settings, such as talk shows (Lunt & Stenner, 2005). Mediatization not only changed the modalities of integration politics; it also changed the interests involved as distant audiences were pulled into local politics. This meant that governance actors could no longer exclusively focus on their local constituents or supporters; remote audiences with different concerns had to be considered. For instance, Islamic associations in a city like Amsterdam are likely to be deeply concerned about the stigmatization of Muslims, while large parts of the predominantly native media audience are more likely to feel anxious about the presence and radicalization of Muslims (Uitermark & Gielen, 2010).

The *second* possible cause for transformation is a change in the bases of support of actors within a field. An example from Bourdieu's research is the explosive increase in the number of students entering universities in the 1950s and early 1960s. Especially in the new disciplines such as sociology, students had no prospects for a job that afforded status and stability (Bourdieu, 1984a). Students and junior teachers in these disciplines were "weakly integrated" into the university system and "liable to resentment" due to the contradiction between their "elevated expectations" and the "disappointment of these expectations entailed by the maintenance in the lowest ranks of the university hierarchy" (Bourdieu, 1984a, p. 170).

This analysis enables Bourdieu to locate the revolutionary sentiment of May '68 in those parts of the university system where increased enrollment had created a pool of students for whom adherence to academic orthodoxy did not pay off. Similar examples can be found at different points in the current study. Part II discusses the example of Pim Fortuyn who was able to mobilize a part of the growing segment of the population disappointed with parliamentary politics. The erosion of the institutions of pillarization and the growing importance of commercial media had created a pool of potential supporters who – because of their low levels of cultural capital and their cynicism towards established parties – were longing for a radical and spectacular alternative. Part III discusses the example of the left-wing minority associations. The aging and increasing unemployment of guest workers, Chapter 8 shows, led to the contraction of the traditional base of support for left-wing minority associations and thus to their eventual demise in governance networks.

The *third* possible cause for transformation is the making or unmaking of alliances within or between fields. Interactions *within* fields create asymmetrical figurations of different groups. Relations *between* fields are especially important for understanding how elites interact across different fields. Towards the end of *Homo Academicus*, Bourdieu developed an “embryo of a theory of symbolic revolutions”; his hypothesis is that synchronized crises in disparate fields can cause systemic crisis (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 81; Bourdieu, 1984a, pp. 159-193). I would add that this process of synchronization is not mechanical; it is the result of coordination between elites operating in different fields. Part II illustrates this by showing how Culturalism became a powerful force when it gained support from an inter-field coalition of previously disparate actors including far-right politicians against migration, artists espousing the freedom of expression, philosophers promoting enlightenment values and Social Democrats reinventing the civilizing missions of the 19th century. Similarly, Part III shows how a coalition combining diversity managers, Labor party officials and Islamic associations emerged in Amsterdam following the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The formation of these coalitions cannot be explained solely as an outcome of changing distributions of capital. There is no alternative to investigating how actors’ strategic interactions produced figurations that brought some actors together while pulling others apart.

It is perhaps important to emphasize that these are three *possible* causes of transformation. Whether these transformations occur, and in what way, depend on both actors’ strategies and on sheer chance. The hijackers of 9/11 and the assassins of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn succeeded in executing their plans and their acts had a major impact on integration politics. But what if the 9/11 hijackers were caught before boarding the planes?

What if Theo van Gogh had not refused protection (as he did) after receiving death threats? What if Fortuyn had been killed by a radical Muslim rather than by a native Dutch environmental activist? While these questions are impossible to answer, it is clear that integration politics would not have been the same. Such sensitivity to indeterminacy, however, does not imply that history should be seen as a series of contingencies. Oppositions are not formed *by* incidents but are remade in response *to* incidents through a process of contentious sense-making. The best we can do is to reconstruct this process of discursive struggle and show why some actors gained power while others lost it.

### **Discussion: how to investigate integration politics?**

The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a conceptual framework that can inform specific research questions and methodologies. Drawing on the work of Bourdieu and Alexander, I have suggested that a field analysis of civil politics provides a promising vantage point from which to analyze the dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics. To recapitulate: I view integration politics as a series of struggles within the civil sphere. The civil sphere is a meta-field (see Couldry, 2003) where actors rooted in different fields struggle to make their particular discourses dominant. The stake in these struggles is civil power: the power to define who belongs to a civil community and what its problems are. This power is not an attribute of an actor or a system, but an emergent property of social interactions between actors unequally invested with resources. Actors mobilize different kinds of capital to articulate and institutionalize their particular definitions of the civil community and its problems. At the most abstract level, transformations occur (1) when the rules of the game change so that some views or resources are revalued, (2) when actors form or break alliances to promote a certain discourse, and (3) when actors mobilize larger quantities and different types of resources to challenge established interests. How will this framework add to our understanding of integration politics? Let us compare the approach I have outlined to five other streams of research that center respectively around citizenship regimes, racial domination, cultural clashes, pluralism, and the politics of recognition.

#### *National models and minority mobilization*

In comparative and historical research, integration politics is often conceived of in terms of national citizenship regimes. Rogers Brubaker has shown how conceptions of nationhood find their way into institutions and structure the access and conditions of citizenship (Brubaker,

1992). The research of Sydney Verba and his colleagues demonstrates that different nations have distinct cultures and institutions that determine how social and economic inequalities affect the level and nature of civil engagement (Verba *et al.*, 1987). A number of researchers have furthermore demonstrated that state institutions influence the extent to which minorities mobilize, and through which identities (Ireland, 1994, 2004; Favell, 2001; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005). These studies work on (and often corroborate) the hypothesis that there are distinct discursive and institutional political opportunity structures that enable and constrain actors to make certain claims. Many observers note that the dominant notion of “race relations” in the United Kingdom has encouraged political actors to mobilize around racial identities (as Blacks or Asians) rather than, for example, religious identities (Modood, 2005). French state institutions, in contrast, encourage political actors to mobilize as citizens of the Republic rather than, say, as ethnic minorities (Chambon, 2002; Garbaye, 2002).

I draw upon these insights in Part III, where I show that the opportunities inherent in local governance figurations shape power relations between governance actors. Nevertheless, the literature on institutions, political opportunities and citizenship regimes tends to focus on continuity rather than change (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999; Duyvendak *et al.*, 2005). As a result, researchers often give short shrift to explanations of why political opportunities change. While inherited institutional figurations obviously influence the agenda and identities of actors, they cannot account for their dynamism.

Can the explanation in terms of national models be “saved” if we consider that models change with voter attitudes? Did – as Koopmans and his colleagues suggest (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005) – growing public dissatisfaction with multiculturalism and hostility towards Islam lead politicians to reconsider and transform past institutional frameworks? Survey results in fact show that attitudes are remarkably constant; they do *not* show a clear trend of decreasing support for multiculturalism or growing hostility towards minorities (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007; Van de Vijver *et al.*, 2007). Although a considerable share of the population (especially those segments with low levels of cultural capital) expresses xenophobic or anti-migration sentiments, this share has not grown over time, implying that changes in public opinion cannot explain the turbulence and volatility of integration politics.

In this study, the attitudes and sentiments of the population come into view, but only to the extent that they are mobilized by civil actors. Dynamism is understood as a play of discursive power in different settings where actors try to garner support and to discredit their opponents. The outcome is a matter of civil power, not of intrinsic merit. If we look at integration politics in this way, it is no longer possible to speak of “a model that has failed” or

to say that “the Dutch” have changed. Instead, we need to examine where discourses come from, how they were mobilized in struggles and how the actors promoting them came to dominate or falter in different settings. Instead of assuming that Dutch (or Amsterdam or Rotterdam) policies and debates originate from a single logic (a “model”), we need to investigate how different actors struggle to make their logic dominant and why they succeed or fail.

### *The study of racial domination*

Researchers like Philomena Essed and Teun van Dijk have extensively investigated racism and discourses on racism in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Teun van Dijk’s analysis of elite discourse in the 1980s and 1990s shows how some actors attempted to broaden the discursive space for culturalist discourses through the discrediting of the anti-racist movement (Van Dijk, 1993, 2003; see also Van der Valk, 2002). My analysis in Part II confirms that Anti-racism was, indeed, a marginal discourse and that it remained so throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Essed’s research on the experiences of black women in the Netherlands, moreover, shows how discursive domination can be researched through the experiences of its victims (Essed, 1991). But though I use or confirm certain insights from the anti-racist literature, I do not adopt it wholesale for at least two reasons.

The first reason is that concepts like “new racism” and “cultural racism” capture new discourses of alterity in the old language of color racism (Schinkel, 2008, p. 85). While this serves the purpose of showing the continuity and similarity of exclusions produced by seemingly different discourses, it does not sufficiently capture their civil dimension. Integration discourses, including most variants of Culturalism, do not (only) serve to demarcate the boundaries of a white nation but (also) seek to expand and restore a civil community. While thinking in terms of a civil community is analogous to racism in that it hinges on the division between insiders and outsiders, it is also an alternative to racist discourse in that it creates possibilities – however few or remote – for outsiders to be defined, and to define themselves, as worthy members of the community.

The second reason is that the literature on racism focuses its analysis of discourses on how they contribute to racial domination. Van Dijk, for instance, examines how the media construct and legitimate racist domination through their choice of topics and their framing of the news. His research on news reports in Dutch newspapers in the 1980s conclusively shows that minorities are portrayed as uncivil – as alien, violent or dependent. No doubt similar results would be found for the 1990s and 2000s. But studying the *effects* and *modalities* of

discourses on racial or ethnic hierarchies does not reveal their *origins*; nor does it explain the *power* of discourses or *changes* within power relations among actors. To explain the genesis, development and transformation of discourse, we need to attend to power relations between elites in public debates and in governance networks. Divisions within these debates and networks do not necessarily develop along ethnic or racial lines; they can develop between actors with different disciplinary backgrounds (philosophers versus sociologists), different party affiliations (left and right) or different class backgrounds (guest worker associations versus diversity managers). Given my aim of explaining why some of these visions prevail, describing what these actors say or do in terms of different forms and degrees of racial domination is of limited use.

### *Cultural analysis*

A very different set of approaches examines integration politics through the prism of culture. The most well-known variant of cultural analysis is based on the idea of civilizational conflict. The leader of the right-wing Liberals, Frits Bolkestein, popularized the idea of a civilizational conflict in the early 1990s when he argued that Islam was an ideological threat to the values of liberalism (Bolkestein, 1991). In the United States, Samuel Huntington coined the phrase “clash of civilizations” in the mid-1990s (Huntington, 1997). According to the idea of civilizational clash, the fundamental division in the Netherlands as well as around the world is between Islam and the West or between pre-enlightenment and enlightened cultures. This approach fails to account for diversity not just within minority communities but among Dutch natives as well (e.g., Guadeloupe & Van de Rooij, 2007). The subsequent chapters will reveal strong oppositions within the debate and within governance networks that cannot be reduced to clashing cultures, for the simple reason that they take place in what Huntington or Bolkestein would regard as a single culture. Rather than providing an explanation of the dynamics of integration politics, the promoters of this frame are a party in such conflicts. Or, as Willem Schinkel puts it, “the clash of civilizations does not result from cultural differences but from the political recodification and strategic mobilization of these differences” (Schinkel, 2008, p. 103). My goal is not to decide whether there really are cultural differences (or, for that matter, structures of racist domination) but to explain why Culturalism emerged, from where it drew support and how it was mobilized in discursive struggle.

Another variant of cultural analysis does not divide the world into two separate entities but foregrounds the importance of political and religious culture. Ian Buruma gives detailed accounts of the main characters in Dutch integration politics and writes extensively about the

evolution of Dutch political culture (Buruma, 2006). Ron Eyerman takes a similar approach as he investigates the multiple meanings of the assassination of Theo van Gogh against the background of the Dutch “postwar psyche” (Eyerman, 2008). While I incorporate insights from this literature when analyzing the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and interpreting the civil dramas that followed the Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh assassinations, my aim is not to interpret meanings but to explain why some interpretations came to prevail in the integration debate and how state institutions were restructured as a result.

A third variant of cultural analysis has a long history in Dutch integration research and focuses on differences between ethnic groups. The minorities policy of the 1980s targeted the four largest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese); they have been compared to each other and to the native Dutch on countless items, including labor market participation, media consumption, crime rates, educational performance, experience of discrimination, *etc.* (see, e.g., Penninx, 1988b; Veenman, 1994; Van Tubergen & Maas, 2006). Since data is gathered per ethnic group, ethnicity (rather than, for instance, class) naturally emerges as the explanation for the divergent scores (for critiques, see Rath, 1991; Essed & Nimako, 2006; Schinkel, 2007). I make use of these data at various points, especially in Part III. At times I also consider the cultural and political environment of sending countries: coalitions and oppositions between associations from the same ethnic group often reflect those of the political field in Morocco and Turkey. But though actors’ backgrounds may explain their stances or capacity to survive, they do not explain the transformations that have occurred in the integration debate or within governance figurations.

### *The pluralist tradition*

Researchers in the pluralist tradition of political science (not to be confused with philosophical proponents of ethnic or cultural pluralism) argue that power in (American) politics is not concentrated in the hands of a single, coherent elite but distributed over a number of groups (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980). A group with power in one domain may have none in another. In the pluralist tradition of Robert Dahl, Jaco Baveling’s analysis of power relations within Amsterdam’s governance networks (Baveling, 1994) employed numerous indicators which allowed him to determine actors’ relative power in the decision-making process. Such data on actors’ preferences and policy decisions reveal a key aspect of power relations: actors whose preferences are realized are obviously more powerful than those whose preferences are inconsequential. The approach, however, restricts power to such an extent that it glosses over some of its more insidious expressions (Lukes, 2005). Staying with

Berveling's study, some actors were found to have more decision-making power than others within projects on migrant education and employment. But this still leaves unanswered the most important question, namely how these actors accrued their power in the first place. To appreciate Berveling's finding that the Moroccan council and the Turkish council influenced decision-making, we need to understand how these councils were established, their internal struggles and positions within wider figurations. These historical and relational dimensions of power escape from view when we focus solely on the extent to which actors' preferences influence decisions – we also want to know how these preferences are formed, which kinds of capital they mobilize to realize their preferences and how actors work together or oppose one another.

### *The politics of recognition*

Another strand of integration research – under the rubric of “the politics of recognition” – focuses on whether and how diversity should be recognized (*cf.* Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Benhabib, 2002; Prins, 2002). Empirical cases here mainly serve as stepping stones for normative analysis; the literature – which is prescriptive rather than descriptive, normative rather than explanatory – analyzes political struggles with the purpose of resolving them. I have no intention to propose how identities should be recognized or which cultural practices should be condoned or accommodated.

Rather than focusing on the dilemmas of recognition, I analyze conflicts over minority integration against the backdrop of more general developments and dynamics in the civil sphere. I do not seek to abstract from reality those elements that exclusively relate to ethnic and religious diversity but instead examine how the rules of the game in different settings allow some actors to promote their understanding of integration while marginalizing others. While this may seem obvious, it is an important corrective to philosophical analyses of integration politics that tend to bracket dimensions of social life that shape power inequalities, such as the introduction of market mechanisms within state institutions (Chapter 8).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has prepared the conceptual groundwork for the remainder of the study. Extant approaches to the study of integration politics do not offer enough analytical leverage to explain transformations within power relations. To address this lacuna, I have suggested a field analysis of civil politics. The approach developed here understands integration politics as

a series of struggles in different settings. This implies that we do not search for a linear development of integration politics in “the Netherlands” but rather investigate where particular discourses garner support or encounter opposition. While this research strategy does not preclude the possibility that one or another discourse will be identified as “dominant,” it does invite us to detail when, where, how, to what extent, and to what effect discourses are powerful. The approach is designed to detect power inequalities but to simultaneously alert us to the ambivalence and limitations of domination. To take due account of differences between settings, the main question of this study – *How and why did power relations transform in Dutch integration politics?* – will be addressed in two parts. Part II deals with the (national) debate and Part III focuses on (local) governance. Needless to say, the national debate and local governance are not mutually autonomous. Many prominent actors in the debate are based in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, while the debate feeds back into local governance figurations. Both Parts II and III analyze the genesis of the contexts in which integration politics take place, map transformations of power relations over time, and provide explanations for these transformations. However, since they pose slightly different questions and look at different sorts of settings, I develop specific methods for each part of the study.

## **PART II**

### **3. Introduction to Part II: civil power and the integration debate**

This chapter explains how the first part of the research question posed in Chapter 1 will be answered: how and why did power relations transform in the debate on integration? I focus specifically on the debate on the opinion pages of broadsheet newspapers. This setting formally approximates Habermas' ideal speech situation in the sense that all persons with the "competence to speak" can submit articles, express attitudes, desires and needs, and question the assertions of others (Habermas, 1990, p. 86). What Weber considered the essence of power – the capacity of actors to carry out their will in spite of resistance from others – is absent from the opinion pages since actors in this setting cannot use formal authority or physical force to coerce their opponents (Weber, 1964, p. 156).

To investigate power within debates on integration, and within the civil sphere more generally, we thus have to develop and operationalize concepts that do not presuppose the exercise of physical force or formal authority but that nevertheless capture inequalities. The goal is to map power relations in the integration debate, to identify the sources of power and to explain transformations. This chapter first indicates how positions and oppositions in the debate are identified and presents the databases used in this part of the study. It then identifies different types of power and indicates how these can be examined through network methodology. The final section of the chapter explores some general developments in the debate and specifies the research questions.

#### **Positions and oppositions in the integration debate**

"Integration" was not a hot topic until 1991. But to understand developments in the debate since then, it is essential to reconstruct the evolution of the context in which the debate unfolded. The next chapter therefore provides an overview of the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere at large and reconstructs the genesis of a policy field through which minorities were to be governed. This analysis is based on the work of other researchers, archival research and my own interviews. Though reliable, detailed data on debates on the opinion pages are only available after 1990, this is fortunately also the period when integration politics proliferated.

To identify positions and oppositions in the integration debate after 1990, I use a corpus of opinion articles, in-depth interviews with actors in the debate and secondary literature. The articles are drawn from three broadsheet newspapers: *Trouw*, *NRC Handelsblad*

and *De Volkskrant*. It should be clear from the outset that I do not consider the opinion pieces in these newspapers reflective of “public opinion” or “the integration debate” at large. As I argued in Chapter 2, the civil sphere is composed of a variety of settings, each with their specific rules and relations of power. Substantialist notions like “public opinion” or “the integration debate” reduce heterogeneity within the civil sphere to an arbitrary average. When I speak of “the” integration debate, the reader should bear in mind that it is really “a” debate in a specific setting. I have chosen this setting because the opinion pages are one core setting of the civil sphere where elites from different fields compete to define issues of general interest. They serve as a discursive arena where the meaning and purpose of public policies are contested. For journalists and editors, opinion pages are a source of news, view points and personalities: they browse opinion pages for cutting edge and authoritative analyses. For authors, the opinion pages are a channel for communicating particular points of view to an elite audience and a portal to much larger audiences that can be reached via gate keepers of other mass media. The opinion pages thus serve as one of the switch boards between, on the one hand, the policy field with its bureaucratic routines and its expert authority and, on the other hand, the media with its drive for spectacle and charismatic authority. I do not study the media field in its entirety (which would necessitate inclusion of many more newspapers and other media); nor do I study the policy field in its entirety (which would necessitate the investigation of many advisory councils, government departments and other state or quasi-state actors). Instead, I focus on one of the settings where these worlds meet: the opinion pages of *NRC Handelsblad*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw* form the intellectual core of the civil sphere where discourses are brokered and contested.

### *Databases*

The corpus includes articles published in the three newspapers that were retrieved from the Lexis Nexis database with three combinations of key words: “minorities AND integration,” “foreigners AND integration,” and “Muslims AND integration.” The Lexis Nexis database contains articles from *NRC Handelsblad* since 1989, *Trouw* since 1991 and *De Volkskrant* since 1994. Only articles over 1,000 words were selected in order to focus on those contributions that are, according to the newspapers’ gate keepers, highly significant within ongoing debates. A further round of selection excluded articles that did not relate to minority integration, such as articles dealing exclusively with European integration. The corpus includes interviews.<sup>14</sup> These selection procedures rendered a corpus of 729 articles. With this corpus, I constructed two databases (detailed in Appendices 1 and 2). Here I briefly introduce

the databases and indicate how I used them to identify positions and oppositions in the debate.

The *properties database* contains properties of the 729 articles, which include the (first) author's name, sex, affiliation and ethnicity.<sup>15</sup> I also assigned a discursive category to the articles, distinguishing between five discourses: Culturalism (see Chapter 1), Pragmatism (characterized by its conception of minorities as a potential underclass), Anti-racism (characterized by its portrayal of minorities as structurally victimized or stigmatized), the Diversity Discourse (characterized by its portrayal of diversity as an opportunity rather than a threat) and Civil Islam (characterized by its emphasis on the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy). While these coarse categorizations inevitably miss the subtleties of the discourse of individual actors, they enable us to identify the correspondence between the backgrounds of authors and the discourses they promote (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1984a, 1984b). Correspondence analysis is an exploratory technique designed to analyze simple two-way and multi-way tables containing some measure of correspondence between the rows and columns. Its goal is to represent the entries in a table of relative frequencies showing distances in a two-dimensional space, which can be visualized with a plot (Statsoft, 2008). Correspondence analysis is a relational technique that maps bundles of properties in a relational space instead of isolating them as variables (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). The benefit of this technique is that we can investigate whether some types of actors (with particular affiliations or ethnic backgrounds) distinguish themselves through the support of one or another discourse. Correspondence analysis thus provides one way to map positions and oppositions in the debate and to identify the bases of support for different discourses.

The *relational database* includes references that actors make to other actors. The database includes 5,397 explicit references. Almost half of the references are categorized as neutral ( $n=2,523$  or 46.7 per cent), while there are many more negative references ( $n=2,007$  or 37.2 per cent) than positive ones ( $n=867$  or 16.1 per cent). These micro-interactions lead to the formation of figurations where actors group together in clusters. For a long time, it was impossible to identify these clusters because algorithms for community detection did not distinguish between positive and negative references, making them unsuitable for studying (discursive) conflict. However, I make use of an algorithm for community detection recently developed by Vincent Traag in collaboration with Jeroen Bruggeman (for technicalities, see Traag and Bruggeman,

2009). The algorithm provides an inductive technique to detect patterns of conflict and cooperation by maximizing positive ties and minimizing negative ties within clusters<sup>16</sup>. The algorithm also takes into account indirect linkages, following the principle that two opponents (or two supporters) of the same actor cluster together, even if the two opponents (or supporters) do not share linkages. This is useful as such indirect linkages often tell us something about patterns of conflict and cooperation not immediately apparent from the identification of shared discourses.<sup>17</sup> For instance, the radical left and the radical right may end up in a cluster when both attack the mainstream left and right without attacking each other. While this result may seem counter-intuitive, it is valid in the sense that it signals (in this hypothetical figuration) that the opposition between radicals and the mainstream is stronger than the opposition between the left and the right.

### *Polarization*

The algorithm identifies clusters of actors who cooperate with each other and oppose others. From a relational perspective, polarization refers to the intensity of the opposition between clusters. However, the literature on political and social polarization generally conceptualizes polarization as divergence, that is, as the extent to which different groups within a population have divergent opinions (e.g. Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Fiorina *et al.*, 2005). A divergence of opinions may be a cause *of* polarization but it is not the same *as* polarization. For instance, strong differences of opinion can be put aside in case of an external threat (like a terrorist attack), while partisans can exploit even small differences of opinion to divide a population. A more relational conceptualization of polarization understands the process as the simultaneous clustering of allies and repulsion between antagonists. Rather than looking at scores that indicate the convergence or divergence of opinions on certain issues, I consider polarization as resulting from the positive and negative interactions within a figuration. I distinguish between two types of polarization: structural polarization and discursive polarization.

The measure for *structural polarization* reflects the idea that a figuration is polarized when interactions within clusters are positive and interactions between clusters are negative. To measure structural polarization, I distinguish between interactions that contribute to polarization and interactions that do not. Interactions that contribute to polarization are positive references *within* clusters and negative references *between* clusters. Other kinds of references (positive references between clusters and negative references within clusters) mute

polarization; I therefore divide the number of references that contribute to polarization by the total number of references. The result is a measure of polarization, which stands for the proportion of interactions that contribute to polarization (for technicalities, see Uitermark *et al.*, 2009).<sup>18</sup>

The measure for *discursive polarization* reflects the idea that clusters are only recognized as poles when they are associated with symbols, in this case discursive leaders – individuals who receive recognition from their cluster members and therefore come to stand for the group. The score for discursive leadership is calculated as the number of cluster members who, on balance, refer positively to an actor. With this measure, we can investigate the extent to which cluster members rally around leaders. Discursive polarization in a figuration is operationalized as the mean value of discursive leadership, where high scores indicate that average cluster members recognize discursive leaders.

### **Mapping power relations**

How does power operate within public debates? Following the argument laid out in Chapter 2, I conceive of power in relational terms, as an outgrowth of interactions rather than a property of actors. I distinguish between three qualitatively different aspects of power that correspond to different positions within network figurations.

*Articulation power* refers to the capacity to make an intervention.<sup>19</sup> In the context of the debate raging on the opinion pages, it means that gate keepers have afforded an actor space because they feel that the individual and his or her discourse are interesting or authoritative enough to warrant publication. Using the properties database, we can determine the number and share of articles written by an actor (for instance, Frits Bolkestein), a group of actors (for instance, right-wing politicians) or that have been coded as belonging to a certain discourse (for instance, Culturalism). With the relational database, the articulation power of a cluster can be measured as the number of active members – those who actively position themselves in relation to others (operationalized as the number of actors who refer to others).

*Consonance power* refers to the capacity to articulate a discourse with which others actively agree (*cf.* Koopmans, 2004a, p. 374). This power is activated when actors “strike a chord” with their audiences and transform them into collaborators, followers or friends. For the debate on the opinion pages, consonance can be measured by the ratio of positive to negative references. Actors or discourses with high consonance power have an identifiable *base of support*: groups of actors that tend to support one actor or discourse rather than

another. Individual actors' bases of support can be identified by tracing those who made positive references to them in the relational database; where different discourses find support can be identified by applying correspondence analysis to the properties database.<sup>20</sup>

*Resonance power* refers to the capacity to attract attention. It is important to make a sharp analytical distinction between consonance and resonance: the first is generated by supporters; the latter by supporters, neutral observers *and* opponents. Resonance can be grasped through measures of centrality: the more references an actor receives, the higher his or her resonance power.<sup>21</sup> Centrality measures are commonly used to identify network benefits that emerge from positive interactions (Bruggeman, 2008). However, civil arenas – and this certainly holds true for the opinion pages of newspapers – thrive on social criticism and the constant creation and recreation of oppositions. This means that the ability to solicit responses indicates power, albeit in a very specific form: resonance power. When an actor receives attention from others, the latter help to disseminate the actor's discourse, even when criticizing it. The conventional measure for centrality is the number of references an actor receives. One problem with this measure, however, is that it does not discriminate between referents. In practice it matters whether an actor is cited by a marginal or central actor. When Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende refers to someone, this indicates a much higher level of resonance power than when an unknown figure refers to that same person. To capture this aspect of centrality, I measure power centrality with a Page Rank algorithm (see Page *et al.*, 1999; Bruggeman, 2008). As in a Google search, the Page Rank orders actors according to the number and prominence of references to them. When the Page Rank scores are normalized, we can express the score as a percentage and say that a particular actor has a certain share of resonance power in a given figuration.

### *Qualitative techniques*

These relational techniques for mapping discursive space in this particular setting of the civil sphere provide insights into the structure and evolution of figurations. They show imbalances of power and help to identify the resources that different actors bring to the battle. As I argued following Elias and Bourdieu, these figurations have lives of their own since no single actor enjoys monopolistic control over them. But the dispositions and strategies of individual actors do matter. The macro-structures of discursive power are the product of the micro-strategies of actors who decide to intervene (authors) or who stage the interventions of others (editors). Individuals internalize discursive power relations but they also creatively interpret social reality and strategically act upon it. The drive to intervene within integration politics and to do

it in particular ways can be examined through interpretative analysis, interviews and secondary literature. *Interpretative analysis* of newspaper articles shows how different actors and discourses project the binaries of the civil sphere upon reality. What are the threats that they identify? To which groups do they ascribe uncivil motives? Which groups do they praise as agents of repair? How do they make sense of key events (like assassinations) or controversial statements (on the superiority of one culture over another, for example)? Interpretative analysis of civil drama can help to uncover the hierarchies implicit in discourse and can illuminate how civil solidarity is extended to some and not to others.

*Interviews* provide information on actors' dispositions and schemes of perception, how they view the world and how they try to change it. I conducted in-depth interviews with around 30 individuals involved in the integration debate as participants or gate keepers.<sup>22</sup> Respondents included politicians, intellectuals and academics who frequently appear on television, on the radio or in the newspapers to air their views on integration issues (and often on other issues as well). Interviews typically began with questions on the interviewees' backgrounds and how they got to where they are now. The interviews reconstructed the evolution of their schemes of perceptions through questions on the milieus in which they cultivated their views and the experiences or events that shaped their life course. I also tried to identify their power resources, such as their sources of income and the institutions that invited them to talk or write (*cf.* Lamont, 1987). The interviews addressed the debate in the newspapers but also explored the position of actors in other settings, such as policy networks, political parties or university departments. To understand their intervention in one setting, we have to investigate how that intervention originated from – and feeds back into – other settings. Interviews with gate keepers, such as editors at newspapers and programmers of debates, included questions on the setting whose access they regulated (e.g., “What is distinctive about this newspaper section?”) and on their methods for selecting and recruiting contributors. Next to the interviews that I conducted myself, I used *secondary data and secondary literature* including interviews, biographies and autobiographies written by and on participants in integration politics. With the aid of these primary and secondary sources of data, we can reconstruct how individuals came to take a certain position. The text boxes interspersed through the text and the sections on experiences of power probe the processes of habitus formation of the most central figures<sup>23</sup>, the feelings that animate integration politics and the different positions that actors take in different fields.

### *Explaining power relations*

The distinction between the three forms of power makes it possible to indicate with considerable precision how strong a discourse, actor or group of actors is at any particular moment in time. Qualitative techniques help to identify the micro-foundations of macro-structures and to make an inventory of the subjective impacts and experiences of power relations. But how to explain transformations within power relations? The social forces that affect the debate are numerous and diverse. So, too, are developments in the debate itself. Many different strategies with origins in different settings push in different directions. For instance, the editors of the newspaper *De Volkskrant* have over the years afforded relatively more space to critics of minority cultures whereas the editors of *NRC Handelsblad* have not. Providing a proper explanation of such divergent developments requires a number of investigations into the different settings where integration discourses are produced. These complexities imply that we should not expect a single, straightforward development. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 identified several possible causes of transformation that can explain the course and outcome of discursive struggles on the opinion pages.

*A reconfiguration of relations between different fields* is one possible cause of transformation. While the format of the opinion pages has changed little, they are part of a larger field that has experienced drastic transformations. One general development that structures power relations is the mediatization of integration politics and the simultaneous sensationalization of the media. In the early 1990s, the media landscape was still dominated by broadcasting associations and newspapers with roots in the era of pillarization (see Chapter 4). But over time, commercial broadcasting associations and (more recently) the Internet have become more important. Some actors are better disposed to respond to this development than others and are therefore more likely to gain power. While my analysis alludes to the importance of these new modalities and settings for integration politics, data has been systematically collected only in one setting (the opinion pages). The allusions thus cannot be systematically elaborated. However, two other possible causes of transformation – changing bases of support and changing relations among groups – can be studied in greater detail.

*Changing bases of support.* Class transformations can impact integration discourse as ascendant groups and their representatives feel they can challenge established elites and denounce their ways as anachronistic or undemocratic. Transformations result from the growth or decline – or the activation and deactivation – of class fractions. For instance, right-leaning philosophers entered the integration debate following the assassination of Theo van Gogh in favor of Culturalism. Whereas they had previously been inactive, they now had a

strong impact. Something similar is true for Fortuyn's core constituency. The group of natives with low levels of cultural capital, distrustful of government and harboring negative attitudes towards migrants, had grown in the 1980s and 1990s. Data on electoral participation shows they remained inactive until Fortuyn pulled them into the political arena (see Chapter 5). The key to explaining change, then, is to investigate how civil elites succeed or fail to mobilize different class fractions. Or to put it in more positivist terms, the interaction effect of a growing support base and the articulation of a discourse that can appeal to that base translates into greater civil power. I investigate such processes through vignettes which describe how actors cultivated the dispositions that enabled them to appeal to specific class fractions. Although the central figures in integration politics tend to have idiosyncratic personalities and life histories, investigating the milieus from which they originated can reveal how their individual trajectories developed in relation to general processes of class transformation (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1984a, p. 113, 1992).

*Changing alliances.* Drastic transformations can occur when the relationship between class fractions is reconfigured. If civil elites turn their absent or antagonistic relationship into a cooperative one, they can focus their attention on a shared goal or on opposing a common opponent. This strategic dimension of integration politics can be examined through the structure of networks, which can explain why certain clusters appear more or less powerful than would be expected on the basis of sheer numbers. I therefore analyze three mechanisms that tie actors together. First, do members of a cluster share (only) opponents or do they (also) maintain internal relations? I use density as a proxy for this feature of clusters, operationalized as the number of positive ties shared by the total number of possible ties. Second, do clusters have discursive leaders – people who come to stand for the group? We can relationally reconceive Weber's "charisma" as the result of a process through which actors invest their energies and emotions into leaders who then come to stand for the group (Weber, 1978, pp. 1158-1159). I label actors "discursive leaders" when their net score for discursive leadership (see above) is at least five.<sup>24</sup> Third, and related to the above, do clusters concentrate discursive power in some actors or do they distribute it evenly? To answer this question, I refer to the variance of discursive leadership within a cluster, with high scores indicating concentration of discursive power in a select number of actors and low scores indicating an egalitarian distribution of discursive power. The growth or decline of civil power can thus be explained, in part, as a function of changing network patterns within and between different clusters. If previously disparate or antagonistic actors start working together (a change that would itself have to be explained) then they – and the discourses they promote – gain in power. If

previously cohesive clusters of actors fragment into disparate or antagonistic groups, then these actors, and the discourses they support, lose in power.


### Specification of the research question

The thrust of the analysis in Part II focuses on the transformations that occurred between 1991 and 2005. To understand the preconditions of these transformations, the next chapter provides an account of the genesis and evolution of the Dutch civil sphere. The two subsequent chapters then examine the power of different discourses between 1991 and 2005 and provide explanations for their transformation. To get a rough idea of the transformations we want to account for, a general overview of the debate is helpful. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 present some initial findings that make it possible to specify the general question – how and why did power relations transform in the debate on integration? – posed at the beginning of this chapter.

**Table 3.1 Relative and absolute support for five integration discourses in five different periods (unknown/other [n=118] not shown)**

	<i>Culturalism</i>		<i>Pragmatism</i>		<i>Civil Islam</i>		<i>Anti-racism</i>		<i>Diversity</i>		<i>Total</i> N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
1990 to 1994	17	14.8	73	63.5	11	9.6	10	8.7	4	3.5	115
1995 to 1999	11	17.5	27	42.9	9	14.3	6	9.5	10	15.9	63
2000 to 9/11	15	23.1	41	63.1	4	6.2	2	3.1	3	4.6	65
9/11 to Fortuyn murder (6 May 2002)	16	34.0	17	36.2	9	19.1	1	2.1	4	8.5	47
6 May 2002 to 1 January 2006	95	29.6	157	48.9	42	13.1	16	5.0	11	3.4	321
<b>Total</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>611</b>

**Figure 3.1** Intensity of debate on minority integration in three Dutch newspapers (*NRC Handelsblad*, *De Volkskrant*, *Trouw*)



The number of hits refers to search results in the Lexis Nexis database. The number of articles in the corpus is much lower than the number of hits because short articles and news items are filtered out.

\* Data for 1990-1991 is only available for *NRC*. To give an approximation of the total coverage, the number of hits has been tripled.

\*\* Data for 1992-1994 is only available for *Trouw* and *NRC*. To give an approximation of the total coverage, the number of hits for *Trouw* and *NRC* have been multiplied by 1.5.

Figure 3.1 shows that the intensity of the integration debate fluctuates over time. The debate flares up when actors struggle over the interpretation of a dramatic event or a shocking intervention. To organize the discussion and data, I distinguish between five periods based on the interventions or events that marked an intensification or pacification of the debate:

*Period 1*: 1990-1994. This period covers the debate following Frits Bolkestein’s intervention in which he argued that integration policies had been too soft and there was a need to make clear that the values of the enlightenment were not up for negotiation. Although Bolkestein focused his criticisms on Islam, the debate mainly revolved around “minorities” and “foreigners.” The end of the period is marked by the entry of the right-wing Liberals into the Cabinet;

*Period 2:* 1995-1999. In this period there is no change in the substance of the debate. Its intensity remains comparatively low;

*Period 3:* 2000 until 11 September 2001. This period runs from the publication of Scheffer's article on the "multicultural drama" to the attacks on the World Trade Tower and the Pentagon. The debate at this point revolved mainly around (ethnic) minorities. Muslims were discussed but not so much;

*Period 4:* from 11 September 2001 until Pim Fortuyn's assassination on 6 May 2002. In this period, the populist politician Fortuyn roared onto the political scene. As a result of the events of 9/11 and a number of his remarks, the debate focused more on "Muslims" than before, though "minorities" are still mentioned twice as often;

*Period 5:* from the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002 until 31 December 2005. The assassination of Fortuyn more or less coincided with the installation of a new cabinet and inaugurated a period of sustained conflict propelled by a series of incidents. The most important of these was the murder of Islam critic and film maker Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004. Together with the Somali refugee and right-wing politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Van Gogh had made a movie, *Submission*, which sought to demonstrate that the Quran justifies the maltreatment of women. In this period, the debate revolves more around "Muslims" than "minorities." The end date is chosen for practical reasons.

The descriptions of these periods already suggest that a select number of actors have leading roles. In spite of their differences, Frits Bolkestein, Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali all support Culturalism. The fact that their names are so well-known compared to their opponents indicates that they have strong resonance – a conjecture confirmed by their Page Rank scores: Bolkestein concentrated no less than 17 per cent of resonance power in the period between his intervention in 1991 and 2000, while Scheffer had 10 per cent between his intervention in 2000 and the events of 9/11. Hirsi Ali (6 per cent) and Pim Fortuyn (4 per cent) were the most central persons after 9/11. Table 3.1 shows, moreover, that the number and share of articles supporting Culturalism has increased drastically over time. Given the growing power of Culturalism, the first set of questions – to be answered in Chapter 5 – is:

What are the ideas, notions and symbols of culturalist integration discourse? From

where does Culturalism draw its increasing power?

The results in Table 3.1 provide a first indication of the growing power of culturalist discourse. But they also show that it would be imprecise to say, without further qualification, that Culturalism is dominant. Its power is limited because culturalists receive much more criticism than praise. For example, Bolkestein was criticized 93 times and praised 28 times in the early 1990s (a ratio of 3.3) while Hirsi Ali was criticized 116 times and praised 59 times (a ratio of 2.0) in the period following the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. Culturalism is also not dominant in the sense that a majority of participants in the debate promote it; more authors support Pragmatism or one of the other integration discourses. The dominance of Culturalism is furthermore ambivalent because its support, as measured by the number of articles, goes up and down alongside the number of non-culturalist articles. Rather than Culturalism crowding out other discourses, integration discourses seem to be *unequal yet symbiotic*, though this is truer for some discourses than others. Hence the second set of questions that Chapter 6 seeks to answer:

Which discourses provide an alternative to Culturalism? What are their ideas, notions and symbols? How did promoters of these discourses respond to the culturalist ascent?

The answers to these sub-questions will provide us with specific answers to the general question of how the balance of power between discourses and actors evolved, and detail the mechanisms and strategies through which power relations were reproduced or transformed. The following chapters also set the stage for Part III where we examine discursive struggle in the governance of diversity in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Obviously the governance of diversity in the two largest Dutch cities plays a role in the national integration debate and *vice versa*. But before we can probe such relations and implications, we have to unpack this monolith – “the debate” – and investigate, in detail, how actors articulate discourses, how they acquire power and how they interact.



## 4. The evolution of the Dutch civil sphere

Culturalism has been a powerful force in the Netherlands since 1991 but it did not emerge out of thin air. To understand integration politics after 1991, we need to reconstruct the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and the genesis of a policy field through which minorities were to be governed. How did power relations form in the civil sphere and how were these refracted in the policy field? This chapter answers this question through an examination of the proliferation and resolution of three formative conflicts in the Dutch civil sphere: the emergence and incorporation of Catholic and Socialist challengers in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>25</sup> the emergence and incorporation of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Moluccan revolt of the 1970s and the subsequent inception of the minorities policy. This chapter shows how each of these conflicts affected power relations in the civil sphere and identifies how their resolution shaped the terrain on which integration politics would unfold after 1991. The chapter concludes that the failure of the minorities policy to successfully incorporate migrants in the 1980s prefigured the emergence of Culturalism in the 1990s.

### **Pillarization and Pragmatism**

During the 17<sup>th</sup> century, a period often referred to as “the golden age” of the Netherlands, the Dutch Republic was a loose federation of provinces rather than a unified state (Gorski, 2003). While the establishment of a monarchy in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and a constitutional monarchy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century centralized powers into a state apparatus, the distribution of power between religious groups (Protestants, Catholics) and class fractions (mercantile capitalists, landed nobility) was so even that it was impossible for any group to monopolize control over the state apparatus and impose its view upon others. Due to this balance of power, transformations took the form of reforms rather than revolutions; when one or the other party gained power and sought to inscribe its discourse into state institutions, this usually resulted in accommodation rather than confrontation.

The creation of “pillarized” institutions was an example such accommodation. In the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Catholics as well as Socialists challenged the hegemony of Protestants and capitalists. Because censitary suffrage and majority rule made it difficult for these groups to enter the parliamentary system, they increasingly organized outside of it. To prevent the kind of revolutionary developments that

had taken place elsewhere, Protestant and capitalist elites agreed to the introduction of universal suffrage and drastic constitutional reforms (Stuurman, 1983). Both the (divided) established elites and the (equally divided) challengers favored a system that accommodated different interests and incorporated even small minorities. The result was an extremely proportional electoral system in which even small Protestant sects and radical left-wing parties could gain seats in parliament; no less than 17 parties entered parliament after the elections of 1918. Since then, there has been a balance of power between three large currents: Christian Democracy (initially subdivided into Catholic and various Protestant parties, later united in the CDA – *Christen Democratisch Appèl* or Christian Democratic Appeal), the right-wing Liberals (VVD, *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* or People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), and the Social Democrats (PvdA – *Partij van de Arbeid* or Labor Party). Without exception, the Netherlands has been governed by coalition governments since the introduction of universal suffrage.

In 1918, the major parties reached an agreement stipulating that each subcultural group was entitled to manage its own service infrastructure with full financial support from the central government. “Pillarization” is a specific type of corporatism with distinct societal blocs each having their own political representatives and institutions of socialization (see Lijphart, 1968). In the terms presented in Chapter 2, pillars functioned as milieus where specific identities and schemes of perception were cultivated. Because each pillar had its own institutions – schools, churches, newspapers and parties – there was little interaction between different constituencies. The pillars remained highly segregated – so much so that they resembled different “countries” (Bagley, 1973, p. 231). For instance, the newspapers examined in the next chapter did not function as discursive arenas but as internal communication channels for pillars. Newspapers devoted disproportionate attention to “their” parties and either ignored or criticized competing parties.<sup>26</sup> The newspaper *Trouw* has its roots in the Protestant resistance against the Nazi occupation and was tied to the Protestant Anti-revolutionary Party in the post-war period. *De Volkskrant* was established as a bulletin of the Catholic labor movement in 1919; its editorials in the post-war period were entirely in line with the ideas of the Catholic People’s Party. The predecessors of *NRC Handelsblad* (*Algemeen Handelsblad* and *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*) had strong allegiance to the liberal parties. In this segregated civil sphere, the elites of the different pillars interacted with opponents but there was a generally accepted set of rules that guaranteed that these interactions would not evolve into open conflict (Lijphart, 1968). The institutions of pillarized corporatism encouraged elites to compromise, negotiate and accommodate, thereby fostering

a political culture of pragmatism. Magnifying cultural or political differences or arousing discontent was not done.<sup>27</sup>

Pillarization was characterized by a high level of communal autonomy at the national level and an equally high level of local paternalism. Services were provided by private charities that tended to see their clients as constituents of pillars. Over time, many of these private initiatives were placed under state control, while rapid secularization in the 1960s put further pressure on pillarized institutions. The Christian Democratic parties at this point changed their strategy. While they had resisted state interference before the war, they now argued for policies that not only benefited workers (the main constituents of the Social Democrats) but also other groups (such as self-employed entrepreneurs and housewives). As a result of this peculiar form of inter-party competition, the Dutch welfare state expanded explosively after the Second World War (Cox, 1995; Gladdish, 1991, p. 141).

Pillarization left an institutional heritage that shapes civil politics to this day. Religious minorities still have the right to establish institutions like schools and broadcasting stations with full financial support from the state. This explains, for instance, the relatively large number of Muslim schools in the Netherlands compared to other countries (see Rath *et al.*, 2001). Another effect of the pluralist compromise of 1918 is that it is comparatively easy for new parties to win seats in parliament; no more than 0.66 per cent of the vote is needed. This is significant for integration politics as it means that the parliamentary system is open to ascending challengers like the progressive movements of the 1960s or the culturalist movement that emerged in 2002. The idea of collective emancipation (and its correlate of communal social control) central to pillarization also influenced the minorities policy of the 1980s, though this was mediated by the new social movements that emerged after the collapse of corporatism.

### **De-pillarization and the new social movements**

The pillars of Dutch politics started to crumble in the late 1960s (Lijphart, 1988). As the welfare state expanded, people became less dependent on private, pillarized initiatives. The expansion of the welfare state came with central coordination and the universalization of standards and procedures. These processes undermined the discretion of pillarized elites to administer and allocate services. A rapidly growing number of youths and urbanites became less inclined to spend their lives in the pillars (and especially in the churches). New discursive milieus formed in the cities around youth movements such as the Provos, hippies and

squatters (Mamadouh, 1992). New political parties such as the progressive Liberal D'66 (Democrats 1966) and the anti-authoritarian PPR (*Politieke Partij Radikalen*, Radical Political Party) organized around new issues and managed to win support from voters who had no affinity with pillars. Within the Labor Party, the new left argued for a more passionate and oppositional style of politics.

De-pillarization affected all pillarized institutions, including the newspapers studied in the following chapters. All three have shaken off their ideological feathers to reach out to the growing number of people who do not wish to read the news from a particular – pillarized or ideological – perspective. The necessity to open up to new markets combined with a growing sense of journalistic professionalism; the result was that the three newspapers became much more alike – they covered similar issues and allowed a similar range of actors to voice their opinions. A side-effect of this process of de-segmentation is that the opinion pages now function as a single civil arena<sup>28</sup> that caters to the general – Dutch – public rather than to Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal subgroups. In fact, all three newspapers' daily opinion pages were introduced around 1990.<sup>29</sup>

The new social movements of the 1970s were accommodated in much the same way as socialist and confessional movements in the 1920s. While the pillars were crumbling, the culture of pragmatic compromise and consultation had become ingrained in the Dutch civil sphere, sustained through the institutions of proportional representation (Hoogenboom, 1996). Through newly established parties, the new movements directly influenced parliamentary politics; their ideas were inscribed into bureaucratic routines and institutional structures. The more reformist wings of the movements for women's emancipation, for housing rights and for the unemployed received subsidies and were incorporated into local and national consultative structures. Many ideas initially considered radical became widely accepted (Inglehart, 1977). During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there was an informalization of customs and a growing distaste for authoritarian relationships, between family members as well as between government and society (Wouters, 2004). Although the new social movements had their base in the expanding sector of (state-hired) specialists, they received support from a range of class fractions (Kriesi, 1989). Around 1990, consensus had grown within the Dutch population on what constitutes good conduct and acceptable ideas. When probed in surveys, at least seventy per cent of respondents *agree* that divorce is acceptable, that homosexuality is nothing special, that they believe in freedom of religion and consciousness, and that they support protection against discrimination. More than seventy per cent *disagree* with the propositions that women should have children to be happy, that there is a need for a strong leader, that

children should respect their parents and that we “would be better of if we returned to traditional ways of life” (Duyvendak, 2004, pp. 5-6).

How are the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s relevant to contemporary integration politics? James Kennedy has suggested that the formation of a secularized “majority culture” explains why the Dutch have so much antipathy towards religion in general and Muslims in particular (Kennedy, 2005). Jan Willem Duyvendak argues that the Dutch “progressive consensus” makes it easier to view Muslims as authoritarian, conservative outsiders (Duyvendak, 2004). Paul Sniderman and Loek Hagendoorn likewise suggest that natives and Muslims in the Netherlands have very different ideas about cultural practices like child rearing and therefore enter into conflict (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). I revisit and qualify these arguments in the next chapter where I specify how the widespread diffusion of progressive ideas shaped power relations in the civil sphere after 1991. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, new social movements spoke out against discrimination and in favor of minority rights. These movements and their ideals influenced the governance of minority integration at the local level and the formulation and implementation of the minorities policy.

### **The formation and contradictions of the minorities policy**

Thus far, this chapter has analyzed the evolution of the civil sphere in general. This section investigates how power relations in the civil sphere at large were refracted in a new policy field which took shape after the minorities policy was implemented in the 1980s. The section first sketches the creation and transformation of local governance networks before the introduction of the minorities policy. It then examines the genesis of the minorities policy and power relations between different actors. Finally, it explains why the corporatism of the minorities policy was in crisis from the moment it was conceived.

#### *An amalgam of local initiatives*

Assistance for foreign workers was organized through private initiative in the 1950s and early 1960s. While some support came from the central government, in most cities and regions confessional charities were the first to receive guest workers. Pillarized welfare foundations had traditionally incorporated the lower classes through paternalistic interventions (Dercksen & Verplanke, 1987); when the first post-colonial migrants and guest workers arrived, they reoriented themselves to this new and rapidly expanding target group (Rath, 1991). Networks of welfare organizations and civil society associations expanded in localities where migrants

concentrated. Confessional organizations had a strong presence in the first stages of the development of these governance networks, while the involvement of left-leaning (anti-racist and anti-imperialist) support groups increased over time. In the 1970s, left-leaning native activists combined forces with politicized migrants, including a small but influential group of political refugees. Coalitions of movement organizations and minority associations organized campaigns and created an infrastructure to assist migrants with legal counseling, Dutch courses, and other services to ease the plight of guest workers. As in many other fields, these progressive movements were incorporated in the state through the creation of professions (the number of community workers exploded in this period), categorical provisions (i.e., provisions for specific migrant groups) and consultative structures. Within the central government, the Ministry of Welfare – the “heart of the welfare state” (De Haan & Duyvendak, 2002) and vestige of the progressive left – financed and united the welfare foundations. This ministry was a central node in what otherwise was a loosely structured field composed of an amalgam of local networks without a clear center. Over the course of the 1980s, these local networks were drastically restructured through the minorities policy.

*The genesis of the minorities policy: standardization and centralization*

The trigger for the creation of the minorities policy was the sudden proliferation of militant action by Moluccans, including hijackings, occupations and killings. The Moluccans form a small community with a peculiar migration history and relationship with the Netherlands (Box 4.1). The established parties nevertheless felt that the Moluccan violence presaged the social unrest that might ensue if ethnic minorities continued to suffer from social isolation and economic deprivation. The solution, they argued, was a policy that would help ethnic minorities socially and economically integrate into Dutch society without shedding their cultural identities. In light of the contention after 1991, it is remarkable that in the late 1970s the main political currents – the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats – could so easily agree on the necessity and content of what would become the minorities policy. They opted for the tried and tested strategy of cooptation through corporatism: minorities were to be included through consultative structures and associations funded by the central state and incorporated into local governance networks.

#### **Box 4.1 A Moluccan backlash and the genesis of the minorities policy**

The Moluccas are an island group in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch colonial enterprise exploited the islands for spices but when trade stagnated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it shifted its attention to other islands. For these missions, the Dutch army recruited especially from Christian minorities such as the Menadonese and the Moluccans. “Of all the groups,” writes Bartels, “the Moluccans most justified the trust put into them.” Not only were they “fierce and daring” (others would say ruthless) soldiers, they also developed “an unquestioning, if not fanatical loyalty to the Dutch, especially to the house of Orange” (Bartels, 1986, p. 25). The Moluccan soldiers helped to suppress the revolts of other (Muslim) communities in Indonesia, joined the Dutch army when the Japanese invaded during World War II and joined the campaigns of the Dutch army to repress the Indonesian independence movement.

In 1950 Soekarno proclaimed the independence of a unitary Indonesian state. Their unwavering support for the former colonizers gave the Moluccan soldiers every reason to fear retaliation from the Indonesian independence movement. Many were convinced that only a federal Indonesia with an autonomous Moluccan Republic would protect them. But no government, including the Dutch one, would recognize the Moluccan Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, RMS). The Moluccan soldiers thus found themselves in a state controlled by their opponents. The soldiers and their families – 12,500 people in total – were shipped to the Netherlands, where they would remain until the Moluccan Republic would be established.

The Moluccans did not receive the warm welcome they had expected after years of loyal service. “Once having arrived in cold, damp Holland, the soldiers were rather unceremoniously discharged and put into camps spread all over the country – such as the former German concentration camps of Schattenberg and Vught” (Bartels, 1986, p. 29). The discharge came as a terrible shock to the soldiers. “The Moluccans felt sold out, treated like worthless trash. ... The proud soldiers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning in their lives” (*ibid.*, 29).

While the leaders of the older generation still hoped that the Dutch government would support the RMS or at least rehabilitate the veterans, the younger generation grew resentful, towards both the Dutch government for forsaking its responsibilities and their leaders for keeping the community at a standstill. After waiting in vain for more than two decades, a part of the younger generation took recourse to radical action, including occupations of the Indonesian embassy and Dutch government buildings. The most dramatic incidents were two hijackings of passenger trains in 1975 and 1977. The Moluccan militants killed hostages in both events to pressure the Dutch government, but to no avail. The first action ended when the hijackers surrendered after twelve days. The second hijacking ended when marines stormed the train and killed all six hijackers. Ed van Thijn, a Labor Party MP at the time, refers to the violence as a “wake-up call” to politicians of his generation (Van Thijn, 2008). National policy-makers felt that similar problems could develop among other minorities, whose numbers were growing. The stage was thus set for policies that would prevent the kind of violence that had brutally disrupted the idea of a peaceful and liberal nation.

The minorities policy marked the inception of a field with a new vocabulary, a new elite and new institutions. Although it is now common practice for Dutch commentators to divide the population into (first, second and third generation) migrants (*allochtonen*) and natives (*autochtonen*), or to distinguish between different ethnic minorities, these concepts and

categorizations only emerged with the minorities policy. Various migrant groups had come to the Netherlands under very different circumstances, spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, had different appearances, lived in different parts of the country and were entangled in different networks. Social scientists were among the first to develop a discourse that enabled the government to make sense of all these groups and to subject them to one and the same policy. The geographer Van Amersfoort (1974) was the first social scientist to offer a truly generalizing discourse through his notion of “minority formation,” which referred to the confluence of cultural alterity and economic marginality. Highly placed civil servants with backgrounds in the social sciences argued for policies to combat the segregation and deprivation of ethnic minorities (Entzinger, 1975).

The Scientific Council for Government Advice was charged with identifying the ethnic minorities to be targeted by such a policy. The Council hired Rinus Penninx – an anthropologist with Marxist sympathies and a history of involvement with migrant support groups (Scholten, 2007, p. 114) – to write a background report. The document he produced reads like, and in a very real sense *is*, the founding statement of a policy field (Penninx, 1979). The report gave lengthy descriptions of three categories of migrants (Moluccans, Mediterranean guest workers, and Surinamese and Antilleans) and an extensive overview of recommended policy measures. Penninx argued that politicians and policy-makers lacked the most basic understanding of the social consequences of immigration and that there was a disturbing lack of policy coordination. Although he did not specify what the policy philosophy should be, he argued for a comprehensive strategy to monitor and improve the position of migrants in various fields (including housing, education and the law) and expressed his hope that migrants would have a strong say in the policies that targeted them. The Scientific Council and the government accepted these recommendations wholesale, though they placed more emphasis on the threats potentially posed by minorities. The Scientific Council claimed that:

It is not to be expected that such participatory processes will take place without conflict; that would be to underestimate the problems at issue. The various cultures coming into confrontation with one another display some attitudes and behaviors that are not easily reconcilable, and that are regarded by both sides as fundamental achievements. Thus, for example, very important aspects of our western culture, such as individual liberty and equality, will be contested by another culture, sometimes militantly. In those cases of confrontation where no practical compromise is possible there remains no choice but to

defend the achievements of our culture against dissenting assertions (WRR, 1979, p. XXI).

Jos van Kemenade, the Minister of Education for the Labor Party, stated in 1982 that not all cultural practices should be preserved:

Although it is usually not stated very emphatically, it is crystal clear that recognition, let alone promotion of a group's own identity, values, normative orientation, behaviors and beliefs, finds its limits where these come into conflict with the values that are enshrined into Dutch society, the constitution and the law and that are part of the achievements of our society. Physical punishment, polygamy, suppression of women, forced marriages of minors, but also the evasion of compulsory education may very well be ... part of the indigenous identity or values ... but do not deserve to be promoted or preserved and, indeed, must be fought. Assimilation to the Dutch value pattern has to come first (cited in Mullard *et al.*, 1990, p. 61).

The above remarks reveal that the minorities policy was driven by a desire to prevent cultural insulation and segregation. Note that there was never any question of policies for non-deprived communities: the impetus was *not* a desire to preserve or celebrate minority cultures but to make sure that ethnic communities did not fall victim to the twin process of cultural isolation and economic deprivation. The sentiment that informed the minorities policy was one of anxious paternalism rather than enthusiastic multiculturalism.

#### *The formation and transformation of power relations in the policy field*

The minorities policy had a profound impact on power relations, both locally and nationally. Since we explore local repercussions in Part III, I here focus on power transformations at the national level. The most profound impact was due to the transformation of an amalgam of institutions into a unified field; bureaucratization created a center in the new policy field from which resources were distributed and through which information was processed. The minorities policy came under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Affairs; its newly established Directorate Minorities Policy acquired control over policy formulation. The technical and discursive skills of experts – proficiency in bureaucratic jargon, capacity to coordinate across departments and communicate with officials – enabled them to take up key positions as advisers, managers or professionals in and around this new center. With the desire

to contain unrest and administer populations at the root of the new policy, minority experts were well-placed to meet the demand for information and insight. One indication of the growing power of experts was the explosion in the number of research projects on minorities: from around 6 per year in the late 1970s to more than 200 in the mid-1980s (Penninx, 1988a, pp. 5-11). While many professionals first became involved in minority affairs due to their solidarity with migrants, bureaucratization and standardization increasingly opened the field to experts with less empathy; passionate advocates who argued on behalf of minorities were gradually replaced with experts who reasoned on behalf of the state.

The new elite entered into an increasingly antagonistic relationship with the elite that had been in control before the inception of the minorities policy. As stated above, the Ministry of Welfare had been a key node in the networks of welfare organizations and minority associations. These actors were marginalized as the field unified and centralized; the new policy was especially damaging for the categorical welfare organizations. The Moluccan Advisory Council, the Surinamese Welfare Council and many minority and welfare associations protested against the abolition of categorical provisions but were unsuccessful (Fermin, 1995). As a compromise, the minorities policy created consultative structures through which minority representatives could influence policy decisions. Minority associations moreover received funds to organize cultural and social activities to maintain migrant participation. Minority representatives were supposed to function as intermediaries and advisers in this corporatist policy figuration.

By the time the minorities policy had crystallized into institutions, it was clear that the newly established policy field was rife with contradictions. First of all, the corporatist structure presumed that ethnic groups were internally cohesive. This was only (partially) true for the Moluccan community. The Turkish and Moroccan communities were internally divided and lacked representative bodies. To nevertheless make use of the possibilities of recognition and its attendant resources, welfare organizations helped leftist political refugees and politicized guest workers to establish associations and to conquer places for themselves in the expanding minorities policy bureaucracy (see Chapters 8 and 11). Though it was convenient for administrators to recognize these figures as representatives, they did not represent the more conservative or apathetic currents within their respective ethnic communities (Köbben, 1983).

Second, minority representatives and experts were unequally invested with cultural capital. As a result of their particular migration trajectories, members of the Turkish and Moroccan communities mostly belonged to the lowest classes; the differences in education

and income with the native population were huge. Minority representatives were caught in a double bind. On the one hand, they were to operate within the state bureaucracy, requiring higher education, proficiency in (bureaucratic) Dutch, careful long-term planning and networking acumen. On the other hand, they were supposed to represent their communities, consisting of people in the lowest segments of the labor market. Their legitimacy was often called into question, either because they were not truly representative of their communities, or because they did not have the proper skills (see, e.g., Köbben, 1983). Minority associations often felt that their concerns were ignored, that they were consulted only after decisions had already been made, and that the government did not sufficiently recognize and reward their contributions. They often used formal hearings or consultations to lament policy decisions and to complain that they were not being taken seriously. Conference proceedings from the time and interviews with minority representatives reveal their intense frustration over the disjuncture between their formal and actual status (e.g. Mullard *et al.*, 1990; PBR, 1991; see Box 4.2). And the tensions between minority representatives and administrators only grew as the social position of minorities became weaker. Due to the contraction and relocation of industries that employed guest workers, unemployment skyrocketed. In 1979, when the Scientific Council published its first advice on the minorities policy, 11 percent of Moroccans and Turks were registered as unemployed (against 6 per cent for natives). In 1983, when the policy was implemented, the figure had risen to a staggering 37 per cent for Moroccans and Turks (against 14 per cent for natives).<sup>30</sup>

#### **Box 4.2 Pragmatic administrators versus passionate advocates – an example**

On 23 November 1987, the national minority organizations organized a symposium to evaluate the minorities policy four years after its inception. The program featured all the key players in the policy field: several researchers, a civil servant, a representative of minority associations, a governmental anti-racist organization and two ministers: L.C. Brinkman of Welfare and C.P. van Dijk of Interior Affairs. The speakers were mostly, though not exclusively, highly educated native Dutch men.

While the report does not list the symposium's attendees, most of the cited audience members were representatives of left-leaning minority associations. Two Turkish women remarked that "the government does not listen well to women" and that "scientists and policy-makers should use the experiences of migrant women" (cited in Lindo, 1986, p. 5). A representative of one of the national councils for migrant representation stated that good intentions are not enough – "the majority also really needs to listen to minorities" (*ibid.*, p. 6). A spokesperson of an umbrella association for guest workers stated that their "right to consultation" did not amount to much if the government did not want to "force itself to be consulted" (*ibid.*, p. 6). A representative of an Italian association used a more frivolous but telling metaphor: the government, he said, had acted as a father who buys a toy train for his son but then does not allow him to play with it (*ibid.*, p. 6).

The demand to be heard was articulated most forcefully in the "manifesto" that Mohammed Rabbae, director of the National Center for Foreigners, read out to Minister Van Dijk. Rabbae suggested, on behalf of "the minority organizations," a whole range of measures that would improve the position of minorities in the policy's various subdomains. But the essence of his message was that he did not feel the government was truly committed. "The minorities policy," he said, was about to degenerate into "minority management, without inspiration, routinized, and defensive" (*ibid.*, p. 147). He questioned whether there was the "*political will*" to put "the perspective of equality" into practice (*ibid.*, p. 152, original emphasis).

Van Dijk was not impressed and asked the audience to "excuse me for not responding to each and every allegation" (*ibid.*, p. 154). The government, he said, had recently discovered the limits of its own power: "We have come to the conclusion that we should be a bit more modest. And this is not just true for the minorities policy but for community work (*maatschappelijk werk*) generally" (*ibid.*, p. 154).

Due to these contradictions, the policy field was in crisis from its inception. In retrospect, it is clear that by the time the minorities policy was implemented, the movements that had shaped its development had lost their momentum. The corporatist logic of pillarization, the progressive ideals of the new social movements and the expansion of the welfare state had defined the content and approach of the minorities policy; it was a bureaucratic remnant of a time when the ideal of state-guided development towards a more equal, tolerant and inclusive society was widely shared. But already in 1987, just four years after the inception of the minorities policy, the government requested the Scientific Council for further advice on minority integration. This time Han Entzinger – an empirical sociologist, civil servant and

member of the progressive Liberals – was chiefly responsible. The advice, which came in 1989, recommended focusing on migrants' position on the labor market: civil integration courses as well as training schemes to reduce their relative disadvantage. Migrants were now relabeled *allochtonen* (WRR, 1989). They were no longer regarded as members of ethnic communities but as individuals with weak positions on the labor market, handicapped by their lack of proficiency in Dutch, by discrimination and by their meager networks.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has sketched the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and the formation and transformation of the policy field through which minorities are administered. I showed that power relations in the Dutch civil sphere experienced sudden transformations on two occasions: in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when pillarization crystallized and in the late 1960s and early 1970s when new social movements put their stamp on the expanding welfare state. Both these ruptures were prefigured by long-term trends that exacerbated the contradictions of power relations in the civil sphere. I argue in the following chapters that a similar process took place in the early 2000s when the Dutch civil sphere experienced another major transformation – the ascendancy of Culturalism – whose conditions of possibility had long been in the making.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little discussion of minority integration within civil arenas. Articles occasionally appeared but there was no intense debate among politicians or intellectuals. Because of this lack of discursive struggle, the field that evolved around the minorities policy could develop its own distinctive rules and positions and oppositions. I especially emphasized the opposition between advocates and experts. The former presented themselves as the agents of migrants' emancipation; the latter, further removed from the experiences of migrants, adopted a more sober discourse. As categorical institutions were dissolved, as migrants suffered growing unemployment and as policies increasingly focused on economic integration, the experts gained in power at the expense of the advocates. This shifting balance of power was also reflected in government discourse. Whereas Rinus Penninx – an anthropologist with Marxist sympathies and a history of involvement with migrant support groups – sketched the contours of a policy for collective emancipation, Han Entzinger – an empirical sociologist, civil servant and member of the progressive Liberals – formulated a discourse that ascribed most value to individual economic integration. These shifts were profound. The ideas that had motivated the minorities policy could no longer count on strong

support when it was implemented; the transition towards the current integration policy was, by the end of the 1980s, well underway. But despite these contradictions, integration was not an issue around which political oppositions formed. The approach of the government was pragmatic and there was consensus among the major currents in Dutch politics that it should remain so. This changed in 1991.

## 5. The ascendancy of Culturalism

In the image of the Dutch civil sphere sketched in the previous chapter, there is no place for a dominant conception of Dutch identity and culture.<sup>31</sup> Relations between groups and their representatives were characterized by pragmatism and the avoidance of conflict. The Netherlands was a country of minorities; it was both practically difficult and morally suspect to claim that one culture is worthier than another. Culturalism thus cannot be understood as a “Dutch discourse.” The promoters of Culturalism, in fact, sought to redefine the Netherlands and transform its political culture. This chapter shows that Culturalism is a discourse of ascendant elites who challenged this pragmatic political culture and its dignitaries. The chapter examines which elites embraced Culturalism, why they did so, and their relative power compared to their antagonists. The first section identifies some of the milieus in which culturalist ideas and notions were cultivated before the 1990s. The subsequent sections analyze the evolution of Culturalism through an analysis of its most prominent representatives: Frits Bolkestein in the 1990s, Paul Scheffer immediately after 2000, Pim Fortuyn after 9/11, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali after the assassinations of first Fortuyn (May 2002) and then Theo van Gogh (November 2004). The sections first examine the discourses of these central figures and subsequently identify their bases of support. Finally, the chapter identifies the kind of power that culturalists exercise and the networks and class fractions that sustain it.

### A pragmatic tradition and the seeds of Culturalism

There were already signs that politics was breaking out of the bounds of consensus and accommodation in the 1980s. While parliamentary elites and their associates in civil society were firmly committed to accommodation, actors on the margins were sowing the seeds of the symbolic revolution that would occur through shocks in 1991, 2000 and 2002-2005.<sup>32</sup> We can distinguish three distinct milieus where Culturalism was cultivated in the 1980s, each with its own particular class composition and discursive codes.

#### *The extreme right's challenge*

First of all there was the extreme right. Hans Janmaat and his Center Party (later the Center Democrats) saw minorities as intruders to be removed from the civil sphere. In local elections, the Center Democrats and the Center Party sometimes won a considerable share of the vote in urban neighborhoods. In newspaper and television interviews, lower class natives complained

about the arrogance and impotence of the established political parties. To voice their discontent they cast “protest votes” – a novel phenomenon that exemplified the corrosion of the traditional institutions of socialization and mobilization in urban areas. In national and European elections the extreme right occasionally succeeded in passing the electoral threshold; since 1980 it has had a parliamentary presence in the person of Hans Janmaat.

Nevertheless, the Center Democrats and the Center Party were tainted with the stigma of racism. Other political parties made every effort to portray their xenophobic colleagues as reincarnations of the ideologies defeated in the Second World War. They ignored Janmaat, walking out of parliament during his speeches and refusing to answer his questions (Koper, 1995). Left-wing groups meticulously monitored the party and used both violent and non-violent strategies to prevent the Center Democrats and Center Party from gathering and organizing. Public prosecutors made every effort to convict the extreme right for “sowing hate” and were successful on several occasions. The symbolic, physical and legal assaults against his party frustrated Janmaat’s attempts to communicate an image of respectability. Although the Center Democrats formally distanced themselves from racism, some of its key figures had been convicted of inciting hatred or racist attacks. There were also obvious connections between the party leadership and Nazi and fascist organizations and gangs. The party attracted mainly disenfranchised lower class people who were routinely portrayed as political illiterates, drunks and hooligans (see, e.g., Frequin, 1994). Despite the efforts of the extreme right to present itself as mainstream – through slogans like “not left, not right” – it did not gain the acceptance of the mainstream parties. The stigma of the extreme right was so strong, in fact, that culturalists either had to moderate their discourse or risk being identified with civil pariahs. But the fact that such a thoroughly stigmatized party could attain electoral success showed that disenfranchised and anxious natives might support a discourse that simultaneously degraded established elites and minorities.

### *Experts against advocates*

A very different kind of culturalist challenge to pragmatist politics came from the experts involved in the minorities policy. As Chapter 4 showed, tension between policy experts and minority advocates was built into the minorities policy from the beginning. Some experts complained that minority spokespersons were not really representative of their communities but were only interested in subsidies or were overly sensitive to criticisms of minority cultures (e.g. Köbben, 1983). The journalist Herman Vuijsje was prominent among those trying to liberate negative opinions and statements about minorities from the stigma of racism; he

brought this discourse out of the policy field and into civil arenas (Vuijsje, 1986, 1997; see also Prins, 2004). One minority researcher told Vuijsje in the mid-1980s that “many people in this milieu have turned away from a love for the underdog to having reservations. After some time you get more spiteful. All those piles of reports on my desk are full of compassion and empathy and at some point you respond; the scales tip in the other direction. I know some people who now take that attitude” (cited in Vuijsje, 1986, p. 68). Another native Dutch researcher claimed that she was “almost lynched” at a sociology conference for her study of Turkish women, but that “after the session at least twenty people [expressed] their admiration for her courage” (cited in Vuijsje, 1986, p. 46). Vuijsje’s reports, however, are so full of people proudly breaking the taboo of examining ethnic differences that it is difficult to maintain that there was such a taboo. Instead, Vuijsje and his interviewees were shifting the balance of discursive power: migrant representatives and antiracists were losing power at the expense of policy researchers much more likely to explain criminality, unemployment and the like by referring to migrants’ cultural backgrounds (see also Mullard *et al.*, 1990). The message of these policy experts was that the minorities policy and its institutions were too respectful of migrants and minority cultures.

Unlike the extreme right, policy experts received positive coverage and were often invited to discuss their ideas in the media or at public debates. The database of newspaper articles contains several articles from 1990 that illustrate the controversies of the time: a professor of discourse analysis at the University of Amsterdam argued that a new anti-crime policy targeting ethnic groups was emblematic of the government’s tendency to adopt rather than resist the racist discourse of the Center Democrats (Van Dijk, 1990); a civil servant of the Municipality of Amsterdam expressed his frustration about taboos of political correctness (Beerenhout, 1990); the director of the Netherlands Center for Foreigners warned that a fee for returning guest workers could be seen as a sign that they were no longer welcome (Rabbae, 1990); and professionals talked about strategies to reduce crime among Moroccan youths (Mejatti *et al.*, 1990). The disputes were fierce: some in the policy field were trying to widen the discursive space available to address migrants’ cultural deficiencies; others were trying to foreground issues of discrimination and racism. Experts, however, spoke as individuals, not as representatives of movements or segments of the population. While discussions among policy-makers occasionally trickled into civil arenas, there was no public debate where different camps formed around focal points or central issues. While professionals and experts promoting Culturalism were gaining ground in the policy field (see Mullard *et al.*, 1990; Prins, 2004), their influence remained limited within public debates.

### *Intellectual flirtations with Culturalism*

Literary and intellectual elites who sought to defend artistic liberties against anti-racist and Islamic attempts to constrain their expression constituted a further culturalist challenge to pragmatist politics. Intellectuals criticized cultural relativism and multiculturalism in periodicals like *De Groene*, *Elsevier* and *Vrij Nederland*. In essays, satires, parodies and caricatures, native cultural elites ridiculed and criticized both Muslims and antiracists.<sup>33</sup> The respected and best-selling writer Gerrit Komrij, for instance, felt that “All the welfare work and the waffling about anti-racism; it was all for nothing. A waste of effort. Money thrown away. There is not a hint of reasonableness or tolerance in that group, which has lived here so long, in a society that actually had much to offer” (Komrij, cited in Van Dijk, 2003, p. 27). Artists and intellectuals who wished to be more hard-hitting in their criticisms complained about the cultural and legal norms that supposedly constrained their expression.

The most bewildering manifestation of the drive for spectacle was the appearance of an author who hid his identity behind the pseudonym Mohammed Rasoel. “Rasoel” made his first appearance on the opinion pages of the *NRC Handelsblad* on 6 March 1989, where he stated that he was a Muslim who had spent the first twenty years of his life in Iran before migrating to “the country of naive fools that goes by the name of The Netherlands” (Rasoel cited in Van Dijk, 2003, p. 25). The author ridiculed those who failed to anticipate Khomeini’s fatwa. “The West could have seen this coming. I could have predicted this response 15 years ago. The West could have known about the kind of fanatical responses that we Muslims are capable of and how much aggression we have inside of us” (Rasoel, cited in Tinnemans, 1994, p. 355). A year later, in 1990, “Rasoel” published *The Downfall of the Netherlands: Country of Naive Fools*. Its simple message – Muslims are inherently aggressive and the Dutch are too ignorant to acknowledge this – was delivered with literary sophistication. The prose of the pamphlet differed from the propaganda of the extreme right in that it was fluent and witty. “Rasoel” now appeared on television shows, on the radio and in prestigious and popular publications. The mystery of his identity – his face was covered with a Palestinian shawl and sunglasses – further fuelled the spectacle. Rasoel’s success was nevertheless short-lived. Several organizations filed complaints of racism. As the joke spiraled out of hand, those behind the pseudonym made every effort to remain anonymous. Teun van Dijk’s research, however, traces “Rasoel” to a group of respected native writers, translators and publishers, while the persons posing as “Rasoel” had been hired and instructed by this group (Van Dijk, 2003). “Rasoel” had given a team of intellectual conspirators the means to express what – in

spite of, or due to their prominence – they could not state openly. Anonymity allowed them to express subaltern sentiments and to become the sophisticated racists that they could not be in real life. The resonance of Rasool's discourse demonstrated the demand for spectacular Islamophobic expressions. But the fact that native intellectuals did not dare to come out into the open illustrated that, in the late 1980s, such expressions did not accord with the norms of good taste.

As these snapshots of the different discursive milieus demonstrate, Culturalism was present in the 1980s and growing in power. Culturalists in the political, bureaucratic and literary fields claimed discursive space to criticize minority cultures for different reasons: the extreme right capitalized on feelings of exclusion and cynicism among the disenfranchised lower classes; experts engaged in a struggle for professional authority with minority representatives and anti-racists; artists and intellectuals sought to gain or regain their power to offend sensitivities. The ingredients for the culturalist movement were thus already in place: hostility towards the political establishment, a desire to criticize minority cultures, and the drive to make policies more stringent. However, the class and cultural differences were so great that the forces from these disparate discursive milieus did not converge into a single movement.

### **Economic liberalism and cultural protectionism: Frits Bolkestein in the 1990s**

The idea of clashing cultures gained a strong presence in the central arenas of the civil sphere only after 1991. Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the right-wing Liberals, was absolutely central to the debate in this period. In 1991, he argued that Western civilization is fundamentally different from – and vastly superior to – Islamic civilization. He unfolded his vision at a meeting of European Liberal parties in the Swiss city of Luzern on 6 September. *Trouw* and *NRC* reported on the lecture but Bolkestein's opinion article in *De Volkskrant* – “The minorities policy needs to be handled with guts” (Bolkestein, 1991) – became the debate's focal point. Its central message was that the government should take robust measures to prevent or reduce the formidable problems arising from mass-migration. In his speech, Bolkestein drew upon the WRR's first report on integration issues:

Very important aspects of our Western culture like individual freedom and equality are under pressure of another culture in a sometimes militant way. In cases of confrontation, when a compromise is a practical impossibility, there is no other

choice than to defend our culture against competing claims (WRR 1979, cited in Bolkestein 1991).<sup>34</sup>

The WRR had arrived at these conclusions in the wake of the Moluccan hijackings and at the time of the incipient Islamic revolution in Iran. By the time Bolkestein delivered his speech, he could appeal to new global signifiers generated during the Rushdie affair:

Islam is not just a religion; it is a way of life. And as such it is at odds with the liberal division between church and state. Many Islamic countries have hardly any freedom of speech. The Salman Rushdie affair is perhaps an extreme case but it shows how much we differ from another in these matters (Bolkestein 1991).

Bolkestein saw himself as an exponent of the enlightenment and Western civilization, praising the achievements of intellectual icons like Goethe and Plato.<sup>35</sup> But he also presented himself as belonging to the “ordinary people” – those who had to shoulder the consequences of mass migration (Prins, 2002). Bolkestein observed that Dutch natives were developing a counter discourse behind the veil of private life:

There is an informal national debate that is not held in public. Voters feel that politicians are not sufficiently aware of their problems. The minority issue is constantly discussed in places like bars and churches. If this is not sufficiently represented in The Hague [the seat of parliament, JU] people will say: why should I vote anyway? (Bolkestein, cited in Prins, 2004, p. 28)

Bolkestein had a higher class background (see Box 5.1) but nevertheless presented himself as a redeemer of unjustly marginalized lower class discourses: “a representative who ignores the people’s concerns is worth nothing” (*ibid.*). “The people” here specifically refers to Dutch natives living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, people with experience, knowledge and, indeed, discourses that are not sufficiently valued in core arenas. Far from being the perpetrators of racism, they are victims – the “autochthonous minorities in poor neighborhoods in the big cities who are living in the midst of an allochtonous majority” (*ibid.*).

### **Box 5.1 Frits Bolkestein – an elite discourse for lower-class natives**

Bolkestein (1933) embodied a vast amount and variety of elite capital. He studied mathematics, science, Greek and philosophy in Amsterdam and graduated with a law degree from Leiden University, thus combining education in the premier milieu for cultural elites (the canal district of Amsterdam) and a premier milieu for governmental and business elites (the law faculty in Leiden). Bolkestein was a member of the Amsterdam student fraternity and a president of the student union. As a student in the late 1950s, he briefly wrote for the satirical literary magazine *Propria Cures*. Like many other editors of the magazine, he wrote on the silliness of religion and Catholicism and cultivated a disposition for polemics. But he was also an aspiring politician who, at the time, put his energies into solving the shortage of student housing in Amsterdam (he failed). The farewell editorial of the magazine described him as as “bustling young man occupied with lofty matters” (cited in *Propria Cures*, 1988, p. 6). After his education, he began working for Shell, one of the world’s oil giants. Some of his first encounters with Islam must have taken place in the 1970s during his time as a coordinator of Shell Chemistry for the Middle East, Asia and Australia. Bolkestein thus cultivated his dispositions in various elite circles and, as a politician, was able to create a stir without losing respectability – a privilege Hans Janmaat and others on the extreme right lacked. After he stepped down as the leader of the right-wing Liberals, Bolkestein became a European commissioner for the internal market. Throughout his career, he remained at the very top of the national market for speakers. In 2009, he received around 15,000 euros per performance (Conijn, 2009).

Culturalism counterposes superior civilizations to inferior civilizations and argues that the mingling of different cultures leads to the disintegration of the national body. As many observers have noted, this scheme has analogies to many racist ideologies (Stolcke, 1995). But precisely because Culturalism is akin to racism in some respects, its claim to civil virtue depends upon its discursive dissociation from racism. Bolkestein has repeatedly stated that discrimination should be combated; in the early 1990s, he participated in large anti-racist demonstrations. In fact, Bolkestein saw his interventions as an effort against Janmaat. “Those who ignore the anxiety will feed the resentment against minorities they oppose,” is the title of one of his articles; in it, he pleads to liberate the discourse on minorities from the envy, anger and apathy that are about to take possession of the electorate: “a distasteful and xenophobic party will not stop me from voicing my opinion. ... If we do not fix the problem our descendants will curse us” (Bolkestein, 1992).

Bolkestein mobilized culturalist discourse to appeal to segments of the population that had previously been socialist (*cf.* Van der Waal *et al.*, 2007). The state, in Bolkestein’s view, should be strict on immigration: to promote integration, the right hand of the state (Bourdieu, 1999, pp. 182-187) should strengthen its grip on those lower-class migrants living in the country but outside the civil community. Bolkestein’s attack on the minorities policy

paralleled his attack on the Rhineland model which, in his view, lacked flexibility and was burdened by too many consultative and regulatory structures (Bolkestein, 1996). Bolkestein's stated goal is the creation of a state in which economically independent citizens can prosper in safety (*ibid*). The ideal of collective and state-supported emancipation enshrined in the minorities policy thus ran counter to his ideas, which favored neoliberalization as a condition for integration. Rather than promoting social harmony, the welfare state created dependence and inertia. And his critique of the minorities policy showed that this applied particularly to lower-class migrants who did not partake in the culture of individual responsibility that Bolkestein associates with the West (e.g. Bolkestein, 1991, 2000).

### *Resonance and consonance*

Bolkestein was severely criticized, receiving 93 negative and 28 positive references over the period 1991-1994. Journalists, academics, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats all argued that he had been too blunt in his criticisms of minority cultures. Bolkestein received praise from actors critical of his discourse who nonetheless felt that his person and intentions were beyond reproach. Especially Labor politicians were keen on differentiating the legitimate Bolkestein from the illegitimate Janmaat. Prominent politicians like Thijs Wöltgens and Ed van Thijn criticized some of Bolkestein's views but praised him for opening up the debate (Wöltgens, cited in Banning & Eppink, 1991; Van Thijn, 1993). Aad Kosto, the Junior Minister for Immigration, similarly made a sharp distinction between Janmaat ("an idiot") and people nursing xenophobic sentiments – in his view an understandable response to the very real problems that plague multicultural neighborhoods (Kosto, 1992). Though Labor politicians and other critics did not agree with Bolkestein's views on Islam, many acknowledged him as a worthy opponent. With one notable exception (Labor minister Hedy d'Ancona), only marginal actors accused Bolkestein of stigmatizing migrants and playing into the hands of the extreme right (d'Ancona, 1992).

### *Bolkestein and the transformation of the integration debate*

Frits Bolkestein is the godfather of Culturalism in the Netherlands. Culturalism – which had been emerging in several discursive milieus – was elevated by Bolkestein into a prominent discourse in the core arenas of the civil sphere. Bolkestein anticipated many of the ideas and notions that culturalists in later periods would promote: the notion that the lower classes deserve cultural (rather than economic) protection was adopted by Pim Fortuyn, the idea that Islam has yet to go through a process of enlightenment became a cornerstone in Hirsi Ali's

discourse, and Paul Scheffer would walk in Bolkestein's footsteps in stressing the importance of national self-assertion. All of Bolkestein's successors agreed that a generous welfare state exacerbates the problems of integration. Bolkestein's intervention thus marked the breakthrough of Culturalism in central civil arenas and its definitive dissociation from racism. The success of the right-wing Liberals in the elections of 1994 showed that Bolkestein's tough stance on immigration and integration also appealed to a substantial segment of voters (see Kleinnijenhuis & De Ridder, 1998).

Bolkestein's legitimacy and that of his discourse hinged on his identification with the political establishment. While his interventions challenged Pragmatism, Bolkestein sought to establish or retain political consensus on minority integration. Immediately before and after his intervention, he declared in parliament and in private conversations with other party leaders<sup>36</sup> that he did not want to turn integration politics into a battle between political parties. This, then, was the part explicit, part implicit trade-off: critics would not associate Bolkestein with the extreme right while the right-wing Liberals would not exploit xenophobic sentiments for electoral purposes. Bolkestein further moderated his discourse when the right-wing Liberals entered the so-called purple coalition with the progressive Liberals and the Social Democrats in 1994. In fact, the entire debate cooled after 1993 (Figure 3.1). The parties in the purple coalition government hid their political differences under a managerial discourse that centered on economic growth, efficient government and job creation. The bracketing of both cultural and class politics depolarized integration politics. The transformation of the minorities policy into an integration policy – underway since the late 1980s – was formally consolidated with the post for a “Minister of Integration” (and big cities) within the purple cabinet in 1998, signaling broad agreement on integration between the right-wing Liberals and the Social Democrats. Or perhaps it would be better to speak of a *modus operandi* since its practices and concepts were designed to suppress rather than express meanings and emotions. Integration politics had been made into a managerial affair for administrators and experts rather than an issue of civil politics for politicians and activists.

### **The civilizing mission of progressive elites: Paul Scheffer's “Multicultural drama” in 2000**

As a contributing editor for *NRC Handelsblad* and a prominent member of the Labor Party, Paul Scheffer was an unlikely candidate for revitalizing Culturalism. But precisely because Culturalism was associated with the political right, his page-long essay “The multicultural

drama” in *NRC Handelsblad* was an immediate hit. The debate blossomed; the number of articles in the database exploded from 8 in 1999 to 43 in 2000 while the number of hits increased from 86 to 222 (see Figure 3.1). “The multicultural drama” became the focal point around which oppositions took shape. The essay posited that there was a process of underclass formation that had accelerated over the last decade:

Overseeing all the available data, one comes to a sobering conclusion: unemployment, poverty, dropping out of school and criminality are increasingly concentrated among minority groups. The prospects are not favorable, in spite of individual success stories. The number of migrants without prospects is enormous and they will increasingly burden Dutch society (Scheffer, 2000).

Scheffer could marshal extensive data on the performance of minorities in various policy domains (see Chapter 4). The results always showed migrants lagging behind, though many researchers concluded that there was movement in the right direction and that policy investments were paying off (e.g., Penninx, 2000). Scheffer, however, perceived migrants’ under-performance through an entirely different scheme of perception. He blamed Dutch culture and specifically Dutch elites. The individual success of some migrants, he argued, should not be interpreted as a sign of collective emancipation – large numbers of people will increasingly burden society as they “lag behind and are bound to fail (*kansloos*)” (Scheffer, 2000). In spite of the clear and present danger posed by mass migration, the Dutch persisted in their culture of relativism, complacency and consensus. “In 1994 the government had expressed its concerns about the position of minorities” but

the solicitude has evaporated in the bliss of the polder model. Many have the misunderstanding that the integration of ethnic minorities will evolve in more or less the same way as the peaceful reconciliation of religious groups, ... that the rules and customs of consensual democracy [*pacificatiedemocratie*] can be used to assuage the new division. The situation is reminiscent of the faith in the neutrality policy on the eve of the Second World War. Everyone was convinced that what had succeeded a quarter century earlier – namely to stay out of the First World War – would have chance of success. And thus an entire nation lost sight of reality (Scheffer, 2000).

For Scheffer, this culture of appeasement is the thread that runs through the minorities policy,

multiculturalism, cultural relativism, pillarization and the polder model. All of these policies, beliefs and institutions in his view fail to respond to the problems of integration because they do not foster national awareness. If the Dutch fail to acknowledge their national identity, migrants will not become part of the nation:

An ease-loving multiculturalism is gaining ground because we do not articulate what binds our society together. We do not say enough about our limits, we do not maintain a relationship to our own past and we treat our language carelessly. A society that belies itself has nothing to offer to newcomers. A majority that denies that it is a majority, has no eye for the hard-handedness of integration, which always entails a loss of one's tradition. Who does not understand what is being taken, does not have much to give (Scheffer, 2000).

In Scheffer's discourse, national awareness is the first step towards civil integration, a strong national identity the prerequisite for openness and cosmopolitanism (see also Scheffer, 2004). Both the traditional politics of pillarization and modern-day cultural relativism must be abandoned; the nation needs to reinvent and reassert itself in order to absorb migrants. Though Scheffer shares Bolkestein's commitment to cultural self-assertion and his antipathy to relativism, he did not adopt Bolkestein's economic liberalism. Seeing parallels between the "social question" of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and contemporary integration issues, Scheffer has called upon Dutch elites to uplift the masses (see Box 5.2). His article is a plea to reinvent the civilizing offensives of those times, the difference being that now migrants rather than the lower classes have to be transformed into virtuous citizens.

### Box 5.2 Paul Scheffer – the anxiety of the progressive middle classes

Paul Scheffer (1954), with his jeans, wild curly hair and casual shirt, looks every inch the progressive Dutch intellectual (Buruma, 2006, p. 126). “If I look at my own role, I would never describe myself as a scientist, but also not as a journalist or a politician, and certainly not as a policy-maker. I like the term ‘public intellectual.’ I have a rather romantic image of engaging the world with my pen as an individual” (interview Scheffer). As many other intellectuals and politicians of his generation (including Pim Fortuyn), Scheffer was a member of the Communist Party and part of the student movement in the 1970s. This is where he cultivated his critical stance towards established interests and his appreciation for the combined power of ideas and mass movements. Years later, after working as a historian at several universities and for the scientific institute of the Labor Party, his position as a regular contributor to *NRC* gave him the possibility and incentive to think and act as a guardian of the general interest *vis-à-vis* power holders. As in his student days, he searched for how elites failed to live up to their promises of accountability and responsibility. Increasingly he felt that the failure of the elites was most apparent in their treatment of the cultural and social consequences of mass immigration. Scheffer often refers to a 1993 visit to Istanbul as the turning point in his thinking on integration:

There I encountered the political and intellectual inner circle and they were all extremely negative about immigration from Anatolia. They talked of barbarians who were destroying the open character of Istanbul with their traditional ideas about religion and family. That was the first time that I realized that immigration does not automatically lead to cosmopolitanism (interview Scheffer).

Identification with the secular elite – and not with lower-class Anatolian and Kurdish immigrants – came naturally to Scheffer. As with many radicals of his generation, he had become part of the progressive elite dominating the arts, universities and the left-leaning political parties. In his many public performances in front of middle class audiences, he discovered that they were anxious in much the same way as the Turkish elite. He wrote the first draft of “The multicultural drama” in 1997 and noticed how it struck a chord with his audiences:

I tried out the piece as a lecture, as I often do. I noticed that there were a lot of people in the audience who were also worried. Everywhere I talked about it, you could notice that there were people thinking “ah, finally, someone with an impeccable background who is not associated with the wrong sort (*foute*) of sympathies.”

Scheffer thus emerged as an organic intellectual of the progressive middle classes, articulating and legitimizing their (previously suspect) sentiments. His opponents were not migrants but elites who, in his view, lacked a sense of purpose. When I asked him who he had in mind when he wrote about the “apologists of diversity,” he did not mention – as I had expected – policy-makers or politicians but the writer Adriaan van Dis who had said, to Scheffer’s dismay, that “integration issues will be solved in bed” (interview Scheffer). Such making light of the problems of integration disturbed Scheffer. He found inspiration in the works of his grandfather, who had been in charge of spatial planning in Amsterdam, including the construction of the postwar suburbs which in the 1990s became emblems of integration gone wrong. As a progressive heir to this tradition of social planning, he sought to devise an approach that would allow governmental elites to get a grip on urban reality: “Confronted with a new social problem – that has, as before, an outspoken cultural dimension – there is no other way out than to search anew for new ways to make the city” (Scheffer, 2004, p. 39).

### *Resonance and consonance*

Scheffer had a slightly higher approval/disapproval ratio than Bolkestein in the early 1990s (Scheffer received 30 positive, 67 neutral and 84 negative references; Bolkestein 28 positive, 51 neutral and 93 negative references). But more interesting are the backgrounds of those who supported him. The Social Democratic element within Scheffer's culturalist discourse (migrants were an underclass in need of emancipation) helped to win support among groups who had previously opposed Bolkestein: Labor politicians, editors and journalists. The growing acceptability of Culturalism among governmental elites is perhaps best illustrated by the intervention of Paul Schnabel, the director of the Social and Cultural Planning Agency. This government think-tank had been critical of multiculturalism for at least a decade (see SCP, 1986, 1998).<sup>37</sup> Just before Scheffer published his article, the director of the Agency publicly spoke out in favor of assimilation. He did so first at the annual meeting of Forum, the government think-tank for multicultural development (Schnabel, 1999), and later in various media (e.g. Schnabel, 2000). Whereas Bolkestein's criticism of the minorities policy had appealed to right-wing Liberals and a few individuals from other sectors, Scheffer's discourse made criticisms of multiculturalism and minority cultures accessible and acceptable to left-leaning cultural and governmental elites. While political parties persisted in their technocratic understanding of integration issues, newspapers endorsed Culturalism much more after Scheffer's intervention, making it the most prominent discourse among journalists and editors.<sup>38</sup> Whereas around 15 per cent of articles promoted Culturalism in the period 1990-2000, after Scheffer's intervention the figure was around 23 per cent (Table 3.1).

### *Scheffer and the transformation of the integration debate*

Scheffer's style radically differed from that of the purple government and its administrators. Under the purple government, politics was more management than drama; the government's role was to coordinate social affairs and to promote economic growth. Integration was a technical manner, something that had to be monitored and managed with skill and tact – the polder strategy. Scheffer provided a radical alternative as he articulated and called for grand narratives about the nation and integration. The policy discussion on minority integration became a civil debate about envisioning a new society and redefining the Netherlands. The number of public lectures, television programs and magazine issues on minorities and integration increased rapidly. But though integration politics proliferated and came to function as a – perhaps *the* – key issue through which divisions in the civil sphere were articulated, it still remained a debate between intellectual, political and governmental elites. Migrants were

virtually absent from the debate. So, too, was the popular media, such as the tabloid newspaper *De Telegraaf*.<sup>39</sup> After 9/11 the focus of the debate shifted to the position of Muslims within society (see Figure 3.1). The debate exploded.

### **Pim Fortuyn and the spectacularization of Culturalism**

Dutch politics was far from exciting under the purple government. Its managerial approach had been challenged by Scheffer and others but the sea-change occurred only after the attacks of 9/11. The towers collapsed in New York but the Netherlands was in crisis too. A frenetic search for meaning ensued. What was under attack? Who were the perpetrators? How should governments respond? While 9/11 raised these questions in many countries, in the Netherlands the shock coincided with the resignation of the purple government.<sup>40</sup> This, together with the heightened anxieties over global security, created the ideal conditions for the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, whose dramatic and sensational performances contrasted sharply with the managerialism of the purple government.

### Box 5.3 Pim Fortuyn – organic intellectual of the *nouveau riches*

As long as he could remember, Fortuyn (1948) had been special: “I wanted to belong but I did not. From my earliest childhood I had the experience that I was different ... in speech, dress and behavior.” He stood out and this, he said, “had something to do with his homosexuality” but also with his opinions: “I always thought I knew better. And, it has to be said, I was often correct” (cited in Pels, 2003, p. 63). As a teenager and young adult in the 1960s and 1970s, he distinguished himself with his impeccable suits and extravagant style. Fortuyn’s autobiographies and biographies show that he desperately wanted his peers to love him as much as he loved himself. With wits and enthusiasm he managed to satisfy his thirst for recognition. This sensitivity towards his cultural and social environment perhaps explains Fortuyn’s chameleon-like changes with the times. In the 1970s he was a Marxist and member of the Communist Party, in the 1980s he wanted to renew social and corporatist democracy and was a member of the Labor Party, in the 1990s he embraced free market ideology and was a member of the right-wing Liberals.

While discontinuities mark Fortuyn’s ideology, in each period he aligned himself with movements growing in power and challenging established interests. Fortuyn had the temperament and skills to divide the world into antagonistic poles and to devote his energies to challenging established interests. Students at Groningen University successfully campaigned to have him appointed as assistant professor of sociology due to his commitment to Marxism. But Fortuyn did not just want to challenge the elites, he wanted to become one of them. He tried to attain positions of power within the university and mainstream political parties, but to no avail. His appetite for conflict, his self-aggrandizement and his desire to be at the center of attention made it impossible for party and political elites to accommodate him.

In 1990 Fortuyn accepted a position as extraordinary professor at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, financed by employers’ organizations and labor unions. But while Fortuyn was writing frenetically and taking part in heated debates, he felt that the university was no longer the place for polemics and passion. During his time as extraordinary professor, Fortuyn found a more rewarding milieu: the rapidly expanding market for opinions in the form of columns and speeches. From 1993 Fortuyn wrote a column for the right-wing weekly *Elsevier*. After 1997 he was the star of the Speakers Academy, a company that organizes speakers’ events. It arranged fifty to sixty bookings for him per year, at 7,000 euros per performance. This is where Fortuyn was at his best and he felt it. He spoke without embarrassment about his “charismatic appearance” and his capacity to “electrify a room.” The audience was “psyched and charged” by the prospect of experiencing the “myth Fortuyn” (Fortuyn cited in Pels, 2003, p. 139). The columns and speeches further cultivated Fortuyn’s talent for rhetoric and one-liners. “A little bit of magic and charisma is required for a good performance” and he learned how to “climb into hearts” with a mixture of “humor and utmost seriousness” (*ibid.*, pp. 138, 139).

Fortuyn’s extravagant style was an instrument to break the power of the people and parties that had rejected him in his younger years. Fortuyn felt that a closed circle of around 20,000 people had created among themselves a consensual culture of mediocrity that worked to exclude all those who have passion and vision (Pels, 2003, p. 171). His discourse appealed to *nouveau riches* whose wealth and status had risen but who remained marginal in terms of culture and state power. They felt excluded, degraded and exploited by the state and its servants, and were willing and able to pay Fortuyn handsomely to discursively retaliate. They made Fortuyn a self-made man. Fortuyn provided a discourse that revalued entrepreneurship and common sense as the highest civil virtues while degrading the jargon, compromises and consensus typical of bureaucracy and polder politics. Through grand narratives and spectacular performances he wanted to become an “incarnation of the people” (cited in Pels, 2003, p. 66). Of course some groups – especially natives with lower levels of cultural capital frustrated with taxes, minorities and bureaucracy – were much more likely to feel that Fortuyn incarnated them.

While Fortuyn had long aspired to a political career, the established political parties offered him little. Livable Netherlands, a newly established party rooted in local oppositional politics, furnished him with a platform. In a landmark interview in *De Volkskrant*, Fortuyn presented Livable Netherlands as a challenger to the status quo: “We agitate against the culture of the polder model. A culture that is closed to outsiders and that does not recognize new interests” (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002). But he deviated from the party line when it came to asylum seekers, Muslims and discrimination. In violation of a motion passed by the party assembly, Fortuyn said that the Netherlands should no longer accept asylum seekers. He also stated that he wanted to “stop the insanity that three-quarters of the Turks and Moroccans who were born here get their wife from a backward region” (*ibid.*). Fortuyn also broke the informal rule of painting Janmaat as a civil pariah, although he, as Bolkestein before him, distanced himself from the (now inactive) politician:

I say: everyone who is in, will stay in. They are our Moroccan rotten boys, we cannot burden King Hassan with them. ... [Janmaat] wanted to encourage people to take a single trip back home. You will not see that with me. But I do say that it should be over now. We have enough. Forty thousand [asylum seekers, JU] per year: that is a city the size of Groningen in four years. People should realize that. And often a trip straight into the underclass. Well, I do not like that. I guess we should stop for a moment. Janmaat was partly right. And because of the demonization – to which your newspaper contributed too – that could not be said (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002).

Fortuyn wanted to open discursive space for some of Janmaat’s ideas – ideas that had been relegated to the far margins of the civil sphere. Fortuyn also challenged one of the fundamental rules of the civil sphere, namely Article 1 of the constitution. The article, formulated in 1983, named discrimination as a civil and indeed legal vice: “Discrimination because of religion, convictions, political orientation, race, sex or any other ground, is not permitted.”<sup>41</sup> Article 1, technically speaking, is not the one that forbids racist or xenophobic remarks. Fortuyn nonetheless attacked it as a symbol of discursive oppression:

I am completely in support of Voltaire: I may find your opinion abject but I will defend your right to voice it. I am in favor of absolving that strange article in the constitution: thou shalt not discriminate. Fantastic. But if it means that people cannot make discriminatory remarks any more – and they are easily made in this country – then I say:

this is not good. Let those people make those remarks. There is a limit and I find that very important: you can never incite physical violence. A state of law cannot afford that. But if an imam likes to say that my [homosexual, JU] way of life is completely reprehensible and lower than that of pigs, well, he should just say that (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002).

Fortuyn desired public debate in which gut feelings about other groups could be voiced without restraint. In his columns for the right-wing weekly *Elsevier* and in his essay on the *Islamization of our culture* (1997), Fortuyn made his views on Islam crystal clear. He characterized Islam as a backward or “retarded (*achterlijke*) culture” (cited in Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002). The achievements of the progressive movements of the past, he claimed, were under threat: “I do not feel like doing the emancipation of women and homosexuals all over again. In high schools there are numerous teachers who do not dare to express their identity because of Moroccan and Turkish boys. I find that a disgrace” (Fortuyn cited in Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002). He traced youth violence, sexism and homophobia to Muslim immigration: they either had to be stopped at the border or disciplined to enforce civil norms.

Fortuyn was kicked out of the party for his interview in *De Volkskrant* but this only boosted his renegade image. He had no interest in honoring the informal pact not to dramatize integration politics; his words and plans were meant to challenge the consensus culture from which he had been excluded (see Box 5.3). With financial support from business interests, in particular real estate and property developers, Fortuyn created his own party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), less than 100 days before the elections of May 2002 (Storm & Naastepad, 2003). Fortuyn now launched a frontal attack against the government. Instead of a party manifesto, he wrote an indictment of the purple coalition: *The ruins of the purple government* (Fortuyn, 2002). While Fortuyn’s discourse was hard-hitting, his fame came from his media appearances. Night after night, Fortuyn provided prime time political drama. And night after night, he stole the show. The occasions where he outperformed his competitors are numerous but let me mention two.

In the first television debate (on 6 March 2002) featuring the leaders of the five largest parties and Fortuyn, the representatives of the established parties made a dismal impression. Fortuyn’s place at the table was due to his astonishing electoral success in Rotterdam (see Chapter 11) and his meteoric rise in the polls. Nevertheless, the others made it clear that they did not want to debate the upstart. Ad Melkert (Labor Party, PvdA), Hans Dijkstal (right-wing Liberals, VVD) and Thom de Graaf (progressive Liberals, D66) sat limply in their chairs

while Fortuyn veered forward and dominated the debate. He reiterated that the purple government had failed to stop the influx of foreigners and that the waiting lists for health care were unacceptably long. Most importantly, Fortuyn emphasized that *he* was the visionary who would lead the way out of the crisis. The other debaters tried to focus on Fortuyn's lack of a party manifesto and detailed budget as well as his lack of political experience – in effect treating him as an incompetent and unreliable intruder into the civil sphere. But Fortuyn had been in this position before (see Box 5.3). He presented himself as an analyst who had written more books and articles than the other candidates and announced the publication of his indictment of the purple government (“192 pages, sir!”). Fortuyn's performance thus transgressed the discursive and performative codes that the leaders of the purple parties embodied. The leader of the Social Democrats, Ad Melkert, “was the biggest loser... With every inch of his body he expressed that he did not feel like it at all. He had an almost physical repulsion for Fortuyn” (Hartman cited in Monden, 2002). The failure of the other candidates was so obvious that their campaign teams sent out statements admitting their dismal performance. But the leaders of the purple parties clearly could not unlearn their dispositions to appear distanced, objective and sober. Time and again, they struggled to get television time while the channels fought to have Fortuyn.

Another landmark performance was the debate that the leaders of the largest parties (and Fortuyn, who polled around 20 per cent) had in the television studios of the Sound Mix show on 28 April 2002. In a quintessential fusion of politics and entertainment, the commercial channel RTL4 had programmed a debate among the candidates as an intermezzo for their talent hunt. The party leaders had no more than 15 seconds to give their view on an issue before the quiz master stirred debate. Audience members could then vote to select their favorite candidates. Fortuyn began with 30 per cent and during the program increased his share to just over 40 percent.

Interestingly, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Jan-Peter Balkenende, did not suffer the brunt of Fortuyn's scorn. While the two had agreed not to attack each other for strategic reasons, there were also discursive affinities between the stiff Christian Democrat and the flamboyant populist. Balkenende explicitly rejected the idea that society should be multicultural and that an Islamic pillar was something to applaud. He spearheaded a segment of the Christian Democrats that emphasized the importance of order and thrift. Society, in his view, could not be an aggregate of multiple cultures; it should be a coherent civil community with shared norms and values (Balkenende, 2002a). He rejected any form of *gedogen*<sup>42</sup> and argued that politicians as well as the government were responsible for defining what was

permissible and what was not (Balkenende 2002b). While his plea for moral values and civil norms did not immediately arouse interest when he articulated these ideas in early 2002, it was the first step towards the establishment of a right-leaning government of Christian Democrats, Pim Fortuyn's party and the right-wing Liberals following the elections of 2002.

Fortuyn was shot dead on 6 May 2002. The assassin was a native Dutch environmental activist alarmed by his rise in the polls and his omnipresence in the media. An assassination of a politician is of course quintessential civil drama. Political leaders expressed their horror over the assassination; Fortuyn's supporters mourned his death at mass ceremonies. He was praised as a civil martyr who had stood up for "the people," for which he paid with his life. The villain in their story was not just the activist who killed Fortuyn, but the political elites and especially the left, who were accused of demonizing Fortuyn and creating the context in which he could be killed. Fortuyn's supporters now began a crusade against statements and ideas that had contributed to the demonization of culturalist discourse. As his political party disagreed with a proposal to postpone the elections, they took place 9 days after the assassination.

#### *Resonance and consonance*

Fortuyn enjoyed success mainly among disenfranchised segments of the population, not among civil elites. He nevertheless received no less than 355 references in the period after 9/11 (until 2006). There is no evidence that Fortuyn was "demonized" by the mainstream media as some commentators and many of his supporters have suggested (see, e.g., Bosman & d'Haenens, 2008). Had this been the case, Fortuyn would have been criticized (much) more often than others. But the opposite was the case: his ratio of criticism to praise (1.94) is slightly better than average (2.31), both before (2.13) and after (1.88) his assassination. Interestingly, the share of neutral references to Fortuyn is unusually high (71.8 per cent,  $n=255$ ). This suggests that civil elites, rather than engaging with his views, chose to reflect on the Fortuyn phenomenon. Indeed, even actors who criticized or praised Fortuyn often balanced their judgments (first praising then criticizing or *vice versa*). The result of these micro-strategies was that, in the period between 9/11 and his assassination, there were no clear divisions in the debate on the opinion pages (see Appendix 3). In this setting Fortuyn only had a handful of supporters and critics; a large majority of those who referred to him posed as neutral by-standers. Undoubtedly, this is because the action took place elsewhere. Although Fortuyn sometimes granted interviews to newspapers (including the infamous interview in *De Volkskrant*), television was his main stage.

Fortuyn's ideas appealed especially to segments of the population with relatively low levels of education, people who valued conformity and felt alienated from established political parties – a group that had grown as the pillars (vehicles for inter-class integration *par excellence*) corroded. So long as politicians did not exploit their sentiments, they had remained inactive and cynical. But once Fortuyn emerged on the scene, his appeal was instant (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Seventeen per cent of voters supported Fortuyn *post mortem*. Their profile did not deviate from the average in economic capital (as measured by income) but they generally had lower levels of cultural capital (as measured by education) (*NRC Handelsblad*, 2002). Cynicism towards politics had grown in the preceding years (e.g. Van Praag, 2002) and Fortuyn had managed to capitalize on these feelings, as shown in the high turn-out and support among voters who had previously abstained.<sup>43</sup> Statistical analyses of voter motivation showed that fear of asylum seekers and cynicism towards government correlated (to roughly the same degree) to the decision to vote for Fortuyn (Bélanger & Aarts, 2006; Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2003). While the LPF fell apart after it entered government, Fortuyn clearly had an impact outlasting the party that carried his name.

#### *Fortuyn and the transformation of the integration debate*

After Fortuyn was killed, his supporters heralded him as the inventor and maestro of the “new politics” – transparent, passionate and thorough as opposed to the soulless compromises of the “old politics.” It is certainly true that politics has aroused more passion since Fortuyn. He turned the election campaign into a spectacle, his wits and energetic appearance reducing his opponents to pitiful grayish bureaucrats. Fortuyn redefined the logic of politics through a style that could mobilize an electorate cynical of established parties and anxious about social transformations, including the growing presence of minorities and Muslims. But it was not only his style that was new. While apprentice politicians normally learn to adapt to the mores of the party, in Fortuyn's case the party was built around him. It could be argued that Fortuyn never had time to develop his party. But it appears that he pioneered a particular form of political organization. Rather than a political bureaucracy – with regulations, manifestos, programs and the like – the party functioned as a marketing bureau that organized events and campaigns around its one and only brand. Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders, two culturalists who broke away from the right-wing Liberal party VVD to establish their own parties, later radicalized this model. Instead of a party where members can vote or convene, they created restricted associations over which they exercise full control. These “parties” are designed to

minimize internal disputes, maximize their resonance in the media and appeal to sponsors (especially the real estate and development industry) who seek to translate their economic power into political influence.

After Fortuyn, there has been a permanent presence of renegade culturalists in core civil arenas challenging established political parties and playing upon the opposition between parliamentary elites (who pamper unworthy minorities) and political renegades (who stand up for hard working and law-abiding citizens). They have challenged not only certain ideas about integration but also the *modus operandi* of politics. For these self-styled renegade politicians, stirring controversy is essential: they rely on the media to communicate to their prospective supporters and to cast themselves as challengers. Whereas under the purple government politics had been reduced to conflict prevention and the sorting of preferences, in the wake of 9/11 Pim Fortuyn injected passion and spectacle into politics – now an arena where renegade politicians compete for the lead role in civil drama.

### **Ayaan Hirsi Ali and enlightenment Culturalism**

Ayaan Hirsi Ali made her first recorded public appearance during a debate on enlightenment in the cultural center De Balie in Amsterdam, one of the intellectual nerve centers of the Netherlands. *Trouw* editor Jaffe Vink narrated her electrifying presence:

... When a philosopher on the stage relativized the foundations of the Enlightenment and went too far in her praise of multiculturalism, a woman stood up to retort. She spoke Dutch with a light accent and she was black – and then it is dead quiet in a place like this. The woman castigated the Dutch philosopher and said she had no idea about Islam. ... [Hirsi Ali] made a plea for ... addressing rather than downplaying the severity of the contemporary state of Islam (Vink, cited in Prins, 2004, p. 143).

A few weeks later, Hirsi Ali published her first article on the opinion pages of *Letter & Geest*, a supplement of the newspaper *Trouw* and a prime milieu of culturalist discourse. While the media's gatekeepers are generally very willing to provide a stage to prominent figures (politicians, writers, etc.) who want to promote Culturalism, the editors of *Letter & Geest* were searching for new personalities. The section had published translated articles from American neoconservatives as well as long and controversial pieces from Dutch culturalists. *Letter & Geest* was the first media outlet to offer a stage to Hirsi Ali's criticisms of Muslims.

She called upon her readers to give dissidents a stage so that they could provide “a counter weight to the one-sided and mind-boggling religious rhetoric that millions of Muslims hear on a daily basis. Let the Voltaires of our time work on the enlightenment of Islam...” (Hirsi Ali, 2001). Immediately after the publication of her article, Hirsi Ali received offers from publishers and invitations for public lectures. As she gained in stature, tensions within the scientific bureau of the Labor party (a discursive milieu for Labor supporters as well as Labor critics like Scheffer) grew stronger. Her colleagues requested Hirsi Ali to tone down her criticisms of Muslims and especially of Labor politicians (see Vink, 2002). The definitive break with the Labor party came when the right-wing Liberals offered her a seat in parliament. In her explanation of her decision to accept their offer, Hirsi Ali expressed her unqualified support of liberalism:

I want to contribute to the struggle for the emancipation of (Muslim) women and to strive to transform the individual who has coincidentally been born in a group culture into a free and responsible citizen. This striving goes to the heart, to the foundations, of a Liberal party for which life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness acquired through fair labor are guiding principles. A party that feels that universal human rights are inalienable and inviolable. ... I realized that [accepting the invitation of the right-wing Liberals] would give me the chance to address the abuse of migrant women who have to hide in shelters [from their men] and the socio-cultural causes that underlie their subjugation and to ... place these themes directly on the political agenda where they belong (Hirsi Ali, 2002).

Hirsi Ali shared Fortuyn’s antipathy towards Islam as well as his drive to challenge the culture of consensus, which she experienced firsthand in the Labor party and in Dutch politics more generally. “I ... realized that Fortuyn had not only been correct about Islam but also with respect to the condition of established politics. We are still going round in the same little circles. Still. We avoid any risk, we do not want to offend or upset anyone. Everything is in the service of harmony” (Hirsi Ali, 2003). Hirsi Ali sought to shock Muslims out of their orthodoxy and Dutch politicians out of the slumber of the polder model.

#### **Box 5.4 Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a Somalian warrior in Dutch polder politics**

Ayaan Hirsi Ali (1969) was born in Somalia. Her father, Hirsi Magan Isse, was educated as an anthropologist at Columbia University and a prominent opponent of the socialist dictatorship of Siad Barre. Hirsi Ali's mother was one of four wives. Her mother and grandmother, who wanted to raise Hirsi Ali according to their clan's interpretation of Islam, had her circumcised when she was five. During Quran lessons, critical questions were not allowed. Hirsi Ali's teacher once hit her so hard that she suffered a fractured skull (Van Tilborgh, 2006, p. 23). Her father accepted the traditional upbringing and its horrors but ensured that his daughter receive a proper education at the English-language Muslim Girls' Secondary School.

Hirsi Ali was a stern believer, sympathized with the Muslim Brotherhood and participated in the book burnings of Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. She nevertheless longed for freedom from misogynist doctrines. She had read about the position of American and European women in the Valley Secretarial College in Nairobi (Kenya) and this made her decide to escape from an arranged marriage with a Canadian Somali. She bolted during a family visit in Düsseldorf and took the train to Amsterdam, where she requested political asylum. She learned Dutch quickly and pursued a master's in political science and political philosophy at Leiden University.

Her faith wavered when she, in her side-job as translator, came into contact with Somali women in asylum centers and hostels for battered women. She saw husbands and male family members using religion to legitimize physical and mental abuse. When she joined a research project on migrant women at the scientific institute of the Labor Party, Hirsi Ali incessantly addressed the hardships that Muslim women and children suffer at the hands of their relatives. She was dismayed that most people in the Labor Party did not share her diagnosis and were unwilling to recognize the link between Islam and the oppression of women. Her identification as a Muslim suffered another blow after 9/11: she was horrified by the attacks but felt that the Quran legitimized the violence. Reading the *Atheist Manifesto (Atheïstisch Manifest)* of Leiden philosopher Herman Philipse was an ultimate revelation and in 2002 she renounced her faith. Shortly afterwards she joined the right-wing Liberals and entered parliament with 40,000 preferential votes.

Hirsi Ali's openness about genital mutilation and other forms of abuse as well as her graceful appearance made her an object of intense media attention. Her higher-class upbringing as well as her devoted supporters (colloquially known as "the friends of Ayaan") gave her the power – the confidence, eloquence and determination – to translate her particular experiences into a universal discourse of liberation from religious oppression. Initially unaffected and later appalled by the culture of consensus and compromises, she argued for full discursive conflict: "dare to clash. It is inevitable. The Netherlands needs to get rid of the fear to stigmatize." The angry responses of Muslims merely reinforced her sense of purpose: "every group that goes through a transformation has to go through such rage" (cited in Van Tilborgh, 2006, pp. 32, 33). The same is true, *in extremis*, of the countless death threats she received. The assassination of Theo van Gogh and the letter to Hirsi Ali that Mohammed Bouyeri stuck into his chest with a dagger – "oh Hirsi Ali, I am certain that you will falter..." – was the final confirmation that her calling was to provoke Islam to take "a shortcut to enlightenment" (the name of her current movie project).

While Hirsi Ali was similar to Fortuyn in some ways, she was different in others. She had previously been a Muslim, and argued against Islamic doctrine in the name of women's liberation. Like many converts, Hirsi Ali had extraordinary zeal and unshakeable convictions (Box 5.4). Due to the abuse she had suffered and her attempts to confront Muslims, she was

the feminine antithesis to pragmatist political culture and its representatives. While many of her statements, appearances and articles aroused interest, her most notable project was the movie *Submission* made with Theo van Gogh, a filmmaker and *bête noir* of Amsterdam's intellectual elite. *Submission* was an 11-minute visual pamphlet that sought to demonstrate that the Quran considers women fundamentally inferior to men. The movie features four female actors whose faces are covered with head scarves and whose naked bodies are visible through transparent veils. The Arabic calligraphy of Quranic verses are projected or painted on the women. The voice-over narrates the horrors they have suffered at the hands of male relatives and suggests that the men use Quranic verses to justify their abuse. Six weeks after the broadcasting, the movie's director was shot and stabbed to death in Amsterdam. The Islamic extremist who killed Van Gogh plunged a dagger into his chest with a note containing threats of death to the West, the United States, the Netherlands and Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

#### *Resonance and consonance*

Like Fortuyn, Hirsi Ali blasted onto the scene: after her debut in mid-2001, the number of her appearances in the newspapers and on television skyrocketed (Van Tilborgh, 2006, p. 24). By 2003 she had become the most central figure in the debate. Between her first appearance and 2006, she received 59 positive (16.8 per cent), 177 neutral (50.3 per cent) and 116 negative references (33 per cent), making her slightly more popular than average. Like Bolkestein and Scheffer, Hirsi Ali was praised by opponents and supporters alike for her courage and for breathing life into politics. Her combination of feminine beauty and hard-hitting discourse made her a culturalist figurehead. Whereas Fortuyn had primarily appealed to the disenfranchised, Hirsi Ali had devotees among the cultural and political elite, including artists, writers, philosophers, politicians and journalists. Especially philosophers of law at Leiden University such as Paul Cliteur and Afshin Ellian supported, both in the newspapers and personally, Hirsi Ali's quest for Islamic enlightenment. Her supporters made her into a civil icon: the embodiment of democratic ideals such as freedom of speech, defiance of unjust authority and heroism in the face of death threats. Hirsi Ali's performances and the assassination of Theo van Gogh pulled writers and artists into the civil sphere. While these groups were previously marginal in the debate, they increasingly appeared on the opinion pages and often expressed passionate support for Hirsi Ali. Due to these developments, the share of articles supporting Culturalism surged to around 30 per cent (see Table 3.1). To her numerous opponents, Hirsi Ali was a mouthpiece for conservatives. Her critics pointed out that she had no special training in Islam and accused her of unjustly projecting her personal

traumas rooted in tribal customs onto Muslims as a group and Islam as a religion.

### *Hirsi Ali and the transformation of the integration debate*

While Hirsi Ali was clearly the most prominent migrant culturalist, she was far from the only one. Other critics from countries where Islam is the dominant religion included Afshin Ellian, a legal scholar and refugee from Iran who routinely projected his experiences of Khomeini's regime upon Dutch politics and Dutch Muslims; Nahed Selim, an Egyptian writer opposed to head scarves and other Islamic commandments for women; Hafid Bouazza, a Moroccan writer and *bon vivant* critical of Islam; Ebru Umar, a writer of Turkish descent and close friend of Theo van Gogh who accused the mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, of failing to protect basic civil liberties in the face of Islamic threats. The list goes on. The prominence of Ayaan Hirsi Ali – and a large number of lesser known figures – signaled a broader shift in civil politics where migrants critical of their own communities played a vital role in increasing Culturalism's legitimacy. While intellectuals, writers and artists had previously not identified with culturalists and tended to lean to the left, this time it was different: they were apparently eager to make a woman's campaign for Islamic enlightenment into a civil spectacle. Since our collection of data stops at the end of 2005, it is not possible to say whether these groups sustained their support for Culturalism after Hirsi Ali left the scene. What we do know is that in 2005, the variety and number of actors supporting Culturalism was larger than ever before.

### **The power of Culturalism, 1991-2005**

The chapter thus far has discussed the evolution of culturalist discourse and the ways in which different civil actors appealed to specific class fractions. The question then arises: if the base of Culturalism was so diverse, did these different actors and class fractions really work together? Did the discursive divides between the different currents of Culturalism disappear? Can we discern the formation of a coherent discursive movement – an alliance of actors with discursive leaders and dense networks? If so, how did this coalition develop in relation to its antagonists between 1990 and 2006?

### *Proliferation and polarization*

Community detection (see Chapter 4) does not always reveal clear patterns of conflict. Between 1994 and 1999, when the debate cooled, there was no straightforward opposition

between culturalists and their opponents. Between 9/11 and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the debate was intense. But here, too, we cannot discern straightforward opposition. Graphs for these periods show a mishmash of antagonisms and alliances that do not add up to discursive opposition at the level of clusters (Appendix 3). In other periods, we see opposition between a cluster predominantly composed of culturalists and a cluster composed mostly of its critics. Similar oppositions recurred after the interventions of Frits Bolkestein (1990-1991), Paul Scheffer (2000-2001) and Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2003-2005).<sup>44</sup> In each period there is a polarized figuration with two major camps and relatively few by-standers.<sup>45</sup> These continuities make it possible to investigate how the relationship between the culturalist cluster and the antagonistic cluster (the antipode) evolved. Below we examine these oppositions in three different periods, referring to the network graphs that visualize the oppositions as well as the statistics in Table 5.1 that summarize power relations within and between the clusters.

**Table 5.1 Features of, and relationships between, the two largest clusters in consecutive periods of integration politics**

<i>Period</i>	<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Members</i>	<i>Articulation</i>	<i>Resonance</i>	<i>Consonance</i>	<i>Density</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Structural polarization</i>	<i>Discursive polarization</i>	<i>Discursive leaders (scores)</i>
1991 to 1994	<i>Culturalist</i>	39	40.4	46.4	-0.45	0.0108	0.62	0.92	0.39	n.a.
	<i>Antipode</i>	55	46.2	49.3	-0.33	0.0057	0.44			n.a.
1995 to 1999	<i>n.a.</i>	23	41.4	39.7	-0.18	0.0138	0.49	0.94	0.26	n.a.
	<i>n.a.</i>	36	44.8	56.1	-0.36	0.0056	0.39			n.a.
2000 to 9/11	<i>Culturalist</i>	68	43.6	67.3	-0.33	0.0070	0.67	0.95	0.38	Paul Scheffer (5)
	<i>Antipode</i>	55	45.5	28.3	-0.29	0.0040	0.25			n.a.
9/11 to Fortuyn murder (6 May 2002)	<i>n.a.</i>	49	37.8	40.8	-0.22	0.0047	0.22	0.91	0.36	n.a.
	<i>n.a.</i>	43	27.0	29.3	-0.65	0.0083	0.52			n.a.
6 May 2002 to 2005	<i>Culturalist</i>	151	31.2	49.6	-0.46	0.0043	2.51	0.9	0.47	Ayaan Hirsi Ali (14), Pim Fortuyn (7), Afshin Ellian (5)
	<i>Antipode</i>	234	57.4	44.1	-0.21	0.0013	0.68			n.a.
1991 to 2005	<i>Culturalist</i>	258	38.1	45.3	-0.41	0.0021	2.48	0.87	0.43	Ayaan Hirsi Ali (14), Frits Bolkestein (10), Afshin Ellian (7), Paul Scheffer (6), Paul Schnabel (5)
	<i>Antipode</i>	348	53.2	47.1	-0.25	0.0008	0.82			Ahmed Aboutaleb (5)

### *The Bolkestein period*

Bolkestein was central to the debate in the 1990s. A very large number of actors directed attention to him, as represented in Figure 5.1 with many (mostly red) lines converging on the large green circle which designates Bolkestein. He is by far the most central figure but he did not only receive support from within ‘his’ cluster, which is why his score for discursive leadership is not higher than 3 (Table 5.1). Bolkestein’s cluster also contains some critics such as Wasif Shadid, an anthropology professor at Leiden University who ended up in this cluster because he shares opponents with Bolkestein. We see that the Labor Party is also in Bolkestein’s cluster; this is because some Labor Party politicians (Thijs Wöltgens, Aad Kosto) went to great lengths to distinguish the legitimate Bolkestein from the illegitimate Janmaat. The ironic consequence is that Janmaat ends up in the cluster of actors who oppose the culturalist turn in government policy (Figure 5.1). Despite these counterintuitive results (a point to which we will return shortly), it is clear that Bolkestein’s cluster is composed mostly of actors who either explicitly promote Culturalism or defend the legitimacy of his discourse. The other cluster mostly includes actors who resist the culturalist turn in government policy and the integration debate. They either support the ideal of collective emancipation as embodied in pillarized institutions or strategies of economic (rather than cultural) integration as promoted by the Scientific Council for Government Advice. The figuration in this period is balanced in the sense that the clusters have similar scores on indicators of articulation, consonance and resonance power. However, the clusters do have different internal figurations (Table 5.1). The culturalist cluster has a high variance in the distribution of discursive leadership and relatively dense networks – a first indication that culturalists tend to form different sorts of networks than their opponents.




Figure 5.1 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period between Frits Bolkestein’s Luzern lecture on integration (September 1991) and the national elections of 1994. Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.

### *The Scheffer period*

We see similar oppositions after Scheffer's publication of the "The multicultural drama" in 2000. Scheffer is the central node in a cluster of actors who support Culturalism (cluster 1, located in the upper-right corner of Figure 5.2). This cluster has an antagonistic cluster consisting mostly of actors who resist the culturalist turn. As in the Bolkestein period, some actors within Scheffer's cluster distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate culturalists. This particularly applies to Paul Kalma, the director of the scientific institute of the Labor Party, who distinguishes between the type of discourse promoted by the columnists of *Elsevier* (including Pim Fortuyn) and the discourse of (his former colleague and fellow party member) Scheffer. The result is that some of the most radical culturalists (like Fortuyn) end up outside Scheffer's cluster and in the cluster of Culturalism's opponents. While these radical culturalists received few references, the dissociating strategies of actors like Kalma are interesting in that they mute conflict by blurring the divide between what would otherwise be more homogeneous clusters. The same happened in the previous period when actors like Shadid chose similar targets as Bolkestein, thus ending up in the cluster in which Bolkestein was the discursive leader. Although such findings initially seem counterintuitive, they reveal a mechanism typical of what Collins refers to as a "tangle of conflicts" – one which produces unexpected alliances and (thus) attenuates polarization (Collins, 2007, p. 5). Actors who distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate culturalists otherwise do not support culturalist views; they have few or negative ties with other members in the cluster, thus making the networks of both clusters less dense (if there are enough of these people, there would no longer be antagonistic clusters). Another similarity with the Bolkestein period is the pattern of a relatively tight-knit cluster dominated by culturalists in opposition to a comparatively diffuse cluster dominated by its critics (Table 5.1). The difference in the variance of discursive leadership between the culturalist cluster and its antipode is again high, indicating a high concentration of discursive power in the culturalist cluster (Table 5.1). There are also some notable differences between Scheffer and Bolkestein's culturalist clusters. Although in both periods their members, on balance, received more criticism than praise, the difference with the antipode is smaller for Scheffer's cluster (Table 5.1). Most strikingly, the resonance power of the culturalist cluster is much stronger in 2000-2001 than it was in 1991-1994: many actors opposed Scheffer and his allies but attracted little attention.




Figure 5.2 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period between the publication of Paul Scheffer's “The multicultural drama” (January 2000) and 9/11. Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.

### *The period after Fortuyn's assassination*

In the period after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn – between May 2002 and January 2006 – we again see opposition between a cluster dominated by culturalists and a cluster dominated by the critics of Culturalism. The central actors no longer distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate culturalists. The oppositions that were partly muted before thus become more pronounced: the tension between culturalists and their opponents increases to levels not seen before (Table 5.1). Figure 5.3 shows a relatively small yet cohesive culturalist cluster (designated with yellow circles) facing a large yet diffuse opposition. Within the culturalist cluster there are comparatively many positive relations, as expressed in a relatively high score for density (Table 5.1). The negative relations that separate the culturalist cluster from the others are comparatively often directed to the culturalist clique; the largest cluster in the figure (designated with orange circles) has some positive internal relations but its members mostly group together because they share a negative relation to the culturalist cluster.

This time Ayaan Hirsi Ali stands out as the most prominent discursive leader of the culturalist cluster; Afshin Ellian and Pim Fortuyn also receive support. The variance of discursive leadership is comparatively high, indicating that discursive power in the culturalist cluster is much more concentrated than in the antipode. While individuals like Roger van Boxtel (the Minister of Integration on behalf of the progressive Liberals) and Job Cohen (mayor of Amsterdam for the Labor Party) receive support from within their own cluster, they also attract criticism. They therefore do not come to stand for the group in the same way Hirsi Ali does. In short, we find the same pattern that was apparent in the early 2000s (and partly in the early 1990s): compared to its antidote, the culturalist cluster has members with much higher resonance, much denser networks and stronger discursive leaders.



### *The period 1991-2005*

“Culturalism” does not refer to exactly the same discourse in each of these periods. There are, for instance, differences of degree and kind between Scheffer’s discourse (focused on the underclass and national culture) and that of Hirsi Ali (focused on Muslims and Western culture). These differences in emphasis partly explain variations in the patterns of conflict and cooperation over time. Nevertheless, there is striking continuity over a time span of 15 years. In times of proliferation, culturalist clusters emerge with relatively strong discursive leaders and dense networks: culturalists seem to support discursive leaders and each other. Their opponents, in contrast, do not defer to leaders and tend to focus on criticizing culturalists rather than supporting their allies. If we aggregate the data for all periods, we find a familiar pattern: a large cluster of culturalists with relatively strong leaders and dense networks versus a very large cluster of their critics with sparse networks and weak leaders (Table 5.1; Figure 5.4).

The term “culturalists” of course refers not only to individuals central in the debate but also to actors who invest them with prestige and prominence. The fact that very different kinds of people become discursive leaders of Culturalism suggests that they do not lead a movement of their own making. Rather, they personify the forces latently or manifestly present throughout the period under investigation. Depending on their backgrounds and discourses, central culturalists can tap diverse bases of support (e.g. Fortuyn appealing to less educated segments of the population, Scheffer appealing to elites). But these are small variations in light of the remarkable continuities (e.g. Scheffer and Fortuyn solidly in the same cluster). While the individuals and themes change over time, the overall pattern remains remarkably stable: culturalists initiate debates and define the parameters and themes of discussion. Compared to their opponents, the resonance of the central culturalists is incredibly strong. Culturalists also tend to band together more than their opponents when the debate heats up and to rally around discursive leaders. The cluster containing most of Culturalism’s critics is very large but it is also fragmented: its networks are sparse, it lacks strong discursive leaders and its most central actors have much lower resonance than the most central culturalists. Actors in clusters other than the culturalist cluster are defined by their opposition to culturalists; they do not comprise a discourse alliance in and of itself. They share opponents, not networks or leaders.




Figure 5.4 Visualization of conflicts and alliances in the period between 1991 and 1 January 2006. Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.

## **Culturalism: experiences of domination and subordination**

How do culturalists perceive their position in the integration debate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how do they operate in the policy field? While culturalists may feel that they have conquered terrain in recent years, they do not feel that their discourse has become dominant, let alone hegemonic. When they comment on the debate, culturalists often suggest that elites censor information that could undermine faith in a multicultural society. When I asked my respondents to identify these censors, I did not receive satisfactory answers. One respondent, after delivering a tirade against multiculturalists, was piqued when I asked him who he had in mind. “I do not give names,” he said, as if he was talking about a secret resistance group rather than a dominant ideology. At other times, respondents mentioned one or several people but they were typically marginal figures – individuals who could hardly be held responsible for the discursive inhibitions culturalists perceive so strongly. Moreover, those actors who had supported Culturalism since the 1980s and 1990s indicated that they received frequent invitations to speak at debates, *especially* in left-wing circles. However, opposition to Culturalism is not a figment of the imagination. Culturalists did not face a passionate opponent but, in the words of one of my respondents, a diffuse mentality difficult to pin down:

I had clear, substantive criticisms against multiculturalism. But each time I presented them, my opponents said “ah, well, if *that* is what you mean by multiculturalism, then I am not a multiculturalist.” And so they escaped every attack.

Other respondents acknowledged that “nowadays” (around 2005) few people championed multiculturalism. Nevertheless, they felt the continued presence of a culture of dogmatic egalitarianism that some referred to as “equality thinking” (*gelijkheidsdenken*), associated with the cultural heritage of Christianity, Socialism and the trauma of the Second World War. Because minorities and the poor are regarded as pitiful creatures, a number of my culturalist respondents argued, their beliefs and actions are exempt from critical scrutiny; the more reprehensible and unsuccessful minorities are, the more Dutch elites feel a need to affirm their equality (e.g., Vink, 2001; see also Bolkestein, 2009). While the resistance culturalists encounter does not take the form of a well-articulated discourse, they can nevertheless sense that they are transgressing social norms:

Just try it at a party. Just try to say something negative about minorities. You will find that people feel uncomfortable, that there is a taboo. More than that, *you* will feel uncomfortable. We have been so much accustomed to censoring ourselves that it is still very difficult to express ourselves. And when you then do express yourself, when you state it like it is and break through the barrier, then you feel a sense of liberation (approximation of interview, talk not recorded).

The above quote shows that culturalists not only struggle with their opponents but also with internalized norms. It also reveals that it can be rewarding to violate these norms. In such instances culturalists experience what social movement scholars call “cognitive liberation” (McAdam, 1982, pp. 34-35). This is not, as James Jasper emphasizes, simply a process of framing reality in a different way but of attaching different emotional values to ideas, notions and symbols (Jasper, 1997). Culturalists mark a discursive break when they feel and say: we no longer feel ashamed to speak this truth to power. Paradoxically, the feeling that one challenges a system of discursive oppression would not be so enthralling if the domination was complete. It is precisely the inability of multiculturalists, anti-racists and the politically correct to enforce these norms that makes it possible and even rewarding to break them. “Breaking the taboo” is no longer an act of individual bravery but a tested repertoire of a growing discursive movement (*cf.* Prins, 2002, 2004).

The scorn of (internalized) others is not the only thing culturalists have to fear. Especially central actors who speak out against Islam risk more than hurting the sensibilities of Dutch civil elites. Physical violence had never been entirely absent from integration politics but it had seemed far away. Khomeini’s *fatwa* was directed against a British writer. The frequent attacks against Janmaat resulted in injuries but the pain of this pariah did not hurt the civil community; when Janmaat’s wife was disabled after a petrol bomb attack from the extreme left, the mainstream political parties and the media were indifferent. This changed after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. Though controversial, he was widely seen as part of the civil community; the shock of his death reverberated throughout the civil sphere (Pantti & Wieten, 2005). The killer was a Dutch native acting alone but Fortuyn’s supporters argued that the “bullet came from the left” and that the established parties had “demonized” their leader, thereby fostering the political climate that killed him. The killing of Van Gogh made him into a martyr for the freedom of expression and a culturalist hero. Culturalists had already cast themselves as protectors of the civil community from outside threats; violence only

confirmed their conviction that they embodied the values that (radical) Muslims sought to destroy.

The assassinations had an ambivalent effect on the (in)famous critics of Islam and their circle of friends. The chance of attack made some more careful in expressing themselves. One of my respondents decided to keep a lower profile because he felt participating in the debate had become unpleasant and perhaps dangerous. When I visited him at his work place, there was a security guard in the corridor to check visitors before letting them in through a locked door. Another respondent was extremely cautious before he agreed to an interview. When I visited him at his home, he spontaneously stated that the lack of a name tag under his bell was “not because of the threats.” When I asked him to sit closer (for the recording), he wondered out loud if I was going to shoot him. When I asked about the threats, he answered that he could not even tell me why he could not tell me.

It is difficult to gauge the effect of being surrounded by guards. But it seems that central culturalists like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and more recently Geert Wilders, underwent a process of radicalization after they were put under constant surveillance. A more tangible consequence of the threats and violence against central culturalists was their supporters drawing together. After the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the “Friends of Theo” – the artists and intellectuals surrounding him – made many appearances on television with satire, criticism and parodies directed against Islam as well as the left (Hajer & Uitermark, 2008). When Ayaan Hirsi Ali went into hiding, the “Friends of Ayaan,” as the media called them, came together to console her. The public signs of support on the opinion pages in part reflect the private friendships that grew stronger in the face of danger. Threats and violence motivated culturalists to utter with greater conviction their discourse against Islam and the complacent left.

These snippets of experience show that Culturalism is a passionate discourse that relies on emotional symbolism. While the gatekeepers of the broadsheet newspapers are generally perceived to be left of the political center, they nevertheless take a strong interest in Culturalism. I do not have detailed data on selection procedures but editors favor contributions that relate to current affairs and that can be communicated through headlines or leads. Culturalists trigger responses and responses are valued: this power to attract attention and to stir debate – what I have referred to as resonance power – defines their power in the media. Their power is much more limited in policy circles. This is not only because many civil servants have an affinity for the left (another general impression I share but cannot prove) but also because they communicate in a vocabulary different from the visionary exclamations of culturalists. When culturalists manage to insert themselves on the agendas of

policy-makers, bureaucratic and parliamentary procedures take the sting out of their discourse. Paul Scheffer, for instance, expressed disappointment after his article was discussed in parliament:

Fundamental questions about the legitimacy of government and about living together in a country with so many differences have been evaded. ... Citizens are more and more concerned about the public cause but this is not reflected in parliamentary deliberations. The debate about the multicultural drama, for example, shrunk after two days into talk about implementation problems with citizenship courses (Scheffer, 2002).

But Scheffer himself also took the sting out of his discourse when he functioned in the state bureaucracy. When he was hired, along with two others, to select candidates for the diversity council in Amsterdam (see Chapter 9), fear of society disintegrating didn't seem to be foremost on his mind:

We looked for strong individual persons. We also wanted to have a significant share of women and ethnic minorities – *it was as politically correct as it could possibly be*. So I think they were very happy about what I did. But I have to say, I value each of the successful candidates very highly, even though most will probably not share my viewpoints. But I have looked at their biographies and qualities rather than their viewpoints. *There are just some problems that everybody has to recognize*, so we do not have to agree that there is a multicultural drama (my emphasis).

Within policy processes, different administrators, departments, quasi-governmental organizations, experts and civil society associations have to coordinate their efforts. The focus is on problems that “everyone” recognizes and these problems are usually described in the sort of bureaucratic jargon that does not offend any of the partners involved. The emotive words that enabled culturalists to take center stage in the debate on minority integration worked against them in policy circles. The pragmatic approach to integration that I introduced in the previous chapter and explore in more detail in the next seemed almost immune to culturalist criticism.

## **Conclusion: the expansion and transformation of Culturalism**

The corrosion of established political institutions has created a pool of disenfranchised citizens apathetic or antagonistic towards parliamentary politics. They often feel that cultural and political elites fail to properly reward conformity or punish transgression. Although they may still favor the redistributive policies of the left, growing numbers of people with low cultural capital and distrust towards elites have put their faith in right-wing populists who promise to let the right hand of the state weigh down upon those who abuse or even threaten the system (Houtman, 2003; Achterberg & Houtman, 2006). Culturalism thus aims to conserve cultural values and enforce cultural norms. But it would be misleading to characterize it as a conservative force for at least two reasons.

First, conservatism is associated – in everyday speech as well as in the academic literature – with traditional family values, religious convictions and respect for authority (e.g. Hunter, 1991; Martin, 1996). But we saw that Dutch culturalist celebrities took issue with conservative values and espoused those progressive values initially promoted by the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (see previous chapter; Duyvendak *et al.*, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The inequality of cultures should be acknowledged, they argued, to protect the equality of men and women, homosexuals and heterosexuals. Second, civil elites articulated a culturalist discourse as part of a more general challenge to accommodation, dialogue and moderation. Culturalism, in the specific figuration in which it was mobilized, functioned more as a revolutionary than a conservative discourse. As a contending elite, culturalists sought to change the rules of the game in order to devalue the dispositions of established elites. Through their bold discourses and sensational performances, culturalists sought to mobilize readers, viewers and voters against the experts, bureaucrats and commissions that dominated established parties and integration policy. The conflict was not simply between natives and migrants but between different ways of talking, acting and performing.

This chapter analyzed the evolution of Culturalism in the 1990s and 2000s against the backdrop of the development of the Dutch civil sphere. Looking at the class and strategic dimensions of discursive power, I observed how culturalists, especially after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, became more diverse in their class composition, dramatized their discourse and clustered around leaders. While it is true that disenfranchised natives formed a core constituency of culturalists, the discourse was also mobilized by intellectuals, academics and politicians who sought to challenge the pragmatist political culture and to redefine power

relations in the civil sphere.

My analysis of Culturalism's development has elucidated how and why the discourse became more powerful. The analysis also suggested that Culturalism did *not* become hegemonic and that its *relative* growth in articulation, consonance and resonance power was limited. The growing power of Culturalism does not preclude the possibility of other integration discourses also increasing in power. As with all civil conflicts, conflicts over integration are not zero-sum games. The growing power of Culturalism evokes opposition and triggers transformation. The next chapter examines in more detail how Culturalism's rise has affected its opponents and how they faltered, adapted or blossomed in the face of the culturalist ascendancy.



## 6. Contesting Culturalism. Anti-racism, Pragmatism and Civil Islam

The previous chapter noted that culturalists were prominent in successive episodes of integration politics. But it also became clear that the power of Culturalism was ambiguous and contested. In this chapter we investigate actors who promoted alternatives to Culturalism, focusing in particular on three discourses: Anti-racism, Pragmatism and Civil Islam. Supporters of these discourses criticized Culturalism for polarizing society and stigmatizing minorities, but did so for very different reasons. As the opponents of Culturalism do not form a coherent group (Chapter 5), this chapter first dissects the integration debate through a correspondence analysis of the different discourses and their promoters. The subsequent sections explore the milieus where these discourses were cultivated, identify their bases of support and analyze their relationships to Culturalism.

### Alternatives to Culturalism

To explain the presence and power of the many critics of Culturalism, I use the properties database introduced in Chapter 3. Through a correspondence analysis of the authors and the discourses they promote, we can examine the discourses' distinct bases of support. Figure 6.1 presents the results of this multiple correspondence analysis<sup>46</sup>. As we would expect, Culturalism finds support among right-wing politicians. We also see that contributors to the newspaper *Trouw* are prominent supporters of Culturalism, due to the efforts of the editors of the *Letter & Geest* section to draw attention to the cultural dimensions of social life, not least to the purported superiority of the West over Islam. The "small minority" group is close to Culturalism; it includes non-Western migrants but not those from the four largest groups living in the Netherlands (Moroccans, Turkish, Surinamese and Antilleans). This group includes people like Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Afshin Ellian who criticize the minority groups living in the Netherlands for failing to meet the standards of enlightenment. They urge the Dutch to become more militant and passionate about defending liberal democracy against the alleged threat posed by radical Islam. The figure shows that the large minority groups, in contrast, support Anti-racism and Civil Islam. The results, in short, confirm and refine the analysis of Culturalism in the previous chapter.




Figure 6.1 Multiple correspondence analysis of newspaper articles: discourse promoted, affiliation and ethnic background of the (first) author ( $n=588$ )

The plot features a discourse that I refer to as “Diversity.” Its promoters focus on the positive aspects of diversity for societies, companies or cities, arguing that growing cultural diversity is positive for business and government organizations as it helps to generate new ideas and to connect to increasingly diverse customers and citizens. Because the diversity discourse is comparatively weak<sup>47</sup> and is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, I do not examine it here. But what about the other discourses? With the aid of correspondence analysis and Table 6.1, the subsequent sections discuss first Anti-racism, then Pragmatism and finally Civil Islam.

**Table 6.1 Relative and absolute support for five integration discourses in five different periods (unknown/other [n=118] not shown) (reproduction of Table 3.1)**

	<i>Culturalism</i>		<i>Pragmatism</i>		<i>Civil Islam</i>		<i>Anti-racism</i>		<i>Diversity</i>		<i>Total</i> N
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
1990 to 1994	17	14.8	73	63.5	11	9.6	10	8.7	4	3.5	115
1995 to 1999	11	17.5	27	42.9	9	14.3	6	9.5	10	15.9	63
2000 to 9/11	15	23.1	41	63.1	4	6.2	2	3.1	3	4.6	65
9/11 to 6 May 2002 (Fortuyn murder)	16	34.0	17	36.2	9	19.1	1	2.1	4	8.5	47
6 May 2002 to 1 Jan 2006	95	29.6	157	75.1	42	20.1	16	7.7	11	5.3	321
Total	154	25.2	315	51.6	75	12.3	35	5.7	32	5.2	611

### **Anti-racism: a marginal discourse**

#### *Introduction*

New social movements proliferated in the Netherlands in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Although the movement for migrant rights and against racism was never as strong (or as well-documented) as some other movements, it was an integral part of a wider network struggling for social justice and equal rights (see, e.g., Van der Valk, 1996). The association NBK (*Nederland Bekent Kleur*, Holland Admits Color) organized mass demonstrations of around 100,000 people in the early 1990s, including many prominent politicians, intellectuals and celebrities. Measures against discrimination and racism were part and parcel of government policies: the 1983 revision of the constitution institutionalized the prohibition of discrimination in Article 1, while subsidies were made available for centers monitoring and acting against racism and discrimination.<sup>48</sup> In sum, Anti-racism was supported by social movements and state institutions in the 1980s. But was it also a powerful discourse among civil elites in the 1990s and 2000s?

There is considerable dispute among scholars over the power of Anti-racism. Many suggest there is a taboo on critical remarks about migrants and minority cultures. Ian Buruma, for instance, writes that both Frits Bolkestein and Paul Scheffer were “denounced as racists” when they warned against the deleterious consequences of mass migration (Buruma, 2006, p. 53). Ruud Koopmans similarly suggests that there has been “a sense of postcolonial guilt and

[an] ever-present fear among authorities of being accused of racism” (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005, p. 15). Other commentators suggest that Anti-racism has been weak in the Netherlands compared to countries like the United States or the United Kingdom. Philomena Essed observes that Dutch scholars have been reluctant to use the word “racism,” instead opting for concepts and measures suggesting that minorities suffer from a deficit (Essed, 1987; Essed and Nimako, 2006), while Teun van Dijk argues that elites blame racism on marginal groups (such as Janmaat’s party), thereby reproducing rather than confronting systemic racism (Van Dijk, 1992, 1993, 2003). Ellie Vasta argues that “structural marginalization and racist discourses have reinforced the exclusion of ethnic minorities...” but “the Dutch” fail to recognize this since “they are not as accommodating as they, and others, think they are” (Vasta, 2007, p. 735). To assess the power of Anti-racism and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I first assess its articulation power and identify its bases of support: how many articles were coded as “anti-racist” and which actors produced these pieces? I then sample some fragments to illustrate variants of Anti-racism before turning to the experiences of anti-racists in the debate and in the policy field.

#### *Articulation power and support base*

Only a relatively small portion of the articles were coded as anti-racist. This was not due to overly restrictive operationalization. As Appendix 1 explains, all articles that exclusively or for the most part address the dangers of discrimination, prejudice, racism or stigmatization were coded as anti-racist. The use of the word “racism” was not a criterion for inclusion, but even with this broad definition of Anti-racism, the share of articles does not exceed 10 per cent in any of the periods. The high-point for Anti-racism was in the 1990s, with a modest resurgence after 9/11 (Table 6.1). The correspondence analysis shows that Anti-racism finds support especially among civil society associations and migrant professionals but not among politicians, academics or journalists (the three groups that respectively account for 24, 22 and 27 per cent of the articles in the database).

#### *Discursive milieus and civil vocabularies*

The articles coded as “anti-racist” cover a wide range of positions from radical to moderate. Radical here means that authors use heavy symbolism to make their point. One such article, authored by the Jewish writer Anne-Ruth Wertheim, draws upon the most charged metaphors of the civil sphere when warning that the fear of migrants could result in massive racist violence: “If Jewish history teaches us anything, it is that pestering and humiliations can lead

to mass murder. We have to be alert to forms of racism that can be a precursor to large-scale eruptions of violence” (Wertheim, 2004). The article is exceptional in that it uses the term “racism” and portrays the Netherlands as a country about to fall victim to the darkest of forces. Other actors aim to treat racism and discrimination as soberly as possible. The director of the anti-discrimination agency Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam, pleased that the issues of discrimination and racism are not as charged as they were in the 1980s, expressly limits herself to technical and juridical procedures (Silversmith, cited in Blokker, 2000). Most of the anti-racist articles fall inbetween these extremes and address the pernicious consequences of increasingly hostile integration discourses and policies. For instance, Kees Groenendijk, a professor of law at the Free University, argues that measures to reduce immigration and discipline migrants have made migrants into second-class citizens: “the results are disastrous for the position of migrants and the relationship between migrants and the majority of the population. Most measures lead to exclusion rather than integration” (Groenendijk, 2004).

The only actor with an anti-racist discourse who received sustained media attention was Abu Jahjah, the leader of the Belgian-based Arabic European League. This was partly because Jahjah is so different from migrants who staff subsidized and institutionalized minority organizations: he is radical. His politics is a fusion of Arab nationalism and the civil rights discourse of Malcolm X (see, e.g., Jahjah, 2003). Jahjah had firsthand experience of Israel’s war against Lebanon and his condemnation of Israel could count on support among some migrant groups. He also took a strong stance against Culturalism. Rather than arguing for integration or dialogue, he claimed that the only way forward was to struggle for full civil rights:

Natives enjoy their civil rights 100 per cent. Migrants get 70 per cent. I also have a right to 100. I am not going to humbly wait till I get those rights and then be grateful. Because I will not get them. So I take them (cited in De Gruyter & Olgun, 2002).

Jahjah explicitly rejects the notion of integration because, in his view, it implies assimilation. He argues for multiculturalism because he feels that full recognition of the identity and culture of minorities is the only way not to exclude minority groups. But the most distinctive feature of his interventions is his constant stress on discrimination as an infringement of civil rights. The difference between the 70 and 100 per cent is due to employers, banks, landlords and the police, all of whom, according to Jahjah, routinely discriminate against migrants regardless of their citizenship status, in violation of anti-discrimination legislation (*ibid.*).

Jahjah's solution is to mobilize so that the abstract rights enshrined in the constitution materialize in practice.

### *Resonance and consonance power*

Contributions addressing the consequences of ethnic or racial domination appeared only incidentally and were written by actors on the margins of the civil sphere. The only person with an anti-racist discourse who achieved a relatively high level of centrality was Abu Jahjah. In contrast to others whose articles were coded as anti-racist, Jahjah had considerable resonance power; his Page Rank score is much lower than Hirsi Ali or Fortuyn though he still ranks third in the period between the Fortuyn and Van Gogh assassinations with 3.9 per cent of the period's resonance power. However, he did not garner much support and had unusually low consonance: 39 negative references versus 4 positive ones. Jahjah thus seems to be the exception that confirms the rule: Anti-racism is a marginal discourse that encounters massive opposition when it moves closer to the core of the civil sphere.

One way to cross-validate these results is to see what the actors in the debate – and not just authors of articles coded as anti-racist – say about racism. If we search the database for the words “racist”, “racists” or “racism” and make a rough distinction between fragments criticizing racism and those criticizing anti-racism, we find that the latter are more numerous: racism is identified as a problem 35 times and anti-racism 61 times. If we examine these fragments in their contexts, we find that racism is normally not associated with Dutch society or with Dutch politicians. Some actors talk about the need to remain vigilant of the dangers of racism, while others speak of racism in other countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, the United States or the United Kingdom.

### *Subjective experiences: feelings of discursive subordination*

How do anti-racists perceive their position in the integration debate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how do they operate in the policy field? Anti-racists, in providing a radical critique of Culturalism, act with the same fervor as culturalists. Like culturalists, they seek to radically transform power relations, albeit in the opposite direction. While the substantive content of Anti-racism is a mirror image of Culturalism, its structural location is very different: anti-racists are in marginal positions, their power has been decreasing, and they seek to defend the interests of groups – migrants, minorities, Muslims – whose members have increasingly been portrayed as unworthy or incapable of incorporation into the Dutch civil community. Whereas culturalists like Afshin Ellian and Paul Scheffer (see

previous chapter) have recently been afforded professorships at Dutch universities, some of the most central anti-racists in academia – Philomena Essed, Chris Mullard, Teun van Dijk, Miriyam Aouragh – have moved abroad. In interviews and articles, they express great frustration over the academic and political climate they left behind. Where culturalists feel that the debate is now (more) “balanced,” anti-racists feel that it is, in the words of one of my respondents, “not even a debate. A debate implies that there are different parties. What you have now is not a debate but the same old rubbish ... of the same old people. Once in a while there is some opposition but it is an illusion to think that this is a public debate.”

Anti-racists feel stigmatized. “The real taboo is racism” is a recurrent phrase in their discourse. When they use the r-word, they are often castigated as censors who seek to suppress criticism of religions or cultures. Stigmatization sometimes borders on, or becomes, intimidation. Some of my respondents were ridiculed in such settings as the popular right-wing website – or shock blog – *Geenstijl*. Several respondents had received threats by email or telephone. One of my student assistants managed to arrange an interview with the chairperson of the Arabic European League (AEL), a man of Moroccan descent who worked as an account manager at a large company. He agreed to the interview on the condition that his last name be kept secret; he did not want to risk a smear campaign that would hurt his career. One AEL activist stated that she did not know whom to trust anymore after finding out others in the movement had been informants or undercover agents of the Dutch intelligence agency.

Anti-racists experience exclusion, not just symbolically but practically. In contrast to the culturalists discussed in the previous chapter, anti-racists have great difficulty accessing the opinion pages or other central settings of the civil sphere. They therefore have to organize outside of it. The anti-racist movement tries to frame the grievances of both migrants and natives who are concerned about the movement I label culturalist but that anti-racists refer to as xenophobic or racist. To tap into these feelings of frustration, and to counter complacency, the anti-racist movement tries to create discursive milieus where the balance of power is radically different from the central settings of the civil sphere. They invite speakers who articulate the same basic message – Islamophobia and the right-wing revolt endanger minorities and society at large – in different ways. One central figure of the International Socialists, a Trotskyist association that supported several campaigns against racism, stated that debates, events and demonstrations should give people the skills and confidence to take unpopular positions. The goal is to “give back pride to people. To offer a stage where they can express their grievances and where they hear arguments that they can use. ... *That* is what

people want. People don't need another debate of left versus right, of Muslims versus VVD [right-wing Liberals].”

The sudden growth of the AEL and considerable turn-out at some anti-racist events (several hundred at a debate, several thousand at a demonstration) fuelled the belief among some anti-racist organizers that there was widespread support for a collective response to the onslaught of Culturalism. But there were also considerable obstacles. In the policy field and in civil society, anti-racist associations have to compete – for members, influence and activists – with actors that have much greater access to state resources. They therefore tend to shy away from radical critique. While anti-racist associations may receive funds from (subdivisions of) charities or donations, they do not have structural access to state funding and therefore lack the infrastructure to sustain mobilization.

### *Conclusion*

The above findings contradict claims that accusations of racism were frequent. They furthermore corroborate claims that elite denials of Dutch racism were commonplace.<sup>49</sup> There were strong discursive restrictions on anti-racist discourse, while personal accusations of racism were altogether absent. The subjective experiences of anti-racists and the structural position of Jahjah (central because of intense criticism) indicate that Anti-racism was very weak. These results are in line with the findings of the previous chapter: culturalists are not hindered by taboos or powerful antagonists, but their critics are. Actors who attempted to blame Dutch natives rather than migrants were marginal figures who received very little space and had virtually no consonance. While there were signs that anti-racist discourse was growing stronger in response to the rising power of Culturalism, the increase in articulation power was limited and Jahjah was central to the debate only during a very brief period. In short, Anti-racism was subordinate to Culturalism. The other discourses had more ambiguous relations to Culturalism.

## **Pragmatism: a resilient discourse**

### *Introduction*

After the emergence of Pim Fortuyn, commentators in and of the Netherlands observed a dramatic shift away from multiculturalism towards policies aimed at assimilation. But the Netherlands never pursued multiculturalism.<sup>50</sup> Intellectuals who explained and espoused its principles were notably absent, as were any attendant policies. The word “multiculturalism”

in fact appears in the database for the first time in 1995 and was used almost exclusively by its opponents. The only exception was Abou Jahjah. It could be argued that this absence was merely semantic, that the word was not used but that the ideas and notions were there. But this would miss the crucial point that the protection and preservation of minority cultures – a central component of any coherent multiculturalist discourse – was never a goal of policy. As Chapter 4 showed, the goal of the minorities policy, and of the integration policy following it, was to *prevent* the process of minority formation, routinely conceptualized as the formation of an ethnic underclass (*cf.* Van Amersfoort, 1974; Penninx, 1988b; Scholten, 2007). Policies thus exclusively targeted stigmatized ethnic groups in lower class positions.

It is essential to understand this prehistory of integration politics to appreciate what exactly culturalists challenged. They did *not* introduce the idea that migration causes problems, that migration had to be curtailed, that migrants had to become autonomous citizens, that unemployed and unskilled labor migrants had to become productive workers, or that some cultural practices (such as forced marriages or domestic abuse) had to be ended. All of these ideas were well-established by the late 1980s and the early 1990s (see also Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid, 2004, pp. 436-445). The designers and defenders of the minorities and integration policies sought to put these ideas into practice through a combination of “poldering” and paternalism. Because they want to solve integration problems as practically and efficiently as possible, I refer to these actors as *pragmatists*. To assess the strength of Pragmatism and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I first look at its articulation power and support base: how many articles were coded as “pragmatist” and who produced them? I then quote fragments to illustrate the different variants of Pragmatism before turning to the experiences of pragmatists with the media and policy field.

#### *Articulation power and base of support*

Most of the critics of Culturalism were classified as “pragmatists.” While their share of articles decreased over time, Pragmatism remained the most articulated discourse throughout the period of investigation. Although support for Pragmatism was highest before 9/11, there has been no sharp downward trend in its relative power since then (Table 6.1). Pragmatism has been resilient. Given its strong presence on the opinion pages, it is hardly surprising that it drew support from many different sectors. The correspondence analysis shows that three sectors distinctively support Pragmatism: left-wing politicians, academic sociologists, and the editors and journalists of *NRC Handelsblad*. These actors all belong to or identify with the governmental elites responsible for integration policy. Below we examine actors from these

three sectors and the type of discourse they promoted.

*Discursive milieus and civil vocabularies*

Since their inception, the institutions of the minorities policy have maintained close relations with left-leaning parties, particularly the Labor Party. Labor traditionally receives a large proportion of migrant votes and recruits politicians and administrators through the institutions of the minorities/integration policy (expertise centers, consultative bodies and civil society associations). Prominent migrant politicians have also arisen through this party (see Chapter 10). Other left-leaning parties likewise have ties to this field. For instance, one of the leaders of the Greens (Mohammed Rabbae) used to work as a director for the Netherlands Center for Foreigners; a progressive Liberal, Roger van Boxtel, was the first Minister of Integration. Together the left-leaning parties account for 61 articles, or just over 20 per cent of the total coded as pragmatist.

Though pragmatists from these parties share some fundamental notions, there are important variations. Within the Labor Party, there is a continuum between politicians who emphasize the obligations of Dutch society and those who emphasize the obligations of migrants. Examples of the former include Ed van Thijn (Minister of Interior Affairs in the 1980s and mayor of Amsterdam in the late 1980s and early 1990s), Hedy d'Ancona (Minister of Welfare in the early 1990s) and Job Cohen (Junior Minister of Justice in the 1990s, mayor of Amsterdam between 2001 and 2010, Labor Party leader since 2010; see Box 6.1). These individuals, while acknowledging that mass migration causes problems, argue that elites have the responsibility, in Cohen's words, to "keep things together." Ed van Thijn argued, *contra* culturalists, that in times of transformation, "governmental elites ... have to be aware of their educational mission and to prepare the way for a society that combines socio-political integration with cultural diversity" (Van Thijn, 1997). On the other end of the continuum are pragmatists who emphasize the obligations of migrants, including Aad Kosto (Junior Minister of Justice and Minister of Interior Affairs in the early 1990s), Wouter Bos (Labor Party leader between 2002 and 2010) and Ahmed Aboutaleb (alderman of diversity in Amsterdam in the early 2000s and since 2008 mayor of Rotterdam). Governmental elites, they argue, have underestimated the problems arising from migration; there is a need, in the words of Wouter Bos, to attend to the "problems that a diversity of cultures can create," particularly the threats posed by "political Islam" (cited in Wansink & Du Pre, 2004). But regardless of the variation in emphasis, these politicians felt that a mixture of "soft" and "hard" measures were necessary to induce migrants to integrate, thereby safeguarding the unity of the nation as a civil

community.

### **Box 6.1 Job Cohen – a passion for moderation**

With his gentle, suave smile, calm voice and serious expression, Job Cohen (1947) perfectly reflects the image of the polder model where leaders are responsible and skillful executioners rather than mobilizers of the masses. Cohen has been an administrator since his time at high school in Haarlem. He served as a class representative and had a position on the board of the school orchestra (Kleijwegt and Van der Vlugt, 2008). At Groningen University he was among the first students to participate in the democratized governing bodies. An academic career as a legal scholar took him first to Leiden University for his dissertation but he focused on academic governance and eventually became *rector magnificus* (the Dutch equivalent of vice chancellor) of Maastricht University. For the Labor Party he took up high-profile positions in the government (as Junior Minister in 1993-1994) and the Senate (1995-1998). His most notable achievement is a new immigration law that made the migration regime of the Netherlands into one of the most strict and restrictive in Europe (Entzinger, 2002). But for Cohen stopping the influx of migrants was not something to boast about, just something that had to be done with prudence and commitment. As the mayor of Amsterdam, Cohen introduced or defended many repressive measures – preventive searches, camera surveillance, raids – but always presented them as part of a more comprehensive approach to “keep things together.” He frequently declared his willingness to work together with migrants and their associations, believing that accommodation and incorporation would reduce resentment and lead to the development of a liberal Islam (see Chapter 10). What defines Cohen’s position is his passionate support for moderation and consensual politics. The move away from the center of politics is of great concern to him. “It is bad for the balance in society” (Kleijwegt and Van der Vlugt, 2008). And balance is something Cohen cherishes. The preservation of social cohesion and social peace is the cornerstone of his approach and central to his understanding of integration politics.

Sociologists, though not the only academics promoting Pragmatism, were the most present. With 38 articles, sociologists published almost twice as many articles as their colleagues from other major disciplines (philosophy, anthropology, political science and history have around 20 articles each). Twenty-three of these articles by sociologists were coded as pragmatist (60.5 per cent). Even more than left-wing politicians, pragmatist sociologists emphasize that heated emotions have no place in integration politics. One sociologist, for instance, stated that there is a need for a “distanced analysis of the goals and effects of policies” (Burgers, 1996); another that integration policies require patience and care rather than the “verbal violence” of party programs (Entzinger, 2002). In the articles and in interviews, these pragmatist sociologists present themselves as intellectual technocrats serving society through relevant insights and reliable findings. The heavy presence of sociologists among academics in the integration debate and their support for Pragmatism is due to their traditional role in monitoring multicultural society and conducting research for integration policy (Essed and

Nimako, 2006; Schinkel, 2007). Though they did not wish to be identified with any particular ideological or political position, pragmatist sociologists were very critical of culturalists, arguing that many other factors besides migrants' cultural backgrounds explain their disadvantaged position.

Alongside sociologists and left-wing politicians, the editors and journalists writing for the *NRC Handelsblad* constitute a third category of actors who form a bastion in support of Pragmatism.<sup>51</sup> Of the 90 articles they produced, 74 per cent were coded as pragmatist. Their support of the discourse, however, fluctuated over time: when Scheffer (himself a regular contributor to *NRC*) published "The multicultural drama," support for Pragmatism was comparatively weak. But in the early 1990s and especially after 9/11, it was very strong. The contributors to *NRC* mostly supported Pragmatism as part of a more general aversion towards populism (which characterized much but not all culturalist discourse). Regular contributors like Elsbeth Etty (15 pragmatist articles) and Sjoerd de Jong (11 pragmatist articles) were fascinated by the growing popularity of populist politicians and tried to place the phenomenon in wider historical and sociological context. Of course their analyses contained a – partly explicit, partly implicit – valuation of civil ideas, notions and symbols. Etty's analysis of growing nationalist sentiment was typical of this denunciatory explanation:

The longing for the strengthening of national identity arises from the fear for the loss of the particularity of Dutch cultural expressions in an era of internationalization and European integration. But even if the fear of an erosion of national culture would be warranted, an argument for a "Dutch we-feeling" in relation to culture amounts to little more than regional folklore (Etty, 2001).

Many such passages can be found: the presentation of culturalists is first criticized (anxiety over Moroccan delinquents or Islamic extremists is in fact a sublimated fear of globalization) and then their agenda is declared irrelevant. Rather than engaging directly with culturalist discourse or its implications for degraded groups (as anti-racists do), such reflections serve to create distance between the analyst and the analyzed, with the former putting the sentiments of the latter into perspective. Other pragmatists writing for the *NRC* identified with disgruntled natives and felt that elites should incorporate rather than denounce culturalists.<sup>52</sup> Whereas previously it was only migrants who had to be accommodated, now resentful natives had to be taken seriously as well, so that they will not grow (even more) resentful towards political and other elites.

### *Resonance and consonance*

Despite their ambitions of civil unification and social harmony, pragmatists with reasonably central positions are focal points of discursive conflict. They are criticized at least as often as central culturalists. Between 2000 and 9/11, the Minister of Integration, Roger Van Boxtel, was a central figure and attracted much more criticism (14 times) than praise (twice). After 9/11, Job Cohen became a central figure and he, too, was much more often criticized (51 times) than praised (8 times). Most other pragmatists, with the possible exception of some policy sociologists, did not achieve centrality. Especially Han Entzinger – a professor of sociology, former civil servant, and one of the designers of the integration policy – had a small but sustained presence on the opinion pages. Compared to most others, he received many neutral references (39) and had a relatively favorable ratio of criticism and praise (9:5).

### *Subjective experiences: the calm confidence of pragmatists*

How do pragmatists perceive their position in the integration debate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how do they operate in the policy field? The discourse that I refer to as Pragmatism covers a wide range of positions. Most of the articles on the opinion pages were produced by persons whose prestige derives in large part from their position within the state: politicians who seek to govern, academics who do research for the government, and experts who gather information and produce advice. They are part of a policy field in which integration is researched, discussed and managed; each day there are dozens of expert meetings, conferences and lectures revolving around the question how diversity should be governed. While there are disagreements, the shared desire to devise practical strategies binds the actors together. For them, integration is a matter of technique, not ideology.

Many pragmatists complain that integration politics has gotten out of hand. They occasionally participate in the media debate but feel uncomfortable with mediatized politics. This passage from an interview with a pragmatist social scientist is typical:

You do research and this gives you a certain claim to, well, to a part of the truth. And this is what you should contribute. After all, it's the taxpayer's money and so you have the task to contribute. But it has to be a debate that does not speak without nuance about, well, jeez, about Muslims, as is happening at the moment. No, you should show nuances. It is all more complicated... Yes, there are scumbags. There are

fundamentalists too. But there are also fundamentalists that are different.

Another academic complained that he had to communicate his findings in sound bites. He occasionally had his articles published in newspapers but felt that he could not get the message across in the space allotted to him. These experiences are typical of researchers in the policy field. They experience a loss of discursive power when they move into the media and are especially frustrated by accusations that their work is multiculturalist ideology dressed up as science (e.g. Ellian, 2005; Scheffer, 2001; Sommer, 2002). When I asked a researcher how he felt about the accusation that he promotes multiculturalism, he grabbed a pile of his publications and threw it before me. He exclaimed that he “*never said anything* like that” and invited me to check. Such feelings of frustration are indicative of discursive subordination. The dispersion of integration politics into the media results in the loss of status based on bureaucratic routines and scientific authority (see also Hajer, 2009). A professor who feels that his work is highly valued in classrooms and expert meetings can be reduced to a mere ideologue in another setting.

However, most of the time pragmatist researchers were calm and confident in their positions. They operate in a policy field that is much less dynamic than the debate on integration in the media and parliament. Policy objectives and media issues may change quickly but power relations in the policy field are robust. One researcher at the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Ethnic and Migration Studies (IMES) – a bulwark of Pragmatism – told me that the ministries did not call as much after the right-wing cabinet of 2002 had been installed but he did not really mind. After all, he said, the government has no other place to turn to if it wants to devise a strategy against radicalization among Muslims. The IMES indeed received the first large grant for studying radicalization (see Buijs *et al.*, 2006). Since then, the IMES has developed a very strong position in the expanding field of radicalization studies. Centers like Forum, the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners and the Moroccan Platform Netherlands (*Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen Nederland*) have jumped on the train and developed courses and programs against radicalization. People working in these institutions feel that the fear of radical Muslims is exaggerated but are nonetheless happy to offer their services. Many of the programs previously aimed at promoting dialogue or emancipation have been adjusted to fit the new policy objectives.

Examples of this sort of adjustment abound (see also Hay, 1995). One senior civil servant who had worked closely with left-leaning administrators for years was surprised by my question whether his work had changed after the siege of Fortuyn’s party. “Of course not!

*Everybody* is for social cohesion,” he said. And he was right. The right-leaning government of Rotterdam had expanded most of the community work programs introduced under previous governments, changing the emphasis from social contact to social control (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Something similar is true at the national level. The right-wing Liberal Rita Verdonk used her power as a minister to promote a culturalist discourse but her so-called &-program was remarkably similar to the left-leaning government of Amsterdam’s policies to fund initiatives transcending ethnic divisions (discussed in Chapter 9). The institute Forum coordinated the program and supported associations and initiatives to break down the barriers Rita Verdonk – nick-named “iron Rita” (*ijzeren Rita*) – had erected. Far from demotivating pragmatists, culturalists seem to have breathed life into a policy field whose legitimacy is based on the idea that integration is neither unproblematic nor impossible. As long as integration is a topic of controversy, the policy field can count on investments.

### *Conclusion*

Although the articles coded as pragmatist vary, their authors share a commitment to an approach based on dialogue and inclusion. Nevertheless, it was clear that not all migrants or Muslims are to be incorporated in the same fashion. Whether they emphasized the obligations of society to include migrants or the obligations of migrants to integrate into society, pragmatists supported measures that restrict immigration and punish transgressors of civil norms. Rather than siding with natives with revanchist sentiments or migrants with fears of xenophobia, they reasoned on behalf of the state in order to help it maintain the civil unity required for the legitimate exercise of power. It is for this reason that pragmatists do not simply have an antagonistic relationship with culturalists. The ascendancy of Culturalism is taken as a sign that there are integration problems that need to be solved and conflicts that need to be resolved.

The widespread feeling that past integration policies have failed has undermined the legitimacy of left-wing administrators and policy sociologists but it has also – paradoxically – created new divisions and tensions that pragmatists can now promise to overcome. Something similar is true for the pragmatist intellectuals writing for *NRC* and other periodicals. Although they are subordinate to culturalists in the sense that they have lower consonance power and much lower resonance power, the parallel increase of culturalist and pragmatist articles indicates that the rise of Culturalism has encouraged pragmatists’ entry into civil arenas. Pragmatists thrive on the feeling that there is a process of polarization between migrants and natives that requires the kind of interpretation, reflection and management that they can

provide.

## **Civil Islam: an emerging discourse**

### *Introduction*

The *fatwa* against Rushdie and Bolkestein's claim to civilizational superiority placed Islam on the agenda of Dutch integration politics in the early 1990s.<sup>53</sup> The images of burning books and Bolkestein's statements dramatically raised the question whether Islamic beliefs and civil engagement can coexist. Culturalists have since argued that this is impossible or improbable, implying that identifying with Islam precludes or constrains membership in the Dutch civil community. Especially after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the integration debate no longer focused on "foreigners" or "minorities" but on "Muslims" (see Figure 3.1). Fortuyn termed Islam a "retarded culture" and specifically stated that Muslim immigration should stop.<sup>54</sup> Ayaan Hirsi Ali likewise argued that confrontational politics was necessary: the strategy to compromise and accommodate would only allow orthodox Muslims to cultivate and disseminate their anti-democratic, misogynist and homophobic ideas (e.g. Hirsi Ali, 2004).

These notions reverberated throughout the civil sphere but did not go uncontested. As the debate evolved, a discourse crystallized that I refer to as Civil Islam. The core premise of this discourse is that Islam allows or even demands full participation in society and commitment to the values and norms enshrined in the Dutch constitution (see for a more elaborate definition Appendix 1). This process of discourse development takes place in everyday life (Buitelaar, 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008; Van Tilborgh, 2006) but also in discursive milieus composed of associations, meetings, books, websites and friendship networks (Buijs, 2009; Maussen, 2009; Roy, 2004). Chapters 10 and 12 identify some of the discursive milieus located within the associational networks of the Netherlands' two largest cities (Amsterdam and Rotterdam) and show how the proponents of Civil Islam argued that the religion is not the same as ethnic tradition and can be used to critically interrogate and reform traditional practices. While these ideas and notions had been cultivated for many years and in many parts of the world, after 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh they also found their way into the opinion pages of Dutch broadsheet newspapers. To assess the strength of Civil Islam in this setting and to analyze its civil vocabulary, I first examine the number of articles coded as "Civil Islam" and the actors who produced them. I then provide fragments to illustrate that Civil Islam does not just negate Culturalism but crucially depends upon and interacts with it. I then investigate what accounts for the consolidation of Civil

Islam and why some actors promoting this discourse have relatively high popularity.

*Articulation power and base of support*

Civil Islam found support especially among anthropologists and representatives of civil society associations (Figure 6.1). The institutional location of the discourse seems similar to Anti-racism but the dynamic is different. Whereas Anti-racism remained stagnant over our period of investigation, the articulation power of Civil Islam was on the rise: from 11 per cent of the articles in the period 1990-1999 to 14 per cent in the period after 9/11 (Table 6.1). These general figures conceal two developments. One is that the Christian Democrats did not sustain their initial support (and partly turned to Culturalism). The other is that increasing numbers of migrants appeared on the opinion pages after 9/11 to promote Civil Islam. Not all migrants supported the discourse but after 9/11 it accounts for almost 28 per cent of the articles by non-Western migrants ( $n=39$ ) and 36 per cent of the articles by authors from the four largest minority groups ( $n=22$ ).

Although there are sociologists and philosophers who promote Civil Islam, the correspondence analysis suggests that anthropologists are the most prominent academic supporters of this discourse (Figure 6.1). Anthropologists such as Thijl Sunier, Wasif Shadid and Peter van der Veer argued that migrants' religious beliefs and practices were changing to meet the demands of their lives in the Netherlands (Shadid, 2002; Sunier, 1997; van der Veer, 2001). They emphasized that because there are numerous interpretations of Islam (see also Van den Brink, 2004), it is problematic to speak of "the Muslim community" or to view Islam as a monolith. There were also many actors who argued as Muslims that their (or the true) interpretation of Islam implies good citizenship. I do not have precise figures on the religious beliefs of authors on the opinion pages but my estimate is that slightly more than half of the articles categorized as Civil Islam were written by Muslims. These intellectuals and representatives certainly did not speak with one voice, but argued and indeed exemplified the idea that Muslims should participate in the debate on their religion. One prominent proponent of this discourse, Tariq Ramadan, was at the time a professor at Freiburg University. Ramadan had become an influential commentator in the international media and Dutch newspapers published his pieces in translation. Right after 9/11, *Trouw* published "An open letter from a Western Muslim":

The starting point has to be an unconditional denunciation of the attacks... The horrible events in the United States force us to engage in wholesome self-criticism and to stop

allocating blame to “the others.” ... Only a minority of Muslims exhibit Muslim citizenship. The large majority of Muslims are in the social and cultural margin and as soon as something happens – first the Rushdie affair, now the attacks – we see the fractures, the distrust and the mental ghetto. Wisdom ... demands that we are present, that we express ourselves, that we explain the Muslim religion with its spirituality, its principles and its demands for justice and peace (Ramadan, 2001).

Ramadan explicitly called upon Muslims to speak out in the civil sphere and to view and present themselves as members of the civil community. In his writings, including those articles in the database, Ramadan argued that Islam requires respect for the constitution and active engagement in political, cultural and social life (*cf.* Ramadan, 2004). He moreover expressed optimism over the growing civil engagement among Muslims:

Progress is necessarily slow but it is real: among the second and third generations there are more and more Muslim women and Muslim men who stand up for both their Muslim convictions and their Western culture. With respect for the constitution they defend citizenship and an open identity, and they promote an American or a European Islamic culture (Ramadan, 2001).

For Ramadan, commitment to Islam entails civil engagement: Muslims have to participate in society and contribute to it. They also have to struggle against injustice, including injustices perpetrated by dictatorships under an Islamic flag: “our ethics of citizenship require us to interpellate our governments, to call upon them to break their ties to dictatorships and to promote pluralism and democratic rights in all countries” (Ramadan, 2001). Ramadan did not have a strong presence on the opinion pages (2 articles) but his views are emblematic of a growing number of Muslims who seek to reconcile religious and civil engagement. Among the other proponents of Civil Islam, we find some actors emphasizing the need to protest against the injustices of Dutch society and some mainly critical of their own communities. The former were mostly affiliated to migrant or religious associations, the latter to government institutions or political parties.

An example of an actor who is especially critical of Dutch society is Mohammed Cheppih, a Muslim preacher who briefly served as the leader of the Dutch branch of the Arab European League. Cheppih, who plays a pivotal role in local networks of Islamic youths, feels that “The Dutch only want to hear that Islam is retarded and evil. Anybody who says that gets

plenty of space. Anybody who goes against it is a fundamentalist and extremist. That is what they think of me” (Cheppih, cited in Olgun, 2003).<sup>55</sup> The journalist and presenter Samira Abbos is a more moderate critic who appeared on the opinion pages when her book “*The Muslim does not exist*” (Abbos, 2005) was published. In it she presented an overview of Dutch Muslims’ interpretations of Islam, ranging from the liberal to the orthodox. She said she desperately tries to build bridges between Muslims and natives but receives no help from the latter. Paul Scheffer, for instance, refused to write the preface for her book because he felt Abbos should have been more critical of Islam (Abbos, cited in Knols, 2005).

Examples of actors especially critical of their own communities include Ahmed Aboutaleb (Box 6.2) and Haci Karacaer, both prominent members of the Labor Party.<sup>56</sup> They had more articulation power than the other actors promoting Civil Islam, producing 7 and 6 articles respectively, of which 3 and 6 respectively were coded as Civil Islam. As the director of Forum, Aboutaleb criticized his fellow-believers for failing to understand their religion: “Muslims in the Netherlands should think better” and acknowledge that “Islam is a flexible religion” that allows and requires its adherents to adjust to circumstances (Aboutaleb, 2002). In the aftermath of the Theo van Gogh assassination he intensified and dramatized this discourse. He told an audience at a mosque that “the Muslim community would be wise to not have its religion hijacked by extremists.” In a remark that could have come straight out of one of Scheffer’s articles, he called upon the Moroccan community to engage in restorative work: “I want to say that the Moroccan community is burdened with the extraordinarily heavy task of cooperating to restore peace and quiet and working on the production of ‘counter poison’ against intolerance” (Aboutaleb, cited in Hajer & Uitermark, 2008, p. 11).

### **Box 6.2 Ahmed Aboutaleb – building bridges between pragmatists and culturalists**

Ahmed Aboutaleb (1961) was born in the village of Beni Sidel on the northern coast of Morocco. He migrated to the Netherlands when he was fourteen. After getting a degree at a polytechnic, he started a career in journalism, working especially for minority media that were, at the time, heavily subsidized by the government. He moved on to become a public relations worker for Hedy d'Ancona when she was Minister of Welfare. As someone who had intimate knowledge of migrant communities but was not immersed in an association or institution promoting a particular (minority) interest, he was perfectly placed to lead Forum. He was hired as director in 1996 when Forum was created out of several interest groups. Unlike its predecessors which were expected to organize and represent groups, the new institute was to perform as an “expertise center for multicultural development.” Aboutaleb believed that such a transformation – from interest representation to expertise – was necessary, and tried to reform or cut off subsidized migrant associations. Under his leadership, the institute opened up channels to Culturalism. In 1998, it requested Jos de Beus, a professor of political science at the University of Amsterdam and prominent member (and critic) of the Labor Party, to write an essay on the “cult of avoidance” (De Beus, 1998). In 2000, the director of the Social and Cultural Planning Agency, Paul Schnabel, was requested to deliver the institute’s annual lecture. His argument that assimilation should be encouraged had strong resonance in the period when the debate revolved around Paul Scheffer’s “multicultural drama” (see Chapter 5). Some time after publishing “The multicultural drama”, Scheffer joined the Forum board.

These examples show the forces under which Aboutaleb developed his civil habitus. The institute and Aboutaleb moved away from representing particular minority interests and increasingly passed on the expectations of civil elites to minority communities. Aboutaleb embodied the idea that migrants have to integrate, uttering it time and time again in columns, lectures, interviews, expert meetings and countless other occasions for ceremonial discourse production. In 2003, Aboutaleb joined the Municipality of Amsterdam as a top-level civil servant. He worked as an advisor to diversity alderman Rob Oudkerk and succeeded him when Oudkerk had to resign after a scandal. Aboutaleb’s disposition to critically address minorities was valued especially in the aftermath of the Theo van Gogh assassination. Aboutaleb was constantly in the media with a dual message: Muslims and Moroccans had to behave as responsible citizens and right-wing politicians should not treat all Muslims as radicals, a stance that earned Aboutaleb praise from both pragmatists and culturalists.

Haci Karacaer was a member of the Labor Party and at the time aspired to be an alderman. He was also the director of Milli Gorus, a transnational Turkish Islamic association that, like the Turkish AK Party, has its origins in Erbakan’s National Salvation Party in Turkey. Karacaer observed that the traditional Turkish nationalist discourse of Erbakan no longer spoke to the younger generation:

Young people say: what does that do for me ... in the Netherlands? So we decided to become part of the mainstream in the Netherlands. ... We could have continued to stay at

the edge and to dangle in the margin of society but we do not want to do that anymore. We want to participate. Our guiding notions now are: integration, participation, emancipation and performance (Karacaer, cited in Janssen, 2003).

For Karacaer this meant that he responded as much as he could to the requests of political parties, government agencies, newspapers, television channels and cultural centers to participate in debates or to provide commentary. Milli Gorus is a conservative association but Haci Karacaer promoted a discourse emphasizing the moral obligation of Muslims to honor and protect liberal democracy. Although he occasionally criticized Dutch politicians, he achieved his central position thanks to his fierce criticisms of Muslims and particularly his own constituents who *have* to integrate:

I organized language courses for my constituents, for the older migrants [*oudkomers*]. There is place for sixty people but so far only twenty or thirty people registered. That was a disappointment. So I told the director of the social services: come to the mosque and say “guys, if you do not take the course, you do not have to try to get money next month.” ... We do not want more people [getting benefits from] social service; we want to develop an Islamic middle class.

Karacaer was criticized from within his own organization, especially for his participation in activities promoting rights for homosexuals (interview Karacaer). His remark that “Islam is not retarded but some Muslims are” angered the conservative segments of his organization, well aware that Karacaer was referring to them (interview Milli Gorus).<sup>57</sup> But as Karacaer lost support among some of his constituents, he strengthened his association’s position in local governance networks (see Chapter 10; see also Uitermark & Gielen, 2010).

### *Resonance and consonance*

Although many actors promoting Civil Islam criticized Dutch or Western society, the most prominent and influential proponents of this discourse almost exclusively allocated blame to migrants. Karacaer and Aboutaleb were central in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and remained prominent afterwards. They were not only central; they were popular. In contrast to all other central actors, Karacaer received more praise (12 times) than criticism (9 times). Aboutaleb received slightly more negative than positive references (27 versus 22) but this was only because one actor (the culturalist *Trouw* columnist Sylvain Ephimenco) trashed him.

These scores are exceptional in that they are much more positive than those of central culturalists and incomparably more positive than those of central pragmatists and anti-racists. The praise was due to various reasons<sup>58</sup> but the most important was that they were Muslims sternly addressing their own community. Pragmatists embraced them as “bridge builders”; culturalists considered them as positive exceptions. Aboutaleb and Karacaer did indeed build bridges, but not necessarily between migrants and natives – they bridged the divide between pragmatists and culturalists.

*Subjective experiences: a passion for norms*

How do actors promoting Civil Islam perceive their position in the integration debate? What drives them to intervene in the way they do? And how do they operate in the policy field? Although Ahmed Aboutaleb, Haci Karacaer and other leading Muslims are often portrayed as idiosyncratic individuals, we need to analyze their success in relation to more general transformations of the integration policy field and the civil sphere. While in corporatist institutions minority leaders are expected to represent their communities, the mediatization of integration politics requires that they authentically address the interests and concerns of core groups. “Authentically” is crucial here; migrant politicians are commonly perceived as acrobats who have to maintain a delicate balance between their communities and society at large (Cadat & Fennema, 1996). But in a highly emotive and mediatized civil sphere, strategic considerations are at best ignored and at worst rejected as expressions of hypocrisy. In order to credibly play the role of a civil leader, it is essential to passionately lament ideas or actions repelled by core groups, such as intolerance towards homosexuals or apologetic remarks about crime or radicalism. And this is what Aboutaleb and Karacaer did: they castigated Moroccans and Turks for being backward, passive and oversensitive. They referred to Islamic principles to argue against insolence, intolerance, and for education, political participation and decency.<sup>59</sup>

It is no coincidence that Aboutaleb and Karacaer (and several other local leaders that we encounter in Part III) were members of the Labor party. The Labor party was always slightly to the right of the Socialist left in that it sought to uplift and educate (rather than mobilize and represent) the masses. Aboutaleb and Karacaer embodied the promise of this civilizing mission as they had wrestled themselves from humble backgrounds and risen to prestigious positions. As a cleaner in Schiphol, Karacaer knew he wanted to move up:

I am a social person, so I drink a cup of tea with the Dutch foremen. The Turks there

felt that I was flirting with those Dutch guys. But I have always been a rebel, arrogant. So one day I go to the foremen and ask: what do I have to do to get at your side of the table? “You cannot,” they said. And then I said: “Just wait.” Later I met a Dutch professor when I was organizing a conference and he said: “it’s ridiculous that you do cleaning work.” That was the turning point to quit what I was doing and to re-educate myself to work in ICT (Karacaer, quoted in Ham & Uitermark, 2007, p. 84).<sup>60</sup>

Aboutaleb speaks in the same angry manner of people from his own community who try to keep him back. “The Moroccan community can be like a box full of crabs; when one tries to get out, the others pull it back” (Aboutaleb, quoted in Ham & Uitermark, 2007, p. 91). Both leaders blame members of their ethnic community for not seizing opportunities. Aboutaleb states that “when you talk to Moroccans, you have to address the issue of the victim role (*slachtofferrol*)” (*ibid.*, p. 81). The “victim role” refers to the mentality of blaming others, and especially discrimination. Migrants may indeed encounter discrimination but Karacaer feels that it is “an illusion” to think that “16 million Dutch people will change because of some pitiful Moroccans and Turks” (Karacaer, quoted in Ham & Uitermark, 2007, p. 85). Because – unlike most Labor party notables and members – they are migrants and have lower-class backgrounds, they can more persuasively claim that migrants in the Netherlands can succeed if they want to. Interestingly, both Aboutaleb and Karacaer do not take strong positions against the culturalist right. They may criticize Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders but they do not get angry with their supporters. Whereas frustrated migrants can count on fierce criticism when they “play the victim role,” Karacaer and Aboutaleb do not lecture natives about victimhood when they complain about migrants.

Their relaxed attitude towards Islamophobic natives and their relativizing stance towards discrimination and racism are often met with criticism from their own ethnic and religious communities – a diffuse and fragmented opposition of orthodox (*salafi*) Muslims, left-wing migrants, internet warriors, street delinquents and elderly conservatives. Such criticisms, however, do not weaken Karacaer or Aboutaleb’s zeal; they only reinforce their conviction that there is a need to stand up to the uncivil parts of their communities. As long as they receive credit from some migrants and much recognition from core groups, they can speak with a confidence and passion rarely found among pragmatists. Whereas many other Muslims share Karacaer and Aboutaleb’s criticisms of migrant communities, they speak out more explicitly against discrimination and therefore do not receive as much recognition within the civil sphere and also feel more frustrated about the debate on their religion. But

unlike the promoters of Anti-racism, they feel that the lack of recognition is due to ignorance. Their solution is therefore to inform people and engage in dialogue. While these promoters of Civil Islam have yet to gain significant articulation power on the opinion pages, Chapters 10 and 11 show that they have already accrued considerable discursive power in local debates in the large cities.

### *Conclusion*

Only Muslims who were (very) critical of their own (ethnic and religious) community had ample space to promote their discourses. It is remarkable that two Muslims – Karacaer and Aboutaleb – were the exceptions to the rule that central actors receive more criticism than praise. Promoters of Civil Islam who were less critical of minorities did not receive anywhere near as many references as Aboutaleb and Karacaer. But the fact that the promoters of Civil Islam increasingly found their way onto the opinion pages indicates that this discourse had a productive relationship with Culturalism. While the supporters of Civil Islam countered the culturalist charge that Islam is inherently uncivil and accused culturalists of stigmatizing Muslims, their discourse shares with Culturalism the idea that migrants exhibit a disturbing lack of will to integrate and participate in society. Actors promoting Civil Islam voiced strong criticisms of migrants committing crimes, underperforming in school, disrespecting women, neglecting their children and committing other civil vices. In contrast to pragmatists and anti-racists, they often did not hesitate to blame traditional Turkish, Berber or Moroccan culture. And in contrast to Culturalism, Civil Islam suggests that the solution to (what it frames as) scandalous and massive transgressions is to adhere to the Holy Scriptures and the teachings of the prophet Muhammed. Civil Islam in a sense transcended the division between pragmatists and culturalists.

The emergence of these groups and discourses seems to be the outcome of a specific mechanism that could be referred to as the “compulsion of the civil sphere”: pollution creates a demand for reparation and it is those subjects whose identities have been tainted who are best positioned to do the repair. Those Muslims who express themselves on the opinion pages generally declare their commitment to the constitution and the values enshrined in it, such as non-discrimination and freedom of expression. They thereby cleanse the stigma attached to Muslims through statements and performances negating the culturalist premise that Islam and integration are a contradiction in terms. The compulsion of the civil sphere is contradictory in its origins – there is a demand for dignified representatives from stigmatized groups – and ambivalent in its effects: while Muslims are degraded, it is precisely this devaluation that

prompts some actors to intervene in core civil arenas.

## **Conclusion**

What can we conclude from this and the previous chapter about discursive power relations between culturalists and their antagonists? There is no doubt that Culturalism has gained power. The breakthrough came with Bolkestein's intervention in the 1990s. The resurgence and expansion of Culturalism occurred in the new millennium. Paul Scheffer first made Culturalism acceptable to the progressive middle classes. The electoral success of Pim Fortuyn subsequently demonstrated that blunt criticisms of Islam in combination with sensational performances could entice and mobilize previously disenfranchised segments of the population. The turbulent life history of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her unsettling appearance finally gave Culturalism an icon that cultural elites, too, could support or even adore.

Whereas support for Culturalism was initially restricted to the right-wing Liberals of the VVD, its base of support diversified and expanded after 2000. Culturalists could now mobilize sentiments and enfranchise groups through civil channels that were previously closed or non-existent. One expression of culturalists' growing discursive power was their ability to neutralize opponents: since accusations of racism and discrimination were declared taboo in the early 1990s, culturalists have rarely been associated with the dark side of the civil sphere. While the three alternative integration discourses considered in this chapter provide both radical and moderate critique, their promoters are forced to respond to culturalists and therefore do not have agenda-setting power. Let me consider these three discourses and their relations to Culturalism in turn.

Anti-racists offered a radical alternative to Culturalism. Their discourse portrays racism and discrimination as clear and present dangers to the civil community and its values. Anti-racists suggest that a crucial precondition for a well-functioning civil sphere is undermined when migrants and Muslims are portrayed or treated as second-class citizens. Like their culturalist adversaries, anti-racists have a controversial and outspoken discourse. But unlike their adversaries, anti-racists were on the margins of the civil sphere. Anti-racism found support among civil society associations representing lower-class and stigmatized groups and academics on the margins of the university system; it did not enjoy support from journalists or political parties (the two groups most present on the opinion pages). The only time an anti-racist achieved centrality in the debate was when Abou Jahjah was working on the Dutch branch of his Arabic European League. But he encountered fierce opposition and in

the end his efforts were unsuccessful.

Pragmatists also offered an alternative to Culturalism and had many opportunities to articulate their discourse. Pragmatism found support among actors in policy circles, left-leaning political parties and the most intellectual quality newspaper (*NRC Handelsblad*). Pragmatism remained resilient in the face of the growing power of Culturalism and its challenge to established interests. This would have been inconsistent were there a zero sum relationship between the two discourses. But Culturalism and Pragmatism are in a symbiotic relationship: culturalists break open the debate by violating the civil norms of pragmatists, giving them ample opportunity to rebut. Rather than pushing Pragmatism out of the civil sphere, Culturalism pulled it in. We also saw that many ideas and notions that pragmatists previously never had to defend became highly contentious. For instance, the idea that confrontation and polarization are bad was no longer self-evident; some of the most central pragmatists (such as Job Cohen) provoked strong opposition when they argued for accommodation and dialogue.

But when we observe that pragmatists were unsuccessful in opposing Culturalism, we should keep in mind that this was never their main goal. The problem that occupied pragmatists was migrants not integrating, not the emergence of Culturalism. Culturalism and Pragmatism share two fundamental notions: first, migration undermines civil unity; second, migrants' lack of civil engagement is a problem requiring state and political attention. Although the discourses have different ideas on how civil integration should be achieved, they are not diametrically opposed: culturalists stand up for Reason, pragmatists argue for reasonableness; culturalists want to confront problems, pragmatists want to handle problems; culturalists say that policies have failed, pragmatists that they have not fully succeeded, etc. There was, in Bourdieu's terms, complicity between the antagonists where different parties compete but also cooperate (Bourdieu, 1984a, pp. 113-114). They mark their positions through their opposition and owe a part of their discursive power to the fact that they constantly provoke and invoke one another.

Civil Islam, too, has a tense yet symbiotic relationship with Culturalism. It differs from Culturalism in that it ascribes civil value to a religion that culturalists frame as a threat or problem. Small but growing numbers of Muslims found their way into one of the core arenas of the civil sphere – the opinion pages – and demonstrated, in words and performances, that there is no contradiction between civil and religious engagement. But Civil Islam did not just negate Culturalism; the discourses share an agenda of norm enforcement. Promoters of Civil Islam claimed that it is indeed the moral responsibility of Muslims to act as assertive

citizens (the critical variant) or to obey the social and legal rules set by both the nation and the religion (the liberal variant). Even though it was obvious that many engaged Muslims and Islamic associations were deeply hurt by the suspicions and accusations of culturalists, many share the idea that Muslims should leave behind their traditional culture and insert themselves into the Dutch civil community. As we will see in Part III, this means that culturalist and pragmatist governments increasingly consider them as vital partners in generating civil engagement, preventing radicalization and promoting civil integration.

The general effect of the various developments analyzed in this and the previous chapter – the ascendancy of Culturalism, the marginalization of Anti-racism, the resilience of Pragmatism and the emergence of Civil Islam – is that the signifier “integration” is filled with ambitions and emotions; *this* is what we need to achieve. As Culturalism consolidated, integration came to mean more than just economic, social or even cultural integration. It is now crucially about *civil* integration: there is a strong demand for migrants and especially Muslims to extend and demonstrate their loyalty. For culturalists, this means that Muslims have to renounce or criticize their religion and communities; for pragmatists, it means they have to engage in dialogue and show commitment to the government’s integration agenda. In this sense, discursive conflict is a tool for integration: it brings together (in struggle) actors who pursue a common yet intrinsically volatile objective – civil integration.

These findings suggest that there was no simple shift in the debate on integration. While positions and oppositions in the debate transformed and the debate’s intensity fluctuated, there was no overall development that can be characterized as, say, a transition from “multiculturalism” to “assimilationism.” Such a characterization would reduce to a single movement what was in fact a complex reshuffling of relations among actors as well as discourses. The divisions and exclusions are complex and contested because different discourses suggest different civil hierarchies and courses of action. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is now more pressure on migrants – especially Muslims – to integrate into Dutch society. What culturalists sought to achieve through strict enforcement, pragmatists sought to achieve through “poldering” and paternalism: the civilizing of minority groups.

How have these discursive processes and policies affected the proximate referents of integration discourse? Are minorities marginalized because they fail to meet the norms that civil elites impose on them? Or do such demands generate countervailing power? Since cities are prime sites where civil integration is negotiated, Part III of this thesis examines how the governance of diversity has transformed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The two largest cities of the Netherlands are where most migrants live; they also function as real-time laboratories

for Pragmatism (Amsterdam), Culturalism (Rotterdam) and Civil Islam (both cities). How do the different discourses play out in these two cities? This is the question that Part III attempts to answer.

## **PART III**



## **7. Introduction to Part III: civil power and governance figurations**

Big cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam are focal points of integration politics. The government and media constantly focus their attention on these places as they are perceived to be the front line of multicultural society. This is where disintegration is supposed to be occurring, where civil norms are violated. News media over the years have produced a steady stream of vivid accounts of Moroccan teenagers harassing elderly natives, parents forsaking their responsibility in raising children, Muslim men who do not want their wives to participate in society and so on. But villains and victims are not the only characters in these stories. There is also intense interest in the heroes and heroines who resist degeneration and strive to restore or recreate civil unity. Civil society associations, active residents and spirited and committed administrators receive favorable coverage.

The subsequent chapters investigate how civil power is distributed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. How and why did power relations transform within local governance networks since 1980? I focus specifically on the position of Moroccan, Turkish and Islamic associations within local governance figurations. The reason for this is that the beliefs and practices of these (overlapping) population groups are most directly at issue in integration politics. Minority associations are often portrayed as threats to the civil community because they allegedly foster uncivil discourses and practices. But minority associations are also called upon to “take responsibility” and to mobilize and educate their constituents so that integration problems can be solved. How does this ambivalence play out in interactions between the government and minority associations? Which associations become powerful actors in governance networks and which associations are marginalized? What are the differences over time and between cities in the balance of power between different civil actors?

At first sight, it seems that minority associations were supported in Amsterdam and marginalized in Rotterdam. Amsterdam has become known as a city that, in spite of severe incidents, puts its faith in dialogue, cooperation and tolerance. Amsterdam’s mayors have a long history of promoting pragmatic solutions to integration problems and since his installment in 2001, Job Cohen has been a figurehead of Pragmatism (Chapter 6). Rotterdam, in contrast, has been the city where Culturalism manifested itself most forcefully. Pim Fortuyn, one of the champions of this discourse and a resident of Rotterdam, won a staggering 35 per cent of the votes in the municipal elections of 2002. After Fortuyn was killed, his party, *Leefbaar Rotterdam*, opted for a confrontational approach. Rather than working with minority

associations, as Cohen proposed, Leefbaar Rotterdam considered minority associations as part of the problem that had to be solved.

These political discourses are obviously important. They are widely disseminated through the media and define oppositions in public debate. But when focusing on the relationships between different actors, we should not assume that political discourses automatically determine power relations. The power and effects of discourses can only be assessed by analyzing how they were mobilized in interactions between local governments, civil society associations and other civil actors. I refer to the set of relationships between the government and civil society associations as a governance figuration and investigate how positions and oppositions crystallized and transformed within these figurations.

The four subsequent chapters show that we can identify three consecutive governance figurations in Amsterdam and just one in Rotterdam, and that each of these governance figurations has its own rules of the game, that is, specific mechanisms for rewarding and recognizing some civil actors while marginalizing others. Part III's concluding chapter provides a more systematic comparison of the structure of governance figurations and the power of minority associations. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the questions and presents the methods, techniques and data used to answer them. I first indicate how power relations in governance relations can be investigated and then formulate a hypothesis about the power of minority associations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

### **Mapping positions, oppositions and power in governance relations**

Before the inception of the minorities policy, government and civil society associations' responses to the influx of migrants were incidental and ad hoc (see Chapter 4). While there were many associations, support groups and government agencies somehow concerned with the position of migrants, they were not part of a unified policy field. Following the introduction of the minorities policy, the national government encouraged local governments to set up consultative structures for minorities. Yasemin Soysal characterizes the governance of diversity in Netherlands in the 1980s and early 1990s as follows:

Elaborate state structures or state-sponsored institutions develop to provide social services. Since the state is responsible for the collective good, governments in corporatist polities generate clear top-down policies for the incorporation of migrants, with an emphasis on standardized protection and services. Corporatist polities have

formal avenues by which new populations can gain access to decision-making mechanisms and pursue their interests (Soysal, 1994, p. 38).

Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam developed corporatist institutions in the 1980s but the type of corporatism was different. Amsterdam opted for a specific variant of corporatism that I refer to as *ethnic corporatism* because its key institutions were consultative councils organized along ethnic lines. Such councils were not established in Rotterdam. The Rotterdam government instead financed non-profit corporations to support minority associations. I refer to these corporations as civil corporations and to Rotterdam's governance figuration as *civil corporatism*. The differences between the cities' governance figurations were initially more a matter of form than of substance. But they nevertheless had long-lasting impact by locking both cities into specific trajectories (*cf.* Pierson, 1994, 2000). The next four chapters examine the evolution of governance figurations in both cities. The remainder of this chapter outlines how I identify positions and oppositions and how I document power relations.

#### *Positions and oppositions*

I mainly used interviews to map positions and oppositions in governance figurations. Interviews provide rich data on actors' dispositions and schemes of perception, how they view the world and how they try to change it. I conducted interviews with around 30 participants in integration politics in both cities. In addition, I drew on around 50 interviews conducted by thesis students or student assistants who carried out research under my supervision.<sup>61</sup> Virtually all respondents cited in Part III represented or worked for associations or organizations. The interviews reconstructed the evolution of respondents' schemes of perception through questions about the settings in which they cultivated their views and the experiences or events that shaped their life course.

Interviews not only provide rich information on actors' perceptions but also give insight into their alliances and antagonisms with other civil actors, such as civil society associations, political parties and government agencies. I asked my respondents to speak about their everyday interactions as well as large-scale events such as conferences and protests. The answers provided detailed information on their activities and on the networks that practically and financially enable them, as well as how actors perceive the figurations in which they are embedded. Apart from interviews, positions and oppositions can also be gleaned from local media, from publications (pamphlets, mission statements, subsidy requests), from secondary literature and from observed interactions during informal

discussions or public debates.

*Power relations: resources and recognition*

As in Part II, I understand power as an outgrowth of the positions of actors within figurations (*cf.* Emirbayer, 1997). Such a relational research strategy can draw upon the work of researchers at the Institute of Ethnic and Migration Studies at the University of Amsterdam to map relations among minority associations. Jean Tillie and Meindert Fennema's comparison of Turkish and Moroccan migrant associations in Amsterdam showed that the Turkish associations have stronger ties between them; they argued that these linkages between associations produced a higher level of civil participation within the Turkish community (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Floris Vermeulen's comparative study of the evolution of Turkish associational networks in Amsterdam and Berlin over three decades concluded that ethnic corporatism in the former supported cooperation between groups with radically different political ideas (Vermeulen, 2006). Apart from relations between civil society associations, I am also interested in the position of minority associations within larger governance figurations in which the state has a strong presence. Power in governance is very directly about access to state resources and this is why I extensively document the interface between the elected government, the state bureaucracy and civil society (*cf.* Putnam, 1976). By analyzing the distribution of *recognition* and *resources*, it is possible to identify and reconstruct power relations within governance figurations.

*Recognition* refers to the extent to which actors are regarded, by others in their networks, as legitimate and honorable representatives of a particular or the general interest. Interviews provide rich data on how different actors in a governance figuration value each other, and why. Sometimes these valuations materialize into institutional structures. Advisory councils, for instance, represent a prime example of the institutionalization of recognition: those who are on the council have the legitimacy – in the eyes of the state – to represent a particular interest. Next to the state, the media is also a source of recognition. In reports on integration issues or incidents, the media portray some individuals as heroes of civil repair while castigating others as threats to the civil community. I incidentally refer to coverage in the local media but since integration politics in both cities is so enmeshed in national integration politics, I can draw extensively upon the analysis in Part II.

There is also a material component to civil politics in multicultural cities: the production, dissemination and institutionalization of discourses require *resources*, including accommodations, equipment and labor power. Governance figurations are not only symbolic

economies; they are also material economies. The state has enormous resources at its disposal, making it a crucial terrain and stake in the struggle for civil power. The analysis focuses especially on those resources appropriated directly for civil projects such as funds spent on campaigns to promote civil unity or to increase civil engagement. With the help of student assistants, I collected data on subsidy relationships between governments and civil society associations in both cities as well as in a number of neighborhood districts. This information was processed in a database containing a total of 397 subsidy allocations. The database includes information on the subsidy (the amount, the purpose, the fund from which it was paid, the target groups, the date) and the association (name, ethnicity). At an average of 14,800 euros, the subsidies are tiny in light of total municipal budgets. Nonetheless, they are important for two reasons. First, civil actors usually have very limited budgets, which is certainly true for associations catering to lower class minorities. Second, subsidy relationships indicate the state's acceptance of a civil actor. If civil actors manage to claim subsidies from a particular fund, it is very likely that they can also tap other resources.<sup>62</sup> An association that receives money to organize a debate on, say, the position of migrant women can usually also claim resources from other sources (from the Department of Education, for instance).<sup>63</sup>

### *Contradictions and transformations*

What determines the balance of power between actors in a governance figuration? How do power relations transform? Chapter 2 identified three possible causes of transformation. First, the relations between different fields can be reconfigured, resulting in new rules of the game. For instance, the introduction of New Public Management techniques (see Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) and the growing importance of image management call corporatist arrangements into question. Actors who have the specific capital required to adapt to these changing circumstances can move to the center and marginalize actors whose prestige depends on their position within corporatist institutions. A second possible cause of transformation is a changing basis of support. Civil society associations cater to specific groups and depend on them for inputs in the form of voluntary work, financial contributions or attendance. When a group contracts (as happened when "guest workers" lost their jobs *en masse*), associations either have to redefine their constituencies or lose ground. Actors within governance networks reconsidering their alliances is a third possible cause of transformation. For instance, oppositions inherited from migrants' countries of origin can be overcome if antagonists find common ground, as happened when Amsterdam's progressive Moroccan associations decided to cooperate with conservative associations.

However, the aim of Part III is not only to explain change but also to account for continuity. Chapter 11 shows that Rotterdam's governance figuration – despite persistent tensions between liberals and conservatives and occasional conflicts between the government and minority associations – has remained remarkably stable over a period of at least 20 years. Since none of the actors gained a decisive advantage over the others, they were unable to shape the figuration according to their own ideas and interests. I argue that there was no such balance of power in Amsterdam due to the direct support of its government for one or the other civil elite. Rather than distributing resources and recognition evenly between secular and religious associations, between progressive and conservative associations, or between mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic associations, the Amsterdam government intervened directly to impose its discourse upon civil society. This, then, is the major difference between Rotterdam and Amsterdam: while the Rotterdam government's shifts in discourse were more radical, such shifts were more consequential in Amsterdam.

### **A comparative study of the power of minority associations**

The different chapters in Part III explain why Rotterdam's governance figuration remained resilient while that of Amsterdam was dynamic. In addition, I make and test the argument that the shape of governance figurations influences the civil power of minority associations. This argument echoes the findings of a body of literature that emphasizes the role of institutions or political opportunities in shaping and channeling contention (Kriesi *et al.*, 1995; Ferree *et al.*, 2002). In the field of integration politics, Ireland's pioneering study suggested that institutions determine how migrants will mobilize (Ireland, 1994; see also Ireland, 2006). For the Netherlands, Soysal (1994), Rath *et al.* (2001) and Koopmans *et al.* (2005) have shown that particular political opportunity structures create distinct patterns of mobilization. The most relevant study for our case is Laure Michon and Jean Tillie's comparison of Amsterdam and Rotterdam (Michon & Tillie, 2003). Anticipating and inspiring some of the arguments made here, the authors suggest that the political participation of minorities in Rotterdam is higher because its government more generously sponsors minority associations. The causal chain is as follows: generous subsidies facilitate minority associations to promote civil engagement, which expresses itself in higher levels of electoral participation. I corroborate and extend this argument. As I am not only interested in electoral participation but in various aspects of civil power, I formulate a deliberately broad hypothesis: *minority associations have more power in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam*. Why I expect stronger minority associations in Rotterdam is

developed in more detail in the various case studies and in the comparative chapter; here I restrict the discussion to the measurement of four indicators of civil power:

1. *Constructive relations* – in some civil societies, associations are segregated along ethnic, ideological or class lines and suffer from destructive inter-associational relations. Such a segregated civil society, where associations work against rather than with each other, drains the energy of civil actors and reduces their capacity to foster ties among different groups (Fiorina, 1999). The case studies show that such destructive relations are more prevalent among Moroccan and Islamic associations than among Turkish associations. Despite their formidable ideological conflicts, the Turkish associations manage to arrive at relatively high levels of cooperation and coordination in both cities (for Amsterdam, see Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Vermeulen, 2006). The litmus test for governance figurations is therefore the level of cooperation among Moroccan and Islamic associations. In both cities, Moroccan and Islamic associations have tried to create an associational network to address the problems that plague their communities, but with different levels of success. The comparative chapter assesses whether minority associations have engaged in constructive cooperation or inter-organizational rivalry.
2. *Resources* – civil society associations compete and cooperate with welfare organizations, consultants and political parties. While the case studies provide detailed information on individual civil society associations' relations with the state, fortunately data exist that enable a more systematic, comparative analysis. Both governments sought to increase their support of civil initiatives in the wake of the Theo van Gogh assassination to prevent polarization between Muslims and natives. Both created a subsidy fund to do so. The Municipality of Amsterdam launched Meldpunt Goede Ideeën (MGI); the Rotterdam government's equivalent was Rotterdam Mee (RM). Their goals were virtually identical: promoting participation, norms and values, and interaction between different groups.<sup>64</sup> The coincidence of both governments creating similar subsidy funds allows a quasi-experimental test of civil power: in which city did minority associations gain more resources?
3. *Constituencies* – strong civil societies organize broad constituencies. While the chapters on Amsterdam and Rotterdam address different types of associations, they do not offer a systematic account of their collective capacity to reach and organize constituents. For this we would need data on the memberships of all associations, which are not available. We do, however, have data on migrants' participation in civil society associations. Jean Tillie presented the findings of a 1999 Municipal Survey in Amsterdam that includes 210

Moroccan and 109 Turkish respondents (Tillie, 2004). Marieke van Londen and her colleagues presented results of the 2000 Rotterdam Minorities Survey, which includes random samples of 640 Turkish and 544 Moroccan respondents (Van Londen *et al.*, 2007).<sup>65</sup>

4. *Political Influence* – strong civil societies foster political interest among constituents. They provide information and mobilize people to make use of their political rights (Putnam, 1993). The case studies provide detailed accounts of how associations do (not) perform these functions while the comparative chapter systematically analyzes electoral participation. To examine migrants' electoral participation, I make use of exit poll data since 1994. The Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies and various partners carried out these surveys in various cities while Dekker & Fattah (2006) summarize the results for both Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

#### *Class, culture and the power of civil society*

We will see that Rotterdam scores better on all indicators, which *prima facie* corroborates the hypothesis that Rotterdam's governance figuration has stronger minority associations than Amsterdam. But apart from the structure of governance figurations, there are other factors that may account for the power of civil society associations. Here I consider these factors and explain how they can be taken into account or bracketed.

*Class.* Many studies – including this one – point to the relevance of *class* factors for explaining participation in civil society associations or elections. Higher educational levels, for instance, correlate positively with electoral participation (e.g. Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998). Different levels of civil engagement could therefore result from differences in the class composition of migrant communities. If migrants have a higher class position in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam, it might very well be that class – and not the structure of governance figurations – explains the difference. But the class position of Turkish and Moroccan migrants is remarkably similar in both cities, as Tables 7.1-7.4 show. Data on income, employment and education indicate that Amsterdam's migrants have higher scores on some variables (especially employment levels). To the extent that class matters, we would expect (slightly) higher levels of civil engagement in Amsterdam. But as we find the opposite, we must conclude that higher class position has no positive impact, or that its impact is mitigated by other, more important factors such as the structure of governance figurations.

**Table 7.1 Ethnic composition of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 2005**

	<i>Amsterdam</i>		<i>Rotterdam</i>	
	N	%	N	%
Native Dutch	377,278	50.8	324,038	54.3
Turks	38,209	5.1	45,254	7.6
Moroccans	64,794	8.7	36,292	6.1
Surinamese	70,993	9.6	52,762	8.8
Antillians	12,021	1.6	20,330	3.4
Industrialized	72,464	9.8	33,242	5.6
Other foreign	107,192	14.4	84,679	14.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>742,951</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>596,597</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Central Bureau of Statistics

**Table 7.2 Highest completed education of labor force in Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 2003 (\*1,000)**

	<i>Amsterdam</i>		<i>Rotterdam</i>	
	N	%	N	%
Elementary school	148	27.6	180	44.2
High school	164	30.6	137	33.7
Higher education	224	41.8	90	22.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>536</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* adapted from Uitermark, 2006, p. 37

**Table 7.3 Cito scores<sup>66</sup> in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 2002**

	<i>Rotterdam</i>		<i>Amsterdam</i>
	girls	boys	boys and girls
Native Dutch	534	534	538
Turks	528	529	529
Moroccans	528	528	530
Surinamese	529	529	531
Antillians	526	526	529

*Source:* COS/Scala, 2004; O&S, 2004, p. 214

**Table 7.4 Unemployment rates as a percentage of the labor force in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1991 and 1998**

		<i>Turkish</i>	<i>Moroccan</i>	<i>Surinamese</i>	<i>Antillean</i>	<i>Native Dutch</i>
Amsterdam	1991	30	30	25	40	12
	1998	17	21	9	9	5
Rotterdam	1991	37	43	35	39	9
	1998	23	27	11	20	5

*Source:* Burgers and Musterd, 2002, p. 411

*Civil culture.* Numerous studies draw attention to the relevance of specifically national or ethnic factors in explaining variations in civil engagement. Traditionally, this line of research has focused on differences between countries (Almond & Verba, 1963; Ferree *et al.*, 2002). More recently, a number of authors have suggested that socio-cultural factors can account for variation between different ethnic groups within a single city or country (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Fennema *et al.*, 2001; Vermeulen, 2005; Nell, 2008). Fortunately, it is possible to control for this variable since the data used in this study differentiate between different ethnic groups, *in casu* Moroccans and Turks. We find strong differences between the two ethnic groups *and* the two cities.

*Cultural interaction.* Analysts of culture such as Ian Buruma and Ron Eyerman graphically narrate the clash between orthodoxy and hedonism, a clash that seems especially explosive in Amsterdam (Buruma, 2006; Eyerman, 2008). Rotterdam, in contrast, has the image of a sober, modern and hard-working city, which may appeal to migrants (Duyvendak, 2002). While an explanation based on city culture cannot be rejected out of hand, it did not find support in my interviews or in other data. Representatives of conservative associations did not express frustration over hedonism, but about slurs made by politicians and other opinion-makers. Available data does not allow systematic comparison of minorities' identification with the cities in which they reside, though available research suggests that migrants in Amsterdam are as likely to identify with their city as migrants in Rotterdam (Van der Welle & Mamadouh, 2008, p. 85; Phalet *et al.*, 2000). My provisional conclusion is that the difference is not one of mental identification but rather one of the mechanisms enabling residents to act upon their commitments, which brings us back to governance figurations.

*Natives*. Another possible explanation for variations in civil engagement focuses on the attitude of natives in general and politicians in particular. Criticisms or slurs may deter migrants from participating in civil life, increase polarization between population groups, and push migrants towards more extremist and fundamentalist view points. If confrontational discourse indeed fuels disengagement, this should be more evident in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. But as we find the opposite, we need to explain why minority associations are more powerful in Rotterdam *in spite of* the discourse of its administrators. This is not to say that this factor is somehow unimportant, but to suggest that other factors have greater impact. It may, for instance, be the case that confrontational discourse pulls minorities into civil politics to rebut criticism. But then we would need to explain which institutions or relations enable such counter-offensives – which once again brings us back to the structure of governance figurations.

## **Conclusion**

In his analysis of migrants' political claims, Ruud Koopmans has shown that “the magnitude of cross-national differences is much more important than that of local variation within each of the countries” (Koopmans, 2004b, p. 449). This is correct but the case studies here show that there are also important variations over time and between cities that a political sociology of integration has to account for. In this chapter I have indicated how positions and oppositions can be identified, and how we can map power relations and explain their transformations. While resources and recognition may be concentrated in individual actors, I have argued that their power relations can only be understood if we position these actors in a governance figuration that consists of asymmetrical interdependencies between actors rooted in different settings and unequally invested with civil power. Focusing on the governance figurations that structure relations between people and their polities allows us to uncover the mechanisms that produce inequalities (and to reflect and act upon them, although this is not my goal here).



## **8. The minorities policy and the dominance of the radical left.**

### **Ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam in the 1980s**

I felt like I was doing a sort of archeology of civil society when I arrived at the neighborhood center in Amsterdam Oud-West. I was to visit an interviewee from *Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland*: the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands. KMAN was established in a squat in 1975. A few years later it opened its headquarters just outside the historic center of Amsterdam. With the support of subsidies and many Moroccan and native volunteers, the association organized frenetically and created an extensive infrastructure of neighborhood subcommittees, working groups and consulting hours. Almost nothing of this was left when I conducted my interview in 2006. Its only regular meetings took place in this neighborhood center which provided KMAN space alongside many other small associations from the neighborhood. KMAN notices were on the front door. I also found a brochure of the City Moroccan Council (*Stedelijke Marokkaanse Raad*, SMR) listing a nine-digit phone number. It must have been printed before 1995, when phone numbers were extended by a single digit.

After searching through the deserted corridors of the neighborhood center, I found myself in a room with elderly Moroccan men drinking tea, playing games and conversing in Arabic or Berber (I cannot tell the difference). When I entered, they stopped their conversations and looked at me with surprise, as if they thought I had entered by mistake. After discovering that I had made an appointment with a member of the association, one of the men offered me a seat at his table. He was about 45 years old and slightly younger than most of the other men. He certainly was more communicative. In broken Dutch and English he explained that he had lived in France before and so did not have many memories of KMAN. But he was nevertheless nostalgic about those days of protests, campaigns and events, and told me of plans to rejuvenate the association.

After some time, a tall man with short gray hair entered the room. I recognized him from a protest against the police killing of a Moroccan man in Amsterdam West that KMAN had organized with other minority and anti-racist associations. KMAN had organized countless demonstrations. That one was the last. The tall man was one of the stewards who had volunteered to guide the protest. I remembered him because his impressive bearing had hardly helped as he tried to calm down some of the Moroccan youths in the protest. He and his fellow activists could not prevent several dozen youths from smashing shop and car

windows, which turned the event into a “rampage” according to the mainstream media. While these memories flashed through my mind he gave me a warm handshake and we exchanged some polite greetings. I think he did not feel comfortable enough about his Dutch to enter into a more substantive conversation but he gestured to me to come to an office in the back.

There I met my respondent, Driss Bouzit, a journalist who had been documenting KMAN from the beginning. He had made a career in the 1980s reporting on “minority affairs,” which became a journalistic niche after the “minorities policy” was established. At the time it was self-evident that reporters from minority groups should report on minority affairs but in the course of the 1990s the institutions of the minority policy had eroded. Bouzit confirmed what many other people had told me: the government had at some point decided to “pull the plug.” Like the civil servants and administrators I talked to, Bouzit said that the KMAN leadership was also to blame for this; they had been unwilling and unable to reform the association to meet contemporary demands. The association had once been a major player in civil society but its most resourceful and energetic activists had left and taken up positions in political parties, consultancy bureaus or welfare organizations, leaving behind the men in this room.

The interview was concluded when a meeting on disability allowances started. Enterprises had laid off guest workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s under the pretext that they were “disabled.” This meant that the government rather than the enterprises were financially responsible. Now, a quarter-century later, the government intended to test whether the recipients were indeed “100% disabled.” The activists of yesteryear had gathered to review the consequences of these reforms for their livelihoods.

\* \* \*

Associations like KMAN had once received recognition and resources from the government but were marginalized over the course of the 1990s. The associations that were once organizing national demonstrations and serving large and diverse constituencies were now struggling for space in neighborhood centers or had disappeared altogether. Their former radicalism and vibrancy still incidentally reverberated in interviews but most of the time they just expressed deep frustration about the government, the media and politicians. They had been relegated from the very center of the field to the outer periphery; what remained was the feeling that they had been disenfranchised and humiliated. Before we can explain how the radical associations lost their power and prestige, we need to examine how they got it in the

first place. The next section analyzes the formation of “ethnic corporatism,” a governance figuration in which left-wing associations like KMAN had a central position. Subsequent sections identify the contradictions of this governance figuration and explain how these contradictions undermined the position of left-wing associations.

### **The formation of ethnic corporatism**

Amsterdam’s policies towards migrants and minority associations took shape in a period of unprecedented social turmoil. Unemployment was skyrocketing, the middle classes were moving out of the city, the housing market had collapsed, drug scenes were growing and crime was on the rise. The city was in crisis but politics was more alive than ever before. Amsterdam in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the stage for some of the most explosive social conflicts of the post-war period. The squatting movement established countless autonomous social centers throughout the city. The student movement revolted in and outside the university. Anarchist and far-left political parties challenged the dominance of the Labor Party.

The government took recourse to draconian repression when the stakes were high – it sent tanks onto the street to break the squatters’ resistance (see Anderiesen, 1981). But it also showed an impressive capacity to pacify social conflict. The combination of pressure from grassroots movements and support from the central state induced the local government to heed many of the demands of the protest groups and to fund and incorporate them. Social movements found inroads into the state and were offered resources and recognition to establish institutions to protect the rights of tenants, workers, welfare recipients, women, and so on. The funds provided by the central state as part of the minorities policy allowed the municipality to use this same strategy to incorporate minority associations into the state bureaucracy.

There were, however, deep schisms within migrant communities. The most vocal minority associations at the time were established by left-wing dissidents and militants who had often fled repression in their country of origin. In the Netherlands they engaged in political struggles for social and legal rights but also confronted co-ethnics who subscribed to conservative or fascist beliefs. Fierce battles were fought among and within minority associations. Within the Moroccan community there were continuous fights – sometimes physical – between dissidents who had fled from the dictatorial Moroccan regime and loyalists who supported the Moroccan King, Hassan VI. Within the Turkish community there

were occasionally violent clashes between Communists, Socialists and Kurds on the one hand and fascists on the other.

Each of these blocs had their own associations. Moroccan dissidents and radicals were united in KMAN,<sup>67</sup> which often engaged in confrontations with the so-called Amicales, a network of associations sponsored by the Moroccan dictatorial state. Divisions among Turkish associations also reflected divisions in the sending country. The Communists of HTIB,<sup>68</sup> the Socialists of DIDF<sup>69</sup> and the Kurdish separatists of FKN<sup>70</sup> were in conflict with supporters of the Turkish fascist party MHP,<sup>71</sup> the so-called Grey Wolves. These conflicts between loyalists and radicals coincided and intersected with struggles between (secular) progressives and (religious) conservatives. As loyalists often organized through mosque associations, this only reinforced the hostility of left-wing associations towards religious groupings and authorities, although most religious associations – then as now – preferred to stay out of politics altogether.

These schisms within migrant communities created problems for the government: how to incorporate communities that were internally divided? The initial answer was to ignore the differences and to provide the same services to all associations through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners. However, left-wing associations and their native sympathizers protested vehemently against the support extended to conservative associations. Activist researchers uncovered the ties between the Amicales and the Moroccan government and disclosed the fascist ideology of the Grey Wolves. The left-wing associations moreover expressed frustration over the paternalism of the welfare organizations. They felt it was outrageous that native civil servants with limited knowledge of minority communities were designing and offering services to migrants. One senior civil servant describes the field in this period as a “political minefield.” She had worked in Rotterdam until 1981 and noticed a stark difference with Amsterdam:

There was a typical difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In Amsterdam there were all sorts of ideological discussions going on in migrant communities, especially among the foreign workers and their associations. The Ministry of Welfare had made a subsidy arrangement for categorical welfare provision through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners and the Surinamese Welfare Foundation. There were no subsidies for migrant associations though they could declare some costs with the Welfare Foundations. But the migrant associations wanted to have a say in how the funds were distributed and they wanted their own budgets. At the time they had the support of

action groups, squatters, students, and many other political groups active in Amsterdam.

As I indicated in Chapter 4, many of the native Dutch professionals and volunteers involved in minority affairs in the 1970s and 1980s identified with the struggles of (left-wing) minority associations. Community workers and left-wing politicians agreed that paternalism had to be avoided and were steadfastly opposed to fascist or reactionary associations. The Welfare Foundation was abolished and the responsibility for the distribution of subsidies transferred to the municipality.<sup>72</sup> This meant that – in contrast to Rotterdam – the Amsterdam government has since engaged directly with minority associations, without the mediation of organizations like the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners.

When the minorities policy was introduced in 1983, the central position of minority associations was formalized and institutionalized in advisory councils for different minority groups. The councils were made up of the representatives of individual minority associations, including political associations, mosques, cultural centers and sport clubs. The respective councils received administrative as well as financial support. Turks and Moroccans were initially together in one council but each community got its own council in 1989. Three other councils represented other ethnic minorities: one for Surinamese and Ghanians, one for Southern Europeans and one for refugees and Chinese. The awkward combination of different groups has to do with the requirement that councils represent at least 16,000 people. If a minority group did not reach this threshold, it had to form a council with other groups.

This way of institutionalizing civil society associations exemplifies the technocratic nature of the minorities policy and illustrates the argument in Chapter 4 that the government wanted, above all else, to organize and categorize these new populations in such a way that they would be governable. There was no multiculturalist impetus but the official policy goals nevertheless reflected the ambitions of progressive movements. The memorandum on the minorities policy in 1989 – the first time the government articulated a coherent framework for the growing range of policy measures related to minorities – mentioned two overall goals: “to take away the disadvantages (*achterstanden*) of migrants and to stimulate their social mobility by expanding access to scarce societal resources and services and by creating the conditions for emancipatory activity” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 16). The first goal fits with pragmatist integration discourse as it emphasizes the importance of preventing underclass formation. The second goal fits with anti-racist discourse as it explicitly states that the government needs to “combat racism and discrimination in order to break down inequalities in power relations” (*ibid.*).

Even though the memorandum explicitly stated that the preservation of cultural identity was not an official goal, the document recognized the importance of minority associations.<sup>73</sup> Associations were supposed to organize groups that were beyond the reach of the state and to represent the interests of ethnic communities to the government. They were provided with subsidies to build an organizational infrastructure and to organize activities to involve groups that would otherwise remain disengaged. The ethnic community and its associations were to serve as a springboard first to the welfare state and then to the labor market (Duyvendak & Rijkschroeff, 2004).

The governance figuration that emerged in Amsterdam in the early 1980s can be characterized as *ethnic corporatism*. It was *ethnic* because the councils were organized along ethnic lines and because associations were expected to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity rather than, for instance, religion, class or race. The figuration was *corporatist* because civil society fused with the state. Several individual associations received subsidies from the municipality while the respective councils received administrative as well as financial support. The secretaries of the councils had contracts as civil servants and were stationed at city hall. In short, a full-fledged minorities policy was in place providing positions and resources to minority associations and their representatives. Which actors reaped the rewards and recognition available within this figuration?

### **Power relations under ethnic corporatism**

Ethnic corporatism in principle provides a model for the inclusion of each and every migrant. Every migrant belongs to an ethnic group which is represented by the ethnic council; every migrant can make use of social provisions provided to his or her ethnic group. In practice, however, ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam was much more open to some associations, communities and discourses than to others. Here I examine power differentials in two central domains of ethnic corporatism: the advisory councils (where recognition for representing migrant communities is at stake) and subsidy relationships (where resources are at stake).

#### *The advisory councils*

The councils were not assemblies where each association or participant had one vote. The councils had many members but only a few associations and individuals made the decisions and articulated the official viewpoints. The passivity of many associations was due to their disinterest in civil politics: their members were concerned with overcoming specific obstacles

(like permit procedures, fire safety regulations, etc.) but had no ambition to influence government policy or to engage in public debate. Another reason was that participation in governance networks and receiving subsidies could lead to scrutiny regarding both ideas and finances. This was especially the case for conservative associations under the watchful eyes of left-wing associations and their wide network of sympathizers, who insisted that the government should only support progressive associations.

In practice the left-wing associations could set the councils' agendas and claim they represented the rest of the community. In many cases they actually did so; conservative and apathetic associations could be hostile to left-wing groups but nevertheless agree with – and passively support – measures that improved the position of their ethnic group, such as access to social housing, health care, education and measures combating discrimination and poverty. The left-wing associations, seeing themselves as vanguards, performed this role with passion. Intellectual dissidents and militant workers from KMAN came to dominate the Moroccan council; the Communists of HTIB the Turkish council.

The formal role of the advisory councils was to advise the government, but in this they never succeeded. Activists and intellectuals within associations like KMAN and HTIB were dominant within their ethnic community but subordinate in the state bureaucracy. While they were located at city hall and involved in various consultative structures, neither civil servants nor the councils felt that the advisory councils had much influence. There were both covert and open conflicts between the state bureaucracy and the advisory councils: they “were within and against the state” (Mayer, 1999, 138). The top level civil servants closest to the alderman responsible for policy said the following of their colleagues further down the hall:

Advocacy in our view does not only mean that one all the time and in the same way reminds others of the presence of migrants and arrogantly points out the implications without proposing solutions or strategies... Where the interests of migrants are represented, one must be convinced by a well-informed and creative contribution that shows new ways to take into account Amsterdam's changing population. There is a lot of scope for improvement in this area. These considerations apply strongest to the participation at an institutional level (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 46).

One reason such constructive advice was not forthcoming was that the left-wing associations did not have the dispositions and networks to place their stamp on the policy process. The councils were unable to convey an image of professionalism and neutrality. Several

evaluations of the councils showed that the government often ignored concrete policy suggestions and it seems that the reputation of the councils deteriorated over time (Göttgens, 2004). But the leading left-wing associations also had a very different idea of their mission. They regarded themselves more as a vanguard than as experts and wanted to mobilize their constituents to push for radical social change.<sup>74</sup>

The Moroccan activists were particularly successful in monopolizing the advisory council as well as the subsidies. The left-wing activists of KMAN and affiliated associations had founded the Moroccan Council (SMR) and the municipality had subsequently recognized it as the official advisory council for Moroccans. The SMR became a vehicle for political mobilization and participated in numerous coalitions for social justice, including the anti-racist movement, the labor movement and the anti-war movement. Especially the anti-racist demonstrations of *Nederland Bekent Kleur* achieved visibility. Abdou Menebhi, the leader of the Moroccan council and one of the leaders of KMAN, was in the very center of the civil sphere during the mass demonstration against racism in 1992. He jumped in front of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers when (radical left-wing) protesters threw tomatoes at him: a quintessential civil act, right in the spotlight of the national media. Left-wing associations also controlled the Turkish council; its chairperson and secretary were normally recruited from their ranks during the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the networks among left-wing Turkish associations (such as DIDE, HITB, DVA<sup>75</sup> and ATKB<sup>76</sup>) were fostered in part through the council, they could not instrumentalize the Turkish council to the same extent as their Moroccan counterparts. The conservative Turkish associations were much better organized than the conservative Moroccan associations and some, like *Milli Gorus*, actively challenged the monopolization of the council by left-wing associations. These differences between the Turkish and Moroccan councils become apparent when we analyze the subsidy relationships that formed the foundation of ethnic corporatism.

### *Subsidy relationships*

Under ethnic corporatism, subsidy relationships and political representation went hand in hand: associations with a central place in advisory councils also received substantial structural subsidies. Table 8.1 breaks down the recipients of subsidy into different categories.<sup>77</sup> The most striking finding is that left-wing associations received well over 70 per cent of the subsidies before 1995. Only after 1995 – when corporatism was corroding (see below) – did their share of subsidies decline. The table also shows that women’s associations accounted for a substantial share of the subsidies. They were, without exception, closely tied to the general –

i.e. male-dominated – left-wing associations. Female family members and acquaintances of the men who dominated the left-wing associations organized traditional cultural activities (knitting, folk dancing) but also campaigned for women’s rights. For instance, the Moroccan women’s association MVVN<sup>78</sup> (related to KMAN) has for decades protested against Moroccan family law as well as Dutch immigration laws that discriminate against women.

**Table 8.1 Municipal subsidies to Turkish and Moroccan associations in Amsterdam, 1985-2005**

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Type of association</i>	1985		1990		1995		2000		2005						
		<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>													
<i>Turkish associations</i>	Left-wing general	2	37,227	17.7	1	29,373	16.2	2	81,889	56.2	2	70,036	26.8	2	69,476	71.4
	Left-wing women	2	97,231	46.1	3	98,602	54.5	0	0	0.0	1	59,309	22.7	0	0	0.0
	Mainstream conservative	1	1,262	0.6	1	4,452	2.5	1	6,784	4.7	2	26,773	10.3	2	27,800	28.6
	Radical conservative	2	47,463	22.5	2	48,341	26.7	2	57,022	39.1	1	41,975	16.1	0	0	0.0
	Kurdish	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	2	62,815	24.1	0	0	0.0
	Unknown / non-ideological	1	27,645	13.1	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
	Total	8	210,827	100	7	180,768	100	5	145,696	100	8	260,908	100	4	97,276	100
<i>Moroccan associations</i>	Left-wing general	3	58,884	51.7	2	54,277	45.1	2	56,324	50.3	3	98,529	66.9	0	0	0.0
	Left-wing women	1	46,889	41.2	2	40,500	33.7	2	55,629	49.7	1	36,833	25.0	0	0	0.0
	Mainstream conservative	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	1	12,025	8.2	1	34,260	100
	Unknown / non-ideological	3	8,168	7.2	3	25,448	21.2	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
	Total	7	113,941	100	7	120,225	100	4	111,953	100	5	147,388	100	1	34,260	100
<i>Turkish and Moroccan associations combined</i>	Total left-wing	8	240,231	74	8	222,752	74	6	193,842	75	7	264,708	65	2	69,476	53
	Total conservative	3	48,724	15	3	52,793	18	3	63,806	25	4	80,773	20	3	62,060	47
	Unknown / other	4	35,813	11	3	25,448	8	0	0	0	2	62,815	15	0	0	0
	Total	15	324,769	100	14	300,992	100	9	257,649	100	13	408,296	100	5	131,536	100

Source: archive Municipality of Amsterdam, author's calculations

Not only the amounts but the nature of the subsidies matter; they were structural rather than project subsidies. Structural subsidies are part of the municipality's annual budget; they reflect the commitment of the government to subsidize associations over a long period of time.<sup>79</sup> Structural subsidies allow associations to invest in their institutional infrastructure, increasing their capacity to search for project subsidies from other sources (such as ministries and charities). Structural subsidies also allowed guest worker associations to expand their base with activities that were not valued by the government (cultural events) or that challenged the government (protests) without fear of losing their funding.

The left-wing associations flourished within this governance figuration: they offered counseling, provided Dutch, Turkish and Arabic language courses, organized information meetings, hosted large cultural events, published magazines, made radio broadcasts and frenetically mobilized for demonstrations and campaigns (Van der Valk, 1996). But the resources they received were out of proportion to the number of migrants they reached. Dozens of other associations did not receive subsidies and held marginal or lacked positions altogether within the advisory councils. As can be seen in Table 8.1, the dominance of the left-wing associations was stronger among Moroccans than Turks.<sup>80</sup> Because they had more political interest and bureaucratic competence than the Moroccan associations, even some radically conservative Turkish associations received funding in this period.<sup>81</sup> These were, however, the exceptions. The overall results are the opposite of what the critics of multiculturalism (Barry, 2001; Baumann, 1996, 1999; Benhabib, 2002; Cornell & Murphy, 2002; Okin, 1999) lead us to expect: left-wing associations managed to move right into the center of power while conservative associations were relegated to the background or excluded altogether.

### **The contradictions and erosion of ethnic corporatism**

Ethnic corporatism was a stable governance figuration in the 1980s. But it contained contradictions that grew over the 1990s and ultimately led to its collapse around the turn of the century. Three developments aggravated the internal contradictions of corporatism: the contraction of the support base of left-wing associations, the introduction of market incentives in governance relationships, and the inability of ethnic representatives to discursively and institutionally manage defiant and disconnected youth.

### *Shifting power relations in the Turkish and Moroccan councils*

When it implemented the minorities policy and established the institutions of ethnic corporatism, the government of Amsterdam was uninterested in the tensions within and between migrant groups.<sup>82</sup> It lumped together Chinese migrants with Somali refugees, ultranationalist Grey Wolves with Kurdish separatists, and Moroccan dissidents with loyalists. As long as the councils formally represented 16,000 residents, the government did not care whether the different associations shared cultural attributes or political orientations. The result of this technocratic ignorance was that associations indifferent or hostile to one another were forced to cooperate. Frictions between the associations were for some time dampened by the incentives that the government – wittingly or not – provided to resolve differences. Floris Vermeulen has shown that Turkish associations in Amsterdam had many more ties between them than in Berlin where different factions existed within separate associational clusters (Vermeulen, 2006). The same was true for the Moroccan council. While Moroccan left-wing associations had initially refused to cooperate with religious associations, their attitude became milder and more pragmatic as the years passed (see, e.g. Haleber & Meijer, 1993). KMAN decided to cooperate with the loyalist mosque association UMMON, reflected in the appearance of Ibn Khaldoun – home base of one of the leaders of UMMON, Mohamed Echarrouti – on the list of subsidized associations (it is the one conservative association mentioned in Table 8.2).<sup>83</sup> However, cooperation between opponents lasted only as long as it provided direct and tangible benefits to those involved. Both councils crumbled under their internal contradictions during the 1990s.

The *Turkish council* was undermined by tensions between conservative and radical associations. While the left-wing associations tried to dominate the council, they had lost many of their constituents and had not succeeded in involving the second generation of migrants, for whom the struggle for the rights of “guest workers” smelled of yesteryear. The guest workers had previously suffered hardship in their workplaces but at least they could mobilize through this identity (as workers) and as part of larger coalitions. When they lost their jobs *en masse*, there was no longer a shared identity through which the left-wing associations could mobilize. The conservative associations, in contrast, mobilized on the basis of Islamic identity – which had become more rather than less salient (see Part II). At one point Haci Karacaer, director of the conservative mosque federation Milli Gorus, became the chairperson of the council. Karacaer enthusiastically advocated the dissolution of the council, which he regarded as an anachronistic institution dominated by even more anachronistic associations and individuals.

The *Moroccan council* was likewise fraught with contradictions but the main conflict here was between the older and the younger generation. As noted above, the radicals of KMAN entered into a coalition with the conservatives of UMMON following the succession of Hassan II. There was undoubtedly a measure of *realpolitik* in this move. Like their Turkish counterparts, the Moroccan left-wing associations had lost their base and political momentum, making it increasingly difficult for them to claim to speak on behalf of the Moroccan community. The coalition with conservatives temporarily helped KMAN but it was rife with conflicts. The most damaging was between the different leaders of KMAN who claimed government subsidies for their own regions. KMAN had successfully applied for subsidies to start development projects in Morocco but these resources divided rather than strengthened the association. It also proved difficult to maintain contact with the younger generation. This was especially problematic in light of the rising anxiety over growing criminality among second generation Moroccans. Since the late 1980s there has been a steady flow of government, academic and media reports on the over-representation of Moroccan youths in crime statistics. The government initially involved Moroccan associations in efforts to prevent disengagement but it became increasingly apparent that there was a generational schism. The Argan youth center established with the support of left-wing associations initially formed part of the network around SMR and KMAN but over the course of the 1990s it cut most of its ties to the older generation.<sup>84</sup>

In short, a major contradiction within ethnic corporatism resulted from the forced cooperation of associations with very different interests, discourses and constituents. It was only possible to suppress these differences when one group of actors so dominated resources and recognition that it could claim to speak for the entire ethnic community. While the guest worker associations initially had this power, as they lost momentum it became increasingly clear that some actors – the younger generation in the case of Moroccans, conservatives in the case of Turks – had no interest in upholding a governance figuration that was controlled by their opponents.

#### *Flexible subsidies and the erosion of corporatist privileges*

A second contradiction within Amsterdam's form of ethnic corporatism was that civil society associations depended for both resources and recognition on the government they agitated against. The model in which civil society associations rely on state funding but nevertheless enjoy a measure of autonomy came under pressure in many countries and in many policy domains in the 1990s (Duyvendak, 1999; Mayer, 1999). Administrators, politicians and civil

servants were increasingly influenced by the idea of a *zakelijke overheid* – the idea that the government should be run like a private company, simulating the market to ensure efficiency and compliance. If governments grant subsidies to civil society associations, they should stipulate how these funds are to be spent and monitor recipients' performance; if an association does not reach stipulated targets, the funds should be transferred to another, more efficient association (Jordan & Jordan, 2000; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Within this neoliberal framework, there was no place for structural subsidies, which were one of the most important sources of income for guest worker associations.<sup>85</sup> Structural subsidies were abolished in 1997 and replaced with project and periodic subsidies.<sup>86</sup> Amounts previously earmarked for structural subsidies were now channeled through the so-called SIP Fund (named after the *Subsidieverordening Integratie en Participatie* or Subsidy Regulation for Integration and Participation), for which civil society associations had to tender bids. A further reform in 2004 opened the bidding to all associations, not just migrant associations. These changes in the rules of the game marked a move away from ethnic corporatism and undermined the power of the left-wing associations.

Table 8.2 shows that a small group of associations still dominated the scene in 1995 but that this had changed completely by 2005. Between 2000 and 2005, the trend was towards smaller subsidies to more and younger associations – indicative of the erosion of privileged positions in this particular policy domain and the crumbling of corporatist arrangements.

**Table 8.2 Subsidy requests to Amsterdam's Department of Societal Development (DMO) in the years 1995, 2000 and 2005**

<i>Year</i>	<i>1995*</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2005**</i>
<i>General</i>			
Budget for subsidies	€ 793,888	€ 812,330	€ 738,022
Number of subsidized organizations	22	42	62
Average requested subsidy	€29,853	€27,653	€25,050
Average amount granted	€ 24,276	€23,592	€14,889
Percentage of requested amount awarded	86	78	63
Average year of foundation (age)	1978 (17)	1986 (14)	1993 (12)
<i>Turkish and Moroccan associations</i>			
Number of subsidized Turkish associations	5	8	4
Number of subsidized Moroccan associations	4	5	1
Per capita subsidy Turkish community	€ 5.40	€ 7.40	€ 4.10
Per capita subsidy Moroccan community	€ 1.90	€ 2.20	€ 0.60
Types of subsidized activities	Mostly socio-cultural activities. Few activities to explicitly promote integration or participation.	Mostly socio-cultural activities. Some activities to explicitly promote integration or participation.	Exclusively activities oriented towards integration and participation.

*\* Data missing for 7 organizations. For these organizations, the amount is estimated on the basis of sources for 1996*

*\*\* Not all subsidy requests had been fully processed at the time of research. We have full data for 40 out of 62 organizations. Missing organizations are included in the budget and in the number of subsidized organizations but not in other figures*

*Source:* archives of the Department for Societal Development, Municipality of Amsterdam. Partly based on Uitermark & Van Steenberghe (2006)

The major losers were – as we would expect by now – the left-wing associations and especially Moroccan guest worker associations. Whereas in 1995 they were still secure in their funding, this was no longer the case after 1997. The shift towards project subsidies was disadvantageous for radical associations as they lacked the dispositions (the will as well as the capacity) to produce proper working plans and to organize the types of activities the government wished to promote. Nevertheless, the number of funded associations and the amount of subsidy per capita increased between 1995 and 2000; the Department for Societal Development at this point was still trying to induce the guest worker associations to operate

within the changing policy framework. While it had begun funding new associations (hence the rise in numbers), it had not yet given up on the old ones. But by 2005, there was very little left of the former elite.<sup>87</sup>

Minority associations not only lost their structural subsidies; the institutional network in which they were embedded was also swept away. Turkish and Moroccan youth centers lost their funding while the Bureau for Strategic Minorities Policy at City Hall was closed down (Zwaap, 2002, n.p.). Such measures weakened the linkages between associations, professionals, civil servants and constituents. The data on structural subsidies merely provide a snapshot of the broader erosion of corporatist institutions and the tearing apart of networks within and between associations. Bahar Asiye's case is illustrative (Box 8.1): associations catering to lower-class groups not only suffered the discontinuation of structural subsidies but reorganizations in the welfare sector, forced relocations and imposed cooperation. The infrastructure that had sustained secular and left-wing minority associations gradually corroded, and with it the power of the associations to organize and represent constituents.

### **Box 8.1 Asiye's course**

Bahar Asiye used to teach illiterate women from Turkey to read and write their native language. Initially she worked as a professional in service of the government, but as a result of the gradual abolition of the minorities policy her position was discontinued. After becoming unemployed she had more time to devote to ATKB, of which she had been a member for fifteen years. As a volunteer she taught grammar and syntax to illiterate women but the courses also had an important social function. The women came with cookies long before the lesson started to talk about their week – for many of them their only break from household or menial work. It was also the only place where they could find information in their native language on topics such as schools for their children, help with legal problems, or advice in case of difficulties in or with the family.

The courses had to be discontinued when the government canceled the association's structural subsidy and forced ATKB to relocate from Amsterdam East to Amsterdam West. As part of a policy to improve efficiency, ATKB was to be accommodated in a space together with other women's associations: the Moroccan MVVN and a Hindustani women's association. ATKB and the other associations protested with letters and on the street against their forced relocation but to no avail. The new building was on the other side of the city and was inaccessible on weekends. Many women did not feel comfortable with the move: they did not know Amsterdam West, were expected to register with a doorman and the location on the tenth floor of an office building was not quite as homely (*gezellig*) as the previous location. Asiye tried to find an alternative place in a neighborhood center in East but no space was available. During the last session of the course many women cried.

Asiye remains active within ATKB but now spends a lot of time to meet the subsidy demands of the government, which is what needs to be done if the association wants to keep its place in West. The municipality heavily subsidizes projects against domestic violence but it is difficult for her to feel that she is really working for women who suffer. The municipality, which demands that different women's associations work together, poses numerous procedural demands. While they lead to all sorts of problems, the women's associations could agree on organizing one large event in one of Amsterdam's premier cultural centers, De Balie. The location is prestigious – much too prestigious for the women who are most likely to be victimized.

### *Stigmatization in civil arenas*

The institutions of ethnic corporatism – the advisory councils, the structural subsidies, the support of professionals – functioned not only as a social infrastructure but as a base from which civil projects were developed. These projects were reasonably successful in that they allowed minority associations to present themselves as and alongside central civil actors. But over time another central contradiction of ethnic corporatism surfaced: ethnic leaders were expected to represent stigmatized and deprived communities in a dignified and professional

manner. This meant that the stigmatization of minority communities constantly threatened to taint the image of their leaders, which indeed happened in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s KMAN and other associations had effectively campaigned for more resources to support social programs and community initiatives. But as negative media coverage intensified, the government became less forthcoming. The representatives of the Moroccan community came to be seen as part of the problem, with the media and government officials increasingly annoyed with the tendency of Moroccan associations to claim they could not tackle problems without significant government support.<sup>88</sup>

The left-wing migrant associations' drop in civil power was even more evident in the organization of protests against Israeli violence in Palestine. KMAN, SMR and many other Moroccan associations supported Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. This was one of the few issues around which they – together with other left-wing and Islamic associations – could mobilize a relatively large crowd of migrants and natives. But the protests against Israeli violence resulted in media coverage that identified the protesters as a threat to the civil community. The most extreme example was a protest in support of the Palestinian intifada in 2002, when a number of banners compared Israel with Nazi Germany, equating the swastika with the Star of David. Youths also attacked a gay night club – the It – with stones. They assaulted people whom they could recognize as Jews and threw stones at the Krasnapolsky Hotel (Krebbers & Tas, 2002). The stewards of the organization had tried to persuade protesters to remove the anti-Semitic banners and to prevent a confrontation with the police. They failed; the demonstration ended with a charge of riot police across Dam Square. The protest was not presented as a civil indictment of an oppressive occupier, but as a direct assault on the Dutch civil community and a reincarnation of the darkest forces in Dutch civil history.

This is just the most extreme example of a protest meant to draw attention to injustice that resulted in the stigmatization of the protesters in the media. Others examples included protests following confrontations between youths and police (in 1998 and 2003) and further protests against Israel (in 2000 and 2004). In each of these cases the demonstration's organizers lost control over groups of second-generation migrant youths and therefore over the media's representation of the protest. This inability to control angry and frustrated youths was also observed among Moluccans (Chapter 4). But unlike the Moluccans, the violent protesters perverted the most sacred symbols of the Dutch civil sphere (the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust) and violated its most cherished norms (the taboo on anti-Semitism).

## Conclusion

In the conclusion to *The Civilizing Process*, Elias tells the story of the Duc de Montmorency who could not accept that King Richelieu monopolized the right to rule. He fought the King as feudal lords had fought each other in olden times, not caring too much for the importance of gun powder in modern battle. Duc de Montmorency thus attacked a battalion of musketeers and artillery in full knightly outfit. His attack was heroic but fatal only to him and his men (Elias, 1994b, pp. 404-405).

The old activists of the guest worker associations sometimes reminded me of the Duc de Montmorency. Their dispositions were so engrained that there was no other way to fight the battle than to mobilize like-minded people and voice demands. Neither the new techniques of public management nor the insights of public relations were of much interest to them. But righteous anger and stubborn insistence on social justice had become archaic by the year 2000. The balance of power between the left-wing minority associations and the government had shifted decisively: the former had lost much of their base and the rules of the game had changed. The government no longer accommodated its counter forces and had reduced civil society associations to state subsidiaries.<sup>89</sup> These shifts marginalized secular and left-wing associations.

For the critics of ethnic corporatism, this process was entirely natural: “the weak must falter,” some said in interviews. But such judgments naturalize what is in fact the result of a reconfiguration of power relations. It was self-evident before that “the weak” should be mobilized, supported and included. But as discursive power relations shifted, it became less self-evident that the government should invest in institutions geared to granting resources and recognition to lower-class groups and the associations struggling for their rights. Instead, the government increasingly embraced a specific form of liberalism dictating that only the most virtuous citizens deserved support. Over the course of the 1990s, Amsterdam moved towards what we might term “civil liberalism.” The next chapter identifies the genesis, power relations and contradictions of this governance figuration.



## **9. The gentrification of civil society. Civil liberalism in Amsterdam in the 1990s**

A new discourse on ethnic diversity and its governance was in the making while the institutions of ethnic corporatism were corroding. This discourse revolved around the notion of “diversity” and was premised on the idea that a diverse population presents opportunities, not only problems. This chapter locates the origins of this discourse and examines how it was institutionalized within government policy. The popularity of the diversity discourse needs to be understood in the context of the broader shift away from ethnic corporatism towards civil liberalism. This chapter identifies the main features of civil liberalism and examines the power relations inherent in it. Although the diversity discourse promised to value all citizens and to recognize their complex identities, in practice the government selectively incorporated partners who could help to produce positive images of diversity and multicultural society. However, growing anxieties over integration aggravated the contradictions of civil liberalism and forced the government to reconsider the ideas, notions and symbols of the diversity discourse.

### **The formation of civil liberalism**

Amsterdam in the 1990s was the mirror image of Amsterdam in the 1980s. Unemployment was declining rapidly, the middle classes were buying their way into gentrifying inner-city neighborhoods, and social programs and repressive measures were ridding the streets of drug users and the homeless. The squatting movement had contracted, students were more interested in affirming rather than challenging the status quo, and the presence of anarchist and far-left political parties within the city council had become marginal. The city was flourishing; political conflicts had been brought back to manageable proportions. Amsterdam had become a much safer and a much more boring place.

Like other cities, Amsterdam came to see itself as an actor in the international marketplace (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1989). Through city marketing campaigns and prestigious urban development projects, the city advertised itself to international investors and tourists (see Hajer, 1989; Oudenampsen, 2007; Ter Borg & Dijkink, 1995). There was never an ideological break with the idea that the government was responsible for the welfare of all its citizens, but administrators increasingly felt that this goal could only be reached if it

devoted more energy and resources to attracting mobile capital. The population increasingly came to be seen as a stock of human capital that the government needed to valorize.

As Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore suggest, neoliberalization – the process through which market mechanisms are brought to bear upon society and the state – unfolds in two analytically distinct moments: one of destruction and one of creation (Peck & Theodore, 2002). We examined the moment of destruction in the previous chapter, which showed that the complex of institutions representing minority interests came to be seen as inefficient and archaic. Although the backlash was not as brutal as it was elsewhere (Leitner *et al.*, 2007), the institutions that had been shaped by the movements of the 1970s and 1980s were dissolved, merged and transformed so that they could no longer do what they had been established to do, that is, promote particular interests and organize constituents. These moments of destruction, however, were followed by moments of creation. The minorities policy was not simply discontinued but transformed by a coalition that fused neoliberal management discourses with post-colonial critiques of multiculturalism.

#### *The genesis of civil liberalism*

The erosion of the institutions of ethnic corporatism created windows of opportunity for actors and discourses that had so far remained on the margins of the policy field. As the left-wing associations lost their privileged positions, alternative discourses could move to the center. These alternative discourses were cultivated in two vibrant discursive milieus. The *first* was located within the institutions of high culture. Intellectuals with migrant backgrounds like Anil Ramdas and Stephen Sanders argued – in high-brow magazines like *De Groene*, for the progressive broadcasting corporation VPRO and on the stages of Amsterdam’s cultural centers – that the notion of collective emancipation was fundamentally flawed. They argued that governments often reified and essentialized the identities of ethnic communities. “Dutch multiculturalism is well-intended but it keeps migrants in the straight jacket of their own group identity. Cultural institutions praise migrants more because of their cultural background than because of their talent” (Ramdas, 1995). Drawing upon a rapidly expanding international, post-multiculturalist literature (see Uitermark *et al.*, 2005), Ramdas and Sanders emphasized the dynamism and multidimensionality of cultural identification: through critical reflection and creative reinterpretation, both migrants and natives could free themselves from the paternalistic and essentializing understandings in which they were caught. The portrayal of migrants as groups that were both needy and exotic implied, for Sanders and Ramdas, a denial of their intellectual and artistic capabilities.

A *second* discursive milieu was located in the state bureaucracy. Professionals with migrant backgrounds often experienced that colleagues and superiors viewed them as ethnics rather than as professionals (Essed, 1991, 1997; Ghorasi, 2006; Anderson, 2004). The association of ethnicity and deprivation built into the minorities policy was an affront to a (very) small but (rapidly) growing segment of migrant professionals, who sought an alternative policy discourse that would recognize their qualities as individuals and professionals. In the policy field at large, the social scientist Philomena Essed was among the most influential critics of the minorities policy. She felt that policies should be directed at society as a whole, not just at minorities. Diversity politics, in her view, meant that the qualities and needs of all people are recognized and acknowledged (Essed, 1997, p. 8); differences along the lines of race, ethnicity, gender, ability, sexuality and age do not just lead to problems but also create possibilities (*ibid.*, p. 9). Minorities should not only be seen as target groups but as contributors: the elderly do not just need care, they can also provide it; migrants do not only have to be acknowledged by party programs, they can also inform them, and so on. Diversity furthermore implies that governments and organizations have an eye for individuality and quality; as container concepts are insufficient to capture the diversity of experience, a more open and probing attitude is required. For Essed and many others who had developed their views on diversity within anti-racist movements and drew inspiration from American business and academic literature,<sup>90</sup> diversity policy was the “next step” forward. Within the state bureaucracy, the Platform for Migrant Civil Servants (*Gemeentelijk Allochtonenoverleg*, GAO) promoted the diversity discourse.

The discourses emerging from these two milieus, while very different,<sup>91</sup> worked together to undermine the legitimacy of the minorities policy and to advance alternatives that better reflected the positions of actors who were highly-educated, had high incomes and prestigious jobs. These actors – while they may have shared ethnic minority status with guest workers – did not need the minorities policy or ethnic corporatism to defend their individual interests. The minorities policy lumped them together with people with much lower status. The critics thus had every interest to challenge the rules of the game of ethnic corporatism: they wanted to break out of the bounds of imposed ethnic solidarity so that their (considerable) value as individuals would be recognized.

Although the ideas of thinkers such as Essed, Sanders and Ramdas were not formulated to support neoliberalism, they were nevertheless easily adapted to fit with the neoliberal transformation of Amsterdam’s governance institutions. The diversity discourse made ideals affordable. Diversity no longer required concessions in the form of specific

institutions, quotas, affirmative action or redistribution. It became a sign of prejudice rather than solidarity to call attention to the structural exclusion of specific groups, while the very idea of “groups” became suspect as such collective representations supposedly failed to recognize individual qualities. The role of government was now to facilitate individual contributions to society to the best of everyone’s abilities. These new conceptions of diversity have discursive affinities to neoliberalism in that they emphasize value, individuality and management rather than rights, collectives and struggle. The government of Amsterdam emerged as a leading client of the growing number of consultancy firms that promoted this notion of diversity and the practice of “diversity management.”

#### *A definitive statement on diversity*

Neoliberal reforms had been underway for some years when Labor Party leader and alderman of diversity, Jaap van der Aa, initiated the reorganization of the institutions of ethnic corporatism. Van der Aa published the first draft of a policy memorandum on diversity in 1998; in 1999 the council approved a definitive statement, *The Power of a Diverse City (De kracht van een diverse stad)*. This document represents the consolidation of a “diversity policy” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1999) that “does not only want to address problems” but “aims to create opportunities” (*ibid.*, p. 3). It argues that “*everybody*” (original emphasis) can contribute to the city. Everybody is entitled to participate, not as a member of a group but as an individual with a multifaceted identity. Dichotomies are rejected: “Amsterdammers [residents of Amsterdam] cannot be captured in one group. They are part of many groups” (*ibid.*, p. 8). The minorities policy allegedly worked in the opposite direction by imposing categories on people and by associating them with negative stereotypes. The new aim was to break down the artificial barriers between groups and to portray diversity in a positive light.<sup>92</sup>

The perspective has thus been reversed. The glass is now half-full, not half-empty. In the words of one senior civil servant: “you use the positive power of the city and the diverse power of the city. You see diversity as an asset for the city and not as an accumulation of problems” (Joris Rijbroek, cited in Van Steenberghe, 2009, p. 27). To unleash the city’s latent powers, the diversity discourse needs to be disseminated; employers and other private actors need to be convinced that they stand to benefit from harnessing diversity within their organizations. The resources of the diversity policy were mainly invested in the municipality’s own bureaucracy (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2000). In the first year, around 3 million guilders (1.4 million euros) were reserved for the Planning and Control cycle to ensure that the municipality’s own working environment was open to “diversity.” A further 1.2 million

guilders (0.5 million euros) were reserved for campaigns and communicative infrastructures to promote the idea that diversity is positive and to help governmental and non-governmental associations to manage and harness diversity. Here we witness government's first steps towards its new role, where the media is a crucial policy domain and communications is a central task. Diversity monitors, diversity gala nights, diversity websites, competitions for diversity prizes, diversity billboard campaigns and diversity television commercials – everything is mobilized to

change attitudes, to create a fertile soil for the diversity policy and to express that the diversity policy is of the utmost importance to the municipality. Attention will be mobilized through so-called “highlights” in the diversity policy, or the moments that products are delivered and concrete results become visible (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2000, p. 40).

It appears that the positive representation of diversity is itself considered a “concrete result”: the “implementation plan” contains 20 measures that all have more to do with communication (and to a lesser extent with management) than with implementation in the conventional sense of the word. It is assumed that once companies, citizens and associations have been informed of the benefits of diversity, they will invest to capitalize on its possibilities.

Taken together, these shifts are more than just incidental changes. Between 1990 and 2000, the entire problematique of ethnic diversity was reconceived. As the previous chapter showed, the government initially regarded the deprivation of minorities as the central problem. The solution then was to administer welfare and to open up decision-making channels to minority representatives. In contrast, the diversity discourse that emerged in the 1990s framed the emphasis on deprivation and collective representation as part of the problem. Instead of associating particular groups with problems, the government needed to actively encourage all citizens to contribute to urban vitality and to reward civil initiatives that break down ethnic barriers. We can thus speak of *civil liberalism*. It is *liberal* because the role of the government is not to support weak actors or reduce inequalities (as under ethnic corporatism) but to promote pride of place and to reward initiative. It is *civil* because it explicitly strives for civil unity and calls upon citizens to contribute to the city. How did the transformation from ethnic corporatism to civil liberalism affect power relations within governance figurations? Which actors bore the costs? Which actors reaped the rewards?

## **Power relations under civil liberalism**

The diversity policy initially recognized minority associations and advisory councils as “partners.” But it was immediately clear that these actors did not fit the image of diversity that the government promoted. While the councils had functioned to represent their communities and to connect their constituents to the state, the diversity discourse devalued these roles. Migrants were now expected to contribute to society, not voice demands. The emergence of the diversity discourse thus reinforced the ongoing move away from minority representation; the reform of consultative structures and subsidy schemes institutionalized the ascendant civil discourse.

### *Advisory institutions*

After the collapse of corporatism, experts filled the void that opened up. When the minority councils were abolished in 2003, a new institution was created that only included experts: the advisory council for diversity and integration (*adviesraad voor diversiteit en integratie*; in short, diversity council). Tellingly, Paul Scheffer and Anil Ramdas – both prominent critics of multiculturalism – were hired alongside Samira Boucetta of the Moroccan women’s association Oumnia to select candidates for this new council. They agreed with each other and with civil servants that the new council should have nothing to do with minority representation. As one of them remarked in an interview:

The councils all had their puny particular interests: the Turks, the Moroccans, ... This advisory council is mixed and completely different. Most people agree that the councils did not work at all and they know why. That is enough reason to now focus on concrete policy issues.

Whereas minority associations were previously evaluated on their ability to represent ethnic communities, candidates were now disqualified if there was suspicion that they represented particular (ethnic) interests. The new diversity council was made up of academics, consultants and other professionals (an architect and a medical specialist). Since the government – rather than constituents or civil society associations – selected its members, it is not surprising that the council operates within the parameters of the government’s discourse and is more likely to suggest improvements than changes.

The “social cohesion think tanks” are the neighborhood equivalents of the diversity

council.<sup>93</sup> The idea to use the networks of the neighborhood's higher-class groups was first advanced by a civil servant in Amsterdam East. She initially wanted to make a list of affluent persons in the district. It was later deemed preferable to recruit participants through the informal networks of administrators and civil servants. Members were only invited if they had careers, contacts with policy-makers and some affinity to integration issues. In practice this means that managers and directors (of schools, housing corporations), professionals and consultants staff the think tanks. While they work as volunteers, the neighborhood council makes funds available to finance their initiatives. The purported success of the think tank in Amsterdam East encouraged other neighborhood councils to establish them, and since 2007 the government of Amsterdam has been supporting the initiative. The think tanks differ from the advisory councils and the minority associations in that they are not predisposed towards criticism. To the best of my knowledge, up until 2009 none of the think tanks ever criticized government policy. Many of the participants, in fact, are policy-makers and since 2007 the think tanks have included elected politicians from neighborhood councils. Box 9.1 gives the example of Zeeburg though similar examples could be drawn from other neighbourhoods.

### **Box 9.1 Class conflict in Amsterdam's civil society**

The professionals who staff think tanks and the volunteers who work for migrant associations have opposing interests but rarely come into conflict as they live in different worlds. The case of Zeeburg is illustrative. For civil society associations, the most dramatic event of 2006 was the privatization of welfare provisions. To cut spending, the council outsourced welfare provisions to a consortium of organizations called Civic. Civic immediately announced that it would close several neighborhood centers where small associations and informal groups organized activities such as cooking clubs, dance lessons, tea drinking sessions, information meetings and Dutch lessons. Civic renamed the remaining neighborhood centers “production houses” to remind their users that they had to generate resources in order to continue using the space. Civic also appointed “civil society developers” to write subsidy requests to increase what was now referred to as “output.”

Some civil society associations lost their accommodation. In interviews and informal conversations, volunteers expressed outrage and tremendous frustration. They had often worked on a voluntary basis for decades and were now told that they had to earn their space through project proposals and work plans. These associations lost many of their constituents while some ceased to exist. In the meantime, the neighborhood council established a social cohesion think tank to function as a “broker of networks” to bring together “different forces that will multiply and make efforts for our neighborhood” (Denktank Sociale Cohesie Zeeburg, 2009). The think tank focuses on “success projects” such as a walking tour of the neighborhood and a tree where people can hang cards with a “wish for the neighborhood.”

The destruction of existing networks was never a concern. In part this was because the think tank was told from the start that it needed to focus on success projects. Most participants – being consultants – deliver what is requested. Furthermore, think tank members cannot be critical of policies because they themselves are responsible for them. One of the members, in fact, is the alderman who made the decision to privatize welfare policies. The social cohesion think tank does not convene in the “production centers” but in the fancy Studio K – a complex of offices, movie theaters and a cafeteria established by the (privatized) housing corporation Ymere to attract buyers of social housing units in an effort to spur gentrification (Oudenampsen, 2005). Most of the associations that were evicted as part of the privatization of welfare are suspicious of this state-sponsored gentrification; some are mobilizing tenants to stand up for their rights. The think tank for social cohesion, however, applauds the efforts of the neighborhood council to make the neighborhood more “mixed” through the displacement of poor households. In the words of its chairman, Firoez Azarhoosh of Razar consultancy, Zeeburg has “potential and also realizes it” (Denktank Sociale Cohesie Zeeburg, 2009).

Borrowing a term from urban studies (Lees *et al.*, 2008; Smith, 1996), we can say that Amsterdam has witnessed a *gentrification* of representation: professionals with high levels of cultural capital, strong networks and prestigious jobs have displaced representatives of guest worker associations. The function of advisory institutions has also changed: while the old councils critically examined government policies and mobilized their constituents to reinforce their demands, the new institutions focus on assisting government initiatives and suggesting improvements to existing policies. As the participants in these new advisory institutions owe

their positions (and often their income) to the government, they are not disposed to criticism.

### *Subsidy relationships*

Changes in the rules of the game did not just undermine the positions of the established associations; they also created opportunities for new actors. If we examine the subsidy fund through which minority associations were traditionally financed (the SIP Fund discussed in the previous chapter), we see that the beneficiaries of the shift towards project subsidies were refugee associations and other associations catering to smaller groups of migrants (see Table 8.1; Uitermark & Van Steenbergen, 2006). This was partly due to these groups' relatively higher levels of cultural capital, as well as their receiving help from (subsidized) community work associations such as *Vluchtelingenwerk* (Refugee Work). Another reason was that these associations were less likely to demand societal change and more likely to act as service providers helping individuals to find their way in society. The associations profiled themselves as gateways providing avenues into society, which fit well with the vision of diversity that Amsterdam had been promoting since the late 1990s.

The major transformations, however, did not take place within existing institutions but through the creation of new ones. Especially the assassination of Theo van Gogh occasioned an institutional overhaul under the banner of the policy program “Wij Amsterdammers.” While the next chapter discusses these reforms in detail, here I focus on one new fund for financing civil society associations – the so-called “reporting point for good ideas” (MGI, *Meldpunt Goede Ideeën*). MGI was established after the assassination of Theo van Gogh to support initiatives for immediate civil repair; it was later institutionalized as a subsidy fund alongside the SIP Fund. MGI fits with civil liberalism in that the government views itself as a facilitator of initiatives that emerge spontaneously. MGI, according to the government, “is based on the idea of empowerment: a government cannot do everything itself and needs [to] stimulate citizens to be creative and responsible” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006, p. A1). Unlike the SIP Fund inherited from the corporatist era, the MGI is a pure expression of the government's changed discourse. As one senior civil servant explains:

Associations within SIP are most of the time not so relevant to the municipality because they neither fit the image the municipality wants to communicate nor meet the specific objectives of the policy. From the government's perspective, the return on investment (*rendement*) is low. That is why new subsidy ordinances (*verordeningen*) are made and why new funds are found to support the desired partners.

Table 9.1 shows which actors received funding through MGI. More than half of the organizations are predominantly native Dutch (14 out of 24).<sup>94</sup> This fits the idea – central to the diversity discourse – that integration is not just a matter for minorities; the focus on ethnic mixing creates possibilities for native organizations to receive funding for projects that involve minorities in one way or another. Since many of these organizations have strong ties to civil servants and have experience writing proposals, they are much more likely than minority associations to claim and receive funding. The strong presence of Moroccan associations (45,000 euros) and mixed associations including Moroccans (249,000 euros) is also interesting, especially in light of the previous chapter’s findings on the marginalization of Moroccan associations. The intense stigmatization of Moroccans in fact led the government to invest heavily in those discursive milieus where Moroccans could be inculcated with civil dispositions. We thus see another example of the ambiguous functioning of the civil sphere: the stigmatization of a community leads to the incorporation of associations from that community (see also Chapter 6). It is only because so many Moroccans are portrayed as threats to the civil community that some Moroccans can appear as super-citizens. These subsidies to Moroccan associations are a precursor of the transformation to civil differentialism, which the next chapter discusses in more detail.

The presence of the Moroccan associations, however, is less prominent than the presence of professionals. It is striking that most recipients are not civil society associations or citizens, at least not in the conventional sense. Seventeen of the 24 projects funded by MGI were carried out by commercial bureaus or by associations connected to a commercial bureau. Actors in this category received 464,850 out of 598,300 euros, or 77.7 per cent of the total.

**Table 9.1 Subsidies awarded through the Municipality of Amsterdam's "Reporting Point for Good Ideas" (Meldpunt Goede Ideeën, MGI) in 2005**

<i>Name of organization</i>	<i>Subsidy granted (euros)</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Type of organization</i>	<i>Target groups</i>
"Pander" and Anita van der Stap Multicultural Onderzoek & Projectmanagement	12,400	Dutch	bureau	school children
AAED Management ism Mex-It	40,000	Varied	bureau	all Amsterdammers
Argan	20,000	Moroccan	community work	Muslim youth and elderly
Culturfabriek	30,000	Dutch	bureau	Migrant/Muslim women
De Slinger	44,000	Dutch	bureau	all Amsterdammers
e74 Productions	10,000	Dutch	bureau	all Amsterdammers
Ememo	15,000	Moroccan	(ethnic) association	Muslim community
Instituut Jeugd en Welzijn, VU	10,000	Varied	bureau	Muslim youth
Mex-It (ism Anne Frank Stichting)	50,000	Varied	bureau	Muslim youth
Montessori Scholen Gemeenschap ism Bureau Rumour	30,000	Dutch	bureau	varied
Nationaal Instituut Nederlands Slavenijverleden en Erfenis (NINsee)	5,000	Surinamese	(ethnic) association	Antillean women
Bureau Maatschappelijke Participatie ism OMWaNNA	40,000	Dutch	bureau	older migrants
Stichting Amsterdam Ontmoet	35,000	Dutch	bureau	neighborhood residents
Stichting Audiovisuele Antropologie Nederland (SAVAN)	5,000	Dutch	bureau	Moroccan women
Stichting COC	15,700	Dutch	community work	Amsterdam homosexuals
Stichting Dialog Visuele Communicatie	20,000	Varied	other	neighborhood residents
Stichting Inner Gold Academy	18,000	Dutch	bureau	Migrant youth
Stichting Kleur in 't Werk	14,450	Dutch	bureau	Moroccan women
Stichting Los Imagos (Feestcommissie)	10,000	Moroccan	bureau	Moroccan youth
Stichting Mijn Wereld is overall	39,000	Varied	individual citizens	Muslim youth
Stichting Samenbinding ism Mex-It (Ramadan Festival)	50,000	Varied	bureau	all Amsterdammers
Stichting StadsSpelen	30,000	Dutch	bureau	all Amsterdammers
Frontmedia	36,000	Dutch	bureau	high school students
Stichting De Spreeksteen	18,750	Dutch	unknown	all Amsterdammers
Total	598,300			

Source: archives of the Municipality of Amsterdam; author's codes

Most of the projects, and especially the large ones, were proposed by organizations that have turned civil engagement into a profession. *Bevordering Maatschappelijke Participatie* (BMP, Promotion of Societal Participation), for instance, was previously funded by the provincial government. But since its privatization in 1992, it is a “project organization” that has to survive in the market for projects and subsidies. The workers are either permanent staff or flexible workers who earn their living from overhead. De Slinger is a similar organization. It was established by the Neighborhood Alliance, which previously operated in the market for government subsidies but has recently discovered private funds (see Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008a). The BMP and the Neighborhood Alliance work with volunteers, their salaried personnel are committed and their directors have outspoken ideas on how to improve society. They nevertheless function as commercial bureaus that require a continuous flow of contracts to survive. In Table 9.1, one organization, Mex-It, appears no less than three times.<sup>95</sup> This is no accident. Mex-It was established by the founders of Towards A New Start (TANS), a national “network organization for highly-educated migrants,”<sup>96</sup> especially second-generation Moroccans working or studying in sectors like banking, consultancy and information technology. TANS caters to a rapidly growing group of students in higher vocational schools and universities. While Moroccans are under-represented in the educational system, the share of young adults entering higher education increased by more than 250 per cent between 1997 and 2007 (O&S, 2006, p. 61; O&S, 2007, p. 6).<sup>97</sup> This created fertile ground for associations like TANS which organize master classes, leadership summits, job markets and network events for ambitious students.

Just as the guest worker elite was inextricably linked to the minorities policy, Mex-It and TANS are the prime representatives and beneficiaries of the diversity policy: the municipality is an important client of Mex-It while both organizations aim to cast diversity in a positive light. As one of the founders of the company explains:

When we were looking at the debate as it was taking place in the Netherlands at that time [after the publication of Scheffer’s “The multicultural drama” in 2000, JU], we felt that we should not stay at the margins.... We felt that we were talking each other into negativity. There are indeed excesses and then you should act *really tough* [*keihard*]. But on the other hand, it is apparent that there is so much potential in this society and we believe you should do much more with this... We wanted to try to get into that playing field and to see how we could give it direction – to steer a little bit.

The associates of Mex-It and many of the other companies funded through MGI are “civil consultants” – committed individuals with visions of how to improve society *and* a strongly developed business sense. They are ideal partners for the government as they cater to its specific needs (as expressed in the conditions for attaining subsidies or contracts) and are convenient to work with: easily reached by phone or email, capable of financial administration and sensitive to the political climate. Because they operate as suppliers on a market, they provide exactly what the municipality demands. The number of civil consultants has exploded in recent years due to the incredible growth in the market for state-funded projects to promote inter-ethnic contact, to create civil unity, to research (the lack of) civil initiative, to improve civil skills and to manage public relations. Civil consultants are particularly well-placed to profit from the shift away from the mobilizing of communities towards image production evident throughout society and especially in the field of integration politics (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008a). The dispositions of these elites are shaped in booming economic sectors like public relations and brand management; they converted capital from these fields into civil power.

In sum, in the transition from ethnic corporatism to civil liberalism we see two related transformations in power relations. The first is the gentrification of civil initiative: both within the advisory councils and among the recipients of subsidies, actors with higher-class backgrounds are much more present than before. Traditional civil society associations that bring people together in pursuit of non-commercial objectives are virtually absent. The second is that there is a stronger focus on images and management at the expense of organization and mobilization. Organizations like TANS and Mex-It profited from both transformations and moved to the center of Amsterdam’s governance figuration. Nevertheless, civil liberalism is not a stable governance figuration as it is plagued with contradictions that make it vulnerable to challenges.

### **The contradictions and erosion of civil liberalism**

A fundamental contradiction of the diversity discourse is the hypocrisy that diversity is valued while minorities are not. The concern for minorities stems from the belief that they are problematic: they do not mix enough, are not liberal enough, do not understand Dutch norms and values, are too often involved in crime, disproportionately drop out of school, are often unemployed, and so on. While the diversity discourse can reframe these problems as obstacles to be overcome and underused talents to be valorized, it cannot capture them in appealing

civil terms. This is why the discourse became popular with managers and policy-makers but did not disseminate in civil arenas. One expression of this failure is the very weak presence of the diversity discourse on the opinion pages (Table 3.1). While the discourse had considerable presence when the debate was relatively calm and when there was cross-party agreement on how integration should be achieved, it virtually disappeared when the debate heated up.

This is especially apparent in debates on crime and Islam. Moroccan criminals and Islamic radicals have been so thoroughly stigmatized in the media that the diversity policy's emphasis on obstacles and opportunities appears other-worldly. It is illustrative that the diversity discourse – literally – has no words for groups that other discourses refer to as problem youths, street youths or Moroccan street terrorists.<sup>98</sup> It is ironic that while Scheffer was trying out his article on the “multicultural drama” on learned audiences, civil servants at city hall were drafting *The Power of a Diverse City*. When Scheffer's article was published early in 2000, it immediately became apparent that the government did not have the discursive power, or even the will, to defend its own, positive vision in civil arenas. The mayor of Amsterdam, Schelto Patijn, attempted to rebut Scheffer's alarmist message by declaring that “Amsterdam does not have a Scheffer problem,” while the alderman for diversity, Van der Aa, suggested that Scheffer had failed to identify positive developments (interview Paul Scheffer). But this storm would not pass by Amsterdam. While the diversity discourse may have worked in government bureaucracies and companies, it was without power in the discursive arenas where integration politics increasingly played out, such as the media and parliament.

In retrospect, it is easy to see that Scheffer's article played upon ideas and feelings that were latently present and that had long been cultivated. Scheffer was right in suggesting that the delinquency of Moroccan young males had become proverbial. While the diversity policy had formally ceased to distinguish between ethnic communities, the media had not stopped reporting about Moroccans robbing, abusing, insulting and annoying natives (see Chapter 8). The intense stigmatization of Moroccans flagrantly contradicted the notions and ideas of diversity that the government was formally committed to. While the diversity policy stipulated that the government would not single out ethnic groups, the media and anxious citizens demanded that politicians address what had become widely recognized as a Moroccan problem.

In one of the historic moments of Dutch integration politics, the successor of Van der Aa, Rob Oudkerk, was caught on film whispering to Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen that he could not understand the magnitude of Fortuyn's success in Rotterdam compared to

Amsterdam because “we also have rotten Moroccans [*kut-Marokkanen*].”<sup>99</sup> This one private performance had much greater impact than the many staged diversity events. It was a definitive verdict: the alderman for diversity had launched a slur (*kut-Marokkanen*) that would resonate on websites, in rap songs and in everyday conversations. The incident also illustrated a pattern: outside of the purview of the diversity policy, administrators fall back on categorizations they have formally abandoned. Numerous politicians and administrators called upon stigmatized communities to “take responsibility” for what were – in spite of the individualizing diversity discourse – framed as the problems of specific ethnic or religious groups.

Ethnic corporatism had been designed to deal with problems and to organize communities but civil liberalism was designed to cater to successful and cooperative individuals. The mechanisms for the distribution of recognition and rewards under civil liberalism favor actors who are willing and able to promote the government’s discourse and exclude those who want to organize marginalized groups or promote radical discourses (see also Essed, 2008). Left-wing minority associations and community workers fell by the wayside and were replaced by advisors of various kinds (university professors, management consultants, Labor party intellectuals). But the latter did not have linkages to problem groups. The paradox is that the government wants to govern these problem groups but does not want to cooperate with the civil actors that represent and organize them. This paradox turned into an even more serious problem for the Amsterdam government when 9/11 and especially the assassination of Theo van Gogh threw fuel on the fire of integration politics.

## **Conclusion**

Far from realizing a utopia of multiplying civil initiatives, the institutions of civil liberalism concentrated power in the hands of a few privileged actors. Civil consultants were recognized and rewarded as super-citizens doing the government’s bidding, namely, producing images and events that shed a positive light on diversity. But civil consultants did not make policy; they were merely its most valued mercenaries. It was, indeed, the government that won the most power in the shift from ethnic corporatism to civil liberalism. It gave itself the discretion to monitor the activities of civil society associations and to discontinue subsidies if they did not meet expectations. The government now dealt with numerous unconnected, small and uncritical associations instead of a handful of connected, large and critical ones. Under ethnic corporatism, institutional inertia and political contestation had circumscribed the power of the

government to impose its vision; under civil liberalism these constraints weakened. The balance of power shifted in favor of the government and its elite partners.

This chapter showed that the government tried to use its central position to promote what I have referred to as the diversity discourse. While its critics sometimes regarded the diversity policy as a remnant of archaic multiculturalism, it in fact was a brand new way of looking at the city: we no longer see groups, injustices, disadvantages or tensions but instead dynamic individuals, opportunities and civil creativity. This discourse originated in the milieu of managers, consultants and other professionals and found its way straight into the self-conception and self-presentation of the city. In the happy images of multicultural Amsterdam, there are no signs of the social injustices that the minority associations dominant under ethnic corporatism had so incessantly addressed.<sup>100</sup> Associations that catered to deprived groups were pushed out of what had now become a market. This also meant that the government only maintained ties with elite actors. While consultants and experts were seen as valuable citizens, they could not create bridges to the problem youths that featured so prominently in media reports and culturalist discourses. The government thus increasingly felt pressured to transform its institutions and reformulate its discourse to get a grip on these groups. The next chapter examines how the government and its partners tried to engineer these linkages and how they mobilized religion and religious institutions in an effort to discipline unruly groups.

## **10. The civilizing of Islam. Civil differentialism in Amsterdam after 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh**

As the integration debate heated up, political and policy attention focused on migrants and Muslims who were actually or potentially criminal, radical, insulated or apathetic. All of these behaviors and attitudes were framed as expressions of a lack of civil integration. Culturalists and pragmatists agreed on this point but disagreed on how to solve the problem. Culturalists developed a discourse demarcating the civil community along the lines of ethnic culture and emphasized the need for strict enforcement. Pragmatists took a different approach and emphasized the transcending of divisions. They, too, felt that Muslims needed to integrate but considered this a collective challenge, not an exclusive obligation for Muslims. Amsterdam was the most important discursive milieu for the development of Pragmatism. In the 2002 elections Labor was pushed out of office at the national level and in Rotterdam but remained in power in Amsterdam, which thus functioned as a showcase for Pragmatism.

The first section of this chapter examines how the Amsterdam government developed its discourse and how it forged its strategy for civil repair in the wake of 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The second section shows that the government divided the population into groups according to their putative civil virtue. The result was the emergence of civil differentialism: a governance figuration that transcended many of the contradictions of ethnic corporatism and civil liberalism but that also – as we shall see in the third section – had contradictions of its own.

### **The formation of civil differentialism**

Part II of this thesis showed that integration politics proliferated after 2000 and exploded after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn. Actors that challenged the pragmatist approach towards integration were stronger than ever before. They claimed that a series of incidents – with the assassination of Van Gogh as apotheosis – demonstrated that the Netherlands had been too soft on migrants and that a more demanding and repressive approach was needed. The heating up of integration politics and the growing power of Culturalism forced the Amsterdam government to abandon its optimistic diversity discourse. After the turn of the century, the government, and especially the mayor, Job Cohen, developed a discourse that revolved around the idea that all groups within society had an obligation to defend civil unity.

According to this discourse, civil unity is under severe threat. It is the task of administrators to stand above and connect the different groups – an approach that developed under the slogan “keeping things together” (*de boel bij elkaar houden*).

Job Cohen declared directly upon his installment as mayor in January 2001 that he wanted to “keep things together” in Amsterdam.<sup>101</sup> He argued that we were witnessing four processes – globalization, individualization, privatization, democratization – that together can lead to civil alienation. If nothing keeps citizens together, society could disintegrate. The very first thing that the government should do to manage such disintegrating processes is to strictly enforce the law: the erosion of traditional mechanisms of social control and the resulting lack of normative orientation should be countered through interventions that make clear, in words and practice, what is and is not allowed (Cohen, 2002). However, this argument was hardly distinctive and no one took issue with it. What defined Cohen’s position – and what made the apparently mundane ambition to “keep things together” into a highly controversial slogan – was his idea that Muslims are an integral part of the civil community. On several high-profile occasions, he argued for mutual understanding and expressed his concern over the backlash against Muslims after 9/11. Whereas culturalists often portray Muslims or radical Muslims as intruders or violators, Cohen argued that Islam and its institutions can in fact help to integrate newcomers. Religious institutions are of special interest to Cohen since he views them as cement that can keep together a society threatened by disintegration:

We now deal with an inflow of people for whom religion often is the most important guide in their lives. That raises the question of acceptance by the secularized society that surrounds them and their integration in this society. As far as this last issue is concerned: religion is for them an easy and obvious entry when they try to connect to the Netherlands. Where would they find that connection if not initially with their compatriots? This is why the integration of these migrants in Dutch society may best be achieved via their religion. That is almost the only anchor they have when they enter the Dutch society of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Cohen, 2002, p. 14).

Cohen thus argued that religion is not antithetical to integration. To the contrary, religion is a vehicle for integration, as are religious institutions like mosques.

One important implication of Cohen’s position is that he values associations and identities that were almost completely ignored under ethnic corporatism and civil liberalism. Mosques and Islamic associations played a role in neighborhood networks but were virtually

invisible for the city's administration.<sup>102</sup> The politicization of Cohen's discourse created a sense among administrators and civil servants that minority associations, and especially Islamic associations, should be incorporated into governance networks. Pragmatists in general, and Cohen in particular, regarded Islamic associations and Muslims as agents of civil repair. If there is a growing schism between Muslims and non-Muslims – as pragmatists believe – then these two groups need to be brought together. Such rituals of civil repair entailed a reconfiguration of governance relations: they represent a move away from individualized understandings of diversity and towards a more group-oriented approach where actors willing to act as Muslims come to play a vital role (even though others have cast them in that role). How were these notions and ideas inscribed into policies and state institutions?

### *Institutionalizing civil differentiation*

After the attacks of 9/11 and especially the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the diversity discourse was abandoned in favor of a discourse based on the idea that the commitment of moderate Muslims is necessary to curb the threat posed by extremism. This was the analysis that would inform subsequent institutional reforms and projects carried out under the banner of *Wij Amsterdammers* (Us Amsterdammers, WA) – a policy program created by top level civil servants under the direct supervision of the aldermen and the mayor. WA marked a definite break in that it did not postulate that “diversity is positive.” It was instead based on the premise that diversity can lead to explosive conflicts that need to be suppressed before they materialize. Whereas before – under the minorities policy – ethnic groups were the policy objects, now the population was divided into different groups according to their putative civil virtue. While the precise articulation of this principle of differentiation varied between individual administrators and policy documents, the continuum usually runs from those who passionately defend liberal democracy to those who passionately attack it. For example, the analysis of conflict potential made immediately after the assassination of Van Gogh distinguished between five groups of Muslims and five groups of non-Muslims. Muslims were distinguished as follows:

1. Muslims who are completely integrated and experience no tension whatsoever between Islam and modernism. They actively resist radical Islam;
2. Muslims who accept the rules of the game of liberal democracy but who feel some tension between Islam and modernism. They resist radical Islam;
3. Muslims who experience strong tension between Islam and modernism but who accept

the Dutch constitutional order. They are willing to provide information on Islamic extremism;

4. Muslims for whom political Islam provides a sense of identity and meaning. They approve the assassination, passively reject the Dutch constitutional order and passively support jihadis;
5. The jihadis who recruit and train, maintain breeding places, spread hatred of the West and want to commit extremist acts. This group consists of 150 people [an estimate by the Dutch intelligence agency, JU] and strong networks around them.

The non-Muslim population, according to WA, consists of:

1. Those who accept Islam within the context of the Dutch liberal state and actively strive for the recognition of Islam within the Netherlands;
  2. Those who accept Islam within the context of the Dutch liberal state;
  3. Those who have difficulty with Islam and exclude and stigmatize Muslims;
  4. Those who want Islam to disappear from the Netherlands and who exclude and stigmatize Muslims;
  5. Those who (want to) undertake violent action against Muslims
- (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004, pp. 4-5).

These categorizations give an impression of the ways in which administrators perceived the population of Amsterdam: there is a rough division between Muslims and non-Muslims and both groups are internally differentiated according to their putative civil virtue. These categorizations also suggest a line of action: the municipality and its administrators should form coalitions with those who embrace liberal democracy, wish to reduce polarization and fight against extremism, and should isolate and prosecute those who seek to undermine liberal democracy. This approach, if successful, would encourage people – so the government’s analysis assumed – to climb up the civil hierarchy.<sup>103</sup> Here I truncate the five groups into three different groups of Muslims (liberal elites, critical counter publics and defiant outsiders) and examine their positions and power relations within the emergent governance figuration.

## Power relations under civil differentialism

### *Embracing the liberal elite*

The growing importance of representations of Islam within integration politics triggered the emergence and consolidation of a small group of Muslim leaders who were able to position themselves as a major force for civil repair. As we saw in Part II, Ahmed Aboutaleb emerged as a central figure in the national debate after 9/11 and enjoyed much more support than other participants in the debate. Haci Karacaer, director of the (Northern branch of) the Turkish Milli Gorus mosque federation, also became a central figure in the debate after 9/11 and he, too, enjoyed comparatively high levels of support (see Chapter 6). Two other central figures were Ahmed Marcouch and Ahmed Larouz. Marcouch had become a spokesperson for the Moroccan mosque federation UMMAO<sup>104</sup> in 2004. Ahmed Larouz and his colleagues at Mex-It also increasingly shifted their attention from diversity management to projects for civil repair. Some of the founders of Mex-It had been born and raised in Amsterdam West and through their projects for the municipality (including the planning of an Islamic graveyard) had established contacts with a number of Moroccan mosques.

These four figures were among the most visible representatives of the Muslim community after the assassination of Theo van Gogh. Larouz, Marcouch and Karacaer staged a press conference in De Balie, one of Amsterdam's most prestigious cultural centers. Larouz read a statement on behalf of the government-funded association "Islam and Citizenship," asking people to stay calm after this "attack on our society." Karacaer was "visibly shocked" by the event according to a newspaper report and uttered "I wish I could undo all this." Ahmed Marcouch declared on behalf of UMMAO that "this was not a religious act, even if the assassin committed it in the name of Allah" (cited in *NRC Handelsblad*, 2004). All three men engaged in symbolic crisis management after the assassination. They set up campaigns and organized events in order to express that the fight against extremism was not a fight against Muslims but a fight by Muslims and non-Muslims against those who disturbed civil peace.

A day after the assassination, Aboutaleb reprimanded the visitors of the Al Kabir Mosque, where he expressed anger that people close to the assassin had not intervened. He called upon the Moroccan and Muslim community to produce "counter poison" and not allow extremists to "hijack their religion" (see Chapter 6). The Amsterdam government supported the civilizing mission of these Muslim leaders in various ways. Some of the attempts to support liberal Islam were hardly controversial while other attempts aroused strong

opposition. Let me mention three large projects – one that materialized and two that did not.

An example of a project that did not arouse much controversy was the Ramadan festival. Mex-It conceived the festival after the assassination of Theo van Gogh. According to the project description, it aims to correct “misunderstandings of Islam among non-Muslims as well as Muslims” (project description, n.d.) and to open up this Islamic holiday for the whole of Amsterdam. The municipality contributed from several funds (including MGI) but the firm was also very effective – much more effective than any migrant or Islamic association with an organized constituency – in attracting funds from commercial sources, including banks, consultancy agencies and privatized welfare agencies eager to improve their positions in a market where more and more customers had Islamic backgrounds. The first edition of the Ramadan festival in 2005 had a budget of around 300,000 euros, which grew to half a million in 2006. In 2007, the festival was expanded to 40 cities in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Its 2007 edition in Amsterdam had dozens of sponsors and partners; well over fifty associations and organizations participated in one way or another. Newspapers and television stations constantly covered the activities. Although controversial issues were debated, the focus was on mundane topics such as food, fashion and business.

An example of a project that aroused much more controversy was the plan to establish a debating center for Islamic culture, Marhaba. The project was first conceived in an expert meeting organized by Job Cohen. The model for Marhaba was the Parisian *L’Institut du Monde Arabe*. City administrators (including Cohen and Aboutaleb) lobbied for subsidies from the central government, believing that such a prestigious center could take the debate on Islam to a higher level. Initially the national government was not forthcoming. In anticipation of a turn of the tide (a change in the government’s attitude or a change of government), the municipality decided to give a “start subsidy” of 26,000 euros for the center in January 2006. Haci Karacaer was hired to initiate the project. A press release announced the project as a “non-religious center for Islamic art and culture” with which the government “gives a powerful message to all Amsterdammers that 120,000 Amsterdam Muslims belong and should participate” (Gemeente Amsterdam, press release, 26 January 2006).

The goal of the start subsidy was to draw up plans in anticipation of further financing from the national government. The working group consisted mostly of individuals strongly in favor of encouraging Muslims to become more self-critical and included Ahmed Marcouch, Haci Karacaer and Mohammed Baba of Mex-It.<sup>105</sup> Referring to Tariq Ramadan, the group argued that it is both a necessity and a moral duty for “European Muslims ... to break out of the isolation that is imposed upon them, to make connections with the ‘Western cultural

universe' and to confront this with their own principles" (Marhaba, 2006, p. 7). To achieve this, the center sought to attract diverse audiences, especially higher-educated youth with an interest in religious issues and current affairs. On the basis of the working plan, Marhaba received an additional 468,000 euros of subsidy in 2006. According to the plans in 2006, Marhaba was to receive a structural subsidy of 2 million euros and an incidental subsidy of several millions for accommodation.<sup>106</sup> But while Marhaba was in the process of development, criticism intensified. National as well as local politicians argued that Marhaba breached the separation between church and state. Local civil society associations pointed out that the generous subsidy to Marhaba represented an arbitrary divergence from the municipality's policy of not funding organizations, let alone organizations that specifically focus on one religion (see Chapter 9). In the end, the opposition was so strong that the municipality abandoned the project.

A third and possibly the most controversial example was the Wester Mosque in the Amsterdam neighborhood of De Baarsjes. The media drama began in the early 1990s when the Turkish mosque federation Milli Gorus and the neighborhood council of De Baarsjes entered into conflict over the construction of the mosque. The neighborhood council and a group of local residents protested against its size and the height of the minaret but Milli Gorus insisted it had the right to build anyway. After some years of stalemate, Milli Gorus pushed forward a leadership that promised the mosque would become a vehicle for emancipation rather than a cultural bastion. The new leadership – with Hacı Karacaer as charismatic figurehead – manifested itself everywhere and spoke out against conservative and fundamentalist tendencies. The mosque association participated in the commemorations of the Second World War and unequivocally denounced the attacks of 9/11. The apotheosis was perhaps Karacaer's performance at the gay monument where he declared to struggle for the rights of other minorities even if that would bring him into conflict with his own community. Milli Gorus had transformed – in media representations – from a hyper-conservative association into a liberal vanguard of Dutch Muslimhood. A housing corporation now agreed to a joint-venture to construct homes on a plot adjacent to the mosque; the neighborhood council agreed to fully support the project. But all this changed in 2007. According to media sources, "conservative hard-liners" sponsored by the German headquarters of Milli Gorus had engineered a "coup" against the "liberals" sponsored by the Amsterdam municipality (e.g. Beusekamp, 2006). The downfall of the liberal leaders robbed pragmatists of what had been their most epic civil story. Cohen's government suffered a direct blow when it crystallized that it had covertly given an indirect subsidy of 2 million euros for the construction of the mosque

complex. While the liberal leadership had told the government that such a subsidy was necessary to prevent a conservative take-over, in yet another media revelation it became apparent that one of the leaders had agreed to hand over ownership of the mosque to the federation's headquarters as soon as the construction was completed. The government and the housing corporation withdrew their support. The plot where the Wester Mosque was to be erected was still vacant in 2009.

These examples show that the government intervened directly in civil society to strengthen the power of liberal Islam. The idea of a level playing field in which associations have to compete for resources (central to civil liberalism) was completely abandoned. The amounts involved were enormous compared to the sums allocated through competitive bidding. The government sought to strengthen the position of Muslims who were critical of their own (ethnic and religious) communities and who expressed support for the Dutch civil community. So strong was this desire that the government attempted to rewrite the rules of the game by giving itself the discretion to subsidize religious discourse.<sup>107</sup>

#### *Accommodating critical Muslims*

A large segment of the Muslim population shows strong civil engagement but is much more critical of Dutch society than the liberal Muslim elite. For the sake of convenience, I refer to this segment as "critical Muslims" though it should be clear that this category lumps together actors as diverse as illiterate first generation mosque representatives who vaguely sense that politicians are against Islam and second generation intellectuals who eloquently counter Islamophobia in newspapers and on television. Under civil differentialism, these critical Muslims did not receive nearly as much recognition and resources as the liberal Muslim elite. Nevertheless, there were attempts to incorporate them into governance networks. Through the support of projects enticing Muslims to enter into debate, governments hoped to reduce the power of radical discourses.

What kinds of projects received support? One example is Muslim Youth Amsterdam (*Moslimjongeren Amsterdam*, MJA), which brought together youths from different ethnic backgrounds and mosques. While the city government had previously shown scant interest in mosques (see previous chapters), this changed after 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The alderman for diversity, Ahmed Aboutaleb, decided that an association was needed after research found that mosques, and especially Moroccan mosques, developed few civil initiatives. Aboutaleb granted the consultancy firms that had carried out the research the assignment to form the association. Its mission was to improve Islam's image and to educate

the next generation of mosque administrators. The group included such diverse people as television presenter and Mex-It freelancer Jihad Alariachi and a young volunteer from the orthodox El Tawheed Mosque. MJA was just one of several associations of young Muslims incorporated into governance networks. Another example was JUMMAO, a group originally brought together by Ahmed Marcouch to participate in a (government-funded) weekend of training by an institute for applied research at the Free University. Islam Aangenaam (Pleasant Islam) was another association of this kind. There was also the National Muslim Youth Organization (*Landelijke Moslimjongerenorganisaties*, LMJO), a national collective of youth associations established by people who had left the group that would eventually become JUMMAO. These were just several of the associations that actually materialized which I encountered in my research. The number of initiatives was probably much higher and the number of ideas for associations and projects countless.

Cultural centers like Mozaïek and Argan functioned as the discursive milieu in which these initiatives emerged. Unlike the prestigious cultural centers in the canal district (such as De Balie, Rode Hoed and Felix Meritis), Mozaïek and Argan attracted large numbers of people from groups that are notoriously difficult for the media and administrators to reach, such as orthodox Muslims and eloquent Moroccan youths. In the debates on integration issues that I attended, roughly half of the audience normally consisted of migrants, mostly second generation Moroccans.<sup>108</sup> The natives at these meetings were by and large on the left and generally opposed Culturalism. Politicians like Geert Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Rita Verdonk could count on no support whatsoever: they were only mentioned negatively and served as the foil against which discourse is articulated. In effect, these discursive milieus functioned as counter publics (Fraser, 1991) where alternative integration discourses were generated and where civil talents were cultivated (Box 10.1).

These associations, venues and events offered excellent entry points for journalists in search of “Muslim youth,” political parties in search of new talent and companies looking for new hires. The most engaged Muslim and Moroccan youths and organic intellectuals ended up in television shows or news reports as “Moroccan youth” or “Muslim.” The fact that these settings were constantly in the spotlight affected how they functioned. In one sense, the media coverage was a crucial part of the attraction. Some people were “discovered” there. One volunteer told me in an informal conversation:

Abdel is now something like a media star. He is just sixteen years old and the perfect Moroccan. Gentle and engaged. He has a group around him who often come to these

debates. They are part of the next generation. They all look up to Mohamed and Jamal and see how far you can get (approximation; talk not recorded).

The presence of important politicians and television cameras certainly adds to the prominence of a debate. The preference for high-profile debates, however, also limited their role as milieus for civil inculcation. Although volunteers and professionals often intended to engage in long-term efforts to build institutional networks, such ambitions were easily forgotten when the next spectacular event took place. Associations in this volatile environment functioned less as civil incubators than as portals for civil talent. Some of the younger Moroccan and Muslim talents I spoke to self-consciously cultivated their skills and networks to be involved in party politics, to represent one or the other association or to work in the integration field. They also experienced major frustrations as they discovered that rejection of their own communities was a prerequisite for success outside of this particular discursive milieu. Especially Marcouch's transformation (from a representative of a Moroccan mosque federation to a critic of his own community, see below) irritated many of his former followers.

### **Box 10.1 A debate on Islam and the Media in the Argan youth center (2 December 2005)**

The chair for tonight was Martijn de Greve, a professional television host and conference chair. The panelists:

1. Mohamed Jabri, a columnist for the internet website El-Qalem. The website had the slogan “to strive with the pen” and gave space to polemical Muslim commentators (like Jabri) and orthodox Muslims who discussed religious affairs;
2. Frank Williams, director of the Dutch Muslim broadcasting station (NMO);
3. Farhad Golyardi, editor of the monthly *Eutopia* that gives a stage to progressive intellectuals to comment on multicultural society and international relations;
4. Fouad Laroui, professor of literature at the Free University, a Muslim and a critic of fundamentalist Islam;
5. Justus Uitermark, PhD student at the ASSR, who had just been in the news with a joint research project that, according to journalists, showed that the media had written with “nuance” and did not “instigate” after the assassination of Theo van Gogh.

Although I had discussed integration issues in public debates, expert meetings and seminars, this was the very first time I had to speak in front of a room that had a large share of vocal minority youths. Throughout the debate, this created a sort of pressure that I had never felt before. Certain mistakes that would be overlooked or ignored by other audiences now drew immediate attention. For instance, when I made a remark about an “imam,” I was corrected by Jabri to the amusement of many in the audience; I should have talked about an Islamic scholar.

One example to illustrate the dynamics of power in this particular setting: at one point, a participant in the audience laughed at the idea that Osama bin Laden was behind the attacks of 9/11 – “the Jews” did that. In a righteous fury he added that the Quran dictated that no harm shall be done to those who are peaceful to Islam but that violence was a natural response to the atrocities committed against Muslims. A loud applause followed. One native Dutch woman said she had become afraid of such rhetoric and openly asked if she, as a lesbian, had anything to fear. An older Muslim woman then reprimanded her for doubting the good intentions of the man who had accused the Jews and then raised her hands to the sky and called out “Allah Akhbar” a few times. After these outbursts a young man called upon “his brother” to be calm and explained in the most dignified manner what he considered proper Islamic conduct.

When I was asked in a later part of the debate to comment on the coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, I remarked that I had no expertise on that topic but that I was shocked by the accusations against Jews and especially by the applause. Jabri accused me of avoiding the topic. Again: applause. Then Frank Williams put an arm around me and said that my feelings should be respected. At the end of the debate, the lesbian went over to the Jew-accuser and, after a short exchange of words, they hugged each other. Once more: applause.

After the debate, several people came to me to explain that the Jew-accuser had been too bold but that there really was evidence suggesting that the official reading of 9/11 was wrong. Other people told me that they appreciated my contribution but that I should not “get so emotional.” We see here a complete inversion of the assumptions and sensitivities inherent in mainstream discourse production. Normally Muslims “get emotional” and cannot take it when their root assumptions are questioned. Now I experienced these expressions of frustration bred by discursive subordination.

The organizers who had invited me to the debate often featured on television as “youth workers” or as “Moroccan youth.” the local channel AT5 invited the Jew-accuser to speak on Islam in a discussion program. I also learned that the Labor Party had scouted two of the female organizers as potential politicians. These are just a few illustrations of Argan’s brokerage role; it had transformed from a center for marginalized youths into a vibrant discursive milieu embedded in governance and media networks. This is partly due to funding from the government. Argan’s community work is structurally funded and for this particular debate the center received a project subsidy from MGI (see Chapter 9).

### *Disciplining defiant Muslims*

Precisely because participation in government-supported associations and debates requires a measure of civil engagement, these events did not attract the problem groups that fill the media and policy documents: isolated women, drop-outs, delinquent youths and (potential) extremists. To get a grip on these groups, the Amsterdam government, as other governments, intensified its investments in repressive and disciplinary institutions: more discretion and personnel for the police, more CCTVs, more state funds and discretion for security personnel, stricter enforcement of the legal requirement to attend school, and so on. But there was also a civil dimension to this offensive. Social isolation, poor school performance, criminality, etc. were redefined under civil differentialism as resulting from the lack of civil engagement. The solution was therefore to stimulate “participation.”<sup>109</sup> To civilize the most defiant groups, the government increasingly called upon Islam, Islamic authorities and Islamic associations. This development, which took place throughout Amsterdam, reached its zenith in the neighborhood of Slotervaart, a post-war neighborhood on the outskirts of Amsterdam which became a laboratory for new governance institutions.

After it became clear that Van Gogh’s assassin lived in Slotervaart, journalists, academics, policy-makers and politicians flooded the neighborhood. Media scrutiny and political interest further intensified when Ahmed Marcouch ran for and became chair of the neighborhood council in 2006 – the first Moroccan to achieve this position in the Netherlands. With Marcouch as charismatic “neighborhood mayor” and the Labor party in charge of national integration policies, all conditions were met to focus attention on, and to invest resources into, Slotervaart. It was the first neighborhood Labor minister Ella Vogelaar visited to learn about radicalization and the fight against it.

Marcouch passionately promoted a discourse of civil differentiation tough on those who commit incivilities and rewarding for those who exhibit civil qualities. Referring to Marcouch’s background as a police officer, the German weekly *Der Spiegel* called him “the sheriff of Slotervaart” (cited in Jongejan, 2007). Indeed, Marcouch had no sympathy whatsoever for youths hanging on the streets after midnight or parents forsaking their responsibilities. But his policies were disciplinary rather than simply repressive: the goal was to weave a network of surveillance and control around the life world of perpetrators and potential perpetrators. The neighborhood government of Slotervaart set up a rapid response unit of “street coaches” (usually martial arts practitioners) to surveil the neighborhood and intervene whenever youths were loitering, skipping school or causing a nuisance. The council also financed curricula for parents on the intricacies of the school system and to stimulate

them to show an interest in the educational performance of their children. Such disciplinary interventions have surged everywhere in the Netherlands (Van den Berg, 2007) and elsewhere (Crawford, 1997, 2006) in recent years. In Slotervaart, religion is used to convince target groups that they need to cooperate. The policy document where the council lays out its strategy against radicalization states that:

the emphasis will be on the opportunities offered by religion and culture in upbringing, strengthening one's own identity and developing a positive self-image. Next to that, there will be a search for points of contact (*aanknopingspunten*) in religion and culture for creating a bridge to Dutch society. Dichotomous world views will be countered with religious prescriptions. This offers the opportunity to convince parents that their wish to give their children an Islamic identity does not entail a clash with Dutch norms and values (Stadsdeel Slotervaart, 2007, pp. 8-9).

In the understanding of Slotervaart, delinquents and radicals should be confronted by authorities who demonstrate to these putative Muslims that their behavior is not in accordance with proper Islamic conduct. These policies reconfigured the relationship of the government to both parents and civil society associations.

One of the goals of the programs for parents was to bring their religious conceptions in sync with what educational and other social environments require. In her evaluation of a course for Moroccan parents offered as part of the anti-radicalization policy, Amy-Jane Gielen shows that parents and especially mothers were not primarily interested in religion or culture but in their children's success in school and on the labor market; most of all, they did not want their children to drop out of school or to fall into the hands of local criminals (Gielen, 2008). But where religion and culture played a role, religious precepts were used to delegitimize cultural beliefs or practices that inhibit success in Dutch society. In the course, for instance, a group of (less-educated) mothers discussed whether it is permissible to hit a child. Some complained that child protection laws are too strict and that Dutch society does not allow them to discipline their children. Others suggested that Islam requires parents to adopt a gentle approach and expressly forbids hitting children. They felt that their ethnic culture holds women back and that greater knowledge of Islam would lead to a reevaluation of the mother's role. As one of them put it: "I do not find traditions and being Moroccan very important because I think we mostly have bad traditions. The fact is that a girl is kept down while a boy is allowed to do anything he likes. Islam is against this" (cited in Gielen, 2008, p. 15). This

quote is no exception. The discourse that I refer to as Civil Islam is not only popular among civil elites but can also count on strong support from lower-class Muslim women, even if they have hardly any contact with native Dutch (Van Tilborgh, 2006).<sup>110</sup>

The growing importance and frequency of state interventions into households was to some extent an alternative to support for civil society associations, which lost their status as intermediaries between the state and residents. Especially secular neighborhood associations lost their subsidies and accommodations (see Box 7.1). But associations that catered to groups close to potential radicals or delinquents retained or consolidated their roles as intermediaries. For instance, participants in courses for child-rearing were now recruited through Islamic associations. The government organized debates within mosques and provided guidance to mosques wishing to present themselves in the media. The government also supported mosques to organize dialogues among their constituents and with other religions in an effort to open up to the younger generation and Dutch society.

### **Contradictions of civil differentialism**

Compared to civil liberalism, civil differentialism has two major strengths. First, by promising to discipline and punish those groups that threaten or dishonor the civil community, it offered an answer to the anxieties expressed most vocally (but not exclusively) by culturalists. Second, civil differentialism incorporated – through discourses of Civil Islam and disciplinary interventions – groups that had been ignored under civil liberalism. But civil differentialism also had its contradictions.

First, the relationship between the Labor Party and Muslims is under the constant scrutiny of other political parties, the media and even the party's own supporters. Any sign that it will use its power in government to support Islam can be seized upon, creating a constant threat of scandals. The subsidies for Marhaba and the indirect subsidy to the Wester Mosque are good examples of attempts to support liberal Islam that generated overwhelming opposition. Many Muslims, too, distrust the government when it comes to religion. Even some of my respondents involved in state-sponsored initiatives having to do with Islam deeply resented the attempts to reform religion. More orthodox Muslims actively searched for interpretations of Islam that did not have the stamp of state approval as they deeply mistrusted the proverbial “subsidy Muslims” (“with or without a beard,” as one of my orthodox respondents said). The subsidizing of liberal Islam – even the impression that the government wants Muslims to believe in liberal Islam – can have results opposite from what the

government intended.

Second, the government was so heavily involved in shaping civil society that it annihilated its autonomy. On the one hand, some civil initiatives or associations were funded and accommodated to the extent that they were transformed into state subsidiaries. On the other hand, groups and people regarded as possible threats were subjected to intense disciplinary interventions. Either way, the government tried to reward civil discourses and to inculcate civil dispositions through direct intervention. Civil society associations following their own agendas were marginalized within governance figurations. This was especially detrimental to groups that neither qualified as super-citizens nor as potential threats to civil order. Neighborhood associations and associations pursuing specific interests did not benefit from the surge of support for civil initiatives at all.

Third, the differential incorporation of different types of actors bred resentment among subordinated actors, thereby undermining the capacity of associations to cooperate. Those who managed to live up to the expectations of core groups sooner or later hurt the sensitivities of co-ethnics or fellow believers. This was not due to any tactical incompetence on their part, but to another imperative of the civil sphere: in order to find acceptance among core groups, civil actors with minority backgrounds have to transform their stigma into marks of distinction, and can only do so by dissociating themselves from stigmatized groups. Aboutaleb's speech in the Al-Kabir Mosque (see Chapter 6) is one example of a performance that simultaneously boosted his status among media audiences and degraded his direct audience. He spoke to the Moroccan community as if he was not part of it and as if they (as volunteers and visitors of a mosque with no connection to the assassin whatsoever) were somehow more to blame than he was (as alderman of diversity).

## **Conclusion**

The intense and often negative focus on Islam may further marginalize Muslims and lead to social disintegration. This, at least, is what many people fear. But this fear triggered counterforces: this chapter showed that as integration politics heated up, more time, energy and resources were devoted to the discursive and institutional incorporation of Turkish and Moroccan migrants, who were increasingly redefined as Muslims. The controversies over Islam were thus divisive in some ways but crucial for bringing together actors that were previously apart. The commitment to Civil Islam bound together a coalition stretching from progressive politicians like Cohen to orthodox Muslims opposing terrorism. Islam thus fused

into governance and was mobilized to extend the influence of the government.

The government liaised at various levels with civil society, even creating new civil society associations: it invested heavily in actors promoting liberal Islam, sponsored actors providing critical or orthodox alternatives to radical Islam, and created disciplinary institutions to civilize groups that supposedly lacked civil engagement. In short, we can observe the emergence of a governance figuration – civil differentialism – in which discourses of Civil Islam fused into, and legitimized, institutions that differentiate between groups according to their civil virtue. Resources and recognition were distributed along these same lines: liberal Muslims close to the Labor party leadership received a great deal of support, critical Muslims further removed from the core could count on attention and limited resources, defiant or marginalized Muslims were the targets rather than the subjects of policies. Although the emerging governance figuration was much better designed to deal with incivilities than civil liberalism, it also suffered from internal contradictions. At the heart of these contradictions was the annihilation of civil society's autonomy. The government intervened directly into power relations in civil society and subjugated civil initiatives to its own policy program, incorporating minority associations in a relation of subordination. The case of Rotterdam provides an interesting counter-example.

## **11. The rise of Culturalism and the resilience of minority associations. Civil corporatism in Rotterdam**

The recent history of integration politics in Rotterdam is at least as turbulent as that of Amsterdam. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn achieved his first great electoral victory in his hometown of Rotterdam. Fortuyn was virulently opposed to what he saw as the Islamization of the Netherlands (see Chapter 5). After his death, the council members and aldermen of his party – Leefbaar Rotterdam – continued Fortuyn’s promotion of culturalist discourse. Leefbaar Rotterdam was extremely critical of minorities and Muslims but, contrary to what we might expect, minority and Islamic associations flourished in this period. Why? The key to answering this question is the specific governance figuration that emerged in Rotterdam in the 1980s, one that has since remained stable and which I refer to as civil corporatism. The first section of this chapter examines civil corporatism’s genesis and evolution; the second shows how civil corporatism produced a balance of power between different types of actors. The third section then identifies three contradictions that plague civil corporatism. The fourth section concludes that Rotterdam’s governance figuration did not only foster stability; it may well have increased the power of minority associations as well.

### **The formation of civil corporatism**

The progressive movements of the 1970s and 1980s had a strong presence in Rotterdam but were not nearly as powerful as in Amsterdam. Those who were attracted to the feminist, gay, squatting and other movements gravitated to Amsterdam with its educational institutions, intellectual elites and cultural provisions. Rotterdam was and remains more of a working class city. It proved a fertile environment for various extreme-right parties and, in contrast to Amsterdam, there were a number of occasions when native mobs assaulted guest workers. The largest outbursts of violence against migrants in the Netherlands occurred in Rotterdam South in 1972. Pensions were set alight and guest workers assaulted. The riots that ensued lasted for days as native youths threw up barricades and fought the police (Dekker & Senstius, 2001).

Migrants received help from community workers and support groups, though these were not as large or as politicized as in Amsterdam. One consequence was that, in contrast to Amsterdam, the Welfare Foundation for Foreign Workers in Rotterdam did not collapse under

the pressure of internal conflicts. Nevertheless, some guest worker associations over the course of the 1970s grew increasingly dissatisfied with the alleged paternalism of native professionals and established, with the support of the government, the Platform for Foreigners in Rijnmond (*Platform Buitenlanders Rijnmond*, PBR) in 1981. Although the South European associations initially took the lead, associations like KMAN and HTIB (see Chapter 8) quickly became involved with PBR. Political refugees who had escaped repression in Greece, Spain, Morocco and Turkey were among the most active members and turned PBR into a bulwark for left-wing minority associations. The platform organized protests against budget-cuts for disability pensions, restrictions on immigration, discriminatory housing policies and many other policies that infringed on the rights of lower-income groups and workers. Like the left-wing associations in Amsterdam, the associations united in PBR refused to cooperate with conservative or Islamic associations. Two mosques requested to join the network but were rejected because they did not, according to PBR's director, "subscribe to the goals of emancipation and participation" (Babalidis, 1991, p. 11).

PBR thus had a similar political profile to the advisory councils in Amsterdam (it was dominated by political refugees and left-wing associations) but – and this is crucially important for understanding the trajectory of Rotterdam's governance figuration – it was not recognized as the official representative of Rotterdam's minorities. The Rotterdam government recognized PBR as a legitimate partner but also argued that it only represented a sub-section of the minority population. Hans Simons, who served as alderman of minority affairs for the Labor Party between 1982 and 1989, felt that the government should also incorporate minority groups that were more conservative and less likely to organize. As a veteran civil servant explains:

We saw that the mosque associations were very isolated. And so we asked community workers: what are you going to do about this? "Well, nothing," was the answer. The resident groups – *white* resident groups – obstructed such efforts. And then we said: "This is absurd." So we started subsidizing a platform, SPIOR, which still exists.

SPIOR (*Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond*, Foundation Platform Islamic Associations Rijnmond) was established in 1988 on the initiative of the city council, with help from some central figures in Rotterdam's Islamic civil society. The government and the mosque associations initially came together to discuss practical issues and to streamline the policy process for establishing mosques (Maussen, 2006). The government, however,

encouraged *all* existing mosques to participate in the new organization, not just the associations that dealt with building applications or other policy technicalities. The more entrepreneurial mosques were willing to help the government reach this objective and actively tried to foster linkages to mosque associations that had previously been isolated.

I refer to PBR and SPIOR as “civil corporations”: non-profit organizations that receive structural subsidies from the local government to support, unite and mobilize a large number of civil society associations. They do not provide direct material support but assist associations in managing their organizations, establishing linkages to other associations and dealing with the government. They also help to attract funds from neighborhood governments, the municipal government and charities. Member associations elect the board members of the civil corporations, thereby exerting control over their policies. The civil corporations, in short, are in the bosom of the state but nevertheless independent of it. In contrast to the councils of Amsterdam’s ethnic corporatism, PBR and SPIOR are not located in city hall but in a nearby office building.

Both PBR and SPIOR have expanded their constituencies over the years. Although it still prides itself as a progressive and secular organization, PBR has lost its radical edge and no longer has principled objections to working with Islamic or other religious associations. While conservative associations still dominate SPIOR, the civil corporation over the years has increasingly served associations not directly connected to mosques. PBR had 38 member associations in 2006 and provided commissioned support to 42 non-member associations (PBR, 2007). It had a staff of 12 salaried (full-time and part-time) workers and a board of 9 elected volunteers. SPIOR had 40 member associations – i.e. officially affiliated civil society associations – in 2007 (SPIOR, 2007). All member associations of SPIOR have a representative on the board that supervises the organization and its staff of nine full-time professionals. Both civil corporations serve as intermediaries between the government and target groups. When a government department has a project targeting groups represented by PBR or SPIOR, it can reach them through these civil corporations; PBR and SPIOR bring policy to their constituents, as it were. The civil corporations also train their member associations in public relations, management and administration so that they can play a role in governance networks.

While SPIOR and PBR are most relevant for Turkish and Moroccan associations, Rotterdam has many more civil corporations for migrants and other population groups. There is a civil corporation for Antillean and Cape Verdian associations, a federation for refugees, and so on. Other corporations cater to women or residents. Since civil corporations are the

cornerstones of Rotterdam's governance figuration, I refer to the figuration as *civil corporatism*. But how can we explain the figuration's remarkable stability? The next section suggests that civil corporations help to create balances of power among different civil actors and function as buffers between the government and civil society.

### **Power relations under civil corporatism**

Unlike the government of Amsterdam, the Rotterdam government provided structural subsidies to organizations from a budget specifically earmarked for minority integration.<sup>111</sup> While recipients of structural subsidies have to adjust to changing circumstances and demonstrate their relevance, they do not constantly have to prove their worth in competition with other civil actors. In this sense, the civil corporations had similar relationships to the government as the advisory councils in Amsterdam but they, in contrast to their counterparts, did not lose power over time. This section examines power relations under civil corporatism by first examining the distribution of structural subsidies. It then explores the balance of power between competing and cooperating civil actors, looking respectively at the relations between large and small civil actors, between progressive and conservative associations, and between the government and civil society.

#### *Structural subsidies*

Table 11.1 shows that, alongside PBR and SPIOR, other organizations cater to different ethnic groups such as the Chinese and Surinamese. Rotterdam also finances Radar, an organization that helps people to make a case if they have been discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity, skin color, sexuality or gender. Radar has its origins in the anti-racist movement and maintains ties with civil society associations but, over the years, has become a professional and general service provider that no longer specifically caters to migrants. Other organizations are not funded from the budget for minorities but are nevertheless important for minority associations. For instance, a structurally subsidized organization like Scala has women as its target group but often works together with minority associations. Another example not included in Table 11.1 as it is funded from a different budget is BOM (*Bureau Opzoomer Mee*, named after the social policy program *Opzoomeren*), which supports resident groups. While resident groups have traditionally been dominated by natives (Duyvendak & De Graaf, 2001), it seems that the activities supported by BOM have more recently reached ethnically diverse groups (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2006).

**Table 11.1 Structural subsidies of the Municipality of Rotterdam to various civil corporations in 2005 (euros)**

PBR (Platform for Foreigners)	285.210
SPIOR (Muslims)	314.656
Wah Fook Wui (Chinese)	140.306
ISWS (Surinamese)	24.447
AVANCO (Cape Verdians)	363.916
RADAR (Anti-racism)	385.833
SWA (Antillean)	567.604
De Meeuw (children)	113.733
Train (Surinamese)	178.572
Refugee Work Rijnmond	399.662
Foundation for Refugee organizations Rijnmond	484.395
PSWR (Surinamese)	769.562
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,027.896</b>

*Source:* Municipality of Rotterdam

As this overview indicates, Rotterdam has many organizations that receive structural subsidies to stimulate civil engagement among minorities or among the population at large. For Turkish and Moroccan associations, PBR and SPIOR are the most relevant organizations.<sup>112</sup> Data on subsidies indicate that their position consolidated in the years prior to this research. In 1998, SPIOR received an annual subsidy of 157,685 euros and PBR 146,235 euros. By 2006, both had doubled their annual subsidies to 317,645 euros and 287,920 euros respectively (Van Steenbergen, 2009, p. 59). As civil corporations have secure incomes, they can invest time and energy into attaining funds for incidental or periodical activities. In addition to subsidies from the municipality, they receive incidental subsidies from a range of sources, including the central government and charities. These civil corporations form the central axes of a figuration in which there is a balance between different types of civil actors.

#### *Balance between large and small actors*

Civil society associations are increasingly called upon to bid for resources. To see how such competition plays out, I focus on the allocation of the *Rotterdam Mee* fund (With Rotterdam, RM). Rotterdam Mee was established after the assassination of Theo van Gogh to support civil initiatives that contribute to civil integration. Table 11.2 shows the allocation of resources per type of civil actor. The bulk of the funds were directed to civil corporations and

civil society associations. PBR received the most funding at 34,000 euros; it organized 17 meetings in various neighborhood centers or in the offices of member associations. The target groups varied: sometimes the meetings aimed to bring together as many different groups as possible; at other times they targeted specific groups (such as the members of a Turkish-Islamic women’s association).

**Table 11.2 Recipients of the Rotterdam Mee subsidy fund for civil initiatives**

Type of organization	<i>Number of associations</i>	<i>Subsidy amount (euros)</i>	<i>% of total subsidy</i>
Civil corporation	6	68,000	22.8
Community work	9	48,000	16.1
Civil consultant	3	22,000	7.4
Migrant association			
Turkish	5	24,000	8.1
Moroccan	7	58,000	19.5
Mixed	4	10,000	3.4
Other ethnicities	16	40,000	13.4
Other types	14	28,000	9.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>298,000</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* archives Municipality of Rotterdam, data processed by author

Civil society associations received 44.3 per cent of the total amount. The seven Moroccan associations included four neighborhood associations, two general Moroccan associations and a women’s association. They organized events for their constituents such as debates, information meetings and social gatherings. Debates – on issues like the position of women, the stigmatization of Moroccans and the challenges of child-rearing – were by far the largest category (65 per cent of meetings,  $n=28$ ). The Turkish associations were likewise diverse, including two women’s associations, two Islamic associations and an association for Alevis.

The figures show that civil society associations catering to ethnically specific and typically lower-class constituents could claim state resources. They were not, as in Amsterdam, marginalized by more professional or larger associations. The civil corporations in fact helped these smaller associations to tap resources. Subsidy applications typically demand administrative competence and inside-information – precisely what these civil corporations provide to their member civil society associations. We thus see that the big players in the governance figuration did not push out the smaller players but instead helped

them to organize activities and to reap the rewards of incorporation into governance networks. Member associations within SPIOR and PBR received a total of 50,000 euros.<sup>113</sup>

These results indicate that Rotterdam's non-profit associations were capable of competing with professional associations. This was sometimes due to their having become quasi-professional associations themselves, and sometimes due to the support they received from professional associations (like civil corporations). Associations catering to lower-class groups could thus adapt to changing circumstances, such as more stringent administrative demands. The welfare organization Delmatur illustrates the cooperative relations between professional and civil society associations in Rotterdam. Delmatur is a professional welfare organization like many others but, unlike all others, was established by a coalition of four Turkish and four Moroccan associations. Rather than fading away – as ethnic associations did in Amsterdam – they evolved with the policy field. They could meet the increasing administrative demands because they could rely on an infrastructure – absent in Amsterdam – that provided sustained support.

#### *The balance between progressives and conservatives*

We saw that in Amsterdam there are sharp divisions between different types of associations. Tensions exist between associations with different ethnic and class backgrounds or with divergent political and religious ideas in Rotterdam as well. In the 1990s, for instance, a conflict erupted within SPIOR when certain Turkish associations no longer wished to cooperate with certain Moroccan associations. The Moroccan associations then decided to establish the Moroccan Federation and to request recognition and resources from the government. Progressives connected to the NCB (see Chapter 4) accused the Moroccan Federation of supporting the Amicales, the band of organizations loyal to Moroccan dictator Hassan II. The progressive critics argued that the government should not recognize the Moroccan Federation as a legitimate representative of the Moroccan community and should deny it subsidies. In the end, the government found no proof of the accusation but the Moroccan Federation never crystallized; the progressives retreated to the PBR and the conservatives to SPIOR (Gemeente Rotterdam, 1993). There were many other examples of such conflicts between progressives and conservatives, Berbers and Arabs, Turks and Moroccans, promoters of secularism and orthodox Muslims, etc. While these conflicts could have partitioned civil society into segregated camps, this did not happen. This is because Rotterdam's governance figuration generates strong centripetal forces that encourage civil society associations to take intermediate and mainstream positions and discourage them to

take idiosyncratic (very conservative, radical, liberal or extremist) positions. Whereas in Amsterdam there were sharp divisions between left-wing associations, orthodox Islamic associations and liberal Muslim leaders, in Rotterdam these divisions were not so clear and rivalry was muted.

The incentives to take intermediate positions result from the presence of civil corporations serving groups with different identities. An association capable of switching between identities and involved in diverse activities can tap different sources of funding. While a conservative Islamic association would normally only receive help from SPIOR, and a progressive secular association only from PBR, an association capable of transcending these identities or switching between them can use the services of both. For example, the association Ettahoud evolved over 15 years from an informal parent initiative to teach Arabic to Moroccan children into an association with 350 paying members and a constituency of well over 1,000. This was in part because Ettahoud could extend services to its members through Rotterdam's programs for child-rearing, resident activities, cultural debates and education. Operating with different identities (as youth, resident or migrant association with strong ties to a student association), it could tap diverse sources of funding and join many different networks.

The disincentives to take a radical position result from the immersion of minority associations in larger networks. If an association were to radicalize and develop extremist viewpoints, this could affect all associations. And due to the relationships between the different actors, it is likely that information about, for instance, an extremist preacher would quickly circulate through the governance network. The dense and fine-grained infrastructure makes it relatively easy for authorities and central figures in civil society to prevent or respond to the formation of uncivil discourses or mediatized incidents (Box 11.1). Most mosques are conservative and opposed to radicalism or extremism. This is the same in Rotterdam as in Amsterdam. But in Rotterdam, there is a city-wide network of corporations and associations that detect and counter these threats, thereby preventing mosques from venturing too far from the mainstream. The senior civil servant quoted above explains how these networks operate in case of a threat:

**Box 11.1 Imam El Moumni: “Homosexuals are lower than pigs and dogs”**

Scandals occur with great frequency in integration politics. Because scandals represent a disruption of the civil sphere, they are a good test of how civil societies and their networks function. One the most explosive incidents occurred in May 2001 when imam El Moumni of the Annasr Mosque stated on national television that homosexuality should be considered an infectious disease and that homosexuals are lower than pigs and dogs. El Moumni claimed that his words had been misunderstood and misrepresented. In a public letter addressed to Roger van Boxtel, El Moumni stated that “Muslims are not allowed to make such judgments” because “humans are the highest beings on earth.” The misunderstanding, El Moumni said, had arisen because he had recited Alaraf, verse 179: “many djins and people we have destined for hell. They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they cannot see, they have ears with which they cannot hear. They are like cattle, no they go astray even more. It is they who do not heed attention.” According to El Moumni, he had only stated that the deeds of the people referred to in this verse were lower than those of apes, dogs and pigs (Trouw 2001). El Moumni was angry with the television show for not broadcasting his additional remark that Islam does not justify violence against homosexuals. The imam himself could not explain this to journalists in Dutch but received help from a group of articulate Moroccan youths who publicly stated that they supported him because he had only recited what the Quran states.

For many actors in integration politics, El Moumni was the quintessential example of an uncivil Muslim: he did not speak Dutch after 10 years of residence in the Netherlands and consistently blamed others for controversies arising out of his media performances. The Moroccan authorities had barred him from preaching in his home country but in the Netherlands he was the spiritual leader of Rotterdam’s largest mosque. Over time, however, both El Moumni and the youths who supported him were incorporated in a variety of governance and civil society networks. This certainly does not mean that the mosque’s attendees or board members have become “liberal Muslims.” Nevertheless, they are now tightly interwoven with civil society associations and civil corporations. The mosque was the setting for some of the preparatory meetings for the Islam debates (see below), in which El Moumni participated without causing a scandal. The mosque now actively profiles itself as a center for social and cultural work where civil skills are cultivated. One of the youth who had supported El Moumni told me in an interview in 2006 that he and the rest of the group would no longer support the imam because they prefer having their own stance to supporting an imam who – they now felt – promotes archaic ideas in an archaic fashion. They were no longer active at the mosque, though some of them had become active elsewhere, organizing debates, events and activities for various civil society associations whose constituencies partly overlap with Annasr.

If there are things going wrong or in case of a threat, I receive a call. Immediately. For instance, when a weird imam – a guest preacher – arrives, we know it the next minute. SPIOR itself then intervenes and ensures that the party will not go on... How do they do that? They throw him out of the mosque. Simple. Well [... long pause ...]. No, I do not

want to comment on that. But let me say that I know the director very well. I personally took him off the shipyard. He worked under me for a number of years. He got his bachelor degree and then he moved to SPIOR. We know each other extremely well (*tot in de haarvaten*) and that has some, well, advantages – let me put it like that.

The above quote illustrates a number of features of civil corporatism. Strong ties exist between top civil servants and the directors of the civil corporations, who in turn maintain close contact with civil society associations. The government – i.e. elected or appointed officials – appears only in the background; it nevertheless maintains sensors in civil society as it has indirect yet structural ties to virtually all minority associations in the city.

#### *The balance between government and civil society*

Governments are naturally central actors within governance figurations. The government can cut subsidies and marginalize previously recognized associations, as we saw in the chapters on Amsterdam. The most profound rupture in Rotterdam – and probably the most profound rupture in post-war Dutch municipal politics – occurred in 2002 when Pim Fortuyn's Leefbaar Rotterdam achieved a momentous electoral victory. Fortuyn had an outspoken culturalist discourse, as we saw in Chapter 5. After his death, the aldermen and council members of Leefbaar continued to speak out against (political) Islam, claiming that the influx of migrants had ruined the city (see, e.g., Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008b). They targeted minority associations in particular: one of the first motions the party proposed, together with the right-wing Liberals, was to reconsider all subsidies to minority associations (Leefbaar Rotterdam and VVD, 2003). In 2005, the leader of Leefbaar's municipal faction stated that his party wanted to “end subsidies of organizations that do not target all Rotterdammers. Cut the subsidies of all those who focus on just one group in society!” (Ronald Sørensen, cited in Van Steenbergen, 2009, p. 54).

Such interventions indicate that the support for minority associations is fragile. But the antipathy against minority associations is counter-balanced by dependency on these same associations. The coalition of Leefbaar, Christian Democrats and right-wing Liberals stated in its plan to promote civil integration that it was very pleased that

so many migrant and other associations have indicated that they are willing to contribute to civil integration and to make social-cultural improvements.... Migrant associations can play an important role in establishing contacts, disseminating

information and motivating groups that are hard to reach. We will more intensively use existing contacts and establish new contacts with organizations that have not yet been reached (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002, pp. 6 and 11).

We see here yet another example of the ambiguous compulsion of the civil sphere: representatives from groups that suffer stigmatization are called upon to participate more actively (see also Chapters 6 and 10). Associations are used as vehicles to reach groups that are supposedly not integrated; their representatives are called upon to engage in the debate on minority integration in civil arenas. The government wanted to “break taboos” in religious and ethnic communities, to foster civil engagement and to connect people to Dutch society and culture – all of which requires knowledge of, and access to, minority groups. Minority associations and civil corporations were therefore not devalued after Labor was pushed from office – perhaps the opposite was the case. The structural subsidies to SPIOR and PBR, far from being cut, were corrected for inflation. In addition, they and their member associations could draw upon the growing resources made available to support incidental projects (including the subsidies of the Rotterdam Mee fund).

### *Balances of power*

The relationships within Rotterdam’s governance figuration were characterized by balances of power: between the government and civil corporations, between civil corporations and civil society associations, and between progressives and conservatives. While we see the same developments as in Amsterdam – the growing importance of Islamic instead of ethnic associations, the mediatization of integration politics, more stringent demands for subsidies – these only result in small alterations and adjustments. Rotterdam’s governance figuration was clearly more durable than Amsterdam’s ethnic corporatism. The next section examines civil corporatism after Leefbaar took office through an exemplary test of discursive power: the Islam debates.

### **Discursive struggles during the Islam debates**

The Islam debates exemplified the government’s approach to break taboos, to speak openly and frankly, and to identify problems. The nine debates were high-profile events that attracted attention from local, national and international media. The formal goal was to address anxieties over Islam through a public discussion of the relationship between Islam and

integration but antagonistic actors pursued divergent objectives. And so ensued an institutional struggle to determine the conditions of debate and a discursive struggle during the debates themselves. In the first, institutional struggle, four different actors had specific stakes.

1. For *Leefbaar Rotterdam* the debates were first and foremost an opportunity to profile itself in public. Although aldermen are normally required to defend their government's position, on this occasion they agreed to present their personal views. This meant that the Leefbaar aldermen had center stage to voice their criticisms of minorities. Two Leefbaar aldermen wrote essays very critical of Muslims. Marianne van den Anker argued that the time had come to critically examine a number of norms and values, including the male duty to protect the virginity of sisters and daughters, the pressure on women to wear headscarves and the lack of disciplining for boys. While she viewed some Muslims and ex-Muslims as partners in the struggle for gender equality, Muslim men were clearly not part of her coalition (Van den Anker, 2005). In his essay, Marco Pastors lauded the separation between church and state and argued that Islam challenges this separation. To earn its place in the Netherlands, Islam needs to become like other religions (Pastors, 2005). The media took a strong interest in the essays and extensively documented the Islam debates and Leefbaar's position in them. The Islam debates thus functioned as a vehicle to disseminate culturalist discourse.

2. For the *other coalition parties* – the Christian Democrats (whose alderman, Leonard Geluk, was formally responsible for integration) and the right-wing Liberals (a small fraction in the council but the party of the mayor, Ivo Opstelten) – something else was at stake. They wanted to show that they had learned from the Fortuyn revolt. They presented the Islam debates as proof that the government was not afraid to openly discuss controversial topics but they – unlike the discursive revolutionaries of Leefbaar – also argued for mutual understanding and sensitivity. Geluk wrote an essay in which he argued, after culturalists, that Islam needs to go through a process of enlightenment and that a large share of minority youths create difficulties because migrants fail to instill norms and values in their children. His discourse differed from that of Van den Anker and Pastors in that he also valued certain aspects of Islamic culture (such as family values) and opposed insults, arguing instead that people should think about the consequences of their words. The latter part of his message positioned Geluk in opposition to Leefbaar: he argued for stability and unity more than for (more) discursive revolutions.

3. For the state bureaucracy and civil corporations, the Islam debates were first of all a logistical challenge. They furthermore saw the debates as a chance to empower minorities and specifically Muslims to participate in civil politics. The actual organization of the debates was in the hands of a project bureau, PSI (*Projectbureau Sociale Integratie*, Project Bureau Social Integration). PSI operated in the corporatist tradition of Rotterdam and actively approached civil society associations for preparatory meetings. It hired SPIOR to organize a number of expert and information meetings with Islamic associations to discuss the themes of the debate. These expert and information meetings featured speakers who – with the possible exception of Paul Scheffer – were very critical of Culturalism. Under pressure from Leefbaar Rotterdam, the project was then handed over to PBR. PBR arranged 11 preparatory debates on the relationship between Islam and Rotterdam society in cooperation with Islamic associations. Almost 1,200 people participated. In a round of 14 extra debates organized on PBR's own initiative, almost 4,000 people participated. For three ethnic groups (Turks, Moroccans and Somalis), meetings were organized in their native language at the location of their civil society associations. Each meeting featured a speaker – often a scientific or religious authority from Turkey or Morocco – who addressed some aspect of the relationship between Islam and integration, including the position of women, self-organization, education and media representations. During the actual debates, PSI staged both left and right-wing politicians. But it also brought in actors that could authoritatively respond to the charges of Culturalism, such as Tariq Ramadan, perhaps the single most influential proponent of Civil Islam in the world (see Chapter 6).

4. For Rotterdam's migrant and Islamic associations, the Islam debates represented a double challenge. The first was to deliberate on their position in Rotterdam and within Dutch society. Reports of the internal debates show that Muslims used the occasion to express and sharpen their views on the position of Islam. The thread running through the meetings is that many cultural practices and beliefs should be abandoned but Islam itself is pure and entirely compatible with a successful life in the Netherlands. This is the discourse of Civil Islam that we observed in the national debate (Chapter 6) and in Amsterdam (Chapter 10): Islam demands that people invest in education, are honest, help their neighbors, engage in politics, respect women, respect the law, raise their children right, respect other beliefs, denounce violence, and so on (PSI, 2004). The second challenge was to respond to the discursive assaults on Muslims. The debates were being prepared when the Rotterdam government fell into the hands of a party outspoken in its rejection of Islam. National integration politics was

more intense than ever before and revolved almost exclusively around “Islam” (see Part II). Muslims were routinely and spectacularly ridiculed and criticized. The drive of Leefbaar to further stretch the discursive boundaries of the debate and to make the renunciation of Islam common sense was clearly felt as a threat. This is why many civil society associations initially resisted the initiative. But the internal debates were eventually used as rehearsals for the public debates; many prepared for the discursive confrontation with Leefbaar. Ettaouhid even organized a debating course for 25 of its members to further sharpen their rhetorical skills.

What actually happened during the debates is of course subject to interpretation but it is clear that Muslims had a relatively strong presence (compared, for instance, to the debate analyzed in Part II). Volunteers, professionals and members of civil society associations pushed each other to overcome their doubts about yet another debate on Muslims and to attend. And so they did. Leefbaar supporters were a minority in the audience (Wijkalliantie, 2005). The composition of the audience was also reflected in the voting. All participants were asked to stand in one of three boxes – “agree,” “doubt” and “disagree” – to indicate their positions on statements. Almost all participants agreed with propositions that emphasized the cultural obligations of migrants, such as “abiding the law is not enough, proficiency in Dutch is also needed” (PSI, 2005, p. 64). Large majorities supported propositions that allocated blame to traditional Muslims rather than to Islam, such as “the problem is family pressure, not Islam” or “it would be better for Rotterdam and the next generation if youths would be less concerned about family pressure” (*ibid.*, p. 71). During the final debate, participants in the discussions could vote on propositions for a civil charter. The most popular propositions argued against discrimination towards Muslims on the labor market. Other popular propositions emphasized the obligation of mosques to open up to Rotterdam society and of public institutions to address diversity issues (*ibid.*, pp. 124-125). Muslims not only dominated numerically but also rhetorically. Very few articulate culturalists made public statements. In some cases culturalist discourses were delegitimized thanks to their promoters, as in the case of a well-known extreme-right felon. Four out of seven times a Muslim woman won the “I have a dream prize” for the best debater of the evening: a quintessential civil trophy.<sup>114</sup>

In short, debates initiated by a government that perceived Muslims as a problem became a significant site for the dissemination of integration discourses antithetical to Culturalism. We might even say that discursive power was subverted: Leefbaar had wanted to address the relationship between Islam and integration but participants constantly raised the

issue of discrimination and racism. This ultimately culminated in a set of propositions – again determined through voting – that stressed the responsibility of employers and the government in removing obstacles to Muslim integration.<sup>115</sup>

This small case study of the Islam debates shows that civil society associations in Rotterdam did not lose power after Leefbaar came to power. They rose to the challenge and grasped the opportunity to counter the discursive assaults. Minority associations and civil corporations were crucial in this process as they prepared and mobilized people to make an articulate contribution to the debate. These mechanisms did not only operate during the Islam debates. Civil corporations and civil society associations constantly mobilize and organize constituents, both during large-scale events like the Rotterdam debates and during small projects carried out at the neighborhood level.

### **Contradictions of civil corporatism**

Rotterdam's governance figuration has been remarkably stable for at least two decades. The above sections explained why: the presence of civil corporations ensured balances of power between various actors and created a buffer between the government and civil society. But while the structure of Rotterdam's governance figuration has been stable, there are also processes that aggravate its contradictions.

The first is that political opposition to the institutions of civil corporatism is strong and may grow stronger. Civil corporatism does not exclusively support minority associations but it does provide much more support to these associations than to non-minority associations. While such support could initially be legitimized on the grounds that newcomers need extra support to establish themselves, the idea that migrants and their descendants are newcomers is rapidly becoming anachronistic. Rotterdam's governance figuration lowers the threshold to civil participation for various minority groups but not for native groups. Since there are no proposals to extend the institutions of civil corporatism to the substantial share of lower-class natives in the population, it is likely that, in time, civil corporatism will be considered a governance figuration biased in favor of minorities. So far, however, political opposition has not been strong enough to corrode civil corporatism.

A second contradiction is that civil politics in Rotterdam is not very exciting or spectacular. The temporary surge of Leefbaar Rotterdam pulled civil society associations into the civil sphere and made civil politics exciting, but after the re-installment of the Labor Party in 2006, things returned to normal. Minority associations tend to avoid confrontations and are

generally oriented towards stability and cohesion. This attitude – cultivated by the institutions of civil corporatism – has promoted stability but may also turn off younger generations from civil politics. Many civil society associations and civil corporations have seen a partial displacement of the first generation but this process has been slow and uneven, partly because of the conservatism of the older generation and partly because younger generations are not very interested in merely reproducing extant institutions. This is in contrast to Amsterdam where the excitement and volatility of civil politics entices the more assertive and engaged of the younger generation to take a stance and to establish their own institutions. Criticisms of key figures like Ahmed Marcouch and Ahmed Aboutaleb may fuel anger among minority groups but can also arouse interest in politics. If the media become more important channels for civil communication than civil society associations, the institutions of civil corporatism may lose their capacity to appeal to, and incorporate, younger generations.

The third contradiction concerns the crumbling of one of the foundations of civil corporatism: structural subsidies. In 2003, the government appointed a commission to critically review subsidy relations. It concluded that the allocation and use of subsidies should be better registered and monitored (Commissie Van Middelkoop, 2003). In recent years, the audit office – which judges subsidies according to their immediately observable efficiency and efficacy – has acquired a more central position. Since the subsidies to civil corporations create a structure rather than deliver a product, they may be seen as anachronistic, as stemming from a time when governments were overly generous and did not demand value for money. Were the government to adopt such a perspective, subsidies to civil corporations would likely be discontinued and redistributed according to a competitive logic. It is therefore likely that Rotterdam merely lags behind Amsterdam and that everything solid in Rotterdam's civil society, too, will eventually melt into thin air. So far the introduction of market and accountability mechanisms have not had drastic consequences. Some organizations have been forced to merge but most have managed to adjust to changing circumstances. Civil servants responsible for integration policies have guided the associations and corporations in this process, especially trying to convince the smaller associations that they need to prepare for more stringent demands. Such support may help civil society associations and civil corporations to survive the transition towards more competition but, in time, they may be less inclined to make long-term investments to expand their constituencies than to secure funding to ensure short-term survival.

## Conclusion

This chapter examined the genesis and evolution of civil corporatism in Rotterdam. As civil corporatism remained remarkably resilient, it was necessary – in contrast to earlier chapters – to explain continuity rather than change. In the formative years of civil corporatism, the government created institutions encompassing as many associations and groups as possible. The government was heavily involved, but from a distance. Rather than intervening directly in civil society, it encouraged civil actors to establish and manage civil corporations and civil society associations. These interventions in the 1980s created a governance figuration that remained resilient throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The figuration was stable because it balanced power relations between different actors. On the one hand, the institutions of civil corporatism could incorporate many different kinds of associations – conservative, small and marginal ones included. Conservative associations were united through SPIOR, progressive associations through PBR. On the other hand, the specific form of corporatism in Rotterdam created strong centripetal forces: associations that fell in the middle of the progressive-conservative continuum and that mobilized through multiple identities won the most resources and recognition.

Rotterdam's governance figuration remained intact during the greatest political earthquake in Dutch local politics since World War II. Pim Fortuyn's *Leefbaar Rotterdam* sought to change discursive power relations and to make acceptable what had previously been frowned upon. It also set itself the goal to reduce the power of minority associations. But the institutions of civil corporatism remained resilient. This was not only because the impact of *Leefbaar Rotterdam* was buffered by corporatist institutions but also because the government itself was ambivalent. It wanted to dismantle institutions for specific groups but also called upon these same groups to engage in debate and to foster civil repair. *Leefbaar* confronted rather than marginalized minority associations. And the institutions of civil corporatism enabled minority associations to rise to the challenge.

Having established that the cities' governance figurations qualitatively differ, we can now more systematically investigate the nature and implications of these differences. This chapter argued *in passim* that Rotterdam's minority associations, due to the support of civil corporations, reach more constituents, have more harmonious relationships and exert more influence on government policy than civil society associations in Amsterdam. The next chapter connects and elaborates on these disparate observations and tests the argument that Rotterdam has stronger minority associations than Amsterdam.



## **12. Comparing the power of minority associations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam**

The chapters of Part III analyzed power relations in the governance figurations of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. They examined how elites in the different figurations could rise to power and showed, *in passim*, that their relations to others were sometimes constructive and at other times destructive. This chapter offers a more systematic comparison of the governance figurations of the two cities. The first section summarizes the findings of the case studies and elaborates on the argument that Rotterdam's governance figuration contains a more powerful civil society. The second section provides a qualitative comparison of the forces that divide and integrate minority associations. The subsequent sections test the argument that Rotterdam's minority associations have greater capacity to tap state resources, to organize constituents and to influence politics. The chapter concludes by arguing that the minority associations in Rotterdam's governance figuration worked more like civil schools while minority associations in Amsterdam functioned more like talent shows. Both governance figurations generated specific distributions of power – with the one in Rotterdam more closely approaching the ideal of a harmonious, inclusive, egalitarian and engaged civil community.

### **Governance figurations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam**

Table 12.1 summarizes the findings of the previous chapters. The Table shows that Amsterdam saw a succession of different elites. In the 1980s and early 1990s, left-wing associations enjoyed central positions. Although these associations had many highly educated sympathizers and leaders (such as political dissidents), they were nevertheless rooted in lower-class migrant communities and were active in mobilizing these communities. But ethnic corporatism was plagued by contradictions. Contrary to what we would expect on the basis of the literature on multiculturalism, conservative associations were marginalized within ethnic corporatism and thus had no incentive to sustain this figuration. The left-wing associations did not open up positions of power to the second generation and monopolized rather than shared recognition and resources. While these contradictions made ethnic corporatism unstable, the final blow came when the government introduced neoliberal governance instruments like market simulations and advertising campaigns. The type of representation that the left-wing associations had monopolized was made obsolete and they

were gradually marginalized.

**Table 12.1 Governance figurations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam**

	<i>Ethnic corporatism</i>	<i>Civil liberalism</i>	<i>Civil differentialism</i>	<i>Civil corporatism</i>
Prevalence (chapter)	Amsterdam, 1980-1995 (Chapter 8)	Amsterdam, 1996-2005 (Chapter 9)	Amsterdam, 2005- (Chapter 10)	Rotterdam, 1988- (Chapter 11)
Winners	Opinionated leaders of guest worker associations	Civil consultants	Celebrity politicians	Moderate grassroots associations
Losers	Younger generations, conservatives	Lower classes	Stigmatized target groups	Radicals
Contradictions	Intra-ethnic strife	Disengagement of lower classes	Tension between leaders and target groups	No (fatal) contradictions

A new elite emerged in the late 1990s: consultants with professional competence in neoliberal governance, committed to creating more positive representations of multicultural society. These civil consultants derived power not from their capacity to mobilize migrant communities but from their mastery of the techniques of business organization and image management. Civil consultants could acquire central positions because they did not depend on (crumbling) corporatist institutions (advisory councils, structural subsidies) and could profit from growing government budgets for management, planning and control cycles, and marketing. Unlike the left-wing associations, they did not advance claims for equality or against racism but instead emphasized the contributions they were making to the city. This meritocratic understanding of civil virtue, however, could not answer the growing anxiety over incivilities perpetrated by Moroccans and Muslims. The positive understanding of diversity that the municipality and its partners advocated was discredited by Scheffer's "The multicultural drama" and the framing of (radical) Islam as a threat to the civil sphere.

After 9/11 in 2001 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004, we see the emergence of a new elite that answers these challenges. Liberal Muslims like Aboutaleb, Marcouch and Karacaer became celebrities in the wake of these dramatic events. Rather than representing their communities (as the elite of ethnic corporatism claimed to do), or

celebrating the power of diversity (as the civil consultants had done), they criticized and confronted their own communities. While these migrant politicians embodied and voiced the civil standards set by Dutch core groups, they did not just demand from migrants that they assimilate to these standards. Instead they argued that migrants, according to their own religious standards, should civilize themselves as well as their co-ethnics: good Muslimhood, in this discourse, implies good citizenship. We thus see a civilizing project taking shape after 9/11 and crystallizing after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, with religion and religious institutions being mobilized to incorporate and discipline lower-class migrant youths.

Governance relations in Rotterdam were less volatile. The civil corporations – large, non-profit organizations receiving structural subsidies to provide professional support to civil society associations – did not lose their power over time. State support for the civil corporations catering specifically to minority associations – PBR and SPIOR – did not decline even during the reign of the culturalists of *Leefbaar Rotterdam*. PBR and SPIOR functioned as central nodes within the network of minority associations; they supported the incorporation of all such associations as they were eligible for support irrespective of their political or religious orientations. Civil corporations also encouraged moderation because associations that take up mainstream positions or mobilize through multiple identities receive more support than others. There is also a premium for associations that cater to large constituencies. Since the government uses its ties with civil corporations and civil society associations to reach target groups, corporations and associations are rewarded if they reach large constituencies.

This summary suggests that Amsterdam's governance figurations have been more dynamic. But there was also continuity: the Amsterdam government always tried to shape power relations within civil society. It initially supported radical left-wing associations to marginalize conservative associations. It then sponsored managerial discourses and consultant companies to marginalize radical left-wing associations. Finally it invested in associations and individuals promoting liberal Islam in the hope of marginalizing radical Islamic discourse. These privileged partners furthermore have no incentive to establish constructive relations with other minority associations or to create large constituencies because their positions depend on support from the government, not from minority communities. This is fundamentally different from the governance figuration in Rotterdam, where state support does not depend on the extent to which associations adopt the government's ideas. In contrast to Amsterdam, associations receive professional support to sustain their organizations, not just for activities that address policy priorities. Civil corporations support associations to build

organizational infrastructures, to expand their constituencies and to establish mutual linkages. This is especially important for conservative associations and those with lower-class constituencies as they lack the resources to participate on a level playing field with more established groups. On the basis of these observations, I hypothesized that minority associations in Rotterdam have more power than minority associations in Amsterdam. The remainder of this chapter examines the four dimensions of power that were identified in Chapter 7.

### **Constructive relations**

Civil societies are composed of networks that either segregate or integrate associations. If civil society associations have constructive relations, they become mutually engaged and work together. Conflicts are not necessarily detrimental but weaken civil society if actors invest their energies in projects that ultimately do not materialize or engage in destructive inter-organizational rivalry. What types of relations do we observe among Moroccan and Islamic associations? What mechanisms account for the observed differences?

#### *Relations among Islamic associations*

Cooperation among Islamic associations was much more developed in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. One organization, SPIOR, united Rotterdam's mosque associations and federations. While SPIOR also had internal frictions and not all mosque associations were equally involved, it is remarkable that SPIOR was able to incorporate the more conservative associations. In Amsterdam, in contrast, there were two Moroccan mosque federations and several Turkish federations with few or conflictual relations between them. While UMMON was traditionally dominant among the Moroccan associations, its purported conservatism led to the founding of its rival, UMMAO. Both are weakly organized compared to SPIOR. Of the several Turkish federations in Amsterdam, Diyanat and Milli Gorus were the largest. The government had a close relationship with Milli Gorus, or at least with its liberal leadership. The involvement of the government was in fact so intensive that both the conservative currents within the federation and Dutch culturalists opposed this cooperation, which in the end fell apart (see also Uitermark & Gielen, 2010). The *direct* support of the Amsterdam government for some civil actors, I conclude, had a detrimental effect, both for the civil actors and for the government. The Amsterdam government maintained contacts with select Islamic associations but could not call upon a professional broker with connections to all mosque

associations in Amsterdam. In short, contacts were absent, conflictual or incidental. Islamic associations either worked against or bypassed each other. The *indirect* support of the Rotterdam government, in contrast, helped to create a network of associations that could be accessed through a central node, namely SPIOR.

I suspect that the structure of Rotterdam's governance figuration not only helped to deliver services and increase coordination but also worked against the formation of discursive milieus where radicalism and extremism could flourish. The ties fostered by civil corporatism bind associations together, thereby preventing the sort of insularity in which fundamentalism or extremism can flourish. Anecdotal evidence from Rotterdam suggests that such ties facilitate the early detection of extremism and provide an infrastructure through which uncivil discourses can be quelled before they grow. While numerous commentators have argued that the growing power of anti-Islamic discourses feeds the frustration and anger that fuel radicalism and extremism, I did not find any evidence of this in Rotterdam. Muslims in Rotterdam did not respond to the growing power of *Leefbaar* with violence or radicalism; no networks of Islamic radicals were found in the city. The absence of ties between different types of Islamic associations in Amsterdam might explain why radicalism and extremism are more prevalent in this city, despite the conciliatory discourses of its government. My observations on radicalism and extremism, while not systematic, point in one direction: Rotterdam's governance figuration features more constructive relations and this mitigates radicalism and extremism.

#### *Relations among Moroccan associations*

What was true for Islamic associations also holds true for Moroccan associations. Chapter 8 showed that the institutions of Moroccan representation eroded in Amsterdam in the 1990s and the government discontinued the ethnic councils in 2003. The dismantling of corporatist institutions fit the idea of Amsterdam administrators that the city is made up of individuals, not groups that can be represented through spokespersons or leaders. But especially after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the government no longer stuck to the civil liberalism that it had preached and practiced since adopting its diversity policy. The government desperately wanted the Moroccan community to take responsibility and to organize itself; it approached two of its privileged partners – TANS and the Argan youth center – to initiate a new Moroccan representative body. But the volunteers soon noticed that many Moroccan associations were no longer active or were unable to participate in such strategic projects. As the project evolved, the cleavage between the old elite of the Moroccan Council and the new

elite of civil consultants became apparent; by 2007 the initiators had moved on to other projects. In contrast to Amsterdam, Rotterdam never had a formal body representing Moroccans. The institutions of civil corporatism did not encourage civil society associations to mobilize on the basis of ethnic identity and Moroccan associations (in contrast to Turkish ones) were for a long time disinclined to do so. Nevertheless, a federation of Moroccan associations – SMOR (*Samenwerkende Marokkaanse Organisaties Rotterdam*, Cooperating Moroccan Associations of Rotterdam) – emerged around 2003. The immediate trigger for the associations to come together was concern over the sexual abuse of minors<sup>116</sup> but the federation consolidated over time.

#### *Government interference and constructive inter-associational relations*

How to explain the fact that Islamic and Moroccan associations managed to create viable federations in Rotterdam but not in Amsterdam? Tensions between different associations also existed in Rotterdam: between Berbers and Arabs, between groups with different regional backgrounds, between royalists and dissidents, and between different class fractions. As in Amsterdam, my respondents in Rotterdam often used their interviews to express frustration with other associations and to spread gossip about their leaders and activities. But these tensions did not result in fractures. Such stability and cooperation, I argue, was due to the *lack* of government intervention in Rotterdam. Unlike the Amsterdam government, the Rotterdam government did not actively try to improve the position of some associations *viz-a-viz* others. Such selective support in Amsterdam led to inequalities among associations, making it frustrating and unrewarding for less valued associations to participate. In Rotterdam, there was a more level playing field as minority associations could draw upon an institutional infrastructure that was more autonomous and less subject to government interference. Rotterdam's support of all associations facilitated cooperation between Moroccan and Islamic associations; Amsterdam's direct support for specific initiatives frustrated rather than promoted cooperation.

#### **Access to state resources**

Governance figurations comprise specific distributions of recognition and resources. The previous chapters focused specifically on funds for minority integration and how resources were distributed among civil actors. Which associations had the will and the capacity to compete for the resources available within their governance figurations? I hinted in Chapter 7

that the presence of similar subsidy funds in Amsterdam and Rotterdam allow a natural experiment of civil power in the two cities. Table 12.2 compares the distribution of resources in Amsterdam and Rotterdam: although the criteria for allocating subsidies are virtually identical, the profile of the recipients is very different. The bulk of the resources in Amsterdam (almost 80 per cent) are allocated to civil consultants or associations established by consultants. The pattern in Rotterdam is markedly different: while civil corporations receive the largest share of subsidies (22.8 per cent), the figure remains comparable to those for Moroccan associations (16.1 per cent) and community work associations (19.5 per cent). Civil consultants have a marginal presence (7.4 per cent). This result indicates that Rotterdam's non-profit associations are capable of competing with professional associations. This is sometimes due to their having become quasi-professional associations (with permanent staff and developed bureaucracies), and at other times due to the support they receive from professional organizations (like civil corporations). As one might expect, these different associations also run very different types of projects. In Amsterdam, only 3 out of 24 projects were organized for constituents (rather than target groups). In Rotterdam, 60 out of 149 meetings were organized for constituents (data not shown).

**Table 12.2 Beneficiaries of funds for the promotion of civil initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotterdam**

<i>Type of organization</i>	<i>Rotterdam Mee</i>			<i>Melkpunt goede Ideeën, Amsterdam</i>		
	<i>Number of associations</i>	<i>Subsidy amount (euros)</i>	<i>% Amount of total subsidy</i>	<i>Number of associations</i>	<i>Subsidy amount (euros)</i>	<i>% Amount of total subsidy</i>
Civil corporation	6	68,000	22.8	0	0	0
Community work	9	48,000	16.1	2	35,700	6.0
Civil consultant	3	22,000	7.4	17	464,850	77.7
Migrant association						
Turkish	5	24,000	8.1	0	0	0
Moroccan	7	58,000	19.5	1	15,000	2.5
Mixed	4	10,000	3.4	2	59,000	9.9
Other ethnicities	16	40,000	13.4	1	5,000	0.8
Other types	14	28,000	9.4	1	18,750	3.1
Total	64	298,000	100	24	598,300	100

*Source:* archives Municipality of Rotterdam and Municipality of Amsterdam, data processed by the author

These figures point to some qualitative differences between government-sponsored civil initiatives in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In most of the Amsterdam initiatives, organizers and participants come from different walks of life. The organizers are usually middle or higher-class natives who earn substantial incomes from the activities. The target groups, in contrast, are usually lower-class migrants who are expected to participate voluntarily. While such power differentials between organizers and target groups also exist in Rotterdam, they are less pronounced. Organizers in Rotterdam are often middle or sometimes lower-class migrants and usually receive modest budgets. In Rotterdam, civil society associations that cater to constituents are still able to tap government resources; in Amsterdam, they either do not try or are unsuccessful.

### **Organizing constituents**

The previous sections showed that Rotterdam's minority associations enjoyed more favorable positions within their governance figuration than Amsterdam's minority associations. They received more practical and financial support, had more constructive relations and enjoyed greater security in their positions. Did these favorable conditions increase their capacity to reach and organize constituents? If so, we would expect higher rates of participation in civil society associations in Rotterdam. The data we have on participation are unfortunately not identical: researchers in Rotterdam asked their respondents in 2000 whether they *participate* in associations while researchers in Amsterdam in 1999 asked whether respondents are *members*. The comparison of both cities nevertheless gives an indication of the relative power of co-ethnic and cross-ethnic associations and the differences between the civil participation of Turkish and Moroccan residents. Table 12.3 shows that migrants in Rotterdam more often participate in co-ethnic associations than in cross-ethnic associations. In Amsterdam, membership in co-ethnic associations is much lower. My fieldwork showed that Rotterdam has many co-ethnic associations that cater to lower-class migrants. Examples include guest worker associations that have transformed into neighborhood-based associations and mosque associations that have transformed from purely religious organizations into civil society associations providing a broad range of services. While similar associations exist in Amsterdam, my fieldwork showed that they were weakened by the developments analyzed in Chapter 8: they lost their structural subsidies and suffered from the corrosion of professional support.

**Table 12.3 Membership of Turks and Moroccans in co-ethnic and cross-ethnic civil organizations in Amsterdam, participation in Rotterdam**

	<i>Co-ethnic</i>	<i>Cross-ethnic</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Amsterdam</i>			
Moroccans (N=210)	21	41	49
Turks (N=109)	11	38	45
<i>Rotterdam</i>			
Moroccans (N=544)	55	36	62
Turks (N=640)	47	35	54

*Source:* Tillie (2004, p. 535), Van Londen *et al.* (2007, p. 1212)

It is remarkable that the differences in civil participation between Turks and Moroccans found in Amsterdam were not found in Rotterdam (Van Londen *et al.*, 2007, p. 1212). My fieldwork shows that Moroccan associations in Amsterdam suffered more from the neoliberalization of governance arrangements than the more resilient Turkish associations, which can explain the differences in civil participation between the two groups (Chapter 8). In contrast, Moroccan associations in Rotterdam, as Chapter 11 showed, benefited from structural support and did not suffer the same fate as their Amsterdam counterparts. The findings suggest a causal chain: greater support for co-ethnic associations leads to higher rates of participation within co-ethnic associations, which leads to higher overall rates of membership in civil society associations. Can we extend this chain further and say that the capacity of civil society associations to organize constituents increases their political influence?

### **Political influence**

One of the functions of civil society associations is to disseminate information on politics and to motivate constituents to exercise their formal political rights (Putnam, 1993; Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Stronger civil society associations can be expected to increase political and specifically electoral participation (Michon & Tillie, 2003). Do we indeed find higher electoral participation in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam? Table 12.4 suggests that this is the case.

**Table 12.4 Turn-out at municipal elections among ethnic minorities in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (%)**

	<i>Amsterdam</i>				<i>Rotterdam</i>			
	<i>1994</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2006</i>
Turks	67	39	30	44	28	42	53	47
Moroccans	49	23	22	35	23	33	39	55
Surinamese/Antillians	30	21	26	24	24	25	25	51
Total electorate	57	46	48	51	57	48	55	58

*Source:* Dekker and Fattah, 2006, p. 8

There is one important qualification, however: Amsterdam had much higher turn-out rates in 1994. The most plausible explanation for the low turn-out in Rotterdam is that progressive associations were not so strong and conservative associations were not so interested in Dutch politics in the early 1990s. Rotterdam's left-wing associations were committed to promoting civil engagement and electoral participation but did not enjoy the resources and recognition commanded by their Amsterdam counterparts. In Amsterdam, Chapter 8 showed, left-wing associations were dominant before 1995 and strongly encouraged their communities to vote.<sup>117</sup> Their loss of steam in the 1990s may well explain declining turn-out in Amsterdam after 1994, although historical research would be necessary to assess the strength of this explanation. Another finding that invites further scrutiny is the rise in electoral turnout in Amsterdam in 2006. Chapter 10 suggested that, after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, Amsterdam's government attempted to incorporate previously excluded (conservative) associations. This may have provided residents with the information and motivation to use their voting rights, though further research would again be necessary to verify this claim.

The overall pattern, however, is that after 1994 turn-out rates for Moroccans and Turks are higher in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam. Since the causes of electoral turnout are numerous, it is difficult to quantitatively estimate the impact of the structure of governance figurations or the power of minority associations. Nevertheless, my fieldwork suggests an important mechanism: civil corporations and civil society associations constantly try to intensify civil engagement through courses, debates, meetings and publications. In the run-up to elections, there are countless meetings where politicians present themselves and where associations provide information on candidates and party programs. The available evidence suggests that the causal chain mentioned in the previous section can indeed be extended:

greater support for co-ethnic associations leads to higher participation within co-ethnic associations, which leads to higher overall membership, which leads to higher electoral turnout (see also Michon & Tillie, 2003).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter confirmed the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 7: Rotterdam's minority associations were stronger than those in Amsterdam. They had more constructive relations among themselves, obtained more resources when they competed with other civil actors and had larger constituencies. The communities they served also showed higher rates of electoral participation. The key to explaining these divergent patterns lies in the structure of the governance figuration in the respective cities. In Amsterdam, state support was, as a rule, short-term. It was also conditional upon the capacity of associations to conform to the government's policy agenda; associations received support only when they contributed directly to the realization of policy goals. Since the erosion of ethnic corporatism, the government of Amsterdam has faced a fragmented civil society. In Rotterdam, in contrast, the power of the government was counterbalanced by the civil corporations which supported and connected different types of minority associations. Although the government posed some administrative and procedural demands, it did not restrict support to associations that shared its discourse. The result of these differences, the case studies showed, is that power relations in Amsterdam's civil society were less equal than in Rotterdam. Amsterdam's governance figuration spawned a handful of stars who enjoyed meteoric careers. Rotterdam, in contrast, had a figuration that encouraged long-term, tranquil engagement. The contrast might be grasped through a metaphor: some powerful minority associations in Amsterdam functioned as civil talent shows while many minority associations in Rotterdam functioned like civil schools.

The structure of Rotterdam's governance figuration made it less susceptible to the negative effects that social differences and inequality can have on relations within civil society. Social deprivation is corrosive because civil engagement requires cultural and economic capital. But in Rotterdam, civil corporations helped civil society associations respond to administrative demands, organizational difficulties and public relations challenges. Especially lower-class migrants benefited from these efforts as they gained access to the resources and dispositions that higher-class groups accumulate during their education or in their working environment. Civil corporations also seem to mitigate the extent to which

ideological or ethnic differences result in conflicts and rivalry. It thus seems that Rotterdam achieved by institutional design what Amsterdam's government attempted to accomplish through conciliatory discourse: "keep things together."

## **PART IV**

### 13. Conclusion: the dynamics of power

Up until 1990, the integration of immigrant minorities into Dutch society was the preserve of specialized politicians, academic experts and minority representatives. While the extreme right tried to turn immigration into a wedge issue for electoral politics, the established political parties agreed immigration was a potentially explosive issue that should be depoliticized by taking an accommodating approach. They therefore established, under the rubric of the minorities policy, comprehensive institutions to support minority associations and to incorporate ethnic leaders. While tensions existed, these were largely contained within the policy field.

The calm was shattered in the early 1990s when the parliamentary leader of the right-wing Liberals, Frits Bolkestein, initiated a heated public debate on minority integration. The institutions of the minorities policy, Bolkestein claimed, had not solved but aggravated the problems of integration. Bolkestein did not focus on particular policy measures but argued for an altogether different approach based on the premise that the majority culture of Dutch natives and the minority cultures of immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, were in conflict. A decade later, in 2000, the Social Democratic intellectual Paul Scheffer renewed the public debate with his attack on multiculturalism and his warnings on the purported formation of an ethnic underclass. Since then, voices arguing for enforced integration and against immigration have multiplied and grown louder. These voices speak through a discourse that I have referred to as Culturalism; a set of notions and sentiments that revolve around the idea that our (enlightened, liberal, Dutch, Western) culture should be defended against minority cultures and especially Islam.

In the *lingua franca* of comparative research on integration politics, the Netherlands moved from “multiculturalism” to “assimilationism.” Indeed, restrictions on immigration have tightened and policies have become much more demanding. Nevertheless, the image of a coherent model that moves from one pole (multiculturalism) to another (assimilationism) does not adequately capture the contentious dynamics of integration politics. To think in terms of a shift requires us to overemphasize one particular development at the expense of others. The rise of Culturalism is just one of the more salient developments in Dutch integration politics; it was moreover fiercely contested both in the national debate and in multicultural cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Instead of a simple shift – where one discourse gradually grows more powerful and engulfs the totality of society – there has been a proliferation of

integration politics where different actors push in different directions. To answer the question posed at the outset – How and why did power relations transform in Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006? – we need an approach that can capture the contentious dynamics of power within integration politics. I developed such an approach in Chapter 2, which I summarize in the following section. Subsequent sections summarize the findings of Parts II and III respectively. The chapter then draws more general theoretical conclusions on the transformation of power relations: how can the theoretical framework developed to study this particular case contribute to our general understanding of discursive struggle?; is it possible to abstract from the empirical findings and indicate, at an abstract level, why and how power relations change? The chapter ends with some reflections on the future of integration politics.

### **The struggle to define integration**

To overcome difficulties inherent in extant approaches to integration politics, I drew upon the political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Although Bourdieu is often portrayed as a reproduction theorist, his work provides numerous tools to explain transformations within power relations. Bourdieu shows how actors mobilize particular types of capital in the symbolic struggle to define and redefine standards within their fields. Integration politics takes place in what Bourdieu refers to as the field of power, a space located at the intersection of the public sphere and the state. Within this meta-field, elites from different fields struggle to make their particular interpretations of the general interest universal. The state, too, is a site for struggle among elites who seek to use its institutional apparatus and symbolic force to impose their visions of the social world. While these theoretical pointers aid our understanding of integration politics, I argued that Bourdieu's conception of symbolic power is too static to grasp the nature and dynamics of power. I thus recalibrated Bourdieu's field analysis in two ways.

First, I argued that discourse analysis can help make Bourdieu's field analysis more sensitive to meaning. Bourdieu tends to conceptualize symbols and language as instruments of absolute domination. But to understand contentious politics, and hence integration politics, we need to allow for the possibility that meaning is ambivalent and contested. Exactly what is at issue – is it a clash of civilizations, a new wave of racism, a gradual Islamic take-over, or an expression of collective hysteria? – is subject to struggles between actors who promote different discourses to make sense of minority integration. Second, I argued that figurational analysis can make Bourdieu's field analysis more sensitive to the tactical and strategic aspects

of politics. Drawing upon the work of Norbert Elias, among others, I argued that extending field theory and discourse analysis with network methodologies can help grasp the interactions through which oppositions and alliances are formed. Bourdieu considers interactions or networks among actors as surface phenomena that sociologists should look beyond. However, if we want to account for a case as dynamic and contentious as Dutch integration politics, there is a need to investigate how the interdependencies between actors form and transform. The power of actors is not simply an expression of their capital but also an outcome of the moves they make and the networks they create.

### **The power of Culturalism**

The approach developed in Chapter 2 – a field analysis of civil politics – suggested a number of causes that can account for the rise or decline of a discourse’s power. First, a reconfiguration of relations between different fields can change the rules of the game in integration politics. Second, a discourse’s bases of support may change: when actors amend their opinions or when previously inactive actors start supporting a discourse, the balance of power shifts. The third possible cause of transformation is the making or unmaking of alliances between actors: the power of a discourse depends in part on the extent to which its supporters manage or fail to work together. Part II examined how these three factors influenced the ascendancy of Culturalism.

#### *Dramatization – changing rules of the game*

Interpretative analysis showed that Frits Bolkestein wrested Culturalism from the stigma of racism in 1991. By distinguishing between the (legitimate) differentiation of cultures and the (illegitimate) differentiation of races, he and his supporters dissociated Culturalism from the extreme right. The anti-racist left, culturalists argued, was correct to denounce racism but overzealous in suppressing criticisms of minority cultures; the memory of the Second World War and its exploitation by the far left had made the Dutch sensitive, understanding and tolerant to the extent that they had become incapable of defending the achievements of their own culture. Bolkestein and his supporters thus argued for a process of cognitive and emotional liberation that would extend freedom of legitimate speech to those who suffer the consequences of mass migration and the censorship of political correctness. This new problem, they argued, required honesty and decisiveness – and thus a departure from the political tradition of seeking compromise and consensus (*cf.* Prins, 2004).

This repertoire of contention – to “break the taboo” and to seek confrontation rather than consensus – grew in importance as media outlets sought to bring news with a dramatic edge. Newspapers and other media outlets with roots in the pillarized political past transformed from communication channels for clearly defined constituencies into discursive arenas featuring a wide range of opinions. It is telling that the right-wing Liberal Bolkestein could publish his controversial article in 1991 in the traditionally left-leaning newspaper *De Volkskrant*. While Bolkestein received more negative than positive attention, the opposition he evoked was part of the attraction of his discourse. Whereas politicians previously felt that a controversial topic like minority integration should be treated as soberly as possible, growing media attention played into the hands of culturalists. The rules of pragmatic politics were challenged as the mass media directed attention towards incidents and sentiments rather than statistical averages and technicalities. Two assassinations of prominent culturalists (Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004) further dramatized integration politics and fuelled culturalists’ zeal to promote their discourse. They no longer simply broke taboos but had civil martyrs to honor and a discourse to redeem in the face of threats.

#### *An expanding and diversifying base of support*

It is important to remember that surveys show no significant shifts in public opinion regarding multiculturalism and minority integration during the period under investigation.<sup>118</sup> The question is therefore *not* why “public opinion” shifted or why “the Dutch” opted for Culturalism. The big changes occurred not in the population’s preferences but in the communicative and regulatory institutions where integration politics was carried out, that is, in the civil sphere. We thus have to explain why more civil actors (politicians, academics, journalists, etc.) promoted Culturalism over time and how they managed to attract support. As I showed in Part II, the number and share of culturalists on the opinion pages of the three largest broadsheet newspapers grew substantially between 1990 and 2005. But what is perhaps more important than absolute and proportional growth is the diversification of the actors who supported the discourse. Initially the political right was alone in its outspoken support of Culturalism. Then in 2000, the Social Democratic intellectual Scheffer espoused a civilizing mission to prevent the formation of an ethnic underclass, a variant of Culturalism that appealed to some parts of the left. Around the same time, the leader of the Christian Democrats, Jan-Peter Balkenende, explicitly rejected multiculturalism and argued for the importance of shared – that is, Dutch – norms and values. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn’s spectacular performances and blunt discourse attracted disgruntled and disenfranchised voters. After the

assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, Culturalism gained adherents among philosophers, writers and, most importantly, migrant politicians and intellectuals critical of Islam. By 2005 – the end of the period investigated here – Culturalism could thus count on support from an amazing diversity of previously disparate actors, ranging from laissez-faire liberals to paternalistic Social Democrats and from enlightenment philosophers to anxious lower-class natives. Though they did not have identical views on integration issues, these actors subscribed to the general tenets of Culturalism and shared an antipathy towards the consensual politics that had historically characterized Dutch political culture.

#### *A cohesive coalition*

As remarkable as the diversity of actors supporting Culturalism is the extent to which culturalists from different milieus work together. With the Traag algorithm for community detection, I identified the networks that sustain Culturalism and examined the extent to which they have internal ties and a mutual focus. In spite of its growing diversity, the coalition supporting Culturalism remained cohesive; as the discourse grew in power, its supporters increasingly rallied behind its leaders. The power of Culturalism is therefore not only due to the dramatization of politics and the expansion of its bases of support but also emerges from culturalists' capacity to support each other and to invest their power in icons. The Somali Muslim apostate and right-wing parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali represented the quintessential example of such an icon as she commanded support from a large number and broad range of actors. What is more, the opponents of Culturalism *also* focused on culturalist icons. Rather than promoting their own notions and ideas or rallying around an icon, they defined themselves through their opposition to culturalists. The central culturalists were thus the focal points around which oppositions took shape. In such a figuration, other actors were reduced to critical footnotes in a civil drama in which culturalists played the lead roles.

#### *Limits to the power of Culturalism*

Thus far we have confirmed that Culturalism became more powerful (as we would expect). I have also ventured to explain how and why this came to be. Although I may not have been exhaustive, I identified a number of factors that plausibly contributed to the rise of Culturalism and, just as importantly, a number of factors that most likely did not. The goal, however, was not only to explain the ascendancy of Culturalism but also to probe the limits and effects of its power. Towards this end, Parts II and III investigated four other integration discourses: the Diversity discourse, Anti-racism, Pragmatism and Civil Islam. The first two –

the Diversity discourse and Anti-racism – never had much support to begin with and were further marginalized as Culturalism grew in power. Opposition to Culturalism thus came (mostly) from pragmatists and (increasingly) from the promoters of Civil Islam.

The relationship between Culturalism and Pragmatism is ambiguous. While culturalists have been challenging pragmatist political culture since the early 1990s and managed to seize the initiative in the debate, their success was not really at the expense of pragmatists. The figures and tables in Chapters 5 and 6 graphically illustrated the symbiotic relationship of the two integration discourses: there were shifts in their balance of power, but one discourse did not replace the other. While culturalists criticized pragmatists, they also created windows of opportunity for pragmatists to show their worth. Pragmatists responded with measured calm to the alarmist discourses of culturalists: yes, there are problems, but we need to be careful and strategic (rather than ideological or emotional) if we are to find workable solutions. Culturalism and Pragmatism derive their power from different sources and have their strongholds in different settings but this asymmetry also provides the basis for their balance of power. The complicity of the antagonists (see Bourdieu, 1984a) involves an unspoken and unplanned division of labor: culturalists define a problem and pragmatists then redefine it in such a way that it can be measured and managed. This is apparent in the debate (where pragmatists respond to culturalists), in national policy circles (where pragmatists measure and monitor the processes that culturalists deplore) and in local governance relations (where pragmatists propose measures to cross the divides that culturalists postulate).

The relationship between Culturalism and Civil Islam may at first seem purely antagonistic: promoters of Civil Islam argue that commitment to Islam presupposes good citizenship while culturalists argue the opposite. But the relationship between Culturalism and Civil Islam is not simply that of a zero sum game. The number and share of migrants who mobilized both as Muslims *and* as members of the Dutch civil community grew considerably over the period under investigation. Moreover, the analysis of the debate on the opinion pages showed that the promoters of Civil Islam, such as Ahmed Aboutaleb and Hacı Karacaer, had unusually high approval ratings because they demanded full civil integration from their ethnic and religious communities. Aboutaleb was the first Dutch-Moroccan to become an alderman in Amsterdam and was later appointed as the first Dutch-Moroccan mayor in the Netherlands – and this in Rotterdam, the city of Pim Fortuyn.

#### *Balance and asymmetry*

The resilience of Pragmatism and the emergence of Civil Islam indicate that Culturalism grew

in power but did not crowd out its competitors. In fact, the ascendancy of Culturalism seems to have triggered its own opposition. We may refer to this mechanism as the dialectic of the civil sphere: discursive assaults solicit discursive counter-attacks, which then leads to a balance of power (in the form of polarization or cross-cutting cleavages) or a transcendence of divisions (in the form of a discourse that synthesizes elements from antagonistic discourses). Though it does not guarantee symmetrical power relations, the civil dialectic mitigates against discursive monopolization. The overall picture is thus ambivalent. Yes, Culturalism has become more powerful because its supporters took the initiative and defined the parameters of the debate. Culturalism could enlist support from professional groups and class fractions that were previously inactive. Finally, culturalists supported each other in the debate in spite of their internal diversity. But, no, Culturalism did not become dominant. The analysis of the opinion pages as well as of local governance networks showed that Culturalism is weak in some settings and vehemently opposed in others. Moreover, while the critics of Culturalism were pushed onto the defensive, they were numerous and remained resilient. Finally, Culturalism did not have a discernable effect on opinions as expressed in surveys. Dutch public opinion was never positive towards minorities, multiculturalism or Muslims, but neither did it become more negative – implying that the dynamics of power in the civil sphere neither originated from, nor resulted in, changes in public opinion.<sup>119</sup>

The field analysis of civil politics developed here suggests that the transformations entailed a reconfiguration of power relations among elites. Culturalists turned against the pragmatist culture that had characterized the Dutch civil sphere and forced the elites associated with this culture to defend their positions. But while culturalists both marked and exploited divisions in a proliferating debate, culturalists and pragmatists agreed that governance institutions had to be redesigned to better promote integration. Part III therefore investigated how different discourses impacted on power relations within governance relations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

### **The governance of integration in Amsterdam and Rotterdam**

Part III examined the relationships between the government and minority associations in the Netherlands' two largest cities: Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Minority associations have an ambivalent position in governance figurations as they are confronted with contradictory demands. On the one hand, minority associations were seen as potential obstacles to civil integration. Minorities – culturalists and pragmatists agree – should not retreat into their own

communities but become part of the Dutch civil community; they should speak as Dutch citizens, not as people whose loyalties are primarily ethnic or religious. On the other hand, minority communities were expected to take responsibility for solving their integration problems, and for this they need to organize themselves and speak out in public debates as Muslims, Moroccans or Turks. The case studies focused on the force field where these contradictory demands play out: the interface between the elected government, civil society and the media. Part III examined the distribution of resources and recognition within governance figurations and attempted to explain continuity or change within power relations.

Like power relations within debates, power relations within governance figurations were transformed by alterations in the rules of the game, changes in discourses' support bases and the (un)making of alliances. The rules of the game in local politics were heavily affected by mediatization and neoliberalization. Mediatization affected power relations as some actors were better able than others to present themselves as a force for civil repair. People like Haci Karacaer and Ahmed Aboutaleb derived power from their position in the national debate and could claim central positions within local governance figurations. Neoliberalization – the process through which market mechanisms are brought to bear upon society and the state – altered the rules of the game to the advantage of a new class of consultants who combined civil engagement with professional competence. Drastic changes also occurred within the support base of different civil actors: the guest worker associations experienced a contraction in their base of support while the pool of potential supporters for Islamic associations and associations with higher-class constituencies grew. Finally, both cities experienced drastic changes as alliances were made and remade. The oppositions that minority associations had imported from their country of origin (between dissidents and loyalists, for example) grew weaker over time, while new divisions emerged (for example, around the question of whether it was necessary to work with the government or to protest against its policies).

However, these different developments did not occur to the same extent or in the same way in both cities. Discourses indeed impacted on power relations, but in surprising ways. At first sight, Amsterdam and Rotterdam represent opposite poles in integration politics. In the municipal elections of 2002, Pim Fortuyn's party achieved a resounding electoral victory in Rotterdam while Amsterdam remained under the control of the Labor Party. Rotterdam became a laboratory for Culturalism; Amsterdam remained a bastion of Pragmatism. On the basis of the discourses of the two city governments, one would expect minority associations to be marginalized in Rotterdam and incorporated in Amsterdam. However, Chapter 2 argued that the power and effects of discourses cannot be understood without paying due attention to

the interdependencies among actors. The structure of these interdependencies explains why we encountered the opposite of what these governments' discourses would lead us to expect.<sup>120</sup>

In Amsterdam, the government reinforced transformations of power through its support of ascendant actors. When left-wing associations were strong in the 1980s, the government supported these, and only these, associations. When consultants and professionals gained ground in the policy field in the 1990s, the government recognized and rewarded these actors at the expense of others. After 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the government recognized and rewarded liberal Muslims. In each of these episodes, state resources helped the government's privileged partners to marginalize their opponents. First the left-wing associations stymied the conservative associations, then the diversity managers marginalized left-wing associations, and finally liberal Muslims criticized other Muslims for failing to show civil commitment. While Amsterdam has a reputation for embracing minority associations, it in fact supported associations selectively and conditionally. Because the government posed relatively stringent administrative demands and demanded conformity to its policy discourse, associations catering to lower-class and conservative constituencies were marginalized within governance figurations. Only professional and liberal associations won resources and recognition.

Rotterdam, in contrast, provided indiscriminate and unconditional support to civil society associations through its civil corporations: non-profit organizations that receive structural subsidies to support and connect a large number of civil society associations. The two civil corporations most relevant to our case – PBR and SPIOR – have remained resilient since their inception (in 1981 and 1988 respectively). While it is hardly surprising that institutions persist, it is remarkable that governance relations proved more stable in the volatile political context of Rotterdam. The comparison identified the specific structure of Rotterdam's governance figuration – referred to as civil corporatism – as the key to explaining this difference. This structure performed a crucial role in balancing power relations among minority associations and in reducing the volatility of civil politics. Civil corporations balanced power relations between conservative and progressive associations because, unlike in Amsterdam, they ensured that each association, regardless of its identity or discourse, received professional support and access to larger associational networks. Civil corporations also balanced power relations between associations catering to lower-class groups and those catering to middle or higher-class groups. Since professional support (partially) compensated for the lack of cultural or economic capital, the disadvantages experienced by associations

with lower-class constituents was muted. Finally, civil corporations reduced volatility because the government did not directly privilege one type of civil society association: associations dwindled or flourished with changes in their constituencies but the kind of elite displacement evident in Amsterdam did not take place in Rotterdam.

The case studies of Amsterdam and Rotterdam showed that government discourses can indeed be influential but only under specific conditions. Even small discursive shifts in Amsterdam immediately influenced the distribution of rewards and recognition because the government could immediately act upon its new preferences. In Rotterdam, in contrast, governance relations were resilient even after the culturalists of *Leefbaar Rotterdam* took office. The stability and relative autonomy of Rotterdam's civil society enabled it to function as a countervailing power *to* the government while the volatility and dependency of Amsterdam's civil society turned it into a front line *of* the government. The comparative chapter showed that Rotterdam's minority associations had more constructive inter-associational relations, acquired more state resources to undertake civil projects and, most probably, organized more constituents and stimulated higher levels of electoral participation. In short, Rotterdam's minority associations were more powerful than those in Amsterdam.

### **Theoretical ramifications**

The primary objective of this study was to map the dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics. Towards this end, I had to engage a number of problems that have relevance beyond the case at hand. In this section, I first consider some methodological and conceptual issues. I then identify patterns found in Dutch integration politics which may exemplify more universal patterns of conflict and contestation. Finally, I draw some conclusions on the role of government and civil society in fostering civil engagement.

#### *A general framework for studying specific power relations*

The framework developed in Chapter 2 was designed to conceptually unpack and empirically investigate power relations in Dutch integration politics but it could, with some modification, be used to study the discursive and institutional politics around issues as diverse as welfare state restructuring, terrorism and financial regulation. For instance, were the conceptual framework applied to the politics of financial regulation, we could compare the strength of various discourses on financial regulation in different time periods, both in the very long run and immediately before and after the economic crisis of 2008. Analogous to the analysis of

the integration debate in Part II, we could ask if promoters of stringent financial regulation cluster together in a powerful discursive coalition or if they are marginal and divided. Analogous to the analysis of governance relations in Part III, it would be possible to examine the allocation of recognition (such as positions in administrations or on advisory boards) and resources (such as bail-outs). While commentators and scholars have wittingly or unwittingly suggested explanations for transformations in this and other fields, the approach developed here allows us to formulate specific hypotheses about transformations in discursive power relations, to survey their impact on governance relations and to develop conjunctural explanations for specific developments. In this sense, this study is a challenge to become more precise and empirical before arriving at conclusions on the “dominance,” “hegemony,” “demise,” “bankruptcy” or “emergence” of one or another discourse, policy approach, framework or ideology.

*Particular case, universal pattern?*

Although this study emphasized the need for conjunctural explanations that take account of the contexts in which conflicts play out, it is interesting to examine whether the patterns found in this study can also be found elsewhere. There is reason to believe that this is the case. For instance, the finding that a few actors concentrate the bulk of references in the Dutch integration debate seems to suggest that the distribution of attention in debates follows a so-called power-law distribution that also typifies distributions as diverse as city size or the page views of websites<sup>121</sup> (cf. Barabási and Albert, 1999; Barabási, 2009; see also Collins, 1998). Another example of a pattern in the Dutch integration debate that can be found elsewhere is the recurrent opposition between, on the one hand, a small and cohesive cluster with strong leaders and, on the other hand, a diffuse cluster without strong leaders: a figuration reminiscent of the one Elias and Scotson found in the English suburb of Winston Parva in the 1950s (Elias and Scotson, 1994). Such similarities encourage exploring whether there are mechanisms at work that produce similar oppositions across widely different contexts (Elias, 1994a). Could the particular relations that we found in the Dutch case signal a more universal *figurational dynamic of discursive transformation*? To answer this question, let’s see how we can describe the Dutch case if we (literally) bracket the particularities.

Discursive transformations start with a challenge: one actor or small group of actors (Bolkestein, Scheffer, Hirsi Ali, and the groups around them) seek to challenge established routines and power relations through dramatic appeals to the public. Unlike the challengers, the “established order” does not really have a face or even coherence. It responds wherever it

is challenged but not through a coordinated strategy or under the guidance of a charismatic leader. The passion and motivation of the challengers – sustained through dense networks and channeled through iconic leaders – pushes established actors onto the defensive as the habits and routines that underwrite their power are questioned. This pattern has the same network properties as Elias’ established-outsider figuration but with an important difference: the interactions among the established (in this case, ministers and other guardians of the policy field) form a network pattern that Elias associates with outsiders (sparse networks). The challengers, in contrast, exhibit a network pattern that Elias associates with the established (dense networks). What we have here is a variation of the established-outsider figuration, which we could refer to as the challenger-established figuration.

The challenger-established figuration (observed in the case of the Dutch integration debate) emerges from two mechanisms. The first is the formation of a network of previously disparate actors willing to support leaders who challenge established interests and the rules of the game. The initial burst into the civil sphere pulls in previously inactive people who rally behind leaders who come to stand for change. The second mechanism is that the established respond to the challenge but do so without coordination or leadership. The result of these two mechanisms is the figuration that recurred at several points in this study<sup>122</sup> – a cluster with few members but with discursive leaders, relatively strong networks and high centrality, amidst a number of clusters with many members but without discursive leaders, with relatively sparse networks and with relatively low centrality. These different network patterns correspond to different emotions and discourses. The challengers identify and criticize orthodoxies and do so with passion.<sup>123</sup> Having experienced cognitive liberation, they rally for change. The challenged, in contrast, respond in a rather *ad hoc* manner. They are more likely to resist particular claims than to offer a comprehensive counter-discourse.

Describing the Dutch case in these general terms makes it easier to explore parallels with other cases of political transformation. Perhaps we can push the argument even further and hypothesize that these figurations do not only emerge in political struggles but also in other forms of competition. Innovations in the artistic or academic fields, for instance, also seem to create a challenger-established figuration: a handful of actors disrupt the field through the postulation of a new division, their names become attached to a particular current (the surrealists, the post-structuralists, etc.) or theory (of evolution, of relativity) and develop an antagonistic relation to a diffuse opposition (*cf.* Kuhn, 1962). Similarly, in the business world, ascendant actors can put their stamp on the market if they manage to hoard certain benefits, such as a new technology, in restricted networks. Google and its partners provide one example

of a cluster of companies that, through its strong networks and strong leader (namely Google), could challenge all established actors in the field, setting into motion numerous yet disparate responses to block its ascendancy.

I construct these arguments on the basis of only one case study but the goal here is less to come to definitive conclusions than to point to directions for future research on the dynamics of power. Future research can systematically investigate whether the challenger-established figuration can indeed be found in the transitions brought about by actors as diverse as culturalists, Darwin, Google, etc. If we can develop a more parsimonious vocabulary, it becomes possible to properly design comparative research and to highlight differences and parallels across different fields and cases. My primary goal here was not to develop such a vocabulary but the results suggest that this is a promising line of enquiry.

#### *The government, civil society and civil engagement*

As I indicated in Chapter 7, I originally expected strong correspondence between policy discourses and state institutions and thus anticipated that the government of Rotterdam would pursue much stricter policies than the government of Amsterdam. In practice, however, measures and policies towards minority associations were stricter and less generous in Amsterdam. Above I provided some possible explanations for these remarkable findings. Here I want to explore some of the theoretical and political implications.

The findings first of all represent a warning to analysts of integration philosophies (see also Favell, 1998). There is a huge literature that critically interrogates the assumptions of culturalist, multiculturalist, assimilationist or other integration philosophies. For instance, both left and right-leaning commentators have criticized multiculturalism for its alleged tendency to overemphasize the cultural differences between groups and to underemphasize the differences within them. The empirical findings presented here, however, suggest that it can be deceptive to analyze discourses in isolation from the relations of power in which they are conceived. For instance, the diversity discourse of the Amsterdam government followed the insights of progressive scholarship to the letter; it was careful not to reify cultural processes or to essentialize identities and did not associate alterity with dangers or deficiencies (Uitermark *et al.*, 2005). For these reasons, the philosopher Seyla Benhabib applauds the Amsterdam government for making the shift from the minorities policy to the diversity policy (Benhabib, 2002). However, the minorities policy did not, as critics of multiculturalism would lead us to expect, benefit the most conservative groups within minority communities. These findings suggest that we need to move away from the scholastic

assumption that discourses should be measured according to scientific or philosophical standards (*cf.* Bourdieu, 2000). This does not mean that we abandon judgment but that we should evaluate philosophies of integration not as ideological templates but as discourses that are strategically mobilized within, and transform, relations of power in particular settings.

Second, these findings are relevant to theories and contemporary policy debates on civil society. Since De Tocqueville's classic study of civil life in the United States of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (de Tocqueville, 1835), commentators have often conceived of civil society as a space where the state is absent. The state, it is assumed, smothers civil initiative and creates dependent subjects rather than autonomous citizens. On the basis of her research on civil integration in Canada and the United States, Irene Bloemraad contradicts the idea that the absence of the state creates space for spontaneous initiatives (Bloemraad, 2005, 2006). She suggests that state support enabled minority associations in Canada to build an extensive organizational infrastructure and that the state's recognition of minorities created symbolic incentives for migrants to participate in their new country. My comparison of Amsterdam and Rotterdam confirms and qualifies this argument. The comparative chapter showed that it is likely that structural support for civil corporations in Rotterdam: (1) promoted cooperation among civil society associations, (2) fostered civil and political participation, (3) muted the negative effects of deprivation on civil engagement, and (4) attenuated extremism and radicalism. If these four criteria of a vibrant civil society are accepted, the verdict is that Rotterdam performed much better than Amsterdam, even though conventional wisdom suggests that Amsterdam had more conducive conditions for civil engagement (Fainstein, 2000, 2005; Soja, 1996; Gilderbloom, 2008). In Rotterdam, structural support for civil corporations created the conditions in which migrants, including deprived migrants, could participate in civil politics. Since civil politics requires skills and resources, professional support from state-funded civil corporations helped to overcome the problems experienced by newcomers and lower-class groups in pursuing a shared objective. However, state support is not *necessarily* beneficial for the development of civil society. If the government intervenes directly in civil society, the chapters on Amsterdam suggested, both weak and strong associations may lose their roles as organizers and intermediaries. If they have to compete for resources and recognition with stronger associations, the weakest associations will be further disadvantaged; the more successful associations may secure their position in governance networks but it is likely that this will be at the cost of losing contact with their base. Rather than building a large base and differentiated networks, they transform – partially or completely – into commercial organizations that care more for clients than constituents.

These findings are politically relevant at a time when governments everywhere are tightening their criteria for subsidizing associations. While policies to promote civil engagement and citizenship are proliferating in the Netherlands and elsewhere, these rarely aim to strengthen the institutional tissue of civil society. If subsidies are considered legitimate at all, there are strict conditions and definitive time limits. Lenin's slogan "trust is good but control is better" has become the motto of today's governments. Governments and commentators alike nowadays balk at the idea of indiscriminate and unconditional support for civil society associations, for this supposedly breeds insolence and dependence. But the findings in this study suggest something quite different: civil society associations in Rotterdam were critical and vibrant *because of* the indiscriminate and unconditional support they received.

## Epilogue

What makes Dutch integration politics so complicated is that there was never strong support for multiculturalism or anti-racism. Activists and intellectuals in the 1970s argued against racism and for minority rights but lost steam as their ideas were enshrined into policy and law. After the inception of the minorities policy in 1983, minority integration increasingly became a matter for administrators and specialists, not for activists or ideologues. The technocratization of minority integration reached its climax during the reign of the purple government, which lumped together all lower-class migrants into one giant target group (*allochtonen*). While *allochtonen* were supposed to integrate and become responsible citizens, civil integration was narrowly and dispassionately operationalized as the position of minority groups on various negative lists: unemployment, crime, educational failures and language problems. Although policy memorandums and administrators occasionally alluded to ideals of multicultural harmony, integration was regarded first and foremost as a practical affair to be handled with prudence and discretion.

For culturalists, integration was never simply a policy matter. In the early 1990s, Frits Bolkestein framed the presence of minorities and specifically Muslims as a threat to the integrity of the civil sphere. The power of this discourse was evidenced by Bolkestein's centrality in the debate; he was so central that it was almost impossible to speak of integration without speaking of Bolkestein. Even his opponents had to refer to his discourse, thereby helping to disseminate it. But some of Bolkestein's opponents also *wanted* to give him space. They made every effort to distinguish Bolkestein from the extreme right and often praised

him for opening up the debate on integration. Much has changed since then: integration politics has further proliferated, Culturalism has grown into a full-blown discursive movement and new leaders have emerged. But there have also been continuities. Throughout the period under investigation, culturalists were at the center of the debate, had relatively dense networks and were more likely to support discursive leaders. Although systematic data collection for this study ended just after Geert Wilders established his Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV), he is only the most recent and radical culturalist to dominate the debate, to lead a movement and to face a diffuse opposition.

That no powerful discourse has yet been able to counter the culturalists from Bolkestein to Wilders signals a discursive and ideological vacuum. The opponents of Culturalism are conserving what already exists rather than promoting a positive new vision of multicultural society. In a way, culturalists resemble the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s in that they use powerful symbolism to challenge inert institutions. And it remains doubtful whether a powerful integration discourse would make the pendulum swing in the other direction. What characterized the progressive movements of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the culturalist movement of the 1990s and 2000s is that they united previously disparate groups behind a shared agenda: their discourses united different class fractions and channeled their anxieties and aspirations. Unlike the progressive social movements, however, Culturalism in a very basic sense is a conservative and reactionary discourse: it seeks to curb threats through the demarcation of boundaries and the exercise of discipline. And as has undoubtedly become clear from my choice of words, I feel that there is an urgent need to foster new coalitions around discourses that do not rely on fear and force. That, however, is a task beyond the political sociology of integration politics that I have attempted here.

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## Appendix 1. Assigning codes to articles

The articles in the database were assigned to five different discursive categories: Culturalism, Anti-racism, the Diversity discourse, Civil Islam and Pragmatism. The distinction between these different discourses is, of course, to some extent arbitrary. Some articles contain elements from two or more discourses while others do not neatly fit any of the categories. However, through test sessions and adjustments in the codes' descriptions, it was possible to generate sufficient levels of inter-coder reliability. Here I present the discursive categories that were used and then elaborate on the coding process.

Several other researchers identified “new realism” or “culturism” as a dominant integration discourse (see Chapter 1). I speak of Culturalism and define it as follows:

*Culturalism* is an integration discourse based on the idea that cultural differences are readily identifiable and have great explanatory relevance in analyzing integration issues. Since some (Dutch, Western) cultural practices are more valuable than others, public debate should focus on the moral evaluation of cultures, while public policy should strictly manage the integration of particular migrant groups to ensure that they do not reproduce or cultivate undesirable cultural norms and values. Culturalists emphasize that there is an urgent need to discuss integration problems but feel political correctness and cultural relativism stand in the way of an open and honest debate.

Culturalism is partly defined in antagonistic relationship to Anti-racism. While some actors self-identify as anti-racists, I decided to use a broader definition that includes statements that are in line with Anti-racism. I thus arrived at the following definition:

*Anti-racism* is an integration discourse based on the idea that migrants suffer from structural symbolic violence. It is dangerous and reprehensible to say that some cultures are better than others as this is a variant of racism and legitimates policy that discriminates against certain groups of migrants. Public debate should focus on the identification of symbolic violence against migrants and provide space for migrants to speak out for themselves. Public policies should help protect migrants from discrimination and compensate them for the disadvantages they suffer due to stigmatization and economic marginalization.

Culturalists also oppose multiculturalism. But as no actors in Dutch integration politics self-identify as multiculturalists, I do not include this category. Nevertheless, the Diversity discourse promoted by some local governments, civil society associations and companies resembles multiculturalism in that its supporters emphasize diversity is essentially a good thing. Religious or ethnic differences should be considered alongside differences of gender, sexuality, age or ability. All these differences can cause problems if they are not recognized but can be advantageous if properly managed. As Chapter 9 shows, these ideas found their way into policy in the second half of the 1990s. The Diversity discourse is defined as follows:

The *Diversity* discourse evaluates cultural diversity positively and wants to identify and capitalize upon the potential inherent in a diverse society. Identification of integration problems may be warranted but public debates should focus on the positive qualities of a multicultural society and how to further develop these qualities. Migrants should be seen as individuals with (bicultural) identities that provide them with extra knowledge and capacities that help them valorize possibilities in an increasingly diverse society. It may be necessary to select migrants as they do not all bring the same qualities but migration itself is a natural and positive process in a globalizing world.

Note that this discourse, or at least its implementation into policy, is fairly recent. A different and older understanding emphasizes that diversity does not *necessarily* lead to conflict but often creates problems of communication and management. This is the discourse that characterized first the minorities policy and later the integration policy. Although there were differences between the two policies, both were based on the idea that ethnic diversity can create problems if it intersects with economic inequality, political exclusion and social isolation. The task for policy-makers is to prevent this process of minority formation (Van Amersfoort, 1974) by creating linkages between minorities and the majority. I refer to this discourse as Pragmatism and define it as follows:

*Pragmatism* is an integration discourse that recognizes cultural differences but considers these differences as complex and of limited explanatory relevance in analyzing integration issues. It is therefore problematic to say that some cultures are better than others; focusing on differences may actually reinforce integration problems. Public debate should focus on local and sectoral problems so that comprehensive policies can be designed to overcome cultural differences and prevent polarization. Pragmatists

emphasize that integration problems are not just cultural but also socio-economic and institutional. They argue that a range of measures are needed to prevent integration problems from spiraling out of control.

Some currents within Culturalism identify an opposition between the West and Islam. In response, a number of authors have tried to transcend this binary and have called upon Muslims to act as responsible members of the civil community; the main text provides a number of examples. I refer to this discourse as Civil Islam and define it as follows:

*Civil Islam* is an integration discourse based on the idea that Islamic and civil commitment can and should go hand in hand. Cultural problems are readily identifiable and have considerable explanatory relevance for analyzing integration issues. But contrary to Culturalism, religion – properly understood – can and does provide solutions as it demands civil behavior from Muslims. Muslims should be assertive in public debate and clearly state what they do or do not consider civil behavior. Public policy should manage the integration of migrant groups because this is necessary to help migrants emancipate as Muslim citizens.

Next to Civil Islam, I initially also distinguished Islamism, defined as a discourse based on the idea that Western societies should be subjected to the rules of the Quran. Actors promoting such a discourse appear in the news quite frequently but not on the opinion pages; only one article in the corpus was an interview with a Muslim who explicitly argued that sharia laws should be implemented in the Netherlands (albeit in modified form, as shariacracy).

As is clear from the descriptions of these discourses, it is conceivable that articles do not neatly fall under one or the other category. Articles very often include elements from different discourses, while many articles do not really promote any particular civil discourse. For these reasons, I included three codes for articles that could not be placed into one of the five discursive categories: “combination” (when actors draw upon two or more of the previous discourses), “multiple viewpoints” (when one article features at least two actors with divergent viewpoints, as happens in interviews where two viewpoints are articulated in opposition) and “unclear” (a residual category). The complete list is as follows:

1. Culturalism
2. Pragmatism

3. Civil Islam
4. Anti-racism
5. Diversity
6. Islamism
7. Combination
8. Multiple viewpoints
9. Unclear

Three research assistants helped to code the articles. One was only involved in the early stage of the coding process; the two others were involved in the entire process. With different combinations of coders, we tested whether and how we could reach agreement on specific articles and sets of articles. We found that only between 30 and 40 per cent of the articles were straightforward in the sense that all four coders assigned the same code. This is hardly surprising as discourses are defined in relation to each other while many authors try to formulate unique viewpoints. But it did pose methodological problems.

Apart from discussing interpretations, refining and expanding the codebook was another way to tackle these problems. The brief descriptions of different discourses were expanded and examples were included to indicate how coders should proceed when articles contained elements of two or more discourses. Around two hundred articles were coded during test sessions. The two principal coders coded the remaining articles. After they had done their work, I took a sample of articles to test whether they had assigned the same codes as I had. This was the case for respectively 71 and 74 per cent of the articles. This is a reasonable score but slightly lower than the  $r$  of 0.8 that is commonly used. I therefore tried to find out if some codes were more problematic than others.

It turned out that a fairly large proportion of the inter-coder disagreement resulted from codes 7 (combination) and 9 (unclear). If these two codes are excluded from the analysis, an inter-coder agreement of respectively 78 and 85 per cent was reached. I thus decided to only use those codes for which there was sufficient agreement, i.e. codes 1-6 and 8. For the remaining articles (those assigned codes 7 and 9) I did not accept the assigned codes. I reread these articles and tried to assign them to codes 1-6 or 8. If the articles did not fit any of these categories, I assigned code 9. There was no disagreement over Code 6 (Islamism) but since this category contained only one article, I also assigned this to the residual category.

To improve the validity of the results, I searched for systematic bias for codes 1-6 that would explain inter-coder disagreement. I usually found none. For instance, I would

sometimes assign a code 3 to an article that a coder had categorized as 2, but at other times it was the other way around; the disagreements were unlikely to change the outcome of the analysis as they seemed random. There were two exceptions. One coder – the one with whom I had a 78 per cent agreement after the exclusion of codes 7 and 9 – often assigned code 5. He assigned this code to all authors promoting state pluralism, even if they also identified a number of migration-related problems. I changed the code to 2, 3 or 9 depending on the emphasis of the article. A second exception is that I more often assigned code 4. I “saw” more anti-racist articles than both coders did: in several cases I had assigned code 4 to authors who spoke out against stereotyping or sensationalism without using words like discrimination, racism or stigmatization. I accepted the coders’ results and included in the codebook the remark that an article would not be categorized as anti-racist (discourse 4) if it communicated one or more of the following messages: integration comes from two sides (discourse 2), there are mutual prejudices (discourses 2 or 3), integration problems result at least in part from cultural differences (discourses 1, 2 or 3), integration can succeed if careful and comprehensive policies are implemented (discourse 2), differences should be seen as opportunities rather than threats (discourse 5). With this elaboration, I revisited all the articles that had been coded as anti-racist.

The labels for the discourses are to some extent arbitrary but I wish to comment on my reasons for using the label “Civil Islam.” I prefer this label to the common notions of “moderate” or “liberal” Islam. By Civil Islam I mean an interpretation and practice of Islam that confirms and meets norms generated in the civil sphere. This implies that there is no single definition of Civil Islam as it is contextually defined. In the Netherlands, Civil Islam implies acknowledgment of the equality between men and women, tolerance of homosexuality, active participation in political processes, unqualified refutation of illegal behavior (especially terrorism), a contextual (i.e. not absolutist) interpretation of religious texts and an understanding attitude towards criticisms of Muslims. Clearly, these features reflect the values of Dutch core groups. In Turkey, to give a contrasting example, Civil Islam would have different features. For instance, compatibility with nationalism could well be a yardstick for civil value while tolerance for homosexuality would not.



## **Appendix 2. Assigning codes to relations between actors**

To map relations among actors in the integration debate, the corpus was coded with the computer program MaxQda for text analysis. Student assistants were assigned the names of 134 opinion-makers. These names were selected according to a process of trial and error. An initial list of 20 opinion-makers whom I expected to feature prominently was expanded with names encountered during the course of research. For instance, it became apparent during the initial coding sessions that administrators (like ministers) featured more prominently than I expected; I therefore decided to include all ministers with responsibility for integration issues during the period under investigation (1990-2005). The references of the 134 pre-selected actors to other, non-selected players were also coded. For instance, the sociologist Bram de Swaan was not included in the list of opinion-makers but his references to pre-selected actors are coded, as are references of pre-selected actors to him. References of non-selected actors to non-selected actors are not included. Note that this method leads to the neglect of actors with little resonance; we can get an idea of the relations of central figures and the actors with whom they are related, but not of all actors within the debate.

Apart from the direction (passive or active), references are distinguished according to their nature (positive, negative and neutral). In many cases, it is difficult to decide whether a remark is “negative,” “neutral” or “positive.” For instance, the phrase “Bolkestein opened the discussion” can be read as a factual statement, as an accusation (when the author feels that the topic is inappropriate for public debate) or as a mark of approval (when the author welcomes public debate on this topic). The position of the author usually becomes clear in the course of the article. In this case, a score of “neutral” would be attributed to Bolkestein’s remark while subsequent quotes that reveal the position of the author would be coded separately. There are many other examples of ambivalent fragments. Irony is quite frequent and sometimes a remark can simultaneously convey a negative and a positive judgment. As a rule, negative and positive codes are assigned only where references are unambiguous.

In total, 1,111 names feature in the analysis, of which 977 were not pre-selected. Most are natural persons but the list also includes institutional actors, like political parties and research institutes. Abstract entities like “Muslims,” “multiculturalists” or “the Dutch” are not included. References that do not specifically refer to a person but to an event associated with that person are also not coded (for instance, “since the murder of Theo van Gogh...” or “The Gumus issue...”). The total number of coded fragments is 5,397. I checked all the codes of assistants to filter out duplicates and to establish whether the direction (positive, negative,

neutral) had been attributed correctly and consistently. The codes were assigned in MaxQda, registered in Excel and subsequently exported to R, a software environment for statistical analysis. Vincent Traag processed the data in R as part of a collaborative project (see Uitermark *et al.*, 2009).

**Appendix 3. Graphs of positive and negative interactions in the integration debate in the period 1995-1999 and between 11 September 2001 and Fortuyn’s assassination (6 May 2002)**




Figure A3.1 Visualization of positive and negative interactions in the period between the national elections of 1994 and the publication of Paul Scheffer’s “The multicultural drama” (January 2000). Red lines represent publication negative references, black lines represent positive references.




Figure A3.2 Visualization of positive and negative interactions in the period between 9/11 and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (6 May 2002). Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.

## Summary

Movements for cultural protectionism have proliferated in recent years throughout Europe and many other parts of the world. The Netherlands is often considered an exemplary case of a country where multiculturalism has been abandoned in favor of policies that demand and enforce integration. Parties on the left reluctantly accede that immigration causes problems, while right-wing parties adamantly argue that liberal democracies have been too soft, too accommodating, too understanding. I refer to these notions as *Culturalism*, a discourse organized around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and that our (enlightened, liberal, Dutch) culture should be defended against the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideologies. This dissertation examines the growing power of culturalist discourse in public debates and its effects on the governance of minority integration. The dissertation's central question is: *How and why did power relations transform in Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006?* The study first elaborates, in Part I, an approach for analyzing dynamic power relations. The main question is then divided into two parts. Part II focuses on the integration *debate*. Part III investigates the *governance* of integration. Part IV draws together the main findings, answers the research question and explores the study's relevance beyond Dutch integration politics.

### **Part I: Theoretical framework and research question**

Part I discusses previous research on integration politics and introduces the research question. Below the trivial observation that culturalist discourse has grown stronger, *Chapter 1* argues, lurk a number of intriguing methodological and theoretical issues. What is integration politics? What is a discourse? What do we mean by power? And how to explain dynamics of power? *Chapter 2* tackles these questions. It presents a framework for analyzing and explaining transformations within power relations. Drawing on a number of sources – including Bourdieu's field analysis, Alexander's analysis of the civil sphere, Elias' figurational sociology, discourse analysis and network analysis – I develop a relational approach to study integration politics. I view integration politics as a series of struggles within the civil sphere. The stake in these struggles is civil power: the power to define who belongs to the civil community and what its problems are. The approach investigates where particular discourses garner support or encounter opposition. While this research strategy does not

preclude the possibility that one or another discourse will be identified as “dominant,” it does invite us to detail when, where, how, to what extent, and to what effect discourses are powerful. The approach is designed to detect power differentials but to simultaneously alert us to the ambivalence and limitations of domination.

## **Part II: Dynamics of power in the public debate**

Part II addresses power relations in the public debate on integration. It focuses in particular on opinion articles published in the broadsheet newspapers *NRC Handelsblad*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw*. *Chapter 3* presents the methods used to investigate power within the debate, including discourse analysis, correspondence analysis, network analysis and in-depth interviews. The chapter recasts familiar concepts in political science and political sociology – polarization, leadership, cooperation, power – in relational terms. *Chapter 4* traces the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere. It argues that the contradictions within the minority policy (conceived in 1979 and implemented in 1983) created the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a radical alternative to the pragmatic politics that had characterized integration politics up to 1990.

*Chapter 5* analyses the emergence of Culturalism. Culturalism cannot be understood as a “Dutch discourse.” The promoters of Culturalism, in fact, sought to redefine the Netherlands and transform its political culture. The chapter shows that Culturalism is a discourse of ascendant elites who challenged the pragmatic political culture and its dignitaries. *Chapter 6* analyses the responses to the rise of Culturalism. The chapter shows that some discourses – notably Anti-racism – were marginalized in the course of time. However, other discourses did not have a zero sum relation to Culturalism. Supporters of Pragmatism – a discourse which emphasizes that differences are real and consequential yet can be overcome with reasonableness and through dialogue – lost some terrain in the debate but consolidated their power in policy circles. Supporters of Civil Islam – a discourse which emphasizes that a commitment to Islam allows or even demands civil loyalty – actually won in power.

While emphasizing that discursive struggles are not zero-sum games, *Part II* identifies three causes of the growing power of Culturalism. First, culturalists’ style – particularly the repertoire of breaking taboos – was increasingly valued as integration politics mediatized; their emotive and hard-hitting discourse easily found its way into the central settings of the civil sphere and achieved much higher resonance than the discourse of their opponents.

Second, the range of actors supporting Culturalism widened (a widening that appears more significant than the considerable growth in the number of actors promoting the discourse). Third, and perhaps most remarkable, culturalists cooperated with one another and rallied around their leaders, such as Paul Scheffer and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The opponents of Culturalism were numerous but they provided neither mutual support nor rallied around leaders.

### **Part III: Dynamics of power in local governance**

Part III addresses power relations in the *governance* of integration. While Part II charts changes in discursive power relations in the national debate, Part III examines how these changes were translated into local strategies for managing minority integration, focusing in particular on the relations between governments and minority associations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. *Chapter 7* presents the methods for investigating power within governance relations, including in-depth interviews and the analysis of subsidy relations. *Chapters 8-10* investigate the various shifts in Amsterdam's governance figurations. Notwithstanding these shifts, there was also continuity: the Amsterdam government always tried to shape power relations within civil society. Between 1980 and 1995, it supported radical left-wing associations in order to marginalize conservative associations. Between 1995 and 2001, it sponsored managerial discourses and consultant companies in order to marginalize radical left-wing associations. After the attacks of 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the government invested in associations and individuals promoting liberal Islam in the hope of marginalizing radical Islamic discourse. In each of these periods, the privileged partners of the government had no incentive to establish constructive relations with other minority associations or to create large constituencies because their positions depended on support from the government, not from minority communities.

*Chapter 11* shows that relations between the government and minority associations in Rotterdam were much more stable than in Amsterdam, in spite of the fact that an outspokenly culturalist government took office in 2002. The cause for the greater stability is that Rotterdam provided structural (rather than periodic or project) subsidies, which meant that state support did not depend on the extent to which associations adopt the government's ideas. In contrast to Amsterdam, associations received professional support to sustain their organizations, not only for activities that address policy priorities. Whereas selective support of ascendant civil actors reinforced inequality in Amsterdam's civil society, general support of all civil actors created a relatively egalitarian figuration in Rotterdam.

The cases of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were initially selected because their governments supported very different discourses between 2002 and 2006 (Rotterdam: culturalist, Amsterdam: pragmatist) but the inherited governance institutions proved at least as important as government discourse in shaping the relations between minority associations and the state. *Chapter 12* investigates whether the differences in the relationship between the state and civil society also affect the quality of civil society according to a number of predefined criteria. The answer is affirmative: minorities in Rotterdam show higher levels of civil and political engagement, minority associations have a greater capacity for collective action and Islamic extremism seems less strong.

#### **Part IV: Conclusion**

*Chapter 13*, the only chapter of Part IV and the concluding chapter of the dissertation, sums up the main findings and explores their relevance beyond the case of Dutch integration politics. The chapter argues that the findings in Part II may signal a more universal figurational dynamic of discursive transformation. While it has previously been assumed (notably due Elias and Scotson's classic study on *The Established and the Outsiders*) that the established have stronger ties and leaders than the outsiders, my study hints that a different figuration emerges during transformational episodes. This figuration has the same network properties as Elias' established-outsider figuration but with an important difference: the interactions among the established (in this case, ministers, policy researchers and other guardians of the policy field) form a network pattern that Elias associates with outsiders (sparse networks). The challengers, in contrast, exhibit a network pattern that Elias associates with the established (dense networks). We can refer to this variation of the established-outsider figuration as the challenger-established figuration. I hypothesize that this figuration is not unique to Dutch integration politics and will also be found in other cases of cultural or political transformation – future research needs to assess whether this is indeed so. Chapter 13 documents why and how culturalist challengers transformed from a marginal current into a full-blown and very powerful discursive movement. However, it also warns against the temptation to assume that Culturalism has become all powerful. Culturalism has countered considerable opposition in the national debate. Moreover, in cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, inherited institutions buffer and mediate the impact of Culturalism and new associational networks foster alternative understandings of integration. The case of Rotterdam shows that the power of Culturalism was limited and ambivalent even during the reign of an

outspokenly culturalist government. Culturalism obviously has grown stronger in the Netherlands but the dissertation tried to move beyond this trivial observation by examining the causes, the nature and the limits of its power.



## Samenvatting ‘Machtdynamiek in Nederlandse integratiepolitiek’

In Europa en de rest van de wereld zijn bewegingen voor cultureel protectionisme de afgelopen jaren sterk in opkomst. Nederland wordt vaak gezien als een exemplarisch voorbeeld van een land waar het multiculturalisme is ingeruild voor beleid dat integratie eist en afdwingt. Aan de linkerkant van het politieke spectrum wordt met enige tegenzin gesteld dat immigratie problemen oplevert, terwijl rechtse partijen met kracht betogen dat het beleid te zacht, te accommoderend en te begripvol is geweest. Ik verwijs naar deze denkbeelden als Culturalisme, een discours dat is georganiseerd rond het idee dat de wereld verdeeld is in culturen en dat onze (verlichte, liberale, Nederlandse) cultuur verdedigd moet worden tegen migranten met onliberale religies en ideologieën. Deze dissertatie onderzoekt de groeiende macht van het culturalistische discours in het publieke debat en het effect daarvan op het lokale integratiebeleid. De hoofdvraag is: *hoe en waarom zijn machtsrelaties in Nederlandse integratiepolitiek veranderd tussen 1980 en 2006?* De studie ontwikkelt eerst, in Deel I, een benadering om dynamische machtsrelaties te analyseren. De hoofdvraag wordt dan opgeknipt in twee delen. Deel II gaat in op het *integratiedebat*. Deel III gaat in op het *integratiebeleid*. Deel IV vat de belangrijkste bevindingen samen, beantwoordt de onderzoeksvraag en verkent de bredere relevantie van de studie.

### Deel I: Theoretisch kader en onderzoeksvraag

Deel I bespreekt bestaand onderzoek naar integratiepolitiek en introduceert de onderzoeksvraag. Onder de triviale observatie dat culturalistisch discours sterker is geworden, stelt *Hoofdstuk 1*, schuilt een aantal intrigerende methodologische en theoretische kwesties. Wat is integratiepolitiek? Wat is een discours? Wat bedoelen we met macht? En hoe kan machtdynamiek worden verklaard? *Hoofdstuk 2* behandelt deze vragen. Het presenteert een raamwerk voor het analyseren en verklaren van veranderende machtsrelaties. Puttend uit een aantal bronnen – waaronder Bourdieu’s veldanalyse, Alexander’s analyse van de civiele sfeer, Elias’ figuratiesociologie, discoursanalyse en netwerkanalyse – ontwikkel ik een relationele benadering voor de studie van integratiepolitiek. Ik beschouw integratiepolitiek als een strijd binnen de civiele sfeer die draait om civiele macht: de macht om te definiëren wie tot de civiele gemeenschap behoort en wat de problemen van die gemeenschap zijn. De aanpak onderzoekt waar discourses steun verkrijgen of stuiten op weerstand. Deze

onderzoeksstrategie sluit niet uit dat een discours wordt geïdentificeerd als ‘dominant,’ maar nodigt uit om te specificeren wanneer, waar, in welke mate en met welk gevolg discourses machtig zijn.

## **Deel II: Machtsdynamiek in het publieke debat**

Deel II gaat in op machtsrelaties in het publieke debat over integratie. Het gaat in het bijzonder in op opinieartikelen die zijn gepubliceerd in NRC Handelsblad, De Volkskrant en Trouw. *Hoofdstuk 3* presenteert de methodes die zijn gebruikt om macht in debatten te onderzoeken, waaronder discoursanalyse, correspondentieanalyse, netwerkanalyse en diepte-interviews. Het hoofdstuk geeft een nieuwe, relationele interpretatie van bekende begrippen uit de politieke wetenschappen en politieke sociologie, zoals polarisatie, leiderschap, samenwerking en macht. *Hoofdstuk 4* analyseert de evolutie van de Nederlandse civiele sfeer. Het beargumenteert dat de tegenstrijdigheden in het minderhedenbeleid (bedacht in 1979 en geïmplementeerd in 1983) de condities hebben gecreëerd voor de opkomst van een radicaal alternatief voor de pragmatistische politiek die integratiepolitiek tot 1990 kenmerkte.

*Hoofdstuk 5* analyseert de opkomst van het Culturalisme. Culturalisme kan niet worden begrepen als een ‘Nederlands discours,’ omdat haar vertegenwoordigers Nederland en zijn politieke cultuur wilden herdefiniëren. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat de uitdragers van het Culturalisme behoren tot een opkomende elite die de pragmatische politieke cultuur en haar notabelen uitdaagde. *Hoofdstuk 6* analyseert de reacties op de opkomst van het Culturalisme. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat sommige discourses – vooral Anti-racisme – in de loop der tijd zijn gemarginaliseerd. Andere discourses verloren echter niet aan macht met de opkomst van het Culturalisme. Aanhangers van het Pragmatisme (een discours dat benadrukt dat er wezenlijke culturele verschillen zijn die echter kunnen worden overstegeen door redelijkheid en dialoog) heeft enig terrein verloren in het debat maar haar macht geconsolideerd in beleidskringen. Uitdragers van de Civiele Islam – een discours dat benadrukt dat toewijding aan Islam civiele loyaliteit toestaat of zelfs eist – hebben, juist door de uitdaging van het Culturalisme, aan macht gewonnen.

*Deel II* identificeert drie oorzaken van de groeiende macht van het Culturalisme. Ten eerste werd de stijl van culturalisten – met name het actierpertoire van het ‘doorbreken van taboes’ – meer gewaardeerd naarmate integratiepolitiek meer aandacht kreeg in de media. Ten tweede nam de verscheidenheid aan actoren die het Culturalisme uitdragen sterk toe (sterker dan de, overigens ook aanzienlijke, toename van het aantal culturalisten op de

opiniepagina's). Ten derde, en dat is misschien nog wel het meest opvallend, werkten culturalisten meer samen en staan ze meer achter discursieve leiders, zoals Paul Scheffer of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. De tegenstanders van het Culturalisme waren talrijk maar ze werkten niet samen en ze gingen niet achter hun leiders staan.

### **Deel III: Machtsdynamiek in lokaal bestuur**

Deel III gaat in op machtsrelaties in het lokale integratiebeleid. Terwijl Deel II veranderingen in discursieve machtsrelaties in het nationale debat in kaart brengt, onderzoekt Deel III hoe deze veranderingen zich vertaalden in lokale bestuurlijke strategieën, waarbij in het bijzonder wordt gekeken naar de relatie tussen overheden en minderhedenorganisaties in Amsterdam en Rotterdam. *Hoofdstuk 7* presenteert de methoden voor het onderzoeken van machtsrelaties binnen lokaal bestuur, waaronder diepte-interviews en het analyseren van subsidierelaties. *Hoofdstukken 8, 9 en 10* laten veranderingen in machtsrelaties binnen bestuursfiguraties in Amsterdam zien. Naast deze veranderingen, is er ook een constante: de Amsterdamse overheid probeerde machtsrelaties binnen het middenveld te veranderen. Tussen 1980 en 1995 steunde de overheid radicale linkse organisaties in de hoop dat zo conservatieve organisaties konden worden gemarginaliseerd. Tussen 1995 en 2001, sponsorde de overheid vooral consultants en hun managementdiscours in de hoop dat zo de radicale linkse organisaties konden worden gemarginaliseerd. En na de aanslagen van 9/11 en de moord op Theo van Gogh, investeerde de overheid in liberaal-Islamitische organisaties in de hoop dat zo radicaal-Islamitische discourses konden worden gemarginaliseerd. In elk van deze periodes werden de bevoorrechte partners van de overheid niet geprikkeld om constructieve relaties aan te gaan met andere minderhedenorganisaties of om hun achterban te vergroten. Hun positie hing immers vooral af van steun van de overheid, niet van de steun van migrantengemeenschappen.

*Hoofdstuk 11* laat zien dat relaties tussen de overheid en minderhedenorganisaties in Rotterdam veel stabielier waren dan in Amsterdam, ondanks dat in 2002 een uitgesproken culturalistisch gemeenbestuur aantrad. De oorzaak voor de grotere stabiliteit is dat Rotterdam structurele (in plaats van periodieke of project-) subsidies verstrekke. Daardoor was staatssteun niet direct afhankelijk van de mate waarin organisaties zich voegden naar de ideeën van het gemeentebestuur. In tegenstelling tot Amsterdam, ontvingen organisaties professionele steun om hun organisaties te versterken, niet alleen voor activiteiten die direct bijdragen aan het verwezenlijken van beleidsdoelen. Terwijl de selectieve steun aan

opkomende organisaties de ongelijkheid in het Amsterdamse middenveld vergrootte, leidde de algemene steun aan alle middenveldorganisaties tot een egalitaire figuratie in Rotterdam.

Amsterdam en Rotterdam werden oorspronkelijk geselecteerd omdat de overheden van beide steden zeer verschillende discoursen uitdroegen tussen 2002 en 2006 (Rotterdam: culturalistisch; Amsterdam: pragmatisch). In de loop van het onderzoek bleek echter dat bestuurlijke instituties minstens evenveel invloed hadden op de relaties tussen overheid en minderhedenorganisaties als het discours van de gemeentelijke overheid. *Hoofdstuk 12* toetst aan de hand van een aantal criteria of de verschillende instituties ook effect hebben op de kwaliteit van het middenveld. Het antwoord is bevestigend: minderheden in Rotterdam hebben een hogere mate van civiele en politieke betrokkenheid, minderhedenorganisaties hebben een groter vermogen tot het ondernemen van collectieve actie en (Islamitisch) extremisme lijkt minder aanwezig.

#### **Deel IV: Conclusie**

*Hoofdstuk 13*, het enige hoofdstuk van Deel IV en het concluderende hoofdstuk van de dissertatie, vat de belangrijkste bevindingen samen en verkent de bredere relevantie van de studie. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat de bevindingen in Deel II een indicatie kunnen zijn voor een meer universele figuratieve dynamiek van discursieve transformatie. Terwijl eerder (vooral door Elias en Scotson's klassieker *The Established and the Outsiders*) werd aangenomen dat de gevestigden sterkere banden en leiders hebben dan de buitenstaanders, suggereert deze studie dat een andere figuratie opkomt tijdens periodes van transformatie. Deze figuratie heeft dezelfde kenmerken als Elias' gevestigden-buitenstaanderfiguratie maar met één belangrijk verschil: de interacties tussen de gevestigden (in casu, de ministers, beleidsonderzoekers en andere hoeders van het beleidsveld) hebben een netwerkpatroon dat Elias associeert met de buitenstaanders (zwakke netwerken). De uitdagers daarentegen hebben een netwerkpatroon dat Elias associeert met de buitenstaanders (hechte netwerken). Deze variatie op de gevestigden-buitenstaanderfiguratie kan aangeduid worden als een uitdager-gevestigdenfiguratie. Ik stel als hypothese dat deze figuratie niet alleen gevonden kan worden in Nederlandse integratiepolitiek maar ook in andere gevallen van culturele en politieke transformatie; toekomstig onderzoek moet uitwijzen of dit inderdaad zo is. Hoofdstuk 13 documenteert waarom en hoe culturalistische uitdagers van een marginale stroming zijn veranderd in een volledig ontwikkelde en zeer sterke discursieve beweging. Het waarschuwt echter ook tegen de verleiding om te veronderstellen dat Culturalisme almachtig is geworden.

Culturalisme stuitte op aanzienlijke weerstand in het nationale debat. Bovendien werd de impact van het Culturalisme gedempt door instituties in Amsterdam en Rotterdam, terwijl ook nieuwe interpretaties van integratie ontstonden in het lokale middenveld in beide steden. Het voorbeeld van Rotterdam laat zien dat zelfs onder een culturalistisch gemeentebestuur de macht van het Culturalisme beperkt en ambivalent was. Culturalisme is overduidelijk machtiger geworden maar de dissertatie probeerde verder te gaan dan deze triviale observatie door de oorzaken, aard en effecten van deze macht te onderzoeken.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The start date of 1980 was chosen as this is when the minorities policy first began to take shape. The end date of 2006 was chosen as it marks the municipal elections and the end of systematic data gathering. Depending on the availability of data and the relevance of particular historical periods, the empirical analysis more closely focuses on some periods than others.

<sup>2</sup> The influence of the institutions of pillarization is explored in Chapter 4.

<sup>3</sup> See Brubaker (1992) for a classic statement and Bauböck *et al.* (2006) for a comprehensive overview.

<sup>4</sup> Whereas Alexander (2006) considers elections and opinion polls as sublime instruments to articulate the will of the civil community, Bourdieu argues that these institutions facilitate sublimated domination because they effect the serial atomization of the population and discriminate against groups that lack the capital to form and express a political opinion (Bourdieu, 2005).

<sup>5</sup> Alexander argues that the nature of civil codes can be deduced with a thought experiment: upon what kind of motives, relations, and institutions would a self-regulating, democratic community be likely to depend? Table 2.1 summarizes Alexander's answers to this question.

**Table 2.1 The cultural structure of the civil sphere according to Jeffrey Alexander**

<i>Motives</i>		<i>Relations</i>		<i>Institutions</i>	
<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>	<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>	<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>
Active	Passive	Open	Secretive	Rule regulated	Arbitrary
Autonomous	Dependent	Trusting	Suspicious	Law	Power
Rational	Irrational	Critical	Deferential	Equality	Hierarchy
Reasonable	Hysterical	Honorable	Self-interested	Inclusive	Exclusive
Calm	Excitable	Altruistic	Greedy	Impersonal	Personal
Self-controlled	Wild-passionate	Truthful	Deceitful	Contracts	Bonds of loyalty
Realistic	Distorted	Straightforward	Calculating	Groups	Factions
Sane	Mad	Deliberate	Conspiratorial	Office	Personality
		Friendly	Antagonistic		

*Source:* Alexander, 2006, pp. 57-59

<sup>6</sup> I owe this insight to Phil Gorski.

<sup>7</sup> I refer specifically to sociologists and philosophers who are engaged in the debate on the opinion pages of the broadsheet newspapers between 2003 and 2006. Note that I do not make a claim about all sociologists and philosophers in the Netherlands. Most sociologists and philosophers do not contribute to the debate on the opinion pages.

<sup>8</sup> Although it is convenient to speak of an interpretation of reality, it is important to realize that the act of interpretation involves the construction of reality. Ideas, notions and symbols have “evocative power” because they draw “discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the undifferentiated” (Bourdieu, cited in Schinkel, 2003, p. 78).

<sup>9</sup> When I quote from newspaper articles, I do not include page numbers. Most of the times newspaper articles cover just one page and therefore the reference to page numbers does not add any information. When a newspaper article covers two or more pages, it is not possible for me to ascertain on which page a quote was

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printed since I collected most of the newspaper articles through the Lexis-Nexis database.

<sup>10</sup> There is spatio-temporal dynamic to discourse production that we could visualize on a map in terms of the intensity of the interactions that infuse its ideas, notions and symbols with emotional meaning (*cf.* Collins, 2004). Take the example of anti-racist discourse. There would be a big, dark red spot on a map if there is a meeting where hundreds of people gather together express their anger over racism. There would be many dots that are somewhat lighter and smaller to designate the instances where committed anti-racists share their ideas in small groups. The lightest spots on the map would be casual observers of everyday anti-racist symbolism, such as readers of an article on an anti-racist protest or observers of the billboards against racism that hang amidst the commercial billboards in soccer stadiums (during matches of the Champion's league, not in the Dutch competition). If we would want to complicate this picture further, we could also use a different color to identify the opposition to anti-racist discourse. During gatherings or in articles, promoters of Culturalism can, for instance, promote the idea that accusations of racism are unfounded or exaggerated. Such instances of anti-anti-racism could then be designated with, say, a blue color. Actual maps would be far too complex to make but thinking in terms of these visualizations nevertheless helps to grasp the situational differentiation of discourse.

<sup>11</sup> "The structure of a field, understood as a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital, is different from the more or less lasting networks through which it manifests itself. It is this structure that determines the possibility or impossibility (or, to be more precise, the greater or lesser probability) of observing the establishment of linkages that express and sustain the existence of networks. The task of science is to uncover the structure of the distribution of species of capital which tends to determine the structure of individual or collective stances taken, through the interests and dispositions it conditions." (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 114-115).

<sup>12</sup> Although the concept of discourse is central to my analysis and serves as the main analytical entry-point into the complexities of integration politics, I do not claim any ontological or causal primacy for discourses as opposed to actors or institutions. There is no point in saying that discourses structure actors or the other way around because they emerge together, develop together and eventually falter together. The same thing goes for the relationship between power and actors: power exists only in and through actors but actors exist only in and through power.

<sup>13</sup> Moreover, since there are many resources of power that can be mobilized in any figuration, power relations are necessarily ambivalent. One classical example is that an established elite control institutions but that an ascending elite can stir up popular discontent. The result is a play of forces that both established and ascending elites can influence but that neither of them can completely control.

<sup>14</sup> The location within the newspaper was irrelevant to the selection, meaning that articles not printed in the debates sections also qualified for inclusion. For instance, some articles were published in the sections for domestic affairs. When I write about the opinion pages, this should thus be understood as shorthand for pages where opinion articles are published.

<sup>15</sup> The database has information on co-authors but for most of the analyses only the data pertaining to the first author is processed.

<sup>16</sup> I speak of "clusters" rather than "communities" as it remains to be seen whether the actors grouped together indeed form a community in the sense that they have positive ties and leaders. The clusters generated with the

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algorithm for community detection should not be confused with the clusters generated through cluster analysis.

<sup>17</sup> When one actor is very central to the debate, commentators regularly assume that the debate is divided between those who support the actor and those who oppose it. While this representation provides a convenient scheme of perception, it does not accurately capture oppositions for at least three reasons. First, supporters and opponents of a central actor may be divided among themselves. Second, opponents that clash over one issue may cooperate on another issue. Third, criticism is much more frequent than praise on the opinion pages and this is true for all actors, not just the most central ones. This means that the intuitive idea the debate is organized into opponents and supporters leads commentators to overestimate the power of the former.

<sup>18</sup> I report this measure for the sake of completeness but on the basis of the findings I think that an adequate understanding of polarization requires that we take into account that divided groups only become recognized as antagonistic poles when they are associated with symbols.

<sup>19</sup> Very often articulation power manifests itself negatively when actors want the world *not* to evolve in the way that their opponents desire and when they are motivated to stop what they – each in their own ways – experience as an attempt to devalue the ideas, symbols and notions that they cherish. Broeders *et al.* (2008) also speak of articulation power but their definition of this concept is more similar to my overarching notion of discursive power. My definition of articulation power comes close to Koopmans' definition of visibility (Koopmans, 2004a) but I do not opt for this concept as it seems to give the impression that all those who appear in civic arenas have resonance. As the analysis below suggests, articulation, resonance, and consonance are analytically and empirically distinct.

<sup>20</sup> The database includes several variables, such as gender, ethnicity, publication date, newspaper, and affiliation. For the last variable, I grouped together actors with similar affiliations in 16 sectors. These sectors are internally diverse but nevertheless it is possible to identify with considerable precision from which sectors discourses draw support and to explain why actors rooted in these sectors express their support.

<sup>21</sup> It does not matter whether these references are positive, neutral or negative. Even if actor A completely rejects the discourse of actor B, actor A helps to disseminate the discourse of B and contributes to the prominence of B. Especially when Actor A responds directly to an intervention of Actor B, Actor A has to operate, to some degree, within the discursive parameters set by B. For instance, if an Actor A feels appalled by an argument of Actor B that Western civilization is superior to Islam and wants to warn that such binaries promote stigmatization, Actor A has to reiterate the binary in order to refute it.

<sup>22</sup> "Circa" 30 because some interviews that were conducted for Part III were also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conversations that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.

<sup>23</sup> Some of the information is drawn from internet sources such as Wikipedia. Before using information from an internet source (usually for something trivial, such as place of birth or place of education), I checked it against other internet, newspaper or academic sources.

<sup>24</sup> A net score of 5 may seem low but remember that negative references are much more frequent than positive references.

<sup>25</sup> The occupation of the Netherlands between 1940 and 1945 did not suspend pillarized politics; the resistance, too, was organized along pillarized lines.

<sup>26</sup> Table 4.1 gives an impression of the partisanship of three different newspapers in 1956.

**Table 4.1 Tone of newspaper reporting in 1956 elections (%)**

<i>Parties/leaders</i>	<i>Het Vrije Volk</i>		<i>De Volkskrant</i>		<i>Algemeen Handelsblad</i>	
	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>
PvdA/Drees	91	0	13	65	9	29
KVP/Romme	5	56	71	3	13	29
VVD/Oud	0	13	0	8	61	6
Others	5	31	16	24	17	35
N	116	152	75	66	23	17

Source: Roele, cited in Brants & Van Praag, 2006, p. 33

<sup>27</sup> Occasionally outsiders, such as the populist Hendrik Koekoek, gained some seats in parliament but they remained marginal and were excluded and ignored by the elites of established parties.

<sup>28</sup> One illustration of this development is that a right-wing politician like Frits Bolkestein had privileged access to the opinion pages *De Volkskrant* in the beginning of the 1990s – something that before had been unthinkable. The contention over this article spread also into the *NRC*, the only newspaper for which we have systematic data in this period (the number of articles in the corpus jumps from 5 in 1990 to 25 in 1991). We see the same type of interaction between newspapers after Scheffer's intervention in 2000. Although 'the multicultural drama' was published in *NRC*, it also intensified the debate in *Trouw* and *De Volkskrant* (the number of articles in the corpus jumps from respectively 2, 3 and 6 in 1999 to 19, 16 and 24 in 2000). One analytical implication of this desegmentation is that we can analyze these three newspapers as a single setting: previously segregated discursive milieus have transformed into a single – if still differentiated – civil arena. Therefore I do not differentiate between newspapers unless there is an *ad hoc* reason to do so.

<sup>29</sup> According to a veteran editor of *De Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* was the first newspaper to introduce the daily opinion page in the late 1980s. *De Volkskrant* followed in 1990. I do not know exactly when *Trouw* started publishing a daily section of opinions but ever since *Trouw* (in 1992) was documented in the Lexis Nexis database the newspaper featured opinion articles.

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**Table 4.2 Registered unemployment, 1979-1985 (%)**

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1988	1990	1992
Native Dutch	6	8	14	12	6	4	3
Turks	11	21	37	39	32	28	24
Moroccans	11	23	37	42	22	26	24
Average	6	9	15	13	6	6	4

Source: Wolff & Penninx, 1993, pp. 22 and 51. Figures for Surinamese and Antilleans are unavailable or unreliable. The data for 1979-1985 and 1988-1992 are based on different methods of calculation.

**Table 4.3 Highest level of completed education for adults per ethnic group**

	<i>Native Dutch</i>	<i>Turks</i>	<i>Moroccans</i>	<i>Surinamese</i>	<i>Antilleans</i>	<i>Total</i>
Elementary school	22	73	74	38	23	12
Lower secondary education (LBO, Mavo)	32	13	11	35	32	26
Higher secondary education (MBO, Havo, VWO)	32	4	2	19	31	41
Higher vocational / university (HBO / WO)	14	1	1	8	13	21

Source: Wolff & Penninx, 1993, p. 35.

<sup>31</sup> Although there was no dominant conception of a Dutch culture, a modicum of cultural essentialism is necessary to accommodate minorities and to assimilate them to a pragmatist political culture. Catholics and Protestants had to be portrayed and organized as blocks in order for their leaders to represent them and the effect on the ground was a combination of intense rivalry and mutual aversion. In the colonies, the Netherlands adopted a governmental strategy where local leaders were accommodated, carving up the colonial population into distinct groups that are easily identified and (hence) managed. Similarly, the consultative structures created as part of the minorities policy divided migrants into minority groups with distinct identities that often had very little meaning to the groups in question (see Chapter 4). ‘Muslims’ occasionally were identified as a specific segment of migrants but most the times minorities were identified on the basis of their nationality. In short, cultural essentialism was strongly present but it was not the Dutch culture that was essentialized.

<sup>32</sup> The systematically collected data stretches from 1991 to 2006. I use anecdotal evidence to historically frame developments in this period. If I were to pinpoint a new turning point, it would be 2008, when Geert Wilders dominated the news with his film *Fitna*. Since Wilders dominated the debate, the question is no longer what integration is and how it should be achieved but whether it is at all possible for Muslims to become part of the Dutch civil community.

<sup>33</sup> The idea that foreigners in general and Muslims in particular are fundamentally different from Westerners is, of course, not new. It has been fostered by orientalists, novelists and correspondents for centuries, both in the Netherlands and in other former colonial powers (Said, 1978; for the Dutch case, see Maussen, 2009).

<sup>34</sup> A fragment of this text was also cited in Chapter 4. The quotes are not identical because I rely upon the translation of the Scientific Council in Chapter 4 and use my own translation in this chapter (all translations from newspaper articles are my own).

<sup>35</sup> Since Goethe and Plato are not claimed by Bolkestein’s opponents, they end up in a cluster with Bolkestein. Passive references – as the references of Goethe and Plato – are not included in many of the measures. Some actors, such as *NRC* contributing editors Elbesth Etty or Sjoerd de Jong, make dozens of references in some periods. These references are valuable for categorizing different actors but not for calculating the power of Etty and De Jong.

<sup>36</sup> “Two years ago I was in the Soviet Union with other party leaders. In Alma Ata I had brief personal talks with Elco Brinkman, Thijs Wöltgens en Hans van Mierlo. I said that the minority issue will be the most important political challenge of the next ten or twenty years; a challenge that transcends the scope of of any single party. I reiterated this a month ago in parliament. I now say it again. So no partisan bickering” (Bolkestein, 1992)

<sup>37</sup> The principal author of the minority reports had frequently ridiculed – under a pseudonym in a professional

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journal *Migrantenstudies* (see Vyvary, 2003) – cultural relativism and xenophilia

<sup>38</sup> Editors and journalists writing for *NRC*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw* produced a total of 18 articles of which 8 were coded as culturalist (44.4 per cent).

<sup>39</sup> “The multicultural drama” prompted an intensification of the debate in the three broadsheet newspapers but not in *De Telegraaf*. The number of articles in the corpus jumps from 2, 3 and 6 in 1999 to 19, 16 and 24 in 2000 in respectively *NRC Handelsblad*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw*. The total number of hits is extremely low in *De Telegraaf* for both 1999 and 2000: respectively 11 and 8. Two articles in 1999 would have qualified for inclusion in the corpus (one interview with the successful Moroccans of *Towards a New Start* – see Chapter 9, another interview with Muslim women with head scarves on their emancipatory struggles) and one article in 2000 would have qualified (an interview with an historian on the electoral success of Jörg Haider in Austria and the difference between Haider and Bolkestein).

<sup>40</sup> The formal reason for the resignation of the government was a report on the peace mission of Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica. Dutch soldiers were supposed to protect this “safe area” but Serbian militias under the leadership of Ratko Mladić invaded the Muslim enclave with overwhelming force. The commander of the Dutch soldiers, Thom Karremans, cooperated when the militias separated the men from the women and accepted a good bye present from Mladić. In a press conference after the fall of Srebrenica, Karremans praised Mladić for his military strategy and assured his audience that “there are no good guys and bad guys in this war.” Eight thousand men were deported and killed, making Srebrenica the biggest massacre in Europe since the Second World War. This is not, however, why the government resigned in 2002. It resigned because research showed that the government of 1994 had not sufficiently assessed the risks of the operation.

<sup>41</sup> The constitution can be found on-line: <http://www.ivir.nl/wetten/nl/grondwet.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2009).

<sup>42</sup> *Gedogen* normally refers to the practice of not enforcing the law when this is not in the interest of public order or public health. Dutch drug policy is in part based on this principle. But *gedogen* also more generally refers to a lenient and understanding attitude that was at the basis of the accommodation politics described in Chapter 4.

<sup>43</sup> One third of the votes for the party were cast by people who had not voted in the previous elections (*NRC Handelsblad*, 2002).

<sup>44</sup> It is remarkable that the size of the culturalist cluster does not steadily increase; in the period in which Scheffer dominated the debate, the culturalist cluster was comparatively bigger than in the preceding and subsequent periods. Unlike Bolkestein and Hirsi Ali, Scheffer was not a parliamentarian for the right-wing Liberals and he did not postulate an opposition between Islam and the West.

<sup>45</sup> Note that it is not at all trivial that we find this pattern. For example, in their analysis of international relations, Traag and Bruggeman found that there were eight blocks of actors (Traag & Bruggeman, 2009).

<sup>46</sup> Articles that were labeled as “unknown” or “other” were not included in the analysis. Two outliers were omitted from the analysis in order to reduce the tightness of the clustering in the plot and thereby to ease interpretation.

<sup>47</sup> Table 6.1 shows that the promoters of the Diversity discourse were relatively powerful in the second half of the 1990s, when they accounted for almost 16 per cent of the articles. Integration politics in this period was calm: the number of articles was relatively low and there were no strong oppositions between different clusters, though there were concerns over integration (there was even a minister of integration). In this context,

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consultants and certain other actors argued that clever management and communication strategies were the key to the success of the integration project and for turning diversity from a weakness into a strength.

<sup>48</sup> Such as Radar, LBR (*Landelijk Bureau Racismebestrijding*, National Agency for Fighting against Racism) and NCB (*Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders*, Dutch Center Foreigners).

<sup>49</sup> One could object that the data pertain to a very specific setting (the opinion pages) and it is indeed true (not to say trivial) that accusations of racism have been made in other settings, such as on websites. But it is highly unlikely that different results would ensue if we included television programs or tabloids since these settings seem even less likely to offer a stage to anti-racist discourse than the (opinion pages of the) broadsheet newspapers (Van Dijk, 1991).

<sup>50</sup> Policies were not simply “multiculturalist” but also did not become “assimilationist.” Although it is certainly true that, after the emergence of Fortuyn, there were more administrators who wanted to force migrants to integrate, at the same time there was an intensification of efforts to help minorities, and especially Muslims, to organize and express themselves (see especially Chapter 10). It is understandable that analysts have used these concepts in comparative research but they tend to reify what is better understood as a dynamic field where different actors push in different directions.

<sup>51</sup> This category includes editors, journalists and contributors. There are no substantial differences between these different types of actors, so I grouped them together as one category “contributors to *NRC Handelsblad*,” which is virtually synonymous with “authors who have been paid by *NRC Handelsblad*.” There were, however, substantial differences between the different newspapers, so I distinguish between contributors to *NRC Handelsblad*, contributors to *De Volkskrant* and contributors to *Trouw*.

<sup>52</sup> Paul Scheffer is one example. Most of his 13 articles were coded as culturalist but 5 were coded as pragmatist. Although he laments the elites (including his colleagues at the *NRC*) for “denying the revolt” by Fortuyn voters (Scheffer, 2002), in other articles he takes a pragmatist approach. Several days after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, for instance, he severely criticized Job Cohen for attempting to quell rather than deal with the tensions and anxieties. He criticized Cohen and other politicians for failing to enforce the law and for letting “some neighborhoods” come under “the grip of violence.” But Scheffer also said that there was a need for a new feeling of collective belonging, a “new we” that would include Muslims on the condition that they do not put the law of religion above the law of the constitution (Scheffer, 2004). These articles serve to reconcile differences and to resolve the cultural conflicts that other, more radical culturalists seek to win.

<sup>53</sup> Most of the debate, however, did not revolve around Muslims; as Figure 3.1 shows, terms like “minorities” and “foreigners” were much more frequently used in combination with “integration” than the term “Muslims.”

<sup>54</sup> To be more precise: he said that he would no longer allow Muslims into the country if it were possible to make juridical arrangements to this effect. However, he did not think this would be feasible.

<sup>55</sup> This article was not coded as Civil Islam because Cheppih explicitly indicated that he wanted to offer an alternative to liberal democracy. He describes his alternative as *sjoerocratie*, a model of deliberative democracy with elements of sharia, including physical punishment. He thereby suggested a contradiction between liberal democracy and Islam, which means that the article cannot be categorized as Civil Islam. The sentence cited here, however, is typical of the more critical variants of Civil Islam.

<sup>56</sup> Ahmed Aboutaleb and Hacı Karacaer are exceptional in that they are very prominent and very critical of their

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own communities. Other Muslims within the Labor Party, such as Fatima Elatik (council chair in the Amsterdam neighborhood of Zeeburg) and Nebahat Albayrak (Junior Minister of Immigration), voiced similar discourses but were more critical of culturalists and milder towards Muslims.

<sup>57</sup> This interview was conducted with three leaders of Milli Gorus responsible for the negotiations over the construction of the Western Mosque after the members of the group around Karacaer had left or were forced to step down.

<sup>58</sup> Three of Aboutaleb's articles in the database were coded as Civil Islam and three were coded as Pragmatism.

<sup>59</sup> For instance: "I say to my brothers and sisters: 'did you ever see a boxing match?' If you punch open the eyebrow of your opponent, then you keep hitting on the wound to knock out your opponent. That is what Wilders does... Our country, our democracy and our legal state deserve an open debate with Wilders and others. I will fight for it until the last drop. For I am a Muslim" (Karacaer, 2007). Another example: "To acquire knowledge is a duty of each Muslim and each Muslim woman. Mind you women! [points finger into the air]. It is mentioned there [in the Quran] specifically [says in Arabic:] Muslim *and* Muslim woman. So when someone writes to me 'please do not force me to learn Dutch because I am so old,' then you know my answer" (Aboutaleb in a speech at the Argan youth center in 2006).

<sup>60</sup> I cite from Ham and Uitermark (2007) since quotes in this piece were approved for publication by the interviewees.

<sup>61</sup> "Around" 30 and 50 because some interviews that were conducted for Part II were also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conversations that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.

<sup>62</sup> The data pertain to subsidies allocated as part of minorities or integration policy. In some cases this means that any initiative promoting integration can apply for a subsidy, in other cases it means that only minority associations can claim these resources.

<sup>63</sup> While associations without subsidies are unlikely to have central positions within governance networks, some may nevertheless operate very successfully on the margins. Some religious associations, for instance, do not receive subsidies but are nevertheless very important as discursive milieus. The thriving orthodox El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam is one example but we could also mention a number of smaller and more traditional Moroccan and Turkish mosques. These associations have a relatively large base of contributing constituents and sometimes also have foreign sponsors such as the Turkish state in the case of Diyanet mosques or Arab royalties in the case of orthodox mosques. A number of associations do not rely on funding for minorities or integration but attract funds from corporate sponsors, charities or government agencies. Such funds are not labeled "subsidies" as they have the character of commissioned or tendered projects, though they amount to support for particular civil discourses.

<sup>64</sup> In Rotterdam, applicants were invited to submit proposals for projects that promote "participation, speaking Dutch, shared values and norms and the power of our diversity" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006, n.p.). The guidelines for MGI indicate that projects should "lead to contacts between different groups; contribute to social cohesion in neighborhoods; contribute to knowledge and opinions about the law, customs, norms, values; lead to interaction among all Amsterdammers and between Amsterdammers and the government; promote dialogue and cooperation between persons that belong to different groups of Amsterdammers" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005, article 3). These guidelines can be interpreted in many different ways. It is difficult, for instance, to think of projects that do not, in one way or another, promote contacts or participation. When associations meet the formal

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requirements, civil servants select on the basis of unofficial or unarticulated criteria (“this is not what we need right now”, “this association has shown that they use the funding properly”). In fact, civil servants usually make a selection *before* the review procedure as civil servants invite some rather than other associations to apply for funding. The most important difference between the funds is that Rotterdam only allows applications for an amount of 2,000 euros. Another difference is that the municipality of Amsterdam formally only funds projects that transcend the neighborhood level. Both procedural demands are not as important as they first appear. In Rotterdam, applicants can fund more expensive projects if they submit multiple applications (which they do). In Amsterdam, the substantial demand that projects promote neighborhood cohesion contradicts the procedural demand that projects are aimed at the city as a whole, which leaves applicants and civil servants discretion to follow the rule they prefer.

<sup>65</sup> The timing of both surveys is significant: they were conducted after Amsterdam’s guest worker associations had been marginalized and before religious associations were embraced.

<sup>66</sup> The CITO-test is a standardized test that virtually all pupils have to take just before they finish elementary school. Scores are between 501 and 550.

<sup>67</sup> *Kommittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland*, Committee for Moroccan Workers.

<sup>68</sup> *Hollanda Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği*, Turkish Worker Association in the Netherlands.

<sup>69</sup> *Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu*, Federation of Democratic Worker Associations from Turkey.

<sup>70</sup> *Federatie van Koerden in Nederland*, Federation of Kurds in the Netherlands. The first Kurdish association to receive subsidies was the *Koerdische Arbeidersvereniging* (Kurdish Worker Association) in 1987.

<sup>71</sup> *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, Party of Nationalist Action.

<sup>72</sup> The abolition coincided with the founding of the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners (*Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders*, ACB), an expertise center that still supports minority associations. The transfer of responsibilities from intermediate institutions to the government sets Amsterdam apart from Rotterdam. As Chapter 11 shows, Rotterdam’s governance figuration has historically been characterized by the presence of large and powerful civil corporations that mediate between the government and civil society associations. In Amsterdam these intermediate institutions played a marginal role and consequently the government interacted directly with civil society associations. In 1981, even before the minorities policy was officially established, the Amsterdam government, in consultation with the Ministry of Welfare and the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners, redirected funds away from the welfare foundations and to migrant associations. The ACB is the closest thing to a civil corporation in Amsterdam. It receives a structural subsidy from the province of Noord-Holland and occasionally wins contracts from the government of Amsterdam.

<sup>73</sup> It is important to stress that this approach is perhaps multicultural in a pragmatic sense but not multiculturalist in an ideological sense. It was *convenient* to have intermediaries to reach culturally distinct groups in need of welfare provisions but there is no sign that administrators were keen on preserving ethnic cultures. The recognition of cultural identities was secondary to, and instrumental for, the technocratic goal of administering welfare provisions as efficiently and widely as possible. Associations were involved to improve the process of policy formulation, implementation and delivery, not to ensure that they cultivate and exhibit their cultural particularities. In the obscure words of the first and last comprehensive white paper on minority integration: “The preservation of cultural identity can in no way be considered as a static fact that is unrelated to presence in the Netherlands.” In Dutch: “[het] behoud van de eigen culturele identiteit [kan] geenszins worden opgevat als

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een onveranderlijk gegeven dat losstaat van het verblijf in Nederland” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 16).

<sup>74</sup> KMAN was on the far left but not easy to categorize. Some members were Marxists while others were syndicalists, but KMAN never had a political identity as clearly defined as the Turkish associations (HTIB – Communist; DIDF – Socialist, etc.).

<sup>75</sup> *Democratische Volksvereniging Amsterdam*, Democratic Popular Association Amsterdam (connected to HTIB).

<sup>76</sup> *Amsterdam Türkiyeli Kadınlar Birliği*, Association of Women from Turkey in Amsterdam (connected to DIDF).

<sup>77</sup> Since the political orientation of associations is often dynamic or ambivalent, we cannot work with a fine-grained coding scheme, though a rough distinction between different types can be made (see also Kraal & Zorlu, 1997; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Maussen, 2006, 2009; Vermeulen, 2006; and the various reports of the leftist monitoring group Kafka). I use the word conservative to refer to associations that do not demand radical social change and that seek to preserve social, religious or ethnic hierarchies. This includes most mosques but of course not those that have a radical Islamist agenda. There are, however, very few Moroccan or Turkish mosques that seem to have such a radical agenda. They are mostly rather precarious institutions that try to preserve ties and dispositions that are of little value in mainstream Dutch society. The Turkish Grey Wolves are an exception, but they are ethnic fascists rather than religious fundamentalists. I categorize these associations as “radical conservatives.”

<sup>78</sup> *Marokkaanse Vrouwen Vereniging Nederland*, Moroccan Women Association Netherlands.

<sup>79</sup> Civil society associations receive the subsidy unless they are suspected of fraud or abuse. It has happened that associations were so fraudulent or chaotic that they lost their subsidies, but this is not the case for the (Turkish and Moroccan) associations discussed here.

<sup>80</sup> When we calculate the per capita subsidy amount (total amount of subsidy for associations divided by total number of residents), we find that the per capita subsidy for the Turkish community is 5.40 euro in 1995, 7.40 euro in 2000 and 4.10 euro in 2005, whereas members of the Moroccan community on average received 1.90 euro in 1995, 2.20 euros in 2000 and 0.60 euro in 2005. These findings seem consistent with Fennema and Tillie’s argument (1999) that the Turkish community has stronger civil society associations than the Moroccan community. After Putnam (1993), they explain this difference as a result of the comparatively large amount of social capital within the Turkish community and especially the comparatively large number of linkages between different Turkish associations. Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that their data (interlocking directorates as registered with the Chamber of Commerce) do not comprehensively grasp relations among some key players. For instance, their data show no connection between KMAN and SMR, which end up in two different clusters, even though the latter is in many ways an offshoot of the former.

<sup>81</sup> The most important cause of these differences between Moroccan and Turkish associations is that the latter have much more cultural capital or, more specifically, the administrative and organizational skills required to operate successfully within the state bureaucracy. The difference in the degree of administrative sophistication is apparent for all types of associations. If we look at religious associations, we find that Turkish mosques are much better organized than Moroccan mosques. Two Moroccan mosque federations in Amsterdam exist on paper and have informal meetings but do not have an institutional infrastructure sustained by contributors. The various

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Turkish mosque federations, in contrast, have highly developed institutional infrastructures, high levels of transnational coordination and considerable administrative competence (Doomernik, 1991; Sunier, 1996). We find a similar pattern when we look at guest worker associations. The website of the Institute for Social History states that the employees who processed the HTIB archive were surprised to find that the organization had archived virtually all of its correspondence, minutes and publications since its inception (IISG, 2009). The KMAN administration, in contrast, was notorious for its imprecision and amateurism. One of the members I interviewed had just put all the old documents in his garage and was waiting for the Institute for Social History to come and pick them up but he warned me that they might take a very long time to sort everything out.

This difference in administrative competence between Turkish and Moroccan associations explains why the former have always received more subsidies than the latter. Even though administrative demands in the 1980s were not very high compared to the standards of, say, 2005, there were many associations that never acquired enough efficacy to penetrate state institutions. This is especially true for conservative Moroccan organizations that showed little interest in politics and were distrusted and obstructed by progressive Moroccan associations. Conservative Turkish associations had more success. While they were opposed by left-wing organizations, a few associations nevertheless succeeded in fostering linkages with civil servants and politicians and, as a result of their relatively large size and strong coordination, managed to attain subsidies. The fact that conservative Turkish associations are subsidized explains in part why the per capita subsidies are higher for the Turkish community. The more stringent demands of the government (see below) explain why the difference between Turkish and Moroccan associations grew over time (a factor of 2.8 in 1995, 3.4 in 2000 and 6.8 in 2005).

Administrative competence may explain much of the divergence between Moroccan and Turkish associations but what explains divergent levels of administrative competence? The most plausible explanation is that the founders and activists of Moroccan and Turkish associations developed their organizational dispositions under different conditions. After the 1960 military coup in Turkey, the regime adopted a constitution that gave left-wing and religious associations some breathing space. There was repression during the 1960s and 1970s but civil politics was nevertheless flourishing, thanks in part to the comprehensive public education system. When there was a backlash in the late 1970s, many associations and intellectuals created branches in Western Europe or even moved their headquarters there. The military coup of 1980 turned back the civil reforms of the 1960s but by that time civil society associations had established large and transnational infrastructures, which helped them to survive the repression of the regime in Turkey. They had also developed the dispositions and skills required to organize and coordinate activities. Their success in getting subsidies is just one expression of this administrative competence.

The situation was very different in Morocco where the regime brutally suppressed religious and political activity that might undermine its authority (Schultz & Krebbers, 1994). The educational system was much less developed than in Turkey. Especially Berber communities and dissident intellectuals had to fear repression, intimidation and infiltration that could only be evaded through secretism, clientelism and syndicalism. The habitus of Moroccan activists in the Netherlands had been shaped under these repressive conditions and this explains the militant syndicalism of KMAN and the aversion to mosque associations. These dispositions had helped Moroccan activists to survive in their country of origin but hindered them in the Netherlands where the government demanded transparency, cooperation and administrative prudence.

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<sup>82</sup> This is not to say that it was entirely unaware of such tensions. When a confrontation between some Amicales and some KMAN radicals escalated, the mayor visited the barricaded KMAN headquarters to review the situation. Civil servants were also aware of the many tensions. But when it came to the organization of corporatism, these insights did not play a role and a bureaucratic logic prevailed.

<sup>83</sup> While Mohammed Rabbae of the NCB (see Chapters 4 and 6) launched an attack in the media against the mosque federation UMMON for its alleged intimidation of dissidents and critics, KMAN and the local chapter of NCB (*Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders*, Amsterdam Center for Foreigners) openly stated that they considered the mosque federation a legitimate partner. Amsterdam was the exception: all local branches of NCB, including the one in Rotterdam, followed Rabbae's line. The Moroccan corporatist institutions in Amsterdam collapsed in spite of the cooperation between radicals and conservatives.

<sup>84</sup> The government established Argan with support of KMAN but it became a battleground between the old and young generation. Since it was first established in 1991, young volunteers and workers had complained about the presence and meddling of older men. There were conflicts within the space as well as in court to decide who would rule the center. When Argan relocated from Amsterdam East to New West, the older men and their influence disappeared. In the new location, street kids undermined the activities of the youth center. When Argan relocated again, from New West to Old West, the street kids and their influence disappeared. In its new location the youth center evolved into a vibrant institution but it could only do so because it had – quite literally – left behind the older generation and street kids, which illustrates the fragmentation of the Moroccan community.

<sup>85</sup> In the 1980s, the guest worker associations received structural subsidies from the municipality but also from the Ministry of Welfare and, occasionally, from the Ministry for Foreign Aid. They also received income from membership contributions, ticket sales for cultural events and donations.

<sup>86</sup> Project subsidies are allocated for specific activities. Periodical subsidies are allocated for specific activities during a particular time frame (usually 6 or 12 months but not more). Periodical subsidies have to be requested annually or bi-annually (several months before the decision is taken) while project subsidies can be requested throughout the year.

<sup>87</sup> In 2005 the only Moroccan association to receive subsidies was the Ibn Khaldoun Mosque. Turkish left-wing associations also suffered. In 2005 there were still two (out of four) associations that received subsidies but the amount was much smaller than in 1995 and 2000. These associations – HTIB and DVA – have managed to transform themselves from left-wing umbrella associations into associations that cater to specific segments within the Turkish community. The reason why Turkish associations suffered less than their Moroccan counterparts has been discussed above but these differences between ethnic groups are of limited importance compared to the much broader shift away from corporatist governance.

<sup>88</sup> On 22 November 2000, *Het Parool* published this characterization of Abdou Menebhi:

Status: professional Moroccan since as long as anybody can remember. Rushes to the scene as soon as there are subsidies. Or when Moroccans are at issue and when an opinion of The Moroccan Community is desired.

But does he speak on behalf of the whole community? Menebhi thinks so. But surely he speaks on behalf of the City Moroccan Council, of which he is a chairman. In broken Dutch, even though he has been here for over a quarter of a century. ...

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Does he have a lot of recognition? Definitely. Especially outside of the Moroccan community. But don't be mistaken: he is an extraordinary authoritarian figure, with a lot of power within his own clan, Berbers from the Rif Mountains. He terrifies them. He hands out the tasks and they c-r-a-w-l for him.

But he loves dialogues so much. Really, he loves them. Especially "open" dialogues. Menebhi is split. For instance during the riots on the Allebei square. He does participate in the demonstration against police action but in the meantime he calls for an "open dialogue" with that same police. ...

What does this City Moroccan Council actually do? You're not the first to wonder. An obscure club. You only hear from them when the mayor really does not know who else he could turn to (*Het Parool*, 2000).

This fragment associates Menebhi with virtually every civil sin: opportunism, clientelism, authoritarianism, hypocrisy. But even this profile concedes that Menebhi is the last person the mayor turns to. At this point, there apparently were no people who could represent a stigmatized community without being stigmatized themselves.

<sup>89</sup> Walter Nicholls observes a similar process in his research of France's *politique de la ville*. He describes it as "associationalism from above" (Nicholls, 2006).

<sup>90</sup> The Hudson Institute is sometimes credited with the invention of diversity policy. In 1987, it stated that "the proper management of [a] diverse workforce is a key priority, not because enterprises are becoming kinder or gentler but because they want to survive and grow" (quoted in Sandon, 2006).

<sup>91</sup> The most important difference is that Essed emphasized the structural dimension of racism and postulated that organized, white interests were standing in the way of equality and diversity. Ramdas directed his criticisms against spokespersons for minorities and emphasized that minority group cultures and solidarities were standing in the way of democracy and liberty.

<sup>92</sup> The types of structural analyses that could be found in the policy framework of 1989 (see previous chapter) are completely absent from the diversity memorandum of 1999. However, the document is not entirely silent about high levels of unemployment, low educational performance and high poverty levels. It posits that policies to reduce disadvantages remain necessary in the light of these ongoing problems. But low educational attainment and unemployment are no longer seen as injustices inflicted upon certain groups but as a waste of talent and human resources. To remedy these problems is not "only social, it is most of all smart" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1999, p. 3). Racism and discrimination are also mentioned in the document but are now part of a more general – and less serious – problem of "mutual prejudice." Especially Moroccan boys and women with head scarves have been negatively portrayed in the media and this requires active efforts by the government and its partners "to create positive images of groups of Amsterdammers" (*ibid.*, 1999, p. 29).

<sup>93</sup> According to a municipal website, there were eight think tanks for social cohesion in November 2008 (Denktank Sociale Cohesie, 2009).

<sup>94</sup> This does not mean that no migrants work in these associations. The distinction between a "varied" and "Dutch" association is not clear-cut. I operationalized the ethnicity of an association by looking at the application and on the association's website. One foreign name would be enough to refer to an association as "varied." The labels may be debatable in individual instances but the overall pattern is clear: associations with Dutch (and to a lesser extent varied and Moroccan) leaderships win at the expense of those with migrant leaderships. Similar problems occur with the operationalization of the distinction between commercial bureaus

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and civil society associations. None of the projects here are presented to the municipality as a “commercial” project and many depend on the efforts of volunteers. In this sense, no activity is purely commercial. However, very often consultancy fees are charged or there is a direct connection between the commercial activities of an agency and its subsidized activities.

<sup>95</sup> Individual organizations can apply for amounts of up to 50,000 euros but the company cooperated with other organizations in three different ventures.

<sup>96</sup> According to the subtitle of their website (TANS, 2009).

<sup>97</sup> This surge is high compared to Turks (130 per cent), Surinamese (60 per cent) and native Dutch (35 per cent). The number stood at 2,100 in 2005. Like students from other large migrant groups, Moroccans often choose for studies like law, administration and economics (O & S, 2007, p. 6).

<sup>98</sup> “Problem youth” appears mainly in policy discourse. “Street culture” is a popular term among the left and social scientists (e.g. De Jong, 2007). The media often report on Moroccan youth gangs. Geert Wilders speaks of “Moroccan street terrorists.” Ahmed Marcouch refers to “thugs.” Oudkerk first coined the phrase *kut-Marokkanen* (which roughly translates as “fucking Moroccans”) but it has since been euphemized into k-u-t-Marokkanen or put in between inverted commas.

<sup>99</sup> To which Cohen replied: “But they are *our* Kut-Marokkanen.”

<sup>100</sup> The city also ran a campaign against discrimination. In 2007, posters on the street showed people who look like a Jew, a Muslim woman, a Moroccan young man and a Surinamese man, with captions suggesting that they are discriminated against (“because of my creed”; “because of my head scarf”; “because of my name”; “because of my skin color”). The posters advertised the municipal reporting point for discrimination. While this showed that the municipality is concerned about discrimination, it also revealed that the government has monopolized the fight against it. Amsterdam did not politically or financially support associations struggling against racism or discrimination but instead established a reporting point in its own bureaucracy – in contrast to Rotterdam where the municipality provided structural subsidies to a monitoring center for racism and an agency against discrimination.

<sup>101</sup> This phrase was originally associated with Joop den Uyl, Labor prime minister between 1973-1977, who said in 1986:

“Polarization” is an inappropriate term to capture the process of segmentation and defusion that currently takes place within our society. The effort to counter this process we can imperfectly describe as an attempt to renew integration and strengthen cohesion. To keep things together – that’s it.

The remark is cited on the back cover of a report on a conference on urban renewal in 1990, which in turn is cited by Jan Dirk Snel (Snel, 2007).

<sup>102</sup> Cohen’s ideas did not suddenly change this situation as it is the alderman for diversity, not the mayor, who is responsible for integration policies. But Cohen’s ideas nevertheless had major symbolic importance.

Mediatization and politicization turned integration into much more than just another policy domain. It became the issue through which the position and identity of the administration was defined.

<sup>103</sup> This represented a conception of the city’s population already long in the making: the population is no longer composed of ethnic groups nor of diverse individuals but of more or less civil groups. The translation of these

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conceptions into institutions is far from trivial for several reasons. Most obviously, it takes time for new political conceptions to materialize into bureaucratic categories and my research was conducted while this process was ongoing. Another reason is that the formal separation of Church and State disallows the government from directly subsidizing liberal Islam or any other form of religion. It is not uncommon to subsidize associations connected to mosques or churches but only for non-religious activities, like computer courses or language lessons. This means that the government can either not fulfill its desire to support liberal Islam or do so indirectly.

<sup>104</sup> *Unie voor Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Amsterdam en Omstreken*, Union for Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and Surroundings. The UMMAO was established as an alternative to UMMON (see Chapter 7), discussed in the chapter on ethnic corporatism. UMMAO has support from representatives of various Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam but lacks institutionalized relationships. It is an informal network without an office and when I conducted an interview with two representatives in 2006, the organizations had just lost their home base because a new and more conservative board did not want to maintain its (strong) relationships with UMMAO.

<sup>105</sup> Other members of the working group were writers Nazmiye Oral and Yasmine Allas – both non-practicing Muslims strongly in favor of making Muslims more self-critical. Pieter Winsemius of the right-wing Liberals (VVD) and Labor Party notable Felix Rottenberg also participated.

<sup>106</sup> According to a note to the municipal council of 16 November 2006, page 5.

<sup>107</sup> The philosophical legitimation for this is the principle of “compensating neutrality,” which stipulates that some forms of religion can be stimulated to increase choice. If one then accepts the idea that fundamentalist or radical Islam is much more powerful than liberal Islam, it is justified, according to the principle of compensating neutrality, to support the latter. It is an interesting paradox that the very same administrators who argue that most Muslims are not fundamentalist or radical argue that fundamentalist or radical Islam is so strong that the government needs to compensate for the weakness of liberal Islam.

<sup>108</sup> Surinamese and other “black” groups are generally absent.

<sup>109</sup> On one of the municipality’s poster campaigns, this discourse was sloganized as “*inburgeren, dat betekent meedoen*” – “civil enculturation, that means participation.” Participation is defined as participation in those institutions where native Dutch dominate. So participation in an ethnic association, in a household or in a network of friends is not, according to the conception of government policy, participation.

<sup>110</sup> Attempts to civilize cultural practices through the mobilization of religious discourse were not unique to Slotervaart; throughout the city similar initiatives were taken, with and without government support. For instance, the women’s association of Milli Gorus received subsidies from the SIP Fund (see Chapters 8 and 9) for a project on emancipation. In this particular project, an imam explained to men that much of the behavior they consider as “religious” is, in fact, “cultural,” and quite possibly in contradiction to the Quran. The women’s website is full of texts (by men) that argue that the well-being of women is central to Islamic belief. Let me cite one particular instance of the appropriation of Islam for civilizing missions.

In the minutes of one meeting published on the internet we can read that two panelists – an imam and a chairman – start by asking what the life of others means to the assembled men. The men answer that their lives are never more important than the lives of others but that sometimes the lives of others are more important than theirs. Then they are asked what they think about when they hear the word “honor.” Most of the men think of

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women, some think more specifically of wives, daughters or mothers. One also thinks of tradition and an old saying: the most important things in a man's life are a horse, a wife and a weapon. They then talk more about who exactly carries the honor (consensus: women) and who has to defend it (consensus: men). When the conversation moves to flirting, one audience member says that it is not allowed according to Islam, another feels it is allowed if the boy and girl marry. And what if honor is violated? One man has the impression that "she must die," others suggest marriage or prevention and one stresses that sufficient proof must exist (because the prophet emphasized this). Then comes the question what the men would do if someone from their family had lost their honor. Here I translate the report literally (with irregularities):

Participant 1: The person should question himself first. What is my share in this?

Participant 2: We raise the children. If my daughter does that, then I am responsible. But I did not raise my wife. What is my share [of the responsibility] when my wife walks down the wrong path?

[interruption] You should also question yourself to see if you give enough attention to your wife.

Participant 3: To give a frightening example, that person could be killed.

Participant 4: I would take a weapon and kill.

Chairman: You say "I will kill my wife or sister?" If it is your little brother, do you kill him too?

Participant 4: I mean, that is what society thinks.

Chairman: No, you talked on your own behalf. It has changed now, because it is about your brother.

Participant 4: .....?

Other participant: Why do we discuss? Because the Dutch want it that way? Our religion is pure and that is why it forbids these kinds of things.

Imam: I do not know what you are saying; what has this to do with the topic? These are our problems.

Chairman: We prepare these programs and questions. It has nothing to do with the wish of the Dutch.

The Dutch do not have honor and honor killings, but our society does. And such bad things are done on behalf of Islam. We work to prevent these problems. These programs are not made to please the people or the government.

Then the discussion moves to gender discrimination and gossiping and what to do when people say your honor has been violated (cited in Milli Gorus, 2006).

The association itself is responsible for the transcription and translation (from Turkish), so information may be distorted. Whether or not the account is precise, it is clear that Islam is mobilized against behavior considered uncivil according to standards generated in the Dutch civil sphere. It is all the more interesting that the imam, Osman Paköz, joined the association in 2004 after lobbying by the German headquarters of the European organization. According to Üzeyir Kabaktepe, this imam "seemed all right at first but then he protested more and more against our liberal policies" (cited in Dros, 2007). We thus see a deeply conservative imam (according to Kabaktepe) promoting an emancipatory discourse.

<sup>111</sup> As indicated in Chapter 8, structural subsidies refer to subsidies for which reservations are made in the municipal budget; this funding is secure as long as politicians do not ask the government to withdraw support and as long as civil servants do not have suspicions of fraud or misuse.

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<sup>112</sup> I examine power relations mainly through data on subsidies and do not devote much attention to consultative bodies. As noted above, ethnic councils did not exist in Rotterdam. There was an advisory council for the multicultural city (*Stedelijke Adviescommissie Multiculturele Stad*, SAMS), established in 1999 and consisting partly of members selected by minority associations and partly of members selected by the government. The institution was in operation until 2003 when its members declared that there was no more need for a specific council for minorities or multicultural society.

<sup>113</sup> PBR and SPIOR are the nodes that tie networks of associations together, the brokers between the government and civil society. They can thus be seen as powerful, though both organizations have internal mechanisms for power-sharing. Note that this is very different from the situation in Amsterdam where the most assertive groups monopolized the recognition and resources channeled to and through the advisory councils. Such monopolization was impossible in Rotterdam as civil corporations have elections and their credibility as intermediaries hinges upon their capacity to reach and organize large and diverse constituencies. Because power is spread over a large number of different associations, it is difficult to identify an elite, a group that clearly has more power than its competitors. The two corporations also balance each other. On the one hand, they constantly compete for the support of minority associations and recognition from the government. On the other hand, they have a productive relationship as they both win if the government seeks to support or target minority associations.

<sup>114</sup> I do not think it is a coincidence that four Muslim women won the prize. More than natives (mostly men) or Muslim men, they have developed a discourse sensitive to the anxieties about Islam *and* to experiences of discrimination. Central to this discourse is the purification strategy (see Chapter 6) which helps them to cleanse religion of culture. They used this strategy to great effect during the debates while authorities like Tariq Ramadan backed attempts to draw a hard line between (uncivil and profane) culture and (civil and sacred) religion. The distinction provided these women and many other Muslims with the chance to undergo a process of simultaneous civil and religious purification – they argued that their communities may indeed have problems but these result from the pollution caused by tradition rather than from any inherent defects in their religion.

<sup>115</sup> Although Muslims and the critics of *Leefbaar* had considerable discursive power, it was limited in time and space. The voting on the propositions was supposed to result in a civil charter stating the terms of conviviality between Muslims and non-Muslims but the government traded this idea for a “Rotterdam code” which had as its first rule that people should speak Dutch in public. Minister Verdonk enthusiastically supported the Rotterdam government and argued in the media that all people in the Netherlands should speak Dutch in public.

<sup>116</sup> It is a public secret that there are groups of young Moroccan men and boys who prostitute themselves. One family in the northern part of the city had raised the issue and a number of individual associations, welfare organizations and professionals indicated that the problem was structural and that collective action was needed. A number of professionals and associations tried to assess the nature and extent of the problem, and their search led them to the circle around Pim Fortuyn who had never made a secret of his sexual relationships with young Moroccan men. When he was once asked whether he ever talks to Muslims he responded with the answer “Talk? I sleep with them!” Most commentators interpreted this remark as just another extravagant quirk but within the Moroccan community there was a rumor that the sexual encounters had been videotaped and that Fortuyn and other Rotterdam homosexuals made use of the services of a clandestine network that actively recruits young

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Moroccans. The associations wrote several letters to administrators and police to demand an investigation. They were unsuccessful but a side-effect of this mobilization was that it created linkages between different segments of the Moroccan community and reinforced the ties of the most central associations with professionals and civil servants.

<sup>117</sup> Abdou Menebhi, the leader of the Moroccan Council, once told me that KMAN encouraged Moroccans to vote “not because local elections are so important but because Hassan II had forbidden people to vote.” The associations united in the Turkish Council also actively encouraged people to vote.

<sup>118</sup> The share of the population supporting the development of a multicultural society in which minorities retain much of their religious and ethnic identity has been remarkably stable since the late 1980s (Vijver *et al.*, 2007). Systematic, longitudinal data on opinions on Muslims has only been available since 2004 but there is no straightforward trend in the direction of more or less negativity (TNS-Nipo, 2008).

<sup>119</sup> The existence of a mechanism that works against discursive monopolization may help to solve a puzzle that I alluded to in the beginning of this study: why did the growing power of Culturalism not result in more negative opinions about the feasibility of a multicultural society? I hypothesize that the reason for this is not simply that people are slow to change their opinions but that their opinions are shaped in a force field that does not decisively transform in one or the other direction.

<sup>120</sup> The analysis focused on the stark differences in the relationship between civil society associations and the government. But when we examine developments in civil society (and not civil society’s relationship to the government), there are striking parallels between the two cities. In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the left-wing associations that had been dominant in the 1980s had lost much of their power by 2005. The network of progressive organizations in which they were embedded lost momentum: their base of support contracted while they suffered from increasingly strict administrative demands. Islamic associations, in contrast, were resilient or even gained in power. Mosque associations appealed to the conservative segments of the first generation while new associations were created by the second generation. The case studies showed that the ambiguous compulsion of the civil sphere also operates in local governance figurations: precisely because conservative and Islamic associations are relatively close to groups deemed to be outside society and beyond the government’s reach, these associations gain recognition as intermediaries and representatives. Moreover, younger generations are more likely to identify as Muslims than as ethnics. Civil Islam is still a marginal discourse in the national debate but among Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their offspring, it is a very strong discourse. Migrants develop interpretations that enable them to identify simultaneously as members of the Dutch civil community and as devout Muslims. While in the past secular associations distinguished themselves through the support of women’s emancipation and integration, such themes are now increasingly taken up by Muslims. Both in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants mobilized Islam against those civil sins that culturalists associate with minorities, including misogyny, authoritarianism, apathy, criminality and indolence.

<sup>121</sup> Note that the method for coding relations could lead to the overestimation of power concentration (see Appendix 2). I do not think that a different method would generate substantially different findings but this would have to be verified.

<sup>122</sup> In the debate on integration on the opinion pages but also, it seems, in Rotterdam during the Islam debates

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(where the challengers of Leefbaar faced a diffuse yet sizeable opposition).

<sup>123</sup> The orthodoxy is not simply out there, waiting to be challenged. It is rather a discursive creation of the challengers who identify – through such floating signifiers as “multiculturalists,” “old politics,” etc. – and thereby construct orthodoxy with which they can then effect a break.