Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics

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2. The struggle for civil power

This chapter presents the main concepts used throughout this study while leaving issues of operationalization and measurement for the introductory chapters of Parts II and III. The main challenge here is to develop conceptual lenses that allow us to ask empirical questions about the dynamics of power in integration politics. The chapter begins with a discussion of Jeffrey Alexander’s work on the civil sphere and how it can be used to study integration politics. It then posits Bourdieu’s field analysis as a fruitful avenue for examining power relations in the civil sphere. I subsequently argue that discourse analysis and network analysis can increase the explanatory leverage of field analysis. The result is an approach that provides a relational understanding of civil power, enabling us to examine transformations of power relations in a variety of different settings. Towards the end of the chapter, I argue that other approaches to the study of integration politics – while providing insight into power relations – do not sufficiently account for its dynamism. Finally, I indicate how this study’s research question will be answered.

Integration: a national fascination

After it became clear that labor and post-colonial migrants were here to stay, West European countries developed comprehensive institutional practices and discursive frameworks to determine if and how these outsiders would be recognized as citizens. The response to the presence of migrants reflected each country’s conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. In the United Kingdom, migrants were classified mainly in terms of “race.” In France, they were labeled as “citizens” in the tradition of the Republic. Migrants in Germany were excluded from citizenship as a result of the ethnic understanding institutionalized in its citizenship regime, while in the Netherlands ethnic diversity was accommodated according to the indigenous logic of “pillarization” (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2001; Joppke, 1996; Koopmans et al., 2005).2

While national idiosyncrasies endure, there seems to be a convergence in citizenship regimes across Western Europe. Most national governments now explicitly aim to reduce the immigration of low-skilled (family) migrants and have developed comprehensive programs to turn those who do immigrate into self-sufficient and autonomous citizens (Joppke, 2007). The desired outcome is individual and societal integration. As Adrian Favell puts it, “integration”
… is about imagining the national institutional forms and structures that can unify a diverse population; hence imagining what the state can actively do to “nationalize” newcomers and re-constitute the nation-state under conditions of growing cultural diversity. … [The] endurance of “integration” as the goal of most practical policy thought on the question in Europe – including amongst the leading independent academic authorities – gives us a clue to the vested interests and applied imperatives of the … nation-state building paradigm: the more-or-less coercive absorption of minority populations and regions through centralizing processes of modernization (2003, p. 18, 19, original emphasis).

Joppke is quite right when he suggests that talk of ‘national models’ smells of yesteryear (Joppke, 2004, p. 452). Left and right-leaning parties now also seem to agree on the basic ingredients of successful integration policy: the immigration of poor migrants must be curtailed, discrimination should be combated, and a set of incentives and disincentives put in place to induce migrants to enter society (Joppke, 2007).

This international convergence and cross-party consensus on the necessity of integration does not, however, preclude contention. While there is certainly convergence between countries and parties when it comes to integration policies, integration politics has grown more contentious. To understand this paradox, we need to realize that integration is now about civil integration. In the Netherlands, policies targeting minorities have existed since the 1970s. But it is only since the 1990s that they have focused on integration, explicitly aiming to turn ethnics into citizens and to unify a society threatened by disintegration. Migrants are not only expected to operate within existing institutional structures; they have become objects – and to some extent subjects – within ongoing struggles over what binds society together. Integration politics has burst out of its specific policy domain and entered into what Jeffrey Alexander (2006) refers to as the civil sphere: those institutions and communicative channels where actors negotiate the conditions and nature of civil belonging. The assassinations of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn and the film maker Theo van Gogh (see Chapter 5) are just two of the most extreme examples of a constant stream of mediatized incidents somehow associated with the presence of migrants and especially Muslims. Newspapers and television programs constantly cover integration issues and the struggle to define what incidents and events mean: what does an assassination mean for the integration of Muslims, how should we interpret high crime rates among migrants, what do we think of the
fears among natives, what can or should the government ask of migrants regarding their adaptation or assimilation? The answers to these questions define and redefine civil solidarities, determining who is in and who is out.

**Discursive struggles in the civil sphere**

Jeffrey Alexander’s conceptualization of the civil sphere – comprised of institutions and communicative channels that “generate the capacity for social criticism and democratic integration” (Alexander, 2006, p. 4) – allows analysis of struggles over inclusion and exclusion. “Such a sphere,” Alexander posits, “relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience, because of our putative commitment to a common secular faith” (*ibid*). As with any faith, however, sacredness implies the existence of profanity. The civil sphere is akin to religion in that it has institutions and rituals through which some actions, motives or relations are rendered pure, and others polluted. Alexander identifies a distinctive symbolic code of the civil sphere that supplies the structured categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential member, of civil society is made to fit. … Members of national communities firmly believe that “the world,” and this notably includes their own nation, is filled with people who either do not deserve freedom and communal support or are not capable of sustaining them… they do not wish to include them, protect them, or offer them rights, for they conceive them as being unworthy and amoral, as in some sense “uncivilized” (2006, p. 55).

Much has been written about the procedures through which nations define and defend their formal membership. But here my concern is with *integration* politics, i.e. with the struggles through which differences and inequalities are constructed between individuals and groups that share the same nationality, namely the Dutch one. More specifically, I want to examine how some identities and acts are construed as civil, while others are not. As Alexander argues, civil politics is

a discursive struggle. It is about the distribution of leader and followers, groups and institutions, not only in terms of material hierarchies but across highly structured symbolic sets. Power conflicts are not simply about who gets what and how much. They
are about who will be what, and for how long. Representation is critical. In the interplay between communicative institutions and their public audiences, will a group be represented in terms of one set of symbolic categories rather than another? This is the critical question.

The meanings ascribed through discourses are by no means neutral: they not only define certain identities and problems but also ascribe civil value to some identities, actions or behaviors while degrading others. Civil discourses define who belongs to a civil community. A civil community is analytically and empirically distinct from a national community. While people with passports and full citizenship rights are formally full members, many are regarded as being outside society – which is why they have to be contained (prisoners) or integrated (migrants, the unemployed) (see also Schinkel, 2007). Integration discourses stipulate how the civil community will be protected and who or what will be sanctified or sacrificed in the process. Integration discourses also suggest ways to design state institutions so that they better sanction civil identities and practices. Through laws, regulations and material support, the ideas and notions that compose integration discourses can be inscribed into the state. Researching civil politics as a process of continuous discursive struggle means studying how actors categorize one another and why they succeed or fail to impose their definition of the situation.

*The limitations of Alexander’s strong program*

While this study employs many of Jeffrey Alexander’s concepts to analyze integration politics, it does not adopt his explanatory strategy. Alexander’s analysis in *The Civil Sphere* (2006) is emblematic of his “strong program” in cultural sociology developed over recent years with several colleagues at Yale University. The type of cultural sociology Alexander advocates requires, first, that other, “non-symbolic social relations” are “bracketed out” in order to reconstruct “the culture structure as a social text” (Alexander & Smith, 2001, n.p.). The analyst then examines the impact of “culture structures” on social practices by anchoring “causality in proximate actors and agencies” (*ibid.*). In his analysis of the civil sphere, this means that Alexander identifies some types of actors as agents of civil repair. Through metaphors and performances, social movements and other actors can entice “core groups,” i.e. historically dominant groups, to view previously stigmatized groups as full members of the civil community. Even though Alexander acknowledges that the drive for exclusion is as foundational for the construction of the civil sphere as the drive for inclusion, he designates
only progressive movements as “civil.” But as several reviewers of Alexander’s work have pointed out, nativist movements of the past as well as the contemporary new right articulate their demands in a civil vocabulary (e.g. Wolve, 2007; Hurenkamp, 2009). Alan Wolve provides a counter-example to Alexander’s example of feminism as a movement for civil repair:

Pro-life activists claim that the rights of the fetus are equal to the rights of the mother and that someone needs to protect the future autonomy of a living creature lacking decision-making capacity now. These claims may be right or they may be wrong. But such claims cannot be judged by consigning those who disagree with the goals of feminists or egalitarians to the dreaded precincts of backlash movements (Wolve, 2007, n.p.).

Much the same is true for movements that mobilize against Muslims and other minorities. While Alexander would undoubtedly consider them “backlash movements”, this is not how they view and present themselves. Chapter 5 shows, for instance, that culturalists employ a symbolically rich discourse in which they frame their own interventions as a force for reason, truth and freedom. To claim that culturalists have grown stronger because civil or uncivil forces have prevailed does not offer an explanation but merely helps to politically locate the analyst who bestows such labels.

In short, Alexander’s work – while providing rich descriptions of the struggles over the status and incorporation of women, blacks and Jews – glosses over power. His framework explains how but not why social movements proliferate or falter at particular moments; nor does it enable us to gauge the impact of power within the civil sphere since civil relations are, by (Alexander’s) definition, characterized by equality and solidarity. Though Alexander recognizes the impact of social inequalities on the distribution of civil power (see below), his strong program in cultural sociology demands that he “brackets out” these relations. In short, Alexander’s concepts are useful to describe what integration politics consist of, but are insufficient to identify and explain dynamic power relations.

**Field analysis and inequalities in the civil sphere**

Whereas Alexander’s project is to identify the “possibilities of justice” (Alexander, 2003) in liberal democracies, Pierre Bourdieu’s work demonstrates the limitations of liberal
Bourdieu focuses on how seemingly universal institutions – religion, education, democracy – come to serve the interests of particular groups and can work to legitimate and conceal social inequalities (Bourdieu, 2005). His work can thus help us to incorporate the analysis of inequality in the study of the civil sphere – a necessary step to analyze integration politics. Synthesizing the work of both theorists, I argue, yields considerable theoretical returns as the weakness of one author is the strength of the other. Alexander provides a vocabulary to explain the formation of solidarities between actors with divergent interests; Bourdieu shows how particular interests motivate universal claims (cf. Bourdieu, 1990). But how to achieve this synthesis? My argument is that the concept of the “civil sphere” can be borrowed from Alexander’s cultural sociology and inserted into Bourdieu’s field theory so that the civil sphere can be analyzed as a field. This theoretical move is possible because the civil sphere, as identified by Alexander, has two structural properties that Bourdieu associates with fields.

First, like fields, the civil sphere has a measure of **autonomy**: it has a distinct logic through which hierarchies are constructed between different actors who partake in struggle. Like science, religion or art, the civil sphere has a vocabulary that all who wish to partake must speak. They must speak in the name of democracy, freedom and justice, and against those groups and discourses that threaten these values. Actors engage in struggles over classification as they try to impose their particular visions of the social world while devaluing those of their opponents (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170; Wacquant, 1992, p. 14). A culturalist, for instance, might argue that Islam has not yet experienced enlightenment and that its believers therefore suffer from irrationality and a distorted view of society. A critic of Culturalism, in contrast, might argue that fear of Islam amounts to hysteria and that civil integration is possible if all parties calmly look for solutions. In the specific vocabulary of the civil sphere, antagonists portray their opponents as a threat to the civil community, its democratic relationships and its capacities for rational reasoning (Alexander, 2006, pp. 57-62).

Second, like fields, the civil sphere only has **relative autonomy**: it refracts the power relations and inequalities of the surrounding environment. This point is crucial for Bourdieu since he argues that the struggle for legitimation within fields is determined by the mobilization and conversion of different forms of capital. While Alexander’s “strong program” precludes analysis of the effects of such inequalities on power relations within the civil sphere, he acknowledges that its autonomy is relative. The outcome of struggles within the civil sphere “depends on resources and inputs from other spheres… In this sense it can be said that civil society is dependent upon these spheres” (Alexander, 2006, pp. 54-55).
Alexander’s account of the performances and symbolism of the civil rights movement, for instance, complements rather than contradicts explanations that center on the growing economic power of the Southern black population or the organizational strength of the black churches. Cultural capital is crucial for actors to formulate effective rhetorical strategies, economic capital to invest in organizational infrastructures that institutionalize and disseminate discourse. While Alexander’s strong program of cultural sociology demands that we “bracket out” such relationships, his conceptualization of the civil sphere does not require us to do so.

For these reasons, I think it is both possible and opportune to use Alexander’s vocabulary to analyze the civil sphere and Bourdieu’s field theory to explain how actors accrue capital and mobilize such capital in struggles to define what is civil and what is not. The concept of civil sphere thus understood is very close to Bourdieu’s understanding of the “field of power”6 – “the public sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the bureaucratic field” (Wacquant, 2007, p. 1). This concept, designed to overcome the substantialist notion of a “ruling class,” allows the relational analysis of struggles between elites rooted in different locations of various fields (Wacquant, 1993). I thus conceive of the civil sphere as a space of struggle where actors compete and cooperate to define who belongs to the civil community and what its problems are.

Bourdieu’s focus on the class component of integration politics – where class should be understood in a broad sense as resulting from the unequal distribution of economic and cultural capital as well as the division of material and symbolic labor (Bourdieu, 1985) – is crucially important in the Dutch context where class inequality is written into integration politics from the start: government policies only label migrant groups as ethnic minorities when they are economically weak (Chapter 4). The coincidence of class and ascribed ethnicity has a profound impact on the distribution of civil power since the consumption of media, involvement in civil society associations, participation in the electoral process and policy-making all require economic and especially cultural capital. In all the fields where integration politics plays out, minorities are likely to suffer from a relative lack of resources.

Nevertheless, integration politics is not a struggle between the native majority and the migrant minority or between Muslims and non-Muslims. The competitors in integration politics are actors promoting divergent views of the civil community and its problems. The civil sphere is a meta-field where logics from different fields collide or coalesce (Couldry, 2003). Actors from different fields (academia, parliamentary politics, journalism, civil society associations, literature) try to promote their particular visions of the social world in public
debates and to inscribe these visions into state institutions. Integration politics therefore does not primarily revolve around the relations between different ethnic or religious groups but between actors who promote different views of minorities and integration issues. Bourdieu’s research shows that differences of opinion or preferences are rooted in different social conditions and become embodied in the actors’ habitus (cf. Bourdieu, 1984b, p. 170). At stake in the struggles is the value of embodied views and perspectives. We will see in Part II, for instance, that sociologists in the integration debate advocate empirical research and appreciation of local contingencies against the tendency of culturalists to think in terms of civilizational or cultural conflict. Since sociologists have historically played an important role in advising the state on how to solve integration problems, it is hardly surprising that they advocate calm assessment to produce effective policy. In contrast, philosophers in the Dutch integration debate tend to focus on the fundamental principles that should inform integration politics and argue that the sacred texts – rather than the social practices – of Muslims should be subject to scrutiny. They usually do not detail how policies should be implemented, but instead argue, with reference to exemplary cases, the need to protect or reject a general principle. Representatives of both disciplines thus do not simply advance arguments about minority integration; they also try to show the value of the schemes of perception over which they have expert control. Divisions within academia are thus refracted and renegotiated in the civil sphere where actors translate views cultivated in particular fields into discourses on how to understand and govern diversity.

Discourses, networks and the limitations of Bourdieu’s analysis of symbolic power

Bourdieu’s work provides the basic concepts and strategies to analyze struggles within the civil sphere and to undertake the sort of political sociology that Alexander’s principled neglect of things non-symbolic prevents. The idea that integration politics is essentially about classificatory struggles and the inscription of these classifications into bodies and institutions is central to this study, as is the idea that actors mobilize different quantities and types of capital in their struggle to make their particular discourse dominant. Although Bourdieu has often been characterized as a reproduction theorist, his work offers ample analytical tools to map and explain historical change (Gorski, 2010a). Nevertheless, the criticism that Bourdieu does not account for transformation – though not entirely accurate – does apply to his concept of symbolic power. While many of Bourdieu’s key concepts are designed to map the gradations, differentiations and dynamics of power, his writings have continued to rely on an
overly structuralist conception of symbolic power. This section identifies lacunas that need to be addressed in order to fully realize the explanatory potential of Bourdieu’s work. Considering discourses and networks, I argue, complements Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power and allows us to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations.

Discourses

“Symbolic power,” for Bourdieu, “is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 164). The dominated are complacent in their own subordination because they do not have the capacity to think outside of the discourses that historically powerful actors have imposed on them. In Bourdieu’s view, the state is the harbinger of such power because state institutions can inculcate subjects with schemes of perception which cue them to view the arbitrary power of the state as authoritative (Bourdieu, 1997, pp. 175-176). This conception of symbolic power, however, is too absolutist: it does not help to identify power where there is open discursive conflict, as is the case in Dutch integration politics. The same criticism applies to the discourse analysis of Willem Schinkel who, inspired by Bourdieu, analyzes the integration discourse (Schinkel, 2008). Schinkel argues that while actors in integration politics may appear to be virulently opposed to each other, their positions in fact emanate from one and the same discourse. In this type of analysis, actors’ positions are over-determined by a discourse that so curtails the range of available options that the differences between actors become mere surface appearances. Without being able to account for the substantive differences between actors, it becomes impossible to analyze the relations of power between them.

My conceptualization of discourse is designed to serve this purpose. I define discourse as a coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities. Let us examine these terms one at a time. I speak of a coherent ensemble to indicate that we cannot speak of a discourse if the attribution of meaning is (entirely) random (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Discourse implies that there are discernible patterns: a position on one issue corresponds to a position on another. For instance, people who argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible are also likely to believe that immigrants should be obliged to learn Dutch, that integration policies have failed, that Israel occupies Palestinian territories out of self-defense, that there should be less attention for the atrocities committed in the Netherlands’ colonial past, that Turkey should not join the...
European Union and that Dutch elites are imprisoned in a culture of political correctness. The correspondence of positions on these seemingly disparate issues justifies speaking of a discourse (a culturalist discourse in my terminology) in the same way that correspondence between scores on different variables indicates the presence of a shared dimension.

The notion of framing is used extensively in the social movement literature to highlight the importance of signification. A frame is “an interpretative schemata that signifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences in one’s present or past environments” (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 137; Goffman, 1974). In my understanding, a frame is composed of ideas, notions and symbols. “Ideas” refer to explicit assumptions and causal reasoning. We may call this the intellectual element of discourse as ideas stipulate how the world works and suggest certain ways to identify and explain patterns of social behavior. “Notions” refer to immediate conceptions or impressions. Notions very often remain implicit but can be expressed as statements that immediately reveal the position of actors. When actors remark that “the West has experienced enlightenment” or posit that “integration requires mutual respect,” they immediately reveal their adherence to a certain discourse (respectively a culturalist discourse and a pragmatist discourse in the terminology I develop in Chapter 3). “Symbols” are visual or verbal representations of values or collectives, such as the Christian cross, the Quran or the constitution. The meaning of these symbols is not stable but depends on how they are mobilized. The Quran, for instance, figures prominently in the discourse of both Muslims and culturalists but in very different ways.

Depending on the frame through which they ascribe meaning to reality, actors not only see but also feel different things. Hochschild’s notion of “feeling and framing rules” captures nicely how emotions are implicated in processes of signification. Framing rules stipulate how we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations; feeling rules “refer to guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 566). I frequently use words like “feel” or “sense” to indicate that what actors “think” is not merely a matter of cognition but also a sensual process. The routine ascription of meaning-emotion normally referred to as “common sense” is different for actors embodying different discourses. As the experiments of John Bargh and other psychologists and neuroscientists have shown, embodied schemes of perception serve to assign positive or negative sentiments to persons, actions or statements in an instant reflex (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Research on neural activity demonstrates how embodied discourses subconsciously influence how actors perceive others. For instance, tests show how subjects
with Democratic or Republican sympathies regulate their emotional reactions when confronted with images of candidates from opposing parties by activating cognitive control networks and suppressing positive feelings (Kaplan et al., 2006, p. 55). Apart from these instantaneous emotional responses, different discourses also stipulate how emotions should be managed (Hochschild, 1979). For instance, one influential promoter of Culturalism, Paul Scheffer, incessantly criticizes politicians and administrators for failing to communicate a “sense of urgency” about the unfolding “multicultural drama” that poses “the biggest threat to social peace” (Scheffer, 2000).9 Others warn against too much anxiety over integration issues and argue that we need to suppress prejudice to allow calm deliberation (see Part II).

Discourses are produced in settings located in particular parts of a field or at the intersection of different fields. To grasp such situational differentiation, we need to think of the civil sphere not only as a symbolic universe or an abstract space but as a physical space with a distinct geography.10 Integration discourses are formed in and through social practices in different settings (cf. Bourdieu, 1980). The particular demands of the situation in these different settings induce actors to adopt discourses that serve some instrumental, material or emotional interest (Swidler, 1994). For instance, diversity management professionals tend to adopt a particular integration discourse designed to capitalize on diversity within businesses or communities. These diversity managers, Chapter 9 shows, portray the city as a vibrant and diverse metropole where citizens are united in their pride of place. This integration discourse is cultivated in a different ecology of settings than, say, Culturalism. Culturalism is cultivated within right-leaning periodicals, right-leaning political parties and other specific settings discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Every discourse has its strongholds, its milieus, where participants share symbolic and class interests and are able to articulate a civil discourse from their perspective. Beyond these milieus, discourses clash and collide in arenas, i.e. settings where promoters of different discourses clash before a remote audience. All fields have settings that resemble milieus and settings that resemble arenas. Generally speaking, the central settings of the civil sphere (the parliament, the media) have large, diverse audiences and function as arenas, while the more marginal settings of the civil sphere (civil society associations, university departments) have smaller and more select audiences and function more as milieus. The distinction between milieus and arenas, while crude, allows us to specify the nature of discourse production in different settings and to indicate how different actors generate or mobilize discourses within them. With these conceptualizations of discourse in place, we can provisionally define discursive power as the capacity of a discourse, or the actor mobilizing it, to ascribe meaning and emotion to material and social realities. Struggles in the
civil sphere then revolve around civil power – the power to define who belongs to a civil community and what its problems are. But how to conceptualize power?

_A relational conception of power_

Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic power not only absolutizes discourse, it also absolutizes power. For Bourdieu, power expresses itself most forcefully in the absence of conflict. While I accept this argument, a case as contentious as Dutch integration politics requires not only looking beneath the surface of political life for shared _doxa_ but also analysis of actual conflict (compare Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 57). When Bourdieu maps power differentials between actors, he tends to equate power with capital. Rather than focusing on actors’ interactions or strategies, Bourdieu proposes to study the distribution of capital which, in his view, constitutes the objective relations that structure a field.

Bourdieu’s principled unwillingness to examine interactions\(^\text{11}\) reduces his capacity to understand the dynamics of collective action (cf. Crossley, 2003; Girling, 2004). Though the distribution of capital obviously shapes social action, the networks formed through interaction have an independent effect on power relations (Wellman, 1988). Norbert Elias’ study on community relations in the suburb of Winston Parva illustrates this point (Elias & Scotson, 1994). Even though the suburb’s two working-class neighborhoods were similar in terms of class and ethnic composition, the residents of one formed a coherent community; they were able to enforce civil norms internally and to exclude residents of the other area who were, even in their own eyes, considered less civilized. This was possible because the former cultivated their feelings of superiority through strong internal ties while the latter suffered in isolated resignation. Elias’ point has been confirmed time and time again by network analysts: the power of groups depends in part on their capacity to function as a group – that is, to channel resources and to coordinate action (Bruggeman, 2008).

To account for these figurational aspects of power relations, I conceptualize power as an emergent property of relations that emanates from, and structures, social interactions (Elias, 1978). Power is the “outgrowth of the positions that social actors occupy in one or more networks ... Far from being an attribute or property of actors, then, power is unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the very way in which figurations ... of relationships are patterned and operate” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 292). Actors “have” (or rather, concentrate) power to the extent that others in their networks feel forced, induced or seduced to infuse them with attention, funds, practical help or other power resources. Central actors are powerful because they serve as brokers and mediators of the resources available within
figurations. Exactly what sort of power is at stake depends on the context: the sources and workings of power differ between, say, intellectual conflicts, military conflicts and struggles within bureaucracies. While such differences add complexity, in all these figurations power emerges from asymmetrical interactions that concentrate resources in central actors while withholding them from marginal actors.

If we apply these general ideas to power in governance relations, “the state” is no longer the harbinger of power. Instead, power lies in the interdependencies between governance actors and their network structures. This relational understanding of power has implications for discourse analysis. Discourse is thoroughly relational in that individual positions, words or symbols cannot be understood outside the matrices of power relations in which they accrue significance. Discourses reflect and mediate the power of groups that imbue them with meaning; they are the interface through which actors come to understand their relation to others and the vehicle through which they try to redefine these relations. In Dutch integration politics, we see that culturalists attempted – quite successfully – to cleanse their group of the stigma of racism and prejudice. They engaged in counter-stigmatization by painting their opponents as dogmatic multiculturalists who censor truthful and sincere critics. The introduction of new words (“multiculturalist” entered the Dutch debate in the mid-1990s as a slur) and changes to the meaning of existing words (accusations of “racism” became taboo in the 1990s) thus signify a changing balance of power. This latter concept allows us to see “shades and grades in the power differentials of human groups. Tradition has confined us too long to static polarities, such as ruled and rulers, where one obviously needs the imaginary of a gliding approach, the ability to say ‘more’ or ‘less’” (Elias, 1998, p. 189).

Research strategy

How can we employ this relational conception of power to analyze change in integration politics? Parts II and III investigate the dynamics of power in two different civil sphere settings: the opinion pages of three broadsheet newspapers and the governance networks of the Netherlands’ two largest cities. Although the settings are very different, Parts II and III both analyze moments in the formation and transformation of power relations within fields (cf. Gorski, 2010b).

The genesis of fields. The starting point for my analysis is the genesis of the fields in which integration politics has historically played out: the civil sphere and the state bureaucracy. To
explain the inception and early development of a policy field for minority integration within the state bureaucracy, I locate its genesis within the broader development of the Dutch civil sphere (cf. Bourdieu, 1992). I show how power relations within the civil sphere at large were refracted in particular ways in the policy field and how the field developed its distinct power relations and contradictions.

The identification of positions and oppositions. After delineating the genesis and formation of a field, we can identify the actors within it and the positions they take. Interpretative analysis can be used to identify the positions of individual actors and to uncover the civil hierarchies implicit in discourse. How do actors define integration? How do they think it should be achieved? What problems do they identify, who do they blame and what kind of solutions do they suggest? Part II answers these questions through a qualitative examination of the trajectory of key actors through social space. Vignettes describe the milieus in which actors cultivated their dispositions and how they took a position in relation to others. Part II uses two quantitative techniques – correspondence analysis and community detection – to identify oppositions, while Part III relies on qualitative data to map positions in governance figurations. Through vignettes, interviews and secondary data, Part III analyzes the milieus where discourses and actors originate and reconstructs the formation of alliances and conflicts between actors from different settings.

The identification of power relations. Once we have identified positions and oppositions, how do we measure the relations of power between them? How do we determine whether a discourse is weak or strong? The abundance of integration discourse makes it possible, and indeed tempting, to substantiate preconceived ideas about the power of discourses. It is, for instance, easy to find evidence for both the strength and weakness of anti-racist discourse. To address this problem, my interpretative analysis is embedded in a quantitative analysis that unveils the relative power of actors by examining their positions within figurations. To remain with the example of anti-racist discourse, the question is not whether anti-racists have a presence in broadsheet newspapers or receive subsidies. The question is whether the promoters of Anti-racism are more or less central than the promoters of other discourses. To investigate the balance of power between discourses and actors through time, Parts II and III draw upon databases that contain quantitative indicators of civil power (see Chapters 3 and 7 for details).
Three possible causes of transformation. After reconstructing the development of fields, we can ask why changes did or did not occur. While the causes of change in power relations can only be identified empirically, here I anticipate some of my findings and use Bourdieu’s work to identify three causal mechanisms (cf. Bourdieu, 1984a, 1991, 1992; Gorski, 2010b). I first introduce examples from Bourdieu’s work and then discuss their relevance for explaining the formation and transformation of power relations in the civil sphere.

The first possible cause of transformation is the reconfiguration of relations between different fields so that the rules of the game in the civil sphere change. In his later work, Bourdieu criticized the subjugation of the logic of different fields to the neoliberal logic of the market (Bourdieu, 1998b, 2003). Similar processes have taken place in integration politics: while in the 1980s it was largely contained in a policy field, media attention intensified in the early 1990s and especially in the first half of the 2000s (see especially Chapters 4 and 5). The logic of integration politics thus became increasingly determined by the logic of the media (Bourdieu, 1998b; see also Hajer, 2009; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008a). The involvement of the media and the concomitant dramatization of integration politics played into the hands of actors with the will and ability to act in the public spotlight and to perform civil drama. Extravagant politicians like Pim Fortuyn could challenge established elites and routines with spectacular performances in new or increasingly important settings, such as talk shows (Lunt & Stenner, 2005). Mediatization not only changed the modalities of integration politics; it also changed the interests involved as distant audiences were pulled into local politics. This meant that governance actors could no longer exclusively focus on their local constituents or supporters; remote audiences with different concerns had to be considered. For instance, Islamic associations in a city like Amsterdam are likely to be deeply concerned about the stigmatization of Muslims, while large parts of the predominantly native media audience are more likely to feel anxious about the presence and radicalization of Muslims (Uitermark & Gielen, 2010).

The second possible cause for transformation is a change in the bases of support of actors within a field. An example from Bourdieu’s research is the explosive increase in the number of students entering universities in the 1950s and early 1960s. Especially in the new disciplines such as sociology, students had no prospects for a job that afforded status and stability (Bourdieu, 1984a). Students and junior teachers in these disciplines were “weakly integrated” into the university system and “liable to resentment” due to the contradiction between their “elevated expectations” and the “disappointment of these expectations entailed by the maintenance in the lowest ranks of the university hierarchy” (Bourdieu, 1984a, p. 170).
This analysis enables Bourdieu to locate the revolutionary sentiment of May ’68 in those parts of the university system where increased enrollment had created a pool of students for whom adherence to academic orthodoxy did not pay off. Similar examples can be found at different points in the current study. Part II discusses the example of Pim Fortuyn who was able to mobilize a part of the growing segment of the population disappointed with parliamentary politics. The erosion of the institutions of pillarization and the growing importance of commercial media had created a pool of potential supporters who – because of their low levels of cultural capital and their cynicism towards established parties – were longing for a radical and spectacular alternative. Part III discusses the example of the left-wing minority associations. The aging and increasing unemployment of guest workers, Chapter 8 shows, led to the contraction of the traditional base of support for left-wing minority associations and thus to their eventual demise in governance networks.

The third possible cause for transformation is the making or unmaking of alliances within or between fields. Interactions within fields create asymmetrical figurations of different groups. Relations between fields are especially important for understanding how elites interact across different fields. Towards the end of *Homo Academicus*, Bourdieu developed an “embryo of a theory of symbolic revolutions”; his hypothesis is that synchronized crises in disparate fields can cause systemic crisis (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 81; Bourdieu, 1984a, pp. 159-193). I would add that this process of synchronization is not mechanical; it is the result of coordination between elites operating in different fields. Part II illustrates this by showing how Culturalism became a powerful force when it gained support from an inter-field coalition of previously disparate actors including far-right politicians against migration, artists espousing the freedom of expression, philosophers promoting enlightenment values and Social Democrats reinventing the civilizing missions of the 19th century. Similarly, Part III shows how a coalition combining diversity managers, Labor party officials and Islamic associations emerged in Amsterdam following the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The formation of these coalitions cannot be explained solely as an outcome of changing distributions of capital. There is no alternative to investigating how actors’ strategic interactions produced figurations that brought some actors together while pulling others apart.

It is perhaps important to emphasize that these are three possible causes of transformation. Whether these transformations occur, and in what way, depend on both actors’ strategies and on sheer chance. The hijackers of 9/11 and the assassins of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn succeeded in executing their plans and their acts had a major impact on integration politics. But what if the 9/11 hijackers were caught before boarding the planes?
What if Theo van Gogh had not refused protection (as he did) after receiving death threats? What if Fortuyn had been killed by a radical Muslim rather than by a native Dutch environmental activist? While these questions are impossible to answer, it is clear that integration politics would not have been the same. Such sensitivity to indeterminacy, however, does not imply that history should be seen as a series of contingencies. Oppositions are not formed by incidents but are remade in response to incidents through a process of contentious sense-making. The best we can do is to reconstruct this process of discursive struggle and show why some actors gained power while others lost it.

**Discussion: how to investigate integration politics?**

The purpose of this chapter has been to develop a conceptual framework that can inform specific research questions and methodologies. Drawing on the work of Bourdieu and Alexander, I have suggested that a field analysis of civil politics provides a promising vantage point from which to analyze the dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics. To recapitulate: I view integration politics as a series of struggles within the civil sphere. The civil sphere is a meta-field (see Couldry, 2003) where actors rooted in different fields struggle to make their particular discourses dominant. The stake in these struggles is civil power: the power to define who belongs to a civil community and what its problems are. This power is not an attribute of an actor or a system, but an emergent property of social interactions between actors unequally invested with resources. Actors mobilize different kinds of capital to articulate and institutionalize their particular definitions of the civil community and its problems. At the most abstract level, transformations occur (1) when the rules of the game change so that some views or resources are revalued, (2) when actors form or break alliances to promote a certain discourse, and (3) when actors mobilize larger quantities and different types of resources to challenge established interests. How will this framework add to our understanding of integration politics? Let us compare the approach I have outlined to five other streams of research that center respectively around citizenship regimes, racial domination, cultural clashes, pluralism, and the politics of recognition.

**National models and minority mobilization**

In comparative and historical research, integration politics is often conceived of in terms of national citizenship regimes. Rogers Brubaker has shown how conceptions of nationhood find their way into institutions and structure the access and conditions of citizenship (Brubaker,
The research of Sydney Verba and his colleagues demonstrates that different nations have distinct cultures and institutions that determine how social and economic inequalities affect the level and nature of civil engagement (Verba et al., 1987). A number of researchers have furthermore demonstrated that state institutions influence the extent to which minorities mobilize, and through which identities (Ireland, 1994, 2004; Favell, 2001; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koopmans et al., 2005). These studies work on (and often corroborate) the hypothesis that there are distinct discursive and institutional political opportunity structures that enable and constrain actors to make certain claims. Many observers note that the dominant notion of “race relations” in the United Kingdom has encouraged political actors to mobilize around racial identities (as Blacks or Asians) rather than, for example, religious identities (Modood, 2005). French state institutions, in contrast, encourage political actors to mobilize as citizens of the Republic rather than, say, as ethnic minorities (Chambon, 2002; Garbaye, 2002).

I draw upon these insights in Part III, where I show that the opportunities inherent in local governance figurations shape power relations between governance actors. Nevertheless, the literature on institutions, political opportunities and citizenship regimes tends to focus on continuity rather than change (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999; Duyvendak et al., 2005). As a result, researchers often give short shrift to explanations of why political opportunities change. While inherited institutional figurations obviously influence the agenda and identities of actors, they cannot account for their dynamism.

Can the explanation in terms of national models be “saved” if we consider that models change with voter attitudes? Did – as Koopmans and his colleagues suggest (Koopmans et al., 2005) – growing public dissatisfaction with multiculturalism and hostility towards Islam lead politicians to reconsider and transform past institutional frameworks? Survey results in fact show that attitudes are remarkably constant; they do not show a clear trend of decreasing support for multiculturalism or growing hostility towards minorities (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007; Van de Vijver et al., 2007). Although a considerable share of the population (especially those segments with low levels of cultural capital) expresses xenophobic or anti-migration sentiments, this share has not grown over time, implying that changes in public opinion cannot explain the turbulence and volatility of integration politics.

In this study, the attitudes and sentiments of the population come into view, but only to the extent that they are mobilized by civil actors. Dynamism is understood as a play of discursive power in different settings where actors try to garner support and to discredit their opponents. The outcome is a matter of civil power, not of intrinsic merit. If we look at integration politics in this way, it is no longer possible to speak of “a model that has failed” or
to say that “the Dutch” have changed. Instead, we need to examine where discourses come from, how they were mobilized in struggles and how the actors promoting them came to dominate or falter in different settings. Instead of assuming that Dutch (or Amsterdam or Rotterdam) policies and debates originate from a single logic (a “model”), we need to investigate how different actors struggle to make their logic dominant and why they succeed or fail.

The study of racial domination
Researchers like Philomena Essed and Teun van Dijk have extensively investigated racism and discourses on racism in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Teun van Dijk’s analysis of elite discourse in the 1980s and 1990s shows how some actors attempted to broaden the discursive space for culturalist discourses through the discrediting of the anti-racist movement (Van Dijk, 1993, 2003; see also Van der Valk, 2002). My analysis in Part II confirms that Anti-racism was, indeed, a marginal discourse and that it remained so throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Essed’s research on the experiences of black women in the Netherlands, moreover, shows how discursive domination can be researched through the experiences of its victims (Essed, 1991). But though I use or confirm certain insights from the anti-racist literature, I do not adopt it wholesale for at least two reasons.

The first reason is that concepts like “new racism” and “cultural racism” capture new discourses of alterity in the old language of color racism (Schinkel, 2008, p. 85). While this serves the purpose of showing the continuity and similarity of exclusions produced by seemingly different discourses, it does not sufficiently capture their civil dimension. Integration discourses, including most variants of Culturalism, do not (only) serve to demarcate the boundaries of a white nation but (also) seek to expand and restore a civil community. While thinking in terms of a civil community is analogous to racism in that it hinges on the division between insiders and outsiders, it is also an alternative to racist discourse in that it creates possibilities – however few or remote – for outsiders to be defined, and to define themselves, as worthy members of the community.

The second reason is that the literature on racism focuses its analysis of discourses on how they contribute to racial domination. Van Dijk, for instance, examines how the media construct and legitimate racist domination through their choice of topics and their framing of the news. His research on news reports in Dutch newspapers in the 1980s conclusively shows that minorities are portrayed as uncivil – as alien, violent or dependent. No doubt similar results would be found for the 1990s and 2000s. But studying the effects and modalities of
discourses on racial or ethnic hierarchies does not reveal their origins; nor does it explain the power of discourses or changes within power relations among actors. To explain the genesis, development and transformation of discourse, we need to attend to power relations between elites in public debates and in governance networks. Divisions within these debates and networks do not necessarily develop along ethnic or racial lines; they can develop between actors with different disciplinary backgrounds (philosophers versus sociologists), different party affiliations (left and right) or different class backgrounds (guest worker associations versus diversity managers). Given my aim of explaining why some of these visions prevail, describing what these actors say or do in terms of different forms and degrees of racial domination is of limited use.

Cultural analysis

A very different set of approaches examines integration politics through the prism of culture. The most well-known variant of cultural analysis is based on the idea of civilizational conflict. The leader of the right-wing Liberals, Frits Bolkestein, popularized the idea of a civilizational conflict in the early 1990s when he argued that Islam was an ideological threat to the values of liberalism (Bolkestein, 1991). In the United States, Samuel Huntington coined the phrase “clash of civilizations” in the mid-1990s (Huntington, 1997). According to the idea of civilizational clash, the fundamental division in the Netherlands as well as around the world is between Islam and the West or between pre-enlightenment and enlightened cultures. This approach fails to account for diversity not just within minority communities but among Dutch natives as well (e.g., Guadeloupe & Van de Rooij, 2007). The subsequent chapters will reveal strong oppositions within the debate and within governance networks that cannot be reduced to clashing cultures, for the simple reason that they take place in what Huntington or Bolkestein would regard as a single culture. Rather than providing an explanation of the dynamics of integration politics, the promoters of this frame are a party in such conflicts. Or, as Willem Schinkel puts it, “the clash of civilizations does not result from cultural differences but from the political recodification and strategic mobilization of these differences” (Schinkel, 2008, p. 103). My goal is not to decide whether there really are cultural differences (or, for that matter, structures of racist domination) but to explain why Culturalism emerged, from where it drew support and how it was mobilized in discursive struggle.

Another variant of cultural analysis does not divide the world into two separate entities but foregrounds the importance of political and religious culture. Ian Buruma gives detailed accounts of the main characters in Dutch integration politics and writes extensively about the
evolution of Dutch political culture (Buruma, 2006). Ron Eyerman takes a similar approach as he investigates the multiple meanings of the assassination of Theo van Gogh against the background of the Dutch “postwar psyche” (Eyerman, 2008). While I incorporate insights from this literature when analyzing the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and interpreting the civil dramas that followed the Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh assassinations, my aim is not to interpret meanings but to explain why some interpretations came to prevail in the integration debate and how state institutions were restructured as a result.

A third variant of cultural analysis has a long history in Dutch integration research and focuses on differences between ethnic groups. The minorities policy of the 1980s targeted the four largest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese); they have been compared to each other and to the native Dutch on countless items, including labor market participation, media consumption, crime rates, educational performance, experience of discrimination, etc. (see, e.g., Penninx, 1988b; Veenman, 1994; Van Tubergen & Maas, 2006). Since data is gathered per ethnic group, ethnicity (rather than, for instance, class) naturally emerges as the explanation for the divergent scores (for critiques, see Rath, 1991; Essed & Nimako, 2006; Schinkel, 2007). I make use of these data at various points, especially in Part III. At times I also consider the cultural and political environment of sending countries: coalitions and oppositions between associations from the same ethnic group often reflect those of the political field in Morocco and Turkey. But though actors’ backgrounds may explain their stances or capacity to survive, they do not explain the transformations that have occurred in the integration debate or within governance figurations.

**The pluralist tradition**

Researchers in the pluralist tradition of political science (not to be confused with philosophical proponents of ethnic or cultural pluralism) argue that power in (American) politics is not concentrated in the hands of a single, coherent elite but distributed over a number of groups (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1980). A group with power in one domain may have none in another. In the pluralist tradition of Robert Dahl, Jaco Berveling’s analysis of power relations within Amsterdam’s governance networks (Berveling, 1994) employed numerous indicators which allowed him to determine actors’ relative power in the decision-making process. Such data on actors’ preferences and policy decisions reveal a key aspect of power relations: actors whose preferences are realized are obviously more powerful than those whose preferences are inconsequential. The approach, however, restricts power to such an extent that it glosses over some of its more insidious expressions (Lukes, 2005). Staying with
Berveling’s study, some actors were found to have more decision-making power than others within projects on migrant education and employment. But this still leaves unanswered the most important question, namely how these actors accrued their power in the first place. To appreciate Berveling’s finding that the Moroccan council and the Turkish council influenced decision-making, we need to understand how these councils were established, their internal struggles and positions within wider figurations. These historical and relational dimensions of power escape from view when we focus solely on the extent to which actors’ preferences influence decisions – we also want to know how these preferences are formed, which kinds of capital they mobilize to realize their preferences and how actors work together or oppose one another.

The politics of recognition

Another strand of integration research – under the rubric of “the politics of recognition” – focuses on whether and how diversity should be recognized (cf. Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Benhabib, 2002; Prins, 2002). Empirical cases here mainly serve as stepping stones for normative analysis; the literature – which is prescriptive rather than descriptive, normative rather than explanatory – analyzes political struggles with the purpose of resolving them. I have no intention to propose how identities should be recognized or which cultural practices should be condoned or accommodated.

Rather than focusing on the dilemmas of recognition, I analyze conflicts over minority integration against the backdrop of more general developments and dynamics in the civil sphere. I do not seek to abstract from reality those elements that exclusively relate to ethnic and religious diversity but instead examine how the rules of the game in different settings allow some actors to promote their understanding of integration while marginalizing others. While this may seem obvious, it is an important corrective to philosophical analyses of integration politics that tend to bracket dimensions of social life that shape power inequalities, such as the introduction of market mechanisms within state institutions (Chapter 8).

Conclusion

This chapter has prepared the conceptual groundwork for the remainder of the study. Extant approaches to the study of integration politics do not offer enough analytical leverage to explain transformations within power relations. To address this lacuna, I have suggested a field analysis of civil politics. The approach developed here understands integration politics as
a series of struggles in different settings. This implies that we do not search for a linear
development of integration politics in “the Netherlands” but rather investigate where
particular discourses garner support or encounter opposition. While this research strategy does
not preclude the possibility that one or another discourse will be identified as “dominant,” it
does invite us to detail when, where, how, to what extent, and to what effect discourses are
powerful. The approach is designed to detect power inequalities but to simultaneously alert us
to the ambivalence and limitations of domination. To take due account of differences between
settings, the main question of this study – *How and why did power relations transform in
Dutch integration politics?* – will be addressed in two parts. Part II deals with the (national)
debate and Part III focuses on (local) governance. Needless to say, the national debate and
local governance are not mutually autonomous. Many prominent actors in the debate are
based in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, while the debate feeds back into local governance
figurations. Both Parts II and III analyze the genesis of the contexts in which integration
politics take place, map transformations of power relations over time, and provide
explanations for these transformations. However, since they pose slightly different questions
and look at different sorts of settings, I develop specific methods for each part of the study.