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### Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics

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## 4. The evolution of the Dutch civil sphere

Culturalism has been a powerful force in the Netherlands since 1991 but it did not emerge out of thin air. To understand integration politics after 1991, we need to reconstruct the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and the genesis of a policy field through which minorities were to be governed. How did power relations form in the civil sphere and how were these refracted in the policy field? This chapter answers this question through an examination of the proliferation and resolution of three formative conflicts in the Dutch civil sphere: the emergence and incorporation of Catholic and Socialist challengers in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>25</sup> the emergence and incorporation of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Moluccan revolt of the 1970s and the subsequent inception of the minorities policy. This chapter shows how each of these conflicts affected power relations in the civil sphere and identifies how their resolution shaped the terrain on which integration politics would unfold after 1991. The chapter concludes that the failure of the minorities policy to successfully incorporate migrants in the 1980s prefigured the emergence of Culturalism in the 1990s.

### **Pillarization and Pragmatism**

During the 17<sup>th</sup> century, a period often referred to as “the golden age” of the Netherlands, the Dutch Republic was a loose federation of provinces rather than a unified state (Gorski, 2003). While the establishment of a monarchy in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and a constitutional monarchy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century centralized powers into a state apparatus, the distribution of power between religious groups (Protestants, Catholics) and class fractions (mercantile capitalists, landed nobility) was so even that it was impossible for any group to monopolize control over the state apparatus and impose its view upon others. Due to this balance of power, transformations took the form of reforms rather than revolutions; when one or the other party gained power and sought to inscribe its discourse into state institutions, this usually resulted in accommodation rather than confrontation.

The creation of “pillarized” institutions was an example such accommodation. In the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Catholics as well as Socialists challenged the hegemony of Protestants and capitalists. Because censitary suffrage and majority rule made it difficult for these groups to enter the parliamentary system, they increasingly organized outside of it. To prevent the kind of revolutionary developments that

had taken place elsewhere, Protestant and capitalist elites agreed to the introduction of universal suffrage and drastic constitutional reforms (Stuurman, 1983). Both the (divided) established elites and the (equally divided) challengers favored a system that accommodated different interests and incorporated even small minorities. The result was an extremely proportional electoral system in which even small Protestant sects and radical left-wing parties could gain seats in parliament; no less than 17 parties entered parliament after the elections of 1918. Since then, there has been a balance of power between three large currents: Christian Democracy (initially subdivided into Catholic and various Protestant parties, later united in the CDA – *Christen Democratisch Appèl* or Christian Democratic Appeal), the right-wing Liberals (VVD, *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* or People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), and the Social Democrats (PvdA – *Partij van de Arbeid* or Labor Party). Without exception, the Netherlands has been governed by coalition governments since the introduction of universal suffrage.

In 1918, the major parties reached an agreement stipulating that each subcultural group was entitled to manage its own service infrastructure with full financial support from the central government. “Pillarization” is a specific type of corporatism with distinct societal blocs each having their own political representatives and institutions of socialization (see Lijphart, 1968). In the terms presented in Chapter 2, pillars functioned as milieus where specific identities and schemes of perception were cultivated. Because each pillar had its own institutions – schools, churches, newspapers and parties – there was little interaction between different constituencies. The pillars remained highly segregated – so much so that they resembled different “countries” (Bagley, 1973, p. 231). For instance, the newspapers examined in the next chapter did not function as discursive arenas but as internal communication channels for pillars. Newspapers devoted disproportionate attention to “their” parties and either ignored or criticized competing parties.<sup>26</sup> The newspaper *Trouw* has its roots in the Protestant resistance against the Nazi occupation and was tied to the Protestant Anti-revolutionary Party in the post-war period. *De Volkskrant* was established as a bulletin of the Catholic labor movement in 1919; its editorials in the post-war period were entirely in line with the ideas of the Catholic People’s Party. The predecessors of *NRC Handelsblad* (*Algemeen Handelsblad* and *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*) had strong allegiance to the liberal parties. In this segregated civil sphere, the elites of the different pillars interacted with opponents but there was a generally accepted set of rules that guaranteed that these interactions would not evolve into open conflict (Lijphart, 1968). The institutions of pillarized corporatism encouraged elites to compromise, negotiate and accommodate, thereby fostering

a political culture of pragmatism. Magnifying cultural or political differences or arousing discontent was not done.<sup>27</sup>

Pillarization was characterized by a high level of communal autonomy at the national level and an equally high level of local paternalism. Services were provided by private charities that tended to see their clients as constituents of pillars. Over time, many of these private initiatives were placed under state control, while rapid secularization in the 1960s put further pressure on pillarized institutions. The Christian Democratic parties at this point changed their strategy. While they had resisted state interference before the war, they now argued for policies that not only benefited workers (the main constituents of the Social Democrats) but also other groups (such as self-employed entrepreneurs and housewives). As a result of this peculiar form of inter-party competition, the Dutch welfare state expanded explosively after the Second World War (Cox, 1995; Gladdish, 1991, p. 141).

Pillarization left an institutional heritage that shapes civil politics to this day. Religious minorities still have the right to establish institutions like schools and broadcasting stations with full financial support from the state. This explains, for instance, the relatively large number of Muslim schools in the Netherlands compared to other countries (see Rath *et al.*, 2001). Another effect of the pluralist compromise of 1918 is that it is comparatively easy for new parties to win seats in parliament; no more than 0.66 per cent of the vote is needed. This is significant for integration politics as it means that the parliamentary system is open to ascending challengers like the progressive movements of the 1960s or the culturalist movement that emerged in 2002. The idea of collective emancipation (and its correlate of communal social control) central to pillarization also influenced the minorities policy of the 1980s, though this was mediated by the new social movements that emerged after the collapse of corporatism.

### **De-pillarization and the new social movements**

The pillars of Dutch politics started to crumble in the late 1960s (Lijphart, 1988). As the welfare state expanded, people became less dependent on private, pillarized initiatives. The expansion of the welfare state came with central coordination and the universalization of standards and procedures. These processes undermined the discretion of pillarized elites to administer and allocate services. A rapidly growing number of youths and urbanites became less inclined to spend their lives in the pillars (and especially in the churches). New discursive milieus formed in the cities around youth movements such as the Provos, hippies and

squatters (Mamadouh, 1992). New political parties such as the progressive Liberal D'66 (Democrats 1966) and the anti-authoritarian PPR (*Politieke Partij Radikalen*, Radical Political Party) organized around new issues and managed to win support from voters who had no affinity with pillars. Within the Labor Party, the new left argued for a more passionate and oppositional style of politics.

De-pillarization affected all pillarized institutions, including the newspapers studied in the following chapters. All three have shaken off their ideological feathers to reach out to the growing number of people who do not wish to read the news from a particular – pillarized or ideological – perspective. The necessity to open up to new markets combined with a growing sense of journalistic professionalism; the result was that the three newspapers became much more alike – they covered similar issues and allowed a similar range of actors to voice their opinions. A side-effect of this process of de-segmentation is that the opinion pages now function as a single civil arena<sup>28</sup> that caters to the general – Dutch – public rather than to Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal subgroups. In fact, all three newspapers' daily opinion pages were introduced around 1990.<sup>29</sup>

The new social movements of the 1970s were accommodated in much the same way as socialist and confessional movements in the 1920s. While the pillars were crumbling, the culture of pragmatic compromise and consultation had become ingrained in the Dutch civil sphere, sustained through the institutions of proportional representation (Hoogenboom, 1996). Through newly established parties, the new movements directly influenced parliamentary politics; their ideas were inscribed into bureaucratic routines and institutional structures. The more reformist wings of the movements for women's emancipation, for housing rights and for the unemployed received subsidies and were incorporated into local and national consultative structures. Many ideas initially considered radical became widely accepted (Inglehart, 1977). During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there was an informalization of customs and a growing distaste for authoritarian relationships, between family members as well as between government and society (Wouters, 2004). Although the new social movements had their base in the expanding sector of (state-hired) specialists, they received support from a range of class fractions (Kriesi, 1989). Around 1990, consensus had grown within the Dutch population on what constitutes good conduct and acceptable ideas. When probed in surveys, at least seventy per cent of respondents *agree* that divorce is acceptable, that homosexuality is nothing special, that they believe in freedom of religion and consciousness, and that they support protection against discrimination. More than seventy per cent *disagree* with the propositions that women should have children to be happy, that there is a need for a strong leader, that

children should respect their parents and that we “would be better of if we returned to traditional ways of life” (Duyvendak, 2004, pp. 5-6).

How are the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s relevant to contemporary integration politics? James Kennedy has suggested that the formation of a secularized “majority culture” explains why the Dutch have so much antipathy towards religion in general and Muslims in particular (Kennedy, 2005). Jan Willem Duyvendak argues that the Dutch “progressive consensus” makes it easier to view Muslims as authoritarian, conservative outsiders (Duyvendak, 2004). Paul Sniderman and Loek Hagendoorn likewise suggest that natives and Muslims in the Netherlands have very different ideas about cultural practices like child rearing and therefore enter into conflict (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). I revisit and qualify these arguments in the next chapter where I specify how the widespread diffusion of progressive ideas shaped power relations in the civil sphere after 1991. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, new social movements spoke out against discrimination and in favor of minority rights. These movements and their ideals influenced the governance of minority integration at the local level and the formulation and implementation of the minorities policy.

### **The formation and contradictions of the minorities policy**

Thus far, this chapter has analyzed the evolution of the civil sphere in general. This section investigates how power relations in the civil sphere at large were refracted in a new policy field which took shape after the minorities policy was implemented in the 1980s. The section first sketches the creation and transformation of local governance networks before the introduction of the minorities policy. It then examines the genesis of the minorities policy and power relations between different actors. Finally, it explains why the corporatism of the minorities policy was in crisis from the moment it was conceived.

#### *An amalgam of local initiatives*

Assistance for foreign workers was organized through private initiative in the 1950s and early 1960s. While some support came from the central government, in most cities and regions confessional charities were the first to receive guest workers. Pillarized welfare foundations had traditionally incorporated the lower classes through paternalistic interventions (Dercksen & Verplanke, 1987); when the first post-colonial migrants and guest workers arrived, they reoriented themselves to this new and rapidly expanding target group (Rath, 1991). Networks of welfare organizations and civil society associations expanded in localities where migrants

concentrated. Confessional organizations had a strong presence in the first stages of the development of these governance networks, while the involvement of left-leaning (anti-racist and anti-imperialist) support groups increased over time. In the 1970s, left-leaning native activists combined forces with politicized migrants, including a small but influential group of political refugees. Coalitions of movement organizations and minority associations organized campaigns and created an infrastructure to assist migrants with legal counseling, Dutch courses, and other services to ease the plight of guest workers. As in many other fields, these progressive movements were incorporated in the state through the creation of professions (the number of community workers exploded in this period), categorical provisions (i.e., provisions for specific migrant groups) and consultative structures. Within the central government, the Ministry of Welfare – the “heart of the welfare state” (De Haan & Duyvendak, 2002) and vestige of the progressive left – financed and united the welfare foundations. This ministry was a central node in what otherwise was a loosely structured field composed of an amalgam of local networks without a clear center. Over the course of the 1980s, these local networks were drastically restructured through the minorities policy.

*The genesis of the minorities policy: standardization and centralization*

The trigger for the creation of the minorities policy was the sudden proliferation of militant action by Moluccans, including hijackings, occupations and killings. The Moluccans form a small community with a peculiar migration history and relationship with the Netherlands (Box 4.1). The established parties nevertheless felt that the Moluccan violence presaged the social unrest that might ensue if ethnic minorities continued to suffer from social isolation and economic deprivation. The solution, they argued, was a policy that would help ethnic minorities socially and economically integrate into Dutch society without shedding their cultural identities. In light of the contention after 1991, it is remarkable that in the late 1970s the main political currents – the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats – could so easily agree on the necessity and content of what would become the minorities policy. They opted for the tried and tested strategy of cooptation through corporatism: minorities were to be included through consultative structures and associations funded by the central state and incorporated into local governance networks.

#### **Box 4.1 A Moluccan backlash and the genesis of the minorities policy**

The Moluccas are an island group in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch colonial enterprise exploited the islands for spices but when trade stagnated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it shifted its attention to other islands. For these missions, the Dutch army recruited especially from Christian minorities such as the Menadonese and the Moluccans. “Of all the groups,” writes Bartels, “the Moluccans most justified the trust put into them.” Not only were they “fierce and daring” (others would say ruthless) soldiers, they also developed “an unquestioning, if not fanatical loyalty to the Dutch, especially to the house of Orange” (Bartels, 1986, p. 25). The Moluccan soldiers helped to suppress the revolts of other (Muslim) communities in Indonesia, joined the Dutch army when the Japanese invaded during World War II and joined the campaigns of the Dutch army to repress the Indonesian independence movement.

In 1950 Soekarno proclaimed the independence of a unitary Indonesian state. Their unwavering support for the former colonizers gave the Moluccan soldiers every reason to fear retaliation from the Indonesian independence movement. Many were convinced that only a federal Indonesia with an autonomous Moluccan Republic would protect them. But no government, including the Dutch one, would recognize the Moluccan Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan*, RMS). The Moluccan soldiers thus found themselves in a state controlled by their opponents. The soldiers and their families – 12,500 people in total – were shipped to the Netherlands, where they would remain until the Moluccan Republic would be established.

The Moluccans did not receive the warm welcome they had expected after years of loyal service. “Once having arrived in cold, damp Holland, the soldiers were rather unceremoniously discharged and put into camps spread all over the country – such as the former German concentration camps of Schattenberg and Vught” (Bartels, 1986, p. 29). The discharge came as a terrible shock to the soldiers. “The Moluccans felt sold out, treated like worthless trash. ... The proud soldiers felt emasculated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning in their lives” (*ibid.*, 29).

While the leaders of the older generation still hoped that the Dutch government would support the RMS or at least rehabilitate the veterans, the younger generation grew resentful, towards both the Dutch government for forsaking its responsibilities and their leaders for keeping the community at a standstill. After waiting in vain for more than two decades, a part of the younger generation took recourse to radical action, including occupations of the Indonesian embassy and Dutch government buildings. The most dramatic incidents were two hijackings of passenger trains in 1975 and 1977. The Moluccan militants killed hostages in both events to pressure the Dutch government, but to no avail. The first action ended when the hijackers surrendered after twelve days. The second hijacking ended when marines stormed the train and killed all six hijackers. Ed van Thijn, a Labor Party MP at the time, refers to the violence as a “wake-up call” to politicians of his generation (Van Thijn, 2008). National policy-makers felt that similar problems could develop among other minorities, whose numbers were growing. The stage was thus set for policies that would prevent the kind of violence that had brutally disrupted the idea of a peaceful and liberal nation.

The minorities policy marked the inception of a field with a new vocabulary, a new elite and new institutions. Although it is now common practice for Dutch commentators to divide the population into (first, second and third generation) migrants (*allochtonen*) and natives (*autochtonen*), or to distinguish between different ethnic minorities, these concepts and

categorizations only emerged with the minorities policy. Various migrant groups had come to the Netherlands under very different circumstances, spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, had different appearances, lived in different parts of the country and were entangled in different networks. Social scientists were among the first to develop a discourse that enabled the government to make sense of all these groups and to subject them to one and the same policy. The geographer Van Amersfoort (1974) was the first social scientist to offer a truly generalizing discourse through his notion of “minority formation,” which referred to the confluence of cultural alterity and economic marginality. Highly placed civil servants with backgrounds in the social sciences argued for policies to combat the segregation and deprivation of ethnic minorities (Entzinger, 1975).

The Scientific Council for Government Advice was charged with identifying the ethnic minorities to be targeted by such a policy. The Council hired Rinus Penninx – an anthropologist with Marxist sympathies and a history of involvement with migrant support groups (Scholten, 2007, p. 114) – to write a background report. The document he produced reads like, and in a very real sense *is*, the founding statement of a policy field (Penninx, 1979). The report gave lengthy descriptions of three categories of migrants (Moluccans, Mediterranean guest workers, and Surinamese and Antilleans) and an extensive overview of recommended policy measures. Penninx argued that politicians and policy-makers lacked the most basic understanding of the social consequences of immigration and that there was a disturbing lack of policy coordination. Although he did not specify what the policy philosophy should be, he argued for a comprehensive strategy to monitor and improve the position of migrants in various fields (including housing, education and the law) and expressed his hope that migrants would have a strong say in the policies that targeted them. The Scientific Council and the government accepted these recommendations wholesale, though they placed more emphasis on the threats potentially posed by minorities. The Scientific Council claimed that:

It is not to be expected that such participatory processes will take place without conflict; that would be to underestimate the problems at issue. The various cultures coming into confrontation with one another display some attitudes and behaviors that are not easily reconcilable, and that are regarded by both sides as fundamental achievements. Thus, for example, very important aspects of our western culture, such as individual liberty and equality, will be contested by another culture, sometimes militantly. In those cases of confrontation where no practical compromise is possible there remains no choice but to

defend the achievements of our culture against dissenting assertions (WRR, 1979, p. XXI).

Jos van Kemenade, the Minister of Education for the Labor Party, stated in 1982 that not all cultural practices should be preserved:

Although it is usually not stated very emphatically, it is crystal clear that recognition, let alone promotion of a group's own identity, values, normative orientation, behaviors and beliefs, finds its limits where these come into conflict with the values that are enshrined into Dutch society, the constitution and the law and that are part of the achievements of our society. Physical punishment, polygamy, suppression of women, forced marriages of minors, but also the evasion of compulsory education may very well be ... part of the indigenous identity or values ... but do not deserve to be promoted or preserved and, indeed, must be fought. Assimilation to the Dutch value pattern has to come first (cited in Mullard *et al.*, 1990, p. 61).

The above remarks reveal that the minorities policy was driven by a desire to prevent cultural insulation and segregation. Note that there was never any question of policies for non-deprived communities: the impetus was *not* a desire to preserve or celebrate minority cultures but to make sure that ethnic communities did not fall victim to the twin process of cultural isolation and economic deprivation. The sentiment that informed the minorities policy was one of anxious paternalism rather than enthusiastic multiculturalism.

#### *The formation and transformation of power relations in the policy field*

The minorities policy had a profound impact on power relations, both locally and nationally. Since we explore local repercussions in Part III, I here focus on power transformations at the national level. The most profound impact was due to the transformation of an amalgam of institutions into a unified field; bureaucratization created a center in the new policy field from which resources were distributed and through which information was processed. The minorities policy came under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Affairs; its newly established Directorate Minorities Policy acquired control over policy formulation. The technical and discursive skills of experts – proficiency in bureaucratic jargon, capacity to coordinate across departments and communicate with officials – enabled them to take up key positions as advisers, managers or professionals in and around this new center. With the desire

to contain unrest and administer populations at the root of the new policy, minority experts were well-placed to meet the demand for information and insight. One indication of the growing power of experts was the explosion in the number of research projects on minorities: from around 6 per year in the late 1970s to more than 200 in the mid-1980s (Penninx, 1988a, pp. 5-11). While many professionals first became involved in minority affairs due to their solidarity with migrants, bureaucratization and standardization increasingly opened the field to experts with less empathy; passionate advocates who argued on behalf of minorities were gradually replaced with experts who reasoned on behalf of the state.

The new elite entered into an increasingly antagonistic relationship with the elite that had been in control before the inception of the minorities policy. As stated above, the Ministry of Welfare had been a key node in the networks of welfare organizations and minority associations. These actors were marginalized as the field unified and centralized; the new policy was especially damaging for the categorical welfare organizations. The Moluccan Advisory Council, the Surinamese Welfare Council and many minority and welfare associations protested against the abolition of categorical provisions but were unsuccessful (Fermin, 1995). As a compromise, the minorities policy created consultative structures through which minority representatives could influence policy decisions. Minority associations moreover received funds to organize cultural and social activities to maintain migrant participation. Minority representatives were supposed to function as intermediaries and advisers in this corporatist policy figuration.

By the time the minorities policy had crystallized into institutions, it was clear that the newly established policy field was rife with contradictions. First of all, the corporatist structure presumed that ethnic groups were internally cohesive. This was only (partially) true for the Moluccan community. The Turkish and Moroccan communities were internally divided and lacked representative bodies. To nevertheless make use of the possibilities of recognition and its attendant resources, welfare organizations helped leftist political refugees and politicized guest workers to establish associations and to conquer places for themselves in the expanding minorities policy bureaucracy (see Chapters 8 and 11). Though it was convenient for administrators to recognize these figures as representatives, they did not represent the more conservative or apathetic currents within their respective ethnic communities (Köbben, 1983).

Second, minority representatives and experts were unequally invested with cultural capital. As a result of their particular migration trajectories, members of the Turkish and Moroccan communities mostly belonged to the lowest classes; the differences in education

and income with the native population were huge. Minority representatives were caught in a double bind. On the one hand, they were to operate within the state bureaucracy, requiring higher education, proficiency in (bureaucratic) Dutch, careful long-term planning and networking acumen. On the other hand, they were supposed to represent their communities, consisting of people in the lowest segments of the labor market. Their legitimacy was often called into question, either because they were not truly representative of their communities, or because they did not have the proper skills (see, e.g., Köbben, 1983). Minority associations often felt that their concerns were ignored, that they were consulted only after decisions had already been made, and that the government did not sufficiently recognize and reward their contributions. They often used formal hearings or consultations to lament policy decisions and to complain that they were not being taken seriously. Conference proceedings from the time and interviews with minority representatives reveal their intense frustration over the disjuncture between their formal and actual status (e.g. Mullard *et al.*, 1990; PBR, 1991; see Box 4.2). And the tensions between minority representatives and administrators only grew as the social position of minorities became weaker. Due to the contraction and relocation of industries that employed guest workers, unemployment skyrocketed. In 1979, when the Scientific Council published its first advice on the minorities policy, 11 percent of Moroccans and Turks were registered as unemployed (against 6 per cent for natives). In 1983, when the policy was implemented, the figure had risen to a staggering 37 per cent for Moroccans and Turks (against 14 per cent for natives).<sup>30</sup>

#### **Box 4.2 Pragmatic administrators versus passionate advocates – an example**

On 23 November 1987, the national minority organizations organized a symposium to evaluate the minorities policy four years after its inception. The program featured all the key players in the policy field: several researchers, a civil servant, a representative of minority associations, a governmental anti-racist organization and two ministers: L.C. Brinkman of Welfare and C.P. van Dijk of Interior Affairs. The speakers were mostly, though not exclusively, highly educated native Dutch men.

While the report does not list the symposium's attendees, most of the cited audience members were representatives of left-leaning minority associations. Two Turkish women remarked that "the government does not listen well to women" and that "scientists and policy-makers should use the experiences of migrant women" (cited in Lindo, 1986, p. 5). A representative of one of the national councils for migrant representation stated that good intentions are not enough – "the majority also really needs to listen to minorities" (*ibid.*, p. 6). A spokesperson of an umbrella association for guest workers stated that their "right to consultation" did not amount to much if the government did not want to "force itself to be consulted" (*ibid.*, p. 6). A representative of an Italian association used a more frivolous but telling metaphor: the government, he said, had acted as a father who buys a toy train for his son but then does not allow him to play with it (*ibid.*, p. 6).

The demand to be heard was articulated most forcefully in the "manifesto" that Mohammed Rabbae, director of the National Center for Foreigners, read out to Minister Van Dijk. Rabbae suggested, on behalf of "the minority organizations," a whole range of measures that would improve the position of minorities in the policy's various subdomains. But the essence of his message was that he did not feel the government was truly committed. "The minorities policy," he said, was about to degenerate into "minority management, without inspiration, routinized, and defensive" (*ibid.*, p. 147). He questioned whether there was the "*political will*" to put "the perspective of equality" into practice (*ibid.*, p. 152, original emphasis).

Van Dijk was not impressed and asked the audience to "excuse me for not responding to each and every allegation" (*ibid.*, p. 154). The government, he said, had recently discovered the limits of its own power: "We have come to the conclusion that we should be a bit more modest. And this is not just true for the minorities policy but for community work (*maatschappelijk werk*) generally" (*ibid.*, p. 154).

Due to these contradictions, the policy field was in crisis from its inception. In retrospect, it is clear that by the time the minorities policy was implemented, the movements that had shaped its development had lost their momentum. The corporatist logic of pillarization, the progressive ideals of the new social movements and the expansion of the welfare state had defined the content and approach of the minorities policy; it was a bureaucratic remnant of a time when the ideal of state-guided development towards a more equal, tolerant and inclusive society was widely shared. But already in 1987, just four years after the inception of the minorities policy, the government requested the Scientific Council for further advice on minority integration. This time Han Entzinger – an empirical sociologist, civil servant and

member of the progressive Liberals – was chiefly responsible. The advice, which came in 1989, recommended focusing on migrants' position on the labor market: civil integration courses as well as training schemes to reduce their relative disadvantage. Migrants were now relabeled *allochtonen* (WRR, 1989). They were no longer regarded as members of ethnic communities but as individuals with weak positions on the labor market, handicapped by their lack of proficiency in Dutch, by discrimination and by their meager networks.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has sketched the evolution of the Dutch civil sphere and the formation and transformation of the policy field through which minorities are administered. I showed that power relations in the Dutch civil sphere experienced sudden transformations on two occasions: in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when pillarization crystallized and in the late 1960s and early 1970s when new social movements put their stamp on the expanding welfare state. Both these ruptures were prefigured by long-term trends that exacerbated the contradictions of power relations in the civil sphere. I argue in the following chapters that a similar process took place in the early 2000s when the Dutch civil sphere experienced another major transformation – the ascendancy of Culturalism – whose conditions of possibility had long been in the making.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little discussion of minority integration within civil arenas. Articles occasionally appeared but there was no intense debate among politicians or intellectuals. Because of this lack of discursive struggle, the field that evolved around the minorities policy could develop its own distinctive rules and positions and oppositions. I especially emphasized the opposition between advocates and experts. The former presented themselves as the agents of migrants' emancipation; the latter, further removed from the experiences of migrants, adopted a more sober discourse. As categorical institutions were dissolved, as migrants suffered growing unemployment and as policies increasingly focused on economic integration, the experts gained in power at the expense of the advocates. This shifting balance of power was also reflected in government discourse. Whereas Rinus Penninx – an anthropologist with Marxist sympathies and a history of involvement with migrant support groups – sketched the contours of a policy for collective emancipation, Han Entzinger – an empirical sociologist, civil servant and member of the progressive Liberals – formulated a discourse that ascribed most value to individual economic integration. These shifts were profound. The ideas that had motivated the minorities policy could no longer count on strong

support when it was implemented; the transition towards the current integration policy was, by the end of the 1980s, well underway. But despite these contradictions, integration was not an issue around which political oppositions formed. The approach of the government was pragmatic and there was consensus among the major currents in Dutch politics that it should remain so. This changed in 1991.