Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics

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8. The minorities policy and the dominance of the radical left.

Ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam in the 1980s

I felt like I was doing a sort of archeology of civil society when I arrived at the neighborhood center in Amsterdam Oud-West. I was to visit an interviewee from Kommittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland: the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands. KMAN was established in a squat in 1975. A few years later it opened its headquarters just outside the historic center of Amsterdam. With the support of subsidies and many Moroccan and native volunteers, the association organized frenetically and created an extensive infrastructure of neighborhood subcommittees, working groups and consulting hours. Almost nothing of this was left when I conducted my interview in 2006. Its only regular meetings took place in this neighborhood center which provided KMAN space alongside many other small associations from the neighborhood. KMAN notices were on the front door. I also found a brochure of the City Moroccan Council (Stedelijke Marokkaanse Raad, SMR) listing a nine-digit phone number. It must have been printed before 1995, when phone numbers were extended by a single digit.

After searching through the deserted corridors of the neighborhood center, I found myself in a room with elderly Moroccan men drinking tea, playing games and conversing in Arabic or Berber (I cannot tell the difference). When I entered, they stopped their conversations and looked at me with surprise, as if they thought I had entered by mistake. After discovering that I had made an appointment with a member of the association, one of the men offered me a seat at his table. He was about 45 years old and slightly younger than most of the other men. He certainly was more communicative. In broken Dutch and English he explained that he had lived in France before and so did not have many memories of KMAN. But he was nevertheless nostalgic about those days of protests, campaigns and events, and told me of plans to rejuvenate the association.

After some time, a tall man with short gray hair entered the room. I recognized him from a protest against the police killing of a Moroccan man in Amsterdam West that KMAN had organized with other minority and anti-racist associations. KMAN had organized countless demonstrations. That one was the last. The tall man was one of the stewards who had volunteered to guide the protest. I remembered him because his impressive bearing had hardly helped as he tried to calm down some of the Moroccan youths in the protest. He and his fellow activists could not prevent several dozen youths from smashing shop and car
windows, which turned the event into a “rampage” according to the mainstream media. While these memories flashed through my mind he gave me a warm handshake and we exchanged some polite greetings. I think he did not feel comfortable enough about his Dutch to enter into a more substantive conversation but he gestured to me to come to an office in the back.

There I met my respondent, Driss Bouzit, a journalist who had been documenting KMAN from the beginning. He had made a career in the 1980s reporting on “minority affairs,” which became a journalistic niche after the “minorities policy” was established. At the time it was self-evident that reporters from minority groups should report on minority affairs but in the course of the 1990s the institutions of the minority policy had eroded. Bouzit confirmed what many other people had told me: the government had at some point decided to “pull the plug.” Like the civil servants and administrators I talked to, Bouzit said that the KMAN leadership was also to blame for this; they had been unwilling and unable to reform the association to meet contemporary demands. The association had once been a major player in civil society but its most resourceful and energetic activists had left and taken up positions in political parties, consultancy bureaus or welfare organizations, leaving behind the men in this room.

The interview was concluded when a meeting on disability allowances started. Enterprises had laid off guest workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s under the pretext that they were “disabled.” This meant that the government rather than the enterprises were financially responsible. Now, a quarter-century later, the government intended to test whether the recipients were indeed “100% disabled.” The activists of yesteryear had gathered to review the consequences of these reforms for their livelihoods.

* * *

Associations like KMAN had once received recognition and resources from the government but were marginalized over the course of the 1990s. The associations that were once organizing national demonstrations and serving large and diverse constituencies were now struggling for space in neighborhood centers or had disappeared altogether. Their former radicalism and vibrancy still incidentally reverberated in interviews but most of the time they just expressed deep frustration about the government, the media and politicians. They had been relegated from the very center of the field to the outer periphery; what remained was the feeling that they had been disenfranchised and humiliated. Before we can explain how the radical associations lost their power and prestige, we need to examine how they got it in the
first place. The next section analyzes the formation of “ethnic corporatism,” a governance figuration in which left-wing associations like KMAN had a central position. Subsequent sections identify the contradictions of this governance figuration and explain how these contradictions undermined the position of left-wing associations.

The formation of ethnic corporatism

Amsterdam’s policies towards migrants and minority associations took shape in a period of unprecedented social turmoil. Unemployment was skyrocketing, the middle classes were moving out of the city, the housing market had collapsed, drug scenes were growing and crime was on the rise. The city was in crisis but politics was more alive than ever before. Amsterdam in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the stage for some of the most explosive social conflicts of the post-war period. The squatting movement established countless autonomous social centers throughout the city. The student movement revolted in and outside the university. Anarchist and far-left political parties challenged the dominance of the Labor Party.

The government took recourse to draconian repression when the stakes were high – it sent tanks onto the street to break the squatters’ resistance (see Andriesen, 1981). But it also showed an impressive capacity to pacify social conflict. The combination of pressure from grassroots movements and support from the central state induced the local government to heed many of the demands of the protest groups and to fund and incorporate them. Social movements found inroads into the state and were offered resources and recognition to establish institutions to protect the rights of tenants, workers, welfare recipients, women, and so on. The funds provided by the central state as part of the minorities policy allowed the municipality to use this same strategy to incorporate minority associations into the state bureaucracy.

There were, however, deep schisms within migrant communities. The most vocal minority associations at the time were established by left-wing dissidents and militants who had often fled repression in their country of origin. In the Netherlands they engaged in political struggles for social and legal rights but also confronted co-ethnics who subscribed to conservative or fascist beliefs. Fierce battles were fought among and within minority associations. Within the Moroccan community there were continuous fights – sometimes physical – between dissidents who had fled from the dictatorial Moroccan regime and loyalists who supported the Moroccan King, Hassan VI. Within the Turkish community there
were occasionally violent clashes between Communists, Socialists and Kurds on the one hand and fascists on the other.

Each of these blocs had their own associations. Moroccan dissidents and radicals were united in KMAN,\(^\text{67}\) which often engaged in confrontations with the so-called Amicales, a network of associations sponsored by the Moroccan dictatorial state. Divisions among Turkish associations also reflected divisions in the sending country. The Communists of HTIB,\(^\text{68}\) the Socialists of DIDF\(^\text{69}\) and the Kurdish separatists of FKN\(^\text{70}\) were in conflict with supporters of the Turkish fascist party MHP,\(^\text{71}\) the so-called Grey Wolves. These conflicts between loyalists and radicals coincided and intersected with struggles between (secular) progressives and (religious) conservatives. As loyalists often organized through mosque associations, this only reinforced the hostility of left-wing associations towards religious groupings and authorities, although most religious associations – then as now – preferred to stay out of politics altogether.

These schisms within migrant communities created problems for the government: how to incorporate communities that were internally divided? The initial answer was to ignore the differences and to provide the same services to all associations through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners. However, left-wing associations and their native sympathizers protested vehemently against the support extended to conservative associations. Activist researchers uncovered the ties between the Amicales and the Moroccan government and disclosed the fascist ideology of the Grey Wolves. The left-wing associations moreover expressed frustration over the paternalism of the welfare organizations. They felt it was outrageous that native civil servants with limited knowledge of minority communities were designing and offering services to migrants. One senior civil servant describes the field in this period as a “political minefield.” She had worked in Rotterdam until 1981 and noticed a stark difference with Amsterdam:

There was a typical difference between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In Amsterdam there were all sorts of ideological discussions going on in migrant communities, especially among the foreign workers and their associations. The Ministry of Welfare had made a subsidy arrangement for categorical welfare provision through the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners and the Surinamese Welfare Foundation. There were no subsidies for migrant associations though they could declare some costs with the Welfare Foundations. But the migrant associations wanted to have a say in how the funds were distributed and they wanted their own budgets. At the time they had the support of
action groups, squatters, students, and many other political groups active in Amsterdam.

As I indicated in Chapter 4, many of the native Dutch professionals and volunteers involved in minority affairs in the 1970s and 1980s identified with the struggles of (left-wing) minority associations. Community workers and left-wing politicians agreed that paternalism had to be avoided and were steadfastly opposed to fascist or reactionary associations. The Welfare Foundation was abolished and the responsibility for the distribution of subsidies transferred to the municipality. This meant that – in contrast to Rotterdam – the Amsterdam government has since engaged directly with minority associations, without the mediation of organizations like the Welfare Foundation for Foreigners.

When the minorities policy was introduced in 1983, the central position of minority associations was formalized and institutionalized in advisory councils for different minority groups. The councils were made up of the representatives of individual minority associations, including political associations, mosques, cultural centers and sport clubs. The respective councils received administrative as well as financial support. Turks and Moroccans were initially together in one council but each community got its own council in 1989. Three other councils represented other ethnic minorities: one for Surinamese and Ghanians, one for Southern Europeans and one for refugees and Chinese. The awkward combination of different groups has to do with the requirement that councils represent at least 16,000 people. If a minority group did not reach this threshold, it had to form a council with other groups.

This way of institutionalizing civil society associations exemplifies the technocratic nature of the minorities policy and illustrates the argument in Chapter 4 that the government wanted, above all else, to organize and categorize these new populations in such a way that they would be governable. There was no multiculturalist impetus but the official policy goals nevertheless reflected the ambitions of progressive movements. The memorandum on the minorities policy in 1989 – the first time the government articulated a coherent framework for the growing range of policy measures related to minorities – mentioned two overall goals: “to take away the disadvantages (achterstanden) of migrants and to stimulate their social mobility by expanding access to scarce societal resources and services and by creating the conditions for emancipatory activity” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 16). The first goal fits with pragmatist integration discourse as it emphasizes the importance of preventing underclass formation. The second goal fits with anti-racist discourse as it explicitly states that the government needs to “combat racism and discrimination in order to break down inequalities in power relations” (ibid.).
Even though the memorandum explicitly stated that the preservation of cultural identity was not an official goal, the document recognized the importance of minority associations. Associations were supposed to organize groups that were beyond the reach of the state and to represent the interests of ethnic communities to the government. They were provided with subsidies to build an organizational infrastructure and to organize activities to involve groups that would otherwise remain disengaged. The ethnic community and its associations were to serve as a springboard first to the welfare state and then to the labor market (Duyvendak & Rijkschroeoff, 2004).

The governance figuration that emerged in Amsterdam in the early 1980s can be characterized as *ethnic corporatism*. It was *ethnic* because the councils were organized along ethnic lines and because associations were expected to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity rather than, for instance, religion, class or race. The figuration was *corporatist* because civil society fused with the state. Several individual associations received subsidies from the municipality while the respective councils received administrative as well as financial support. The secretaries of the councils had contracts as civil servants and were stationed at city hall. In short, a full-fledged minorities policy was in place providing positions and resources to minority associations and their representatives. Which actors reaped the rewards and recognition available within this figuration?

**Power relations under ethnic corporatism**

Ethnic corporatism in principle provides a model for the inclusion of each and every migrant. Every migrant belongs to an ethnic group which is represented by the ethnic council; every migrant can make use of social provisions provided to his or her ethnic group. In practice, however, ethnic corporatism in Amsterdam was much more open to some associations, communities and discourses than to others. Here I examine power differentials in two central domains of ethnic corporatism: the advisory councils (where recognition for representing migrant communities is at stake) and subsidy relationships (where resources are at stake).

*The advisory councils*

The councils were not assemblies where each association or participant had one vote. The councils had many members but only a few associations and individuals made the decisions and articulated the official viewpoints. The passivity of many associations was due to their disinterest in civil politics: their members were concerned with overcoming specific obstacles
(like permit procedures, fire safety regulations, etc.) but had no ambition to influence government policy or to engage in public debate. Another reason was that participation in governance networks and receiving subsidies could lead to scrutiny regarding both ideas and finances. This was especially the case for conservative associations under the watchful eyes of left-wing associations and their wide network of sympathizers, who insisted that the government should only support progressive associations.

In practice the left-wing associations could set the councils’ agendas and claim they represented the rest of the community. In many cases they actually did so; conservative and apathetic associations could be hostile to left-wing groups but nevertheless agree with – and passively support – measures that improved the position of their ethnic group, such as access to social housing, health care, education and measures combating discrimination and poverty. The left-wing associations, seeing themselves as vanguards, performed this role with passion. Intellectual dissidents and militant workers from KMAN came to dominate the Moroccan council; the Communists of HTIB the Turkish council.

The formal role of the advisory councils was to advise the government, but in this they never succeeded. Activists and intellectuals within associations like KMAN and HTIB were dominant within their ethnic community but subordinate in the state bureaucracy. While they were located at city hall and involved in various consultative structures, neither civil servants nor the councils felt that the advisory councils had much influence. There were both covert and open conflicts between the state bureaucracy and the advisory councils: they “were within and against the state” (Mayer, 1999, 138). The top level civil servants closest to the alderman responsible for policy said the following of their colleagues further down the hall:

Advocacy in our view does not only mean that one all the time and in the same way reminds others of the presence of migrants and arrogantly points out the implications without proposing solutions or strategies… Where the interests of migrants are represented, one must be convinced by a well-informed and creative contribution that shows new ways to take into account Amsterdam’s changing population. There is a lot of scope for improvement in this area. These considerations apply strongest to the participation at an institutional level (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 46).

One reason such constructive advice was not forthcoming was that the left-wing associations did not have the dispositions and networks to place their stamp on the policy process. The councils were unable to convey an image of professionalism and neutrality. Several
evaluations of the councils showed that the government often ignored concrete policy suggestions and it seems that the reputation of the councils deteriorated over time (Göttgens, 2004). But the leading left-wing associations also had a very different idea of their mission. They regarded themselves more as a vanguard than as experts and wanted to mobilize their constituents to push for radical social change.74

The Moroccan activists were particularly successful in monopolizing the advisory council as well as the subsidies. The left-wing activists of KMAN and affiliated associations had founded the Moroccan Council (SMR) and the municipality had subsequently recognized it as the official advisory council for Moroccans. The SMR became a vehicle for political mobilization and participated in numerous coalitions for social justice, including the anti-racist movement, the labor movement and the anti-war movement. Especially the anti-racist demonstrations of Nederland Bekent Kleur achieved visibility. Abdou Menebhi, the leader of the Moroccan council and one of the leaders of KMAN, was in the very center of the civil sphere during the mass demonstration against racism in 1992. He jumped in front of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers when (radical left-wing) protesters threw tomatoes at him: a quintessential civil act, right in the spotlight of the national media. Left-wing associations also controlled the Turkish council; its chairperson and secretary were normally recruited from their ranks during the late 1980s and early 1990s. While the networks among left-wing Turkish associations (such as DIDF, HITB, DVA75 and ATKB76) were fostered in part through the council, they could not instrumentalize the Turkish council to the same extent as their Moroccan counterparts. The conservative Turkish associations were much better organized than the conservative Moroccan associations and some, like Milli Gorus, actively challenged the monopolization of the council by left-wing associations. These differences between the Turkish and Moroccan councils become apparent when we analyze the subsidy relationships that formed the foundation of ethnic corporatism.

Subsidy relationships
Under ethnic corporatism, subsidy relationships and political representation went hand in hand: associations with a central place in advisory councils also received substantial structural subsidies. Table 8.1 breaks down the recipients of subsidy into different categories.77 The most striking finding is that left-wing associations received well over 70 per cent of the subsidies before 1995. Only after 1995 – when corporatism was corroding (see below) – did their share of subsidies decline. The table also shows that women’s associations accounted for a substantial share of the subsidies. They were, without exception, closely tied to the general –
i.e. male-dominated – left-wing associations. Female family members and acquaintances of
the men who dominated the left-wing associations organized traditional cultural activities
(knitting, folk dancing) but also campaigned for women’s rights. For instance, the Moroccan
women’s association MVVN\textsuperscript{78} (related to KMAN) has for decades protested against
Moroccan family law as well as Dutch immigration laws that discriminate against women.
Table 8.1 Municipal subsidies to Turkish and Moroccan associations in Amsterdam, 1985-2005

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<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish associations</td>
<td>Left-wing general</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37,227</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29,373</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>81,889</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Left-wing women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97,231</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>98,602</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,452</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47,463</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48,341</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57,022</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown / non-ideological</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27,645</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>210,827</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>180,768</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>145,696</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

| Moroccan associations | Left-wing general  | 3      | 58,884 | 51.7 | 2 | 54,277 | 45.1 | 2 | 56,324 | 50.3 | 3 | 98,529 | 66.9 | 0 | 0      | 0.0  |
|                       | Left-wing women    | 1      | 46,889 | 41.2 | 2 | 40,500 | 33.7 | 2 | 55,629 | 49.7 | 1 | 36,833 | 25.0 | 0 | 0      | 0.0  |
|                       | Mainstream         | 0      | 0      | 0.0  | 0 | 0      | 0.0  | 0 | 0      | 0.0  | 1 | 12,025 | 8.2  | 1 | 34,260 | 100  |
|                       | Conservative       | 3      | 8,168  | 7.2  | 3 | 25,448 | 21.2 | 0 | 0      | 0.0  | 0 | 0      | 0.0  | 0 | 0      | 0.0  |
| Total                 |                    | 7      | 113,941 | 100 | 7 | 120,225 | 100 | 4 | 111,953 | 100 | 5 | 147,388 | 100 | 1 | 34,260 | 100  |

| Turkish and Moroccan associations combined | Total left-wing | 8      | 240,231 | 74  | 8 | 222,752 | 74  | 6 | 193,842 | 75  | 7 | 264,708 | 65  | 2 | 69,476 | 53  |
|                                            | Total conservative | 3     | 48,724  | 15  | 3 | 52,793 | 18  | 3 | 63,806 | 25  | 4 | 80,773 | 20  | 3 | 62,060 | 47  |
|                                            | Unknown / other    | 4     | 35,813  | 11  | 3 | 25,448 | 8   | 0 | 0      | 0.0  | 2 | 62,815 | 15  | 0 | 0      | 0.0  |
| Total                                   |                    | 15     | 324,769 | 100 | 14 | 300,992 | 100 | 9 | 257,649 | 100 | 13 | 408,296 | 100 | 5 | 131,536 | 100 |

Source: archive Municipality of Amsterdam, author’s calculations
Not only the amounts but the nature of the subsidies matter; they were structural rather than project subsidies. Structural subsidies are part of the municipality’s annual budget; they reflect the commitment of the government to subsidize associations over a long period of time. Structural subsidies allow associations to invest in their institutional infrastructure, increasing their capacity to search for project subsidies from other sources (such as ministries and charities). Structural subsidies also allowed guest worker associations to expand their base with activities that were not valued by the government (cultural events) or that challenged the government (protests) without fear of losing their funding.

The left-wing associations flourished within this governance figuration: they offered counseling, provided Dutch, Turkish and Arabic language courses, organized information meetings, hosted large cultural events, published magazines, made radio broadcasts and frenetically mobilized for demonstrations and campaigns (Van der Valk, 1996). But the resources they received were out of proportion to the number of migrants they reached. Dozens of other associations did not receive subsidies and held marginal or lacked positions altogether within the advisory councils. As can be seen in Table 8.1, the dominance of the left-wing associations was stronger among Moroccans than Turks. Because they had more political interest and bureaucratic competence than the Moroccan associations, even some radically conservative Turkish associations received funding in this period. These were, however, the exceptions. The overall results are the opposite of what the critics of multiculturalism (Barry, 2001; Baumann, 1996, 1999; Benhabib, 2002; Cornell & Murphy, 2002; Okin, 1999) lead us to expect: left-wing associations managed to move right into the center of power while conservative associations were relegated to the background or excluded altogether.

The contradictions and erosion of ethnic corporatism

Ethnic corporatism was a stable governance figuration in the 1980s. But it contained contradictions that grew over the 1990s and ultimately led to its collapse around the turn of the century. Three developments aggravated the internal contradictions of corporatism: the contraction of the support base of left-wing associations, the introduction of market incentives in governance relationships, and the inability of ethnic representatives to discursively and institutionally manage defiant and disconnected youth.
When it implemented the minorities policy and established the institutions of ethnic corporatism, the government of Amsterdam was uninterested in the tensions within and between migrant groups.\(^82\) It lumped together Chinese migrants with Somali refugees, ultranationalist Grey Wolves with Kurdish separatists, and Moroccan dissidents with loyalists. As long as the councils formally represented 16,000 residents, the government did not care whether the different associations shared cultural attributes or political orientations. The result of this technocratic ignorance was that associations indifferent or hostile to one another were forced to cooperate. Frictions between the associations were for some time dampened by the incentives that the government – wittingly or not – provided to resolve differences. Floris Vermeulen has shown that Turkish associations in Amsterdam had many more ties between them than in Berlin where different factions existed within separate associational clusters (Vermeulen, 2006). The same was true for the Moroccan council. While Moroccan left-wing associations had initially refused to cooperate with religious associations, their attitude became milder and more pragmatic as the years passed (see, e.g. Haleber & Meijer, 1993). KMAN decided to cooperate with the loyalist mosque association UMMON, reflected in the appearance of Ibn Khaldoun – home base of one of the leaders of UMMON, Mohamed Echarrouati – on the list of subsidized associations (it is the one conservative association mentioned in Table 8.2).\(^83\) However, cooperation between opponents lasted only as long as it provided direct and tangible benefits to those involved. Both councils crumbled under their internal contradictions during the 1990s.

The **Turkish council** was undermined by tensions between conservative and radical associations. While the left-wing associations tried to dominate the council, they had lost many of their constituents and had not succeeded in involving the second generation of migrants, for whom the struggle for the rights of “guest workers” smelled of yesteryear. The guest workers had previously suffered hardship in their workplaces but at least they could mobilize through this identity (as workers) and as part of larger coalitions. When they lost their jobs *en masse*, there was no longer a shared identity through which the left-wing associations could mobilize. The conservative associations, in contrast, mobilized on the basis of Islamic identity – which had become more rather than less salient (see Part II). At one point Haci Karacaer, director of the conservative mosque federation Milli Gorus, became the chairperson of the council. Karacaer enthusiastically advocated the dissolution of the council, which he regarded as an anachronistic institution dominated by even more anachronistic associations and individuals.
The Moroccan council was likewise fraught with contradictions but the main conflict here was between the older and the younger generation. As noted above, the radicals of KMAN entered into a coalition with the conservatives of UMMON following the succession of Hassan II. There was undoubtedly a measure of *realpolitik* in this move. Like their Turkish counterparts, the Moroccan left-wing associations had lost their base and political momentum, making it increasingly difficult for them to claim to speak on behalf of the Moroccan community. The coalition with conservatives temporarily helped KMAN but it was rife with conflicts. The most damaging was between the different leaders of KMAN who claimed government subsidies for their own regions. KMAN had successfully applied for subsidies to start development projects in Morocco but these resources divided rather than strengthened the association. It also proved difficult to maintain contact with the younger generation. This was especially problematic in light of the rising anxiety over growing criminality among second generation Moroccans. Since the late 1980s there has been a steady flow of government, academic and media reports on the over-representation of Moroccan youths in crime statistics. The government initially involved Moroccan associations in efforts to prevent disengagement but it became increasingly apparent that there was a generational schism. The Argan youth center established with the support of left-wing associations initially formed part of the network around SMR and KMAN but over the course of the 1990s it cut most of its ties to the older generation.84

In short, a major contradiction within ethnic corporatism resulted from the forced cooperation of associations with very different interests, discourses and constituents. It was only possible to suppress these differences when one group of actors so dominated resources and recognition that it could claim to speak for the entire ethnic community. While the guest worker associations initially had this power, as they lost momentum it became increasingly clear that some actors – the younger generation in the case of Moroccans, conservatives in the case of Turks – had no interest in upholding a governance figuration that was controlled by their opponents.

*Flexible subsidies and the erosion of corporatist privileges*

A second contradiction within Amsterdam’s form of ethnic corporatism was that civil society associations depended for both resources and recognition on the government they agitated against. The model in which civil society associations rely on state funding but nevertheless enjoy a measure of autonomy came under pressure in many countries and in many policy domains in the 1990s (Duyvendak, 1999; Mayer, 1999). Administrators, politicians and civil
servants were increasingly influenced by the idea of a zakelijke overheid – the idea that the government should be run like a private company, simulating the market to ensure efficiency and compliance. If governments grant subsidies to civil society associations, they should stipulate how these funds are to be spent and monitor recipients’ performance; if an association does not reach stipulated targets, the funds should be transferred to another, more efficient association (Jordan & Jordan, 2000; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Within this neoliberal framework, there was no place for structural subsidies, which were one of the most important sources of income for guest worker associations.\textsuperscript{85} Structural subsidies were abolished in 1997 and replaced with project and periodic subsidies.\textsuperscript{86} Amounts previously earmarked for structural subsidies were now channeled through the so-called SIP Fund (named after the Subsidieverordening Integratie en Participatie or Subsidy Regulation for Integration and Participation), for which civil society associations had to tender bids. A further reform in 2004 opened the bidding to all associations, not just migrant associations. These changes in the rules of the game marked a move away from ethnic corporatism and undermined the power of the left-wing associations.

Table 8.2 shows that a small group of associations still dominated the scene in 1995 but that this had changed completely by 2005. Between 2000 and 2005, the trend was towards smaller subsidies to more and younger associations – indicative of the erosion of privileged positions in this particular policy domain and the crumbling of corporatist arrangements.
Table 8.2 Subsidy requests to Amsterdam’s Department of Societal Development (DMO) in the years 1995, 2000 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1995*</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget for subsidies</td>
<td>€ 793,888</td>
<td>€ 812,330</td>
<td>€ 738,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of subsidized organizations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average requested subsidy</td>
<td>€29,853</td>
<td>€27,653</td>
<td>€25,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average amount granted</td>
<td>€ 24,276</td>
<td>€23,592</td>
<td>€14,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of requested amount awarded</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average year of foundation (age)</td>
<td>1978 (17)</td>
<td>1986 (14)</td>
<td>1993 (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Turkish and Moroccan associations** | | | |
| Number of subsidized Turkish associations | 5 | 8 | 4 |
| Number of subsidized Moroccan associations | 4 | 5 | 1 |
| Per capita subsidy Turkish community | € 5.40 | € 7.40 | € 4.10 |
| Per capita subsidy Moroccan community | € 1.90 | € 2.20 | € 0.60 |

| Types of subsidized activities | Mostly socio-cultural activities. Few activities to explicitly promote integration or participation. | Mostly socio-cultural activities. Some activities to explicitly promote integration or participation. | Exclusively activities oriented towards integration and participation. |

* Data missing for 7 organizations. For these organizations, the amount is estimated on the basis of sources for 1996.

** Not all subsidy requests had been fully processed at the time of research. We have full data for 40 out of 62 organizations. Missing organizations are included in the budget and in the number of subsidized organizations but not in other figures.


The major losers were – as we would expect by now – the left-wing associations and especially Moroccan guest worker associations. Whereas in 1995 they were still secure in their funding, this was no longer the case after 1997. The shift towards project subsidies was disadvantageous for radical associations as they lacked the dispositions (the will as well as the capacity) to produce proper working plans and to organize the types of activities the government wished to promote. Nevertheless, the number of funded associations and the amount of subsidy per capita increased between 1995 and 2000; the Department for Societal Development at this point was still trying to induce the guest worker associations to operate.
within the changing policy framework. While it had begun funding new associations (hence the rise in numbers), it had not yet given up on the old ones. But by 2005, there was very little left of the former elite.87

Minority associations not only lost their structural subsidies; the institutional network in which they were embedded was also swept away. Turkish and Moroccan youth centers lost their funding while the Bureau for Strategic Minorities Policy at City Hall was closed down (Zwaap, 2002, n.p.). Such measures weakened the linkages between associations, professionals, civil servants and constituents. The data on structural subsidies merely provide a snapshot of the broader erosion of corporatist institutions and the tearing apart of networks within and between associations. Bahar Asiye’s case is illustrative (Box 8.1): associations catering to lower-class groups not only suffered the discontinuation of structural subsidies but reorganizations in the welfare sector, forced relocations and imposed cooperation. The infrastructure that had sustained secular and left-wing minority associations gradually corroded, and with it the power of the associations to organize and represent constituents.
Box 8.1 Asiye’s course

Bahar Asiye used to teach illiterate women from Turkey to read and write their native language. Initially she worked as a professional in service of the government, but as a result of the gradual abolition of the minorities policy her position was discontinued. After becoming unemployed she had more time to devote to ATKB, of which she had been a member for fifteen years. As a volunteer she taught grammar and syntax to illiterate women but the courses also had an important social function. The women came with cookies long before the lesson started to talk about their week – for many of them their only break from household or menial work. It was also the only place where they could find information in their native language on topics such as schools for their children, help with legal problems, or advice in case of difficulties in or with the family.

The courses had to be discontinued when the government canceled the association’s structural subsidy and forced ATKB to relocate from Amsterdam East to Amsterdam West. As part of a policy to improve efficiency, ATKB was to be accommodated in a space together with other women’s associations: the Moroccan MVVN and a Hindustani women’s association. ATKB and the other associations protested with letters and on the street against their forced relocation but to no avail. The new building was on the other side of the city and was inaccessible on weekends. Many women did not feel comfortable with the move: they did not know Amsterdam West, were expected to register with a doorman and the location on the tenth floor of an office building was not quite as homely (gezellig) as the previous location. Asiye tried to find an alternative place in a neighborhood center in East but no space was available. During the last session of the course many women cried.

Asiye remains active within ATKB but now spends a lot of time to meet the subsidy demands of the government, which is what needs to be done if the association wants to keep its place in West. The municipality heavily subsidizes projects against domestic violence but it is difficult for her to feel that she is really working for women who suffer. The municipality, which demands that different women’s associations work together, poses numerous procedural demands. While they lead to all sorts of problems, the women’s associations could agree on organizing one large event in one of Amsterdam’s premier cultural centers, De Balie. The location is prestigious – much too prestigious for the women who are most likely to be victimized.

Stigmatization in civil arenas

The institutions of ethnic corporatism – the advisory councils, the structural subsidies, the support of professionals – functioned not only as a social infrastructure but as a base from which civil projects were developed. These projects were reasonably successful in that they allowed minority associations to present themselves as and alongside central civil actors. But over time another central contradiction of ethnic corporatism surfaced: ethnic leaders were expected to represent stigmatized and deprived communities in a dignified and professional
manner. This meant that the stigmatization of minority communities constantly threatened to taint the image of their leaders, which indeed happened in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s KMAN and other associations had effectively campaigned for more resources to support social programs and community initiatives. But as negative media coverage intensified, the government became less forthcoming. The representatives of the Moroccan community came to be seen as part of the problem, with the media and government officials increasingly annoyed with the tendency of Moroccan associations to claim they could not tackle problems without significant government support.88

The left-wing migrant associations’ drop in civil power was even more evident in the organization of protests against Israeli violence in Palestine. KMAN, SMR and many other Moroccan associations supported Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation. This was one of the few issues around which they – together with other left-wing and Islamic associations – could mobilize a relatively large crowd of migrants and natives. But the protests against Israeli violence resulted in media coverage that identified the protesters as a threat to the civil community. The most extreme example was a protest in support of the Palestinian intifada in 2002, when a number of banners compared Israel with Nazi Germany, equating the swastika with the Star of David. Youths also attacked a gay night club – the It – with stones. They assaulted people whom they could recognize as Jews and threw stones at the Krasnapolsky Hotel (Krebers & Tas, 2002). The stewards of the organization had tried to persuade protesters to remove the anti-Semitic banners and to prevent a confrontation with the police. They failed; the demonstration ended with a charge of riot police across Dam Square. The protest was not presented as a civil indictment of an oppressive occupier, but as a direct assault on the Dutch civil community and a reincarnation of the darkest forces in Dutch civil history.

This is just the most extreme example of a protest meant to draw attention to injustice that resulted in the stigmatization of the protesters in the media. Others examples included protests following confrontations between youths and police (in 1998 and 2003) and further protests against Israel (in 2000 and 2004). In each of these cases the demonstration’s organizers lost control over groups of second-generation migrant youths and therefore over the media’s representation of the protest. This inability to control angry and frustrated youths was also observed among Moluccans (Chapter 4). But unlike the Moluccans, the violent protesters perverted the most sacred symbols of the Dutch civil sphere (the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust) and violated its most cherished norms (the taboo on anti-Semitism).
Conclusion

In the conclusion to *The Civilizing Process*, Elias tells the story of the Duc de Montmorency who could not accept that King Richelieu monopolized the right to rule. He fought the King as feudal lords had fought each other in olden times, not caring too much for the importance of gun powder in modern battle. Duc de Montmorency thus attacked a battalion of musketeers and artillery in full knightly outfit. His attack was heroic but fatal only to him and his men (Elias, 1994b, pp. 404-405).

The old activists of the guest worker associations sometimes reminded me of the Duc de Montmorency. Their dispositions were so engrained that there was no other way to fight the battle than to mobilize like-minded people and voice demands. Neither the new techniques of public management nor the insights of public relations were of much interest to them. But righteous anger and stubborn insistence on social justice had become archaic by the year 2000. The balance of power between the left-wing minority associations and the government had shifted decisively: the former had lost much of their base and the rules of the game had changed. The government no longer accommodated its counter forces and had reduced civil society associations to state subsidiaries. These shifts marginalized secular and left-wing associations.

For the critics of ethnic corporatism, this process was entirely natural: “the weak must falter,” some said in interviews. But such judgments naturalize what is in fact the result of a reconfiguration of power relations. It was self-evident before that “the weak” should be mobilized, supported and included. But as discursive power relations shifted, it became less self-evident that the government should invest in institutions geared to granting resources and recognition to lower-class groups and the associations struggling for their rights. Instead, the government increasingly embraced a specific form of liberalism dictating that only the most virtuous citizens deserved support. Over the course of the 1990s, Amsterdam moved towards what we might term “civil liberalism.” The next chapter identifies the genesis, power relations and contradictions of this governance figuration.