Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics

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Appendix 1. Assigning codes to articles

The articles in the database were assigned to five different discursive categories: Culturalism, Anti-racism, the Diversity discourse, Civil Islam and Pragmatism. The distinction between these different discourses is, of course, to some extent arbitrary. Some articles contain elements from two or more discourses while others do not neatly fit any of the categories. However, through test sessions and adjustments in the codes’ descriptions, it was possible to generate sufficient levels of inter-coder reliability. Here I present the discursive categories that were used and then elaborate on the coding process.

Several other researchers identified “new realism” or “culturism” as a dominant integration discourse (see Chapter 1). I speak of Culturalism and define it as follows:

*Culturalism* is an integration discourse based on the idea that cultural differences are readily identifiable and have great explanatory relevance in analyzing integration issues. Since some (Dutch, Western) cultural practices are more valuable than others, public debate should focus on the moral evaluation of cultures, while public policy should strictly manage the integration of particular migrant groups to ensure that they do not reproduce or cultivate undesirable cultural norms and values. Culturalists emphasize that there is an urgent need to discuss integration problems but feel political correctness and cultural relativism stand in the way of an open and honest debate.

Culturalism is partly defined in antagonistic relationship to Anti-racism. While some actors self-identify as anti-racists, I decided to use a broader definition that includes statements that are in line with Anti-racism. I thus arrived at the following definition:

*Anti-racism* is an integration discourse based on the idea that migrants suffer from structural symbolic violence. It is dangerous and reprehensible to say that some cultures are better than others as this is a variant of racism and legitimates policy that discriminates against certain groups of migrants. Public debate should focus on the identification of symbolic violence against migrants and provide space for migrants to speak out for themselves. Public policies should help protect migrants from discrimination and compensate them for the disadvantages they suffer due to stigmatization and economic marginalization.
Culturalists also oppose multiculturalism. But as no actors in Dutch integration politics self-identify as multiculturalists, I do not include this category. Nevertheless, the Diversity discourse promoted by some local governments, civil society associations and companies resembles multiculturalism in that its supporters emphasize diversity is essentially a good thing. Religious or ethnic differences should be considered alongside differences of gender, sexuality, age or ability. All these differences can cause problems if they are not recognized but can be advantageous if properly managed. As Chapter 9 shows, these ideas found their way into policy in the second half of the 1990s. The Diversity discourse is defined as follows:

The *Diversity* discourse evaluates cultural diversity positively and wants to identify and capitalize upon the potential inherent in a diverse society. Identification of integration problems may be warranted but public debates should focus on the positive qualities of a multicultural society and how to further develop these qualities. Migrants should be seen as individuals with (bicultural) identities that provide them with extra knowledge and capacities that help them valorize possibilities in an increasingly diverse society. It may be necessary to select migrants as they do not all bring the same qualities but migration itself is a natural and positive process in a globalizing world.

Note that this discourse, or at least its implementation into policy, is fairly recent. A different and older understanding emphasizes that diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict but often creates problems of communication and management. This is the discourse that characterized first the minorities policy and later the integration policy. Although there were differences between the two policies, both were based on the idea that ethnic diversity can create problems if it intersects with economic inequality, political exclusion and social isolation. The task for policy-makers is to prevent this process of minority formation (Van Amersfoort, 1974) by creating linkages between minorities and the majority. I refer to this discourse as Pragmatism and define it as follows:

*Pragmatism* is an integration discourse that recognizes cultural differences but considers these differences as complex and of limited explanatory relevance in analyzing integration issues. It is therefore problematic to say that some cultures are better than others; focusing on differences may actually reinforce integration problems. Public debate should focus on local and sectoral problems so that comprehensive policies can be designed to overcome cultural differences and prevent polarization. Pragmatists
emphasize that integration problems are not just cultural but also socio-economic and institutional. They argue that a range of measures are needed to prevent integration problems from spiraling out of control.

Some currents within Culturalism identify an opposition between the West and Islam. In response, a number of authors have tried to transcend this binary and have called upon Muslims to act as responsible members of the civil community; the main text provides a number of examples. I refer to this discourse as Civil Islam and define it as follows:

*Civil Islam* is an integration discourse based on the idea that Islamic and civil commitment can and should go hand in hand. Cultural problems are readily identifiable and have considerable explanatory relevance for analyzing integration issues. But contrary to Culturalism, religion – properly understood – can and does provide solutions as it demands civil behavior from Muslims. Muslims should be assertive in public debate and clearly state what they do or do not consider civil behavior. Public policy should manage the integration of migrant groups because this is necessary to help migrants emancipate as Muslim citizens.

Next to Civil Islam, I initially also distinguished Islamism, defined as a discourse based on the idea that Western societies should be subjected to the rules of the Quran. Actors promoting such a discourse appear in the news quite frequently but not on the opinion pages; only one article in the corpus was an interview with a Muslim who explicitly argued that sharia laws should be implemented in the Netherlands (albeit in modified form, as shariacracy).

As is clear from the descriptions of these discourses, it is conceivable that articles do not neatly fall under one or the other category. Articles very often include elements from different discourses, while many articles do not really promote any particular civil discourse. For these reasons, I included three codes for articles that could not be placed into one of the five discursive categories: “combination” (when actors draw upon two or more of the previous discourses), “multiple viewpoints” (when one article features at least two actors with divergent viewpoints, as happens in interviews where two viewpoints are articulated in opposition) and “unclear” (a residual category). The complete list is as follows:

1. Culturalism
2. Pragmatism
Three research assistants helped to code the articles. One was only involved in the early stage of the coding process; the two others were involved in the entire process. With different combinations of coders, we tested whether and how we could reach agreement on specific articles and sets of articles. We found that only between 30 and 40 per cent of the articles were straightforward in the sense that all four coders assigned the same code. This is hardly surprising as discourses are defined in relation to each other while many authors try to formulate unique viewpoints. But it did pose methodological problems.

Apart from discussing interpretations, refining and expanding the codebook was another way to tackle these problems. The brief descriptions of different discourses were expanded and examples were included to indicate how coders should proceed when articles contained elements of two or more discourses. Around two hundred articles were coded during test sessions. The two principal coders coded the remaining articles. After they had done their work, I took a sample of articles to test whether they had assigned the same codes as I had. This was the case for respectively 71 and 74 per cent of the articles. This is a reasonable score but slightly lower than the r of 0.8 that is commonly used. I therefore tried to find out if some codes were more problematic than others.

It turned out that a fairly large proportion of the inter-coder disagreement resulted from codes 7 (combination) and 9 (unclear). If these two codes are excluded from the analysis, an inter-coder agreement of respectively 78 and 85 per cent was reached. I thus decided to only use those codes for which there was sufficient agreement, i.e. codes 1-6 and 8. For the remaining articles (those assigned codes 7 and 9) I did not accept the assigned codes. I reread these articles and tried to assign them to codes 1-6 or 8. If the articles did not fit any of these categories, I assigned code 9. There was no disagreement over Code 6 (Islamism) but since this category contained only one article, I also assigned this to the residual category.

To improve the validity of the results, I searched for systematic bias for codes 1-6 that would explain inter-coder disagreement. I usually found none. For instance, I would
sometimes assign a code 3 to an article that a coder had categorized as 2, but at other times it was the other way around; the disagreements were unlikely to change the outcome of the analysis as they seemed random. There were two exceptions. One coder – the one with whom I had a 78 per cent agreement after the exclusion of codes 7 and 9 – often assigned code 5. He assigned this code to all authors promoting state pluralism, even if they also identified a number of migration-related problems. I changed the code to 2, 3 or 9 depending on the emphasis of the article. A second exception is that I more often assigned code 4. I “saw” more anti-racist articles than both coders did: in several cases I had assigned code 4 to authors who spoke out against stereotyping or sensationalism without using words like discrimination, racism or stigmatization. I accepted the coders’ results and included in the codebook the remark that an article would not be categorized as anti-racist (discourse 4) if it communicated one or more of the following messages: integration comes from two sides (discourse 2), there are mutual prejudices (discourses 2 or 3), integration problems result at least in part from cultural differences (discourses 1, 2 or 3), integration can succeed if careful and comprehensive policies are implemented (discourse 2), differences should be seen as opportunities rather than threats (discourse 5). With this elaboration, I revisited all the articles that had been coded as anti-racist.

The labels for the discourses are to some extent arbitrary but I wish to comment on my reasons for using the label “Civil Islam.” I prefer this label to the common notions of “moderate” or “liberal” Islam. By Civil Islam I mean an interpretation and practice of Islam that confirms and meets norms generated in the civil sphere. This implies that there is no single definition of Civil Islam as it is contextually defined. In the Netherlands, Civil Islam implies acknowledgment of the equality between men and women, tolerance of homosexuality, active participation in political processes, unqualified refutation of illegal behavior (especially terrorism), a contextual (i.e. not absolutist) interpretation of religious texts and an understanding attitude towards criticisms of Muslims. Clearly, these features reflect the values of Dutch core groups. In Turkey, to give a contrasting example, Civil Islam would have different features. For instance, compatibility with nationalism could well be a yardstick for civil value while tolerance for homosexuality would not.
Appendix 2. Assigning codes to relations between actors

To map relations among actors in the integration debate, the corpus was coded with the computer program MaxQda for text analysis. Student assistants were assigned the names of 134 opinion-makers. These names were selected according to a process of trial and error. An initial list of 20 opinion-makers whom I expected to feature prominently was expanded with names encountered during the course of research. For instance, it became apparent during the initial coding sessions that administrators (like ministers) featured more prominently than I expected; I therefore decided to include all ministers with responsibility for integration issues during the period under investigation (1990-2005). The references of the 134 pre-selected actors to other, non-selected players were also coded. For instance, the sociologist Bram de Swaan was not included in the list of opinion-makers but his references to pre-selected actors are coded, as are references of pre-selected actors to him. References of non-selected actors to non-selected actors are not included. Note that this method leads to the neglect of actors with little resonance; we can get an idea of the relations of central figures and the actors with whom they are related, but not of all actors within the debate.

Apart from the direction (passive or active), references are distinguished according to their nature (positive, negative and neutral). In many cases, it is difficult to decide whether a remark is “negative,” “neutral” or “positive.” For instance, the phrase “Bolkestein opened the discussion” can be read as a factual statement, as an accusation (when the author feels that the topic is inappropriate for public debate) or as a mark of approval (when the author welcomes public debate on this topic). The position of the author usually becomes clear in the course of the article. In this case, a score of “neutral” would be attributed to Bolkestein’s remark while subsequent quotes that reveal the position of the author would be coded separately. There are many other examples of ambivalent fragments. Irony is quite frequent and sometimes a remark can simultaneously convey a negative and a positive judgment. As a rule, negative and positive codes are assigned only where references are unambiguous.

In total, 1,111 names feature in the analysis, of which 977 were not pre-selected. Most are natural persons but the list also includes institutional actors, like political parties and research institutes. Abstract entities like “Muslims,” “multiculturalists” or “the Dutch” are not included. References that do not specifically refer to a person but to an event associated with that person are also not coded (for instance, “since the murder of Theo van Gogh…” or “The Gumus issue…”). The total number of coded fragments is 5,397. I checked all the codes of assistants to filter out duplicates and to establish whether the direction (positive, negative,
neutral) had been attributed correctly and consistently. The codes were assigned in MaxQda, registered in Excel and subsequently exported to R, a software environment for statistical analysis. Vincent Traag processed the data in R as part of a collaborative project (see Uitermark et al., 2009).

Figure A3.1 Visualization of positive and negative interactions in the period between the national elections of 1994 and the publication of Paul Scheffer’s “The multicultural drama” (January 2000). Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.
Figure A3.2 Visualization of positive and negative interactions in the period between 9/11 and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (6 May 2002). Red lines represent negative references, black lines represent positive references.