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Dynamics of power in Dutch integration politics

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Notes

¹ The start date of 1980 was chosen as this is when the minorities policy first began to take shape. The end date of 2006 was chosen as it marks the municipal elections and the end of systematic data gathering. Depending on the availability of data and the relevance of particular historical periods, the empirical analysis more closely focuses on some periods than others.

² The influence of the institutions of pillarization is explored in Chapter 4.

³ See Brubaker (1992) for a classic statement and Bauböck *et al.* (2006) for a comprehensive overview.

⁴ Whereas Alexander (2006) considers elections and opinion polls as sublime instruments to articulate the will of the civil community, Bourdieu argues that these institutions facilitate sublimated domination because they effect the serial atomization of the population and discriminate against groups that lack the capital to form and express a political opinion (Bourdieu, 2005).

⁵ Alexander argues that the nature of civil codes can be deduced with a thought experiment: upon what kind of motives, relations, and institutions would a self-regulating, democratic community be likely to depend? Table 2.1 summarizes Alexander's answers to this question.

Table 2.1 The cultural structure of the civil sphere according to Jeffrey Alexander

<i>Motives</i>		<i>Relations</i>		<i>Institutions</i>	
<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>	<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>	<i>Civil</i>	<i>Anticivil</i>
Active	Passive	Open	Secretive	Rule regulated	Arbitrary
Autonomous	Dependent	Trusting	Suspicious	Law	Power
Rational	Irrational	Critical	Deferential	Equality	Hierarchy
Reasonable	Hysterical	Honorable	Self-interested	Inclusive	Exclusive
Calm	Excitable	Altruistic	Greedy	Impersonal	Personal
Self-controlled	Wild-passionate	Truthful	Deceitful	Contracts	Bonds of loyalty
Realistic	Distorted	Straightforward	Calculating	Groups	Factions
Sane	Mad	Deliberate	Conspiratorial	Office	Personality
		Friendly	Antagonistic		

Source: Alexander, 2006, pp. 57-59

⁶ I owe this insight to Phil Gorski.

⁷ I refer specifically to sociologists and philosophers who are engaged in the debate on the opinion pages of the broadsheet newspapers between 2003 and 2006. Note that I do not make a claim about all sociologists and philosophers in the Netherlands. Most sociologists and philosophers do not contribute to the debate on the opinion pages.

⁸ Although it is convenient to speak of an interpretation of reality, it is important to realize that the act of interpretation involves the construction of reality. Ideas, notions and symbols have “evocative power” because they draw “discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the undifferentiated” (Bourdieu, cited in Schinkel, 2003, p. 78).

⁹ When I quote from newspaper articles, I do not include page numbers. Most of the times newspaper articles cover just one page and therefore the reference to page numbers does not add any information. When a newspaper article covers two or more pages, it is not possible for me to ascertain on which page a quote was

printed since I collected most of the newspaper articles through the Lexis-Nexis database.

¹⁰ There is spatio-temporal dynamic to discourse production that we could visualize on a map in terms of the intensity of the interactions that infuse its ideas, notions and symbols with emotional meaning (*cf.* Collins, 2004). Take the example of anti-racist discourse. There would be a big, dark red spot on a map if there is a meeting where hundreds of people gather together express their anger over racism. There would be many dots that are somewhat lighter and smaller to designate the instances where committed anti-racists share their ideas in small groups. The lightest spots on the map would be casual observers of everyday anti-racist symbolism, such as readers of an article on an anti-racist protest or observers of the billboards against racism that hang amidst the commercial billboards in soccer stadiums (during matches of the Champion's league, not in the Dutch competition). If we would want to complicate this picture further, we could also use a different color to identify the opposition to anti-racist discourse. During gatherings or in articles, promoters of Culturalism can, for instance, promote the idea that accusations of racism are unfounded or exaggerated. Such instances of anti-anti-racism could then be designated with, say, a blue color. Actual maps would be far too complex to make but thinking in terms of these visualizations nevertheless helps to grasp the situational differentiation of discourse.

¹¹ "The structure of a field, understood as a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital, is different from the more or less lasting networks through which it manifests itself. It is this structure that determines the possibility or impossibility (or, to be more precise, the greater or lesser probability) of observing the establishment of linkages that express and sustain the existence of networks. The task of science is to uncover the structure of the distribution of species of capital which tends to determine the structure of individual or collective stances taken, through the interests and dispositions it conditions." (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 114-115).

¹² Although the concept of discourse is central to my analysis and serves as the main analytical entry-point into the complexities of integration politics, I do not claim any ontological or causal primacy for discourses as opposed to actors or institutions. There is no point in saying that discourses structure actors or the other way around because they emerge together, develop together and eventually falter together. The same thing goes for the relationship between power and actors: power exists only in and through actors but actors exist only in and through power.

¹³ Moreover, since there are many resources of power that can be mobilized in any figuration, power relations are necessarily ambivalent. One classical example is that an established elite control institutions but that an ascending elite can stir up popular discontent. The result is a play of forces that both established and ascending elites can influence but that neither of them can completely control.

¹⁴ The location within the newspaper was irrelevant to the selection, meaning that articles not printed in the debates sections also qualified for inclusion. For instance, some articles were published in the sections for domestic affairs. When I write about the opinion pages, this should thus be understood as shorthand for pages where opinion articles are published.

¹⁵ The database has information on co-authors but for most of the analyses only the data pertaining to the first author is processed.

¹⁶ I speak of "clusters" rather than "communities" as it remains to be seen whether the actors grouped together indeed form a community in the sense that they have positive ties and leaders. The clusters generated with the

algorithm for community detection should not be confused with the clusters generated through cluster analysis.

¹⁷ When one actor is very central to the debate, commentators regularly assume that the debate is divided between those who support the actor and those who oppose it. While this representation provides a convenient scheme of perception, it does not accurately capture oppositions for at least three reasons. First, supporters and opponents of a central actor may be divided among themselves. Second, opponents that clash over one issue may cooperate on another issue. Third, criticism is much more frequent than praise on the opinion pages and this is true for all actors, not just the most central ones. This means that the intuitive idea the debate is organized into opponents and supporters leads commentators to overestimate the power of the former.

¹⁸ I report this measure for the sake of completeness but on the basis of the findings I think that an adequate understanding of polarization requires that we take into account that divided groups only become recognized as antagonistic poles when they are associated with symbols.

¹⁹ Very often articulation power manifests itself negatively when actors want the world *not* to evolve in the way that their opponents desire and when they are motivated to stop what they – each in their own ways – experience as an attempt to devalue the ideas, symbols and notions that they cherish. Broeders *et al.* (2008) also speak of articulation power but their definition of this concept is more similar to my overarching notion of discursive power. My definition of articulation power comes close to Koopmans' definition of visibility (Koopmans, 2004a) but I do not opt for this concept as it seems to give the impression that all those who appear in civic arenas have resonance. As the analysis below suggests, articulation, resonance, and consonance are analytically and empirically distinct.

²⁰ The database includes several variables, such as gender, ethnicity, publication date, newspaper, and affiliation. For the last variable, I grouped together actors with similar affiliations in 16 sectors. These sectors are internally diverse but nevertheless it is possible to identify with considerable precision from which sectors discourses draw support and to explain why actors rooted in these sectors express their support.

²¹ It does not matter whether these references are positive, neutral or negative. Even if actor A completely rejects the discourse of actor B, actor A helps to disseminate the discourse of B and contributes to the prominence of B. Especially when Actor A responds directly to an intervention of Actor B, Actor A has to operate, to some degree, within the discursive parameters set by B. For instance, if an Actor A feels appalled by an argument of Actor B that Western civilization is superior to Islam and wants to warn that such binaries promote stigmatization, Actor A has to reiterate the binary in order to refute it.

²² "Circa" 30 because some interviews that were conducted for Part III were also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conversations that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.

²³ Some of the information is drawn from internet sources such as Wikipedia. Before using information from an internet source (usually for something trivial, such as place of birth or place of education), I checked it against other internet, newspaper or academic sources.

²⁴ A net score of 5 may seem low but remember that negative references are much more frequent than positive references.

²⁵ The occupation of the Netherlands between 1940 and 1945 did not suspend pillarized politics; the resistance, too, was organized along pillarized lines.

²⁶ Table 4.1 gives an impression of the partisanship of three different newspapers in 1956.

Table 4.1 Tone of newspaper reporting in 1956 elections (%)

<i>Parties/leaders</i>	<i>Het Vrije Volk</i>		<i>De Volkskrant</i>		<i>Algemeen Handelsblad</i>	
	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>
PvdA/Drees	91	0	13	65	9	29
KVP/Romme	5	56	71	3	13	29
VVD/Oud	0	13	0	8	61	6
Others	5	31	16	24	17	35
N	116	152	75	66	23	17

Source: Roele, cited in Brants & Van Praag, 2006, p. 33

²⁷ Occasionally outsiders, such as the populist Hendrik Koekoek, gained some seats in parliament but they remained marginal and were excluded and ignored by the elites of established parties.

²⁸ One illustration of this development is that a right-wing politician like Frits Bolkestein had privileged access to the opinion pages *De Volkskrant* in the beginning of the 1990s – something that before had been unthinkable. The contention over this article spread also into the *NRC*, the only newspaper for which we have systematic data in this period (the number of articles in the corpus jumps from 5 in 1990 to 25 in 1991). We see the same type of interaction between newspapers after Scheffer's intervention in 2000. Although 'the multicultural drama' was published in *NRC*, it also intensified the debate in *Trouw* and *De Volkskrant* (the number of articles in the corpus jumps from respectively 2, 3 and 6 in 1999 to 19, 16 and 24 in 2000). One analytical implication of this desegmentation is that we can analyze these three newspapers as a single setting: previously segregated discursive milieus have transformed into a single – if still differentiated – civil arena. Therefore I do not differentiate between newspapers unless there is an *ad hoc* reason to do so.

²⁹ According to a veteran editor of *De Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* was the first newspaper to introduce the daily opinion page in the late 1980s. *De Volkskrant* followed in 1990. I do not know exactly when *Trouw* started publishing a daily section of opinions but ever since *Trouw* (in 1992) was documented in the Lexis Nexis database the newspaper featured opinion articles.

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Table 4.2 Registered unemployment, 1979-1985 (%)

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1988	1990	1992
Native Dutch	6	8	14	12	6	4	3
Turks	11	21	37	39	32	28	24
Moroccans	11	23	37	42	22	26	24
Average	6	9	15	13	6	6	4

Source: Wolff & Penninx, 1993, pp. 22 and 51. Figures for Surinamese and Antilleans are unavailable or unreliable. The data for 1979-1985 and 1988-1992 are based on different methods of calculation.

Table 4.3 Highest level of completed education for adults per ethnic group

	<i>Native Dutch</i>	<i>Turks</i>	<i>Moroccans</i>	<i>Surinamese</i>	<i>Antilleans</i>	<i>Total</i>
Elementary school	22	73	74	38	23	12
Lower secondary education (LBO, Mavo)	32	13	11	35	32	26
Higher secondary education (MBO, Havo, VWO)	32	4	2	19	31	41
Higher vocational / university (HBO / WO)	14	1	1	8	13	21

Source: Wolff & Penninx, 1993, p. 35.

³¹ Although there was no dominant conception of a Dutch culture, a modicum of cultural essentialism is necessary to accommodate minorities and to assimilate them to a pragmatist political culture. Catholics and Protestants had to be portrayed and organized as blocks in order for their leaders to represent them and the effect on the ground was a combination of intense rivalry and mutual aversion. In the colonies, the Netherlands adopted a governmental strategy where local leaders were accommodated, carving up the colonial population into distinct groups that are easily identified and (hence) managed. Similarly, the consultative structures created as part of the minorities policy divided migrants into minority groups with distinct identities that often had very little meaning to the groups in question (see Chapter 4). ‘Muslims’ occasionally were identified as a specific segment of migrants but most the times minorities were identified on the basis of their nationality. In short, cultural essentialism was strongly present but it was not the Dutch culture that was essentialized.

³² The systematically collected data stretches from 1991 to 2006. I use anecdotal evidence to historically frame developments in this period. If I were to pinpoint a new turning point, it would be 2008, when Geert Wilders dominated the news with his film *Fitna*. Since Wilders dominated the debate, the question is no longer what integration is and how it should be achieved but whether it is at all possible for Muslims to become part of the Dutch civil community.

³³ The idea that foreigners in general and Muslims in particular are fundamentally different from Westerners is, of course, not new. It has been fostered by orientalists, novelists and correspondents for centuries, both in the Netherlands and in other former colonial powers (Said, 1978; for the Dutch case, see Maussen, 2009).

³⁴ A fragment of this text was also cited in Chapter 4. The quotes are not identical because I rely upon the translation of the Scientific Council in Chapter 4 and use my own translation in this chapter (all translations from newspaper articles are my own).

³⁵ Since Goethe and Plato are not claimed by Bolkestein’s opponents, they end up in a cluster with Bolkestein. Passive references – as the references of Goethe and Plato – are not included in many of the measures. Some actors, such as *NRC* contributing editors Elbesth Etty or Sjoerd de Jong, make dozens of references in some periods. These references are valuable for categorizing different actors but not for calculating the power of Etty and De Jong.

³⁶ “Two years ago I was in the Soviet Union with other party leaders. In Alma Ata I had brief personal talks with Elco Brinkman, Thijs Wöltgens en Hans van Mierlo. I said that the minority issue will be the most important political challenge of the next ten or twenty years; a challenge that transcends the scope of of any single party. I reiterated this a month ago in parliament. I now say it again. So no partisan bickering” (Bolkestein, 1992)

³⁷ The principal author of the minority reports had frequently ridiculed – under a pseudonym in a professional

journal *Migrantenstudies* (see Vyvary, 2003) – cultural relativism and xenophilia

³⁸ Editors and journalists writing for *NRC*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw* produced a total of 18 articles of which 8 were coded as culturalist (44.4 per cent).

³⁹ “The multicultural drama” prompted an intensification of the debate in the three broadsheet newspapers but not in *De Telegraaf*. The number of articles in the corpus jumps from 2, 3 and 6 in 1999 to 19, 16 and 24 in 2000 in respectively *NRC Handelsblad*, *De Volkskrant* and *Trouw*. The total number of hits is extremely low in *De Telegraaf* for both 1999 and 2000: respectively 11 and 8. Two articles in 1999 would have qualified for inclusion in the corpus (one interview with the successful Moroccans of *Towards a New Start* – see Chapter 9, another interview with Muslim women with head scarves on their emancipatory struggles) and one article in 2000 would have qualified (an interview with an historian on the electoral success of Jörg Haider in Austria and the difference between Haider and Bolkestein).

⁴⁰ The formal reason for the resignation of the government was a report on the peace mission of Dutch soldiers in Srebrenica. Dutch soldiers were supposed to protect this “safe area” but Serbian militias under the leadership of Ratko Mladić invaded the Muslim enclave with overwhelming force. The commander of the Dutch soldiers, Thom Karremans, cooperated when the militias separated the men from the women and accepted a good bye present from Mladić. In a press conference after the fall of Srebrenica, Karremans praised Mladić for his military strategy and assured his audience that “there are no good guys and bad guys in this war.” Eight thousand men were deported and killed, making Srebrenica the biggest massacre in Europe since the Second World War. This is not, however, why the government resigned in 2002. It resigned because research showed that the government of 1994 had not sufficiently assessed the risks of the operation.

⁴¹ The constitution can be found on-line: <http://www.ivir.nl/wetten/nl/grondwet.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2009).

⁴² *Gedogen* normally refers to the practice of not enforcing the law when this is not in the interest of public order or public health. Dutch drug policy is in part based on this principle. But *gedogen* also more generally refers to a lenient and understanding attitude that was at the basis of the accommodation politics described in Chapter 4.

⁴³ One third of the votes for the party were cast by people who had not voted in the previous elections (*NRC Handelsblad*, 2002).

⁴⁴ It is remarkable that the size of the culturalist cluster does not steadily increase; in the period in which Scheffer dominated the debate, the culturalist cluster was comparatively bigger than in the preceding and subsequent periods. Unlike Bolkestein and Hirsi Ali, Scheffer was not a parliamentarian for the right-wing Liberals and he did not postulate an opposition between Islam and the West.

⁴⁵ Note that it is not at all trivial that we find this pattern. For example, in their analysis of international relations, Traag and Bruggeman found that there were eight blocks of actors (Traag & Bruggeman, 2009).

⁴⁶ Articles that were labeled as “unknown” or “other” were not included in the analysis. Two outliers were omitted from the analysis in order to reduce the tightness of the clustering in the plot and thereby to ease interpretation.

⁴⁷ Table 6.1 shows that the promoters of the Diversity discourse were relatively powerful in the second half of the 1990s, when they accounted for almost 16 per cent of the articles. Integration politics in this period was calm: the number of articles was relatively low and there were no strong oppositions between different clusters, though there were concerns over integration (there was even a minister of integration). In this context,

consultants and certain other actors argued that clever management and communication strategies were the key to the success of the integration project and for turning diversity from a weakness into a strength.

⁴⁸ Such as Radar, LBR (*Landelijk Bureau Racismebestrijding*, National Agency for Fighting against Racism) and NCB (*Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders*, Dutch Center Foreigners).

⁴⁹ One could object that the data pertain to a very specific setting (the opinion pages) and it is indeed true (not to say trivial) that accusations of racism have been made in other settings, such as on websites. But it is highly unlikely that different results would ensue if we included television programs or tabloids since these settings seem even less likely to offer a stage to anti-racist discourse than the (opinion pages of the) broadsheet newspapers (Van Dijk, 1991).

⁵⁰ Policies were not simply “multiculturalist” but also did not become “assimilationist.” Although it is certainly true that, after the emergence of Fortuyn, there were more administrators who wanted to force migrants to integrate, at the same time there was an intensification of efforts to help minorities, and especially Muslims, to organize and express themselves (see especially Chapter 10). It is understandable that analysts have used these concepts in comparative research but they tend to reify what is better understood as a dynamic field where different actors push in different directions.

⁵¹ This category includes editors, journalists and contributors. There are no substantial differences between these different types of actors, so I grouped them together as one category “contributors to *NRC Handelsblad*,” which is virtually synonymous with “authors who have been paid by *NRC Handelsblad*.” There were, however, substantial differences between the different newspapers, so I distinguish between contributors to *NRC Handelsblad*, contributors to *De Volkskrant* and contributors to *Trouw*.

⁵² Paul Scheffer is one example. Most of his 13 articles were coded as culturalist but 5 were coded as pragmatist. Although he laments the elites (including his colleagues at the *NRC*) for “denying the revolt” by Fortuyn voters (Scheffer, 2002), in other articles he takes a pragmatist approach. Several days after the assassination of Theo van Gogh, for instance, he severely criticized Job Cohen for attempting to quell rather than deal with the tensions and anxieties. He criticized Cohen and other politicians for failing to enforce the law and for letting “some neighborhoods” come under “the grip of violence.” But Scheffer also said that there was a need for a new feeling of collective belonging, a “new we” that would include Muslims on the condition that they do not put the law of religion above the law of the constitution (Scheffer, 2004). These articles serve to reconcile differences and to resolve the cultural conflicts that other, more radical culturalists seek to win.

⁵³ Most of the debate, however, did not revolve around Muslims; as Figure 3.1 shows, terms like “minorities” and “foreigners” were much more frequently used in combination with “integration” than the term “Muslims.”

⁵⁴ To be more precise: he said that he would no longer allow Muslims into the country if it were possible to make juridical arrangements to this effect. However, he did not think this would be feasible.

⁵⁵ This article was not coded as Civil Islam because Cheppih explicitly indicated that he wanted to offer an alternative to liberal democracy. He describes his alternative as *sjoerocratie*, a model of deliberative democracy with elements of sharia, including physical punishment. He thereby suggested a contradiction between liberal democracy and Islam, which means that the article cannot be categorized as Civil Islam. The sentence cited here, however, is typical of the more critical variants of Civil Islam.

⁵⁶ Ahmed Aboutaleb and Hacı Karacaer are exceptional in that they are very prominent and very critical of their

own communities. Other Muslims within the Labor Party, such as Fatima Elatik (council chair in the Amsterdam neighborhood of Zeeburg) and Nebahat Albayrak (Junior Minister of Immigration), voiced similar discourses but were more critical of culturalists and milder towards Muslims.

⁵⁷ This interview was conducted with three leaders of Milli Gorus responsible for the negotiations over the construction of the Western Mosque after the members of the group around Karacaer had left or were forced to step down.

⁵⁸ Three of Aboutaleb's articles in the database were coded as Civil Islam and three were coded as Pragmatism.

⁵⁹ For instance: "I say to my brothers and sisters: 'did you ever see a boxing match?' If you punch open the eyebrow of your opponent, then you keep hitting on the wound to knock out your opponent. That is what Wilders does... Our country, our democracy and our legal state deserve an open debate with Wilders and others. I will fight for it until the last drop. For I am a Muslim" (Karacaer, 2007). Another example: "To acquire knowledge is a duty of each Muslim and each Muslim woman. Mind you women! [points finger into the air]. It is mentioned there [in the Quran] specifically [says in Arabic:] Muslim *and* Muslim woman. So when someone writes to me 'please do not force me to learn Dutch because I am so old,' then you know my answer" (Aboutaleb in a speech at the Argan youth center in 2006).

⁶⁰ I cite from Ham and Uitermark (2007) since quotes in this piece were approved for publication by the interviewees.

⁶¹ "Around" 30 and 50 because some interviews that were conducted for Part II were also used here. I also conducted many interviews and informal conversations that were not tape-recorded and transcribed.

⁶² The data pertain to subsidies allocated as part of minorities or integration policy. In some cases this means that any initiative promoting integration can apply for a subsidy, in other cases it means that only minority associations can claim these resources.

⁶³ While associations without subsidies are unlikely to have central positions within governance networks, some may nevertheless operate very successfully on the margins. Some religious associations, for instance, do not receive subsidies but are nevertheless very important as discursive milieus. The thriving orthodox El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam is one example but we could also mention a number of smaller and more traditional Moroccan and Turkish mosques. These associations have a relatively large base of contributing constituents and sometimes also have foreign sponsors such as the Turkish state in the case of Diyanet mosques or Arab royalties in the case of orthodox mosques. A number of associations do not rely on funding for minorities or integration but attract funds from corporate sponsors, charities or government agencies. Such funds are not labeled "subsidies" as they have the character of commissioned or tendered projects, though they amount to support for particular civil discourses.

⁶⁴ In Rotterdam, applicants were invited to submit proposals for projects that promote "participation, speaking Dutch, shared values and norms and the power of our diversity" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006, n.p.). The guidelines for MGI indicate that projects should "lead to contacts between different groups; contribute to social cohesion in neighborhoods; contribute to knowledge and opinions about the law, customs, norms, values; lead to interaction among all Amsterdammers and between Amsterdammers and the government; promote dialogue and cooperation between persons that belong to different groups of Amsterdammers" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005, article 3). These guidelines can be interpreted in many different ways. It is difficult, for instance, to think of projects that do not, in one way or another, promote contacts or participation. When associations meet the formal

requirements, civil servants select on the basis of unofficial or unarticulated criteria (“this is not what we need right now”, “this association has shown that they use the funding properly”). In fact, civil servants usually make a selection *before* the review procedure as civil servants invite some rather than other associations to apply for funding. The most important difference between the funds is that Rotterdam only allows applications for an amount of 2,000 euros. Another difference is that the municipality of Amsterdam formally only funds projects that transcend the neighborhood level. Both procedural demands are not as important as they first appear. In Rotterdam, applicants can fund more expensive projects if they submit multiple applications (which they do). In Amsterdam, the substantial demand that projects promote neighborhood cohesion contradicts the procedural demand that projects are aimed at the city as a whole, which leaves applicants and civil servants discretion to follow the rule they prefer.

⁶⁵ The timing of both surveys is significant: they were conducted after Amsterdam’s guest worker associations had been marginalized and before religious associations were embraced.

⁶⁶ The CITO-test is a standardized test that virtually all pupils have to take just before they finish elementary school. Scores are between 501 and 550.

⁶⁷ *Kommittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland*, Committee for Moroccan Workers.

⁶⁸ *Hollanda Türkiyeli İşçiler Birliği*, Turkish Worker Association in the Netherlands.

⁶⁹ *Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu*, Federation of Democratic Worker Associations from Turkey.

⁷⁰ *Federatie van Koerden in Nederland*, Federation of Kurds in the Netherlands. The first Kurdish association to receive subsidies was the *Koerdische Arbeidersvereniging* (Kurdish Worker Association) in 1987.

⁷¹ *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, Party of Nationalist Action.

⁷² The abolition coincided with the founding of the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners (*Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders*, ACB), an expertise center that still supports minority associations. The transfer of responsibilities from intermediate institutions to the government sets Amsterdam apart from Rotterdam. As Chapter 11 shows, Rotterdam’s governance figuration has historically been characterized by the presence of large and powerful civil corporations that mediate between the government and civil society associations. In Amsterdam these intermediate institutions played a marginal role and consequently the government interacted directly with civil society associations. In 1981, even before the minorities policy was officially established, the Amsterdam government, in consultation with the Ministry of Welfare and the Amsterdam Center for Foreigners, redirected funds away from the welfare foundations and to migrant associations. The ACB is the closest thing to a civil corporation in Amsterdam. It receives a structural subsidy from the province of Noord-Holland and occasionally wins contracts from the government of Amsterdam.

⁷³ It is important to stress that this approach is perhaps multicultural in a pragmatic sense but not multiculturalist in an ideological sense. It was *convenient* to have intermediaries to reach culturally distinct groups in need of welfare provisions but there is no sign that administrators were keen on preserving ethnic cultures. The recognition of cultural identities was secondary to, and instrumental for, the technocratic goal of administering welfare provisions as efficiently and widely as possible. Associations were involved to improve the process of policy formulation, implementation and delivery, not to ensure that they cultivate and exhibit their cultural particularities. In the obscure words of the first and last comprehensive white paper on minority integration: “The preservation of cultural identity can in no way be considered as a static fact that is unrelated to presence in the Netherlands.” In Dutch: “[het] behoud van de eigen culturele identiteit [kan] geenszins worden opgevat als

een onveranderlijk gegeven dat losstaat van het verblijf in Nederland” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1989, p. 16).

⁷⁴ KMAN was on the far left but not easy to categorize. Some members were Marxists while others were syndicalists, but KMAN never had a political identity as clearly defined as the Turkish associations (HTIB – Communist; DIDF – Socialist, etc.).

⁷⁵ *Democratische Volksvereniging Amsterdam*, Democratic Popular Association Amsterdam (connected to HTIB).

⁷⁶ *Amsterdam Türkiyeli Kadınlar Birliği*, Association of Women from Turkey in Amsterdam (connected to DIDF).

⁷⁷ Since the political orientation of associations is often dynamic or ambivalent, we cannot work with a fine-grained coding scheme, though a rough distinction between different types can be made (see also Kraal & Zorlu, 1997; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Maussen, 2006, 2009; Vermeulen, 2006; and the various reports of the leftist monitoring group Kafka). I use the word conservative to refer to associations that do not demand radical social change and that seek to preserve social, religious or ethnic hierarchies. This includes most mosques but of course not those that have a radical Islamist agenda. There are, however, very few Moroccan or Turkish mosques that seem to have such a radical agenda. They are mostly rather precarious institutions that try to preserve ties and dispositions that are of little value in mainstream Dutch society. The Turkish Grey Wolves are an exception, but they are ethnic fascists rather than religious fundamentalists. I categorize these associations as “radical conservatives.”

⁷⁸ *Marokkaanse Vrouwen Vereniging Nederland*, Moroccan Women Association Netherlands.

⁷⁹ Civil society associations receive the subsidy unless they are suspected of fraud or abuse. It has happened that associations were so fraudulent or chaotic that they lost their subsidies, but this is not the case for the (Turkish and Moroccan) associations discussed here.

⁸⁰ When we calculate the per capita subsidy amount (total amount of subsidy for associations divided by total number of residents), we find that the per capita subsidy for the Turkish community is 5.40 euro in 1995, 7.40 euro in 2000 and 4.10 euro in 2005, whereas members of the Moroccan community on average received 1.90 euro in 1995, 2.20 euros in 2000 and 0.60 euro in 2005. These findings seem consistent with Fennema and Tillie’s argument (1999) that the Turkish community has stronger civil society associations than the Moroccan community. After Putnam (1993), they explain this difference as a result of the comparatively large amount of social capital within the Turkish community and especially the comparatively large number of linkages between different Turkish associations. Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that their data (interlocking directorates as registered with the Chamber of Commerce) do not comprehensively grasp relations among some key players. For instance, their data show no connection between KMAN and SMR, which end up in two different clusters, even though the latter is in many ways an offshoot of the former.

⁸¹ The most important cause of these differences between Moroccan and Turkish associations is that the latter have much more cultural capital or, more specifically, the administrative and organizational skills required to operate successfully within the state bureaucracy. The difference in the degree of administrative sophistication is apparent for all types of associations. If we look at religious associations, we find that Turkish mosques are much better organized than Moroccan mosques. Two Moroccan mosque federations in Amsterdam exist on paper and have informal meetings but do not have an institutional infrastructure sustained by contributors. The various

Turkish mosque federations, in contrast, have highly developed institutional infrastructures, high levels of transnational coordination and considerable administrative competence (Doomernik, 1991; Sunier, 1996). We find a similar pattern when we look at guest worker associations. The website of the Institute for Social History states that the employees who processed the HTIB archive were surprised to find that the organization had archived virtually all of its correspondence, minutes and publications since its inception (IISG, 2009). The KMAN administration, in contrast, was notorious for its imprecision and amateurism. One of the members I interviewed had just put all the old documents in his garage and was waiting for the Institute for Social History to come and pick them up but he warned me that they might take a very long time to sort everything out.

This difference in administrative competence between Turkish and Moroccan associations explains why the former have always received more subsidies than the latter. Even though administrative demands in the 1980s were not very high compared to the standards of, say, 2005, there were many associations that never acquired enough efficacy to penetrate state institutions. This is especially true for conservative Moroccan organizations that showed little interest in politics and were distrusted and obstructed by progressive Moroccan associations. Conservative Turkish associations had more success. While they were opposed by left-wing organizations, a few associations nevertheless succeeded in fostering linkages with civil servants and politicians and, as a result of their relatively large size and strong coordination, managed to attain subsidies. The fact that conservative Turkish associations are subsidized explains in part why the per capita subsidies are higher for the Turkish community. The more stringent demands of the government (see below) explain why the difference between Turkish and Moroccan associations grew over time (a factor of 2.8 in 1995, 3.4 in 2000 and 6.8 in 2005).

Administrative competence may explain much of the divergence between Moroccan and Turkish associations but what explains divergent levels of administrative competence? The most plausible explanation is that the founders and activists of Moroccan and Turkish associations developed their organizational dispositions under different conditions. After the 1960 military coup in Turkey, the regime adopted a constitution that gave left-wing and religious associations some breathing space. There was repression during the 1960s and 1970s but civil politics was nevertheless flourishing, thanks in part to the comprehensive public education system. When there was a backlash in the late 1970s, many associations and intellectuals created branches in Western Europe or even moved their headquarters there. The military coup of 1980 turned back the civil reforms of the 1960s but by that time civil society associations had established large and transnational infrastructures, which helped them to survive the repression of the regime in Turkey. They had also developed the dispositions and skills required to organize and coordinate activities. Their success in getting subsidies is just one expression of this administrative competence.

The situation was very different in Morocco where the regime brutally suppressed religious and political activity that might undermine its authority (Schultz & Krebbers, 1994). The educational system was much less developed than in Turkey. Especially Berber communities and dissident intellectuals had to fear repression, intimidation and infiltration that could only be evaded through secretism, clientelism and syndicalism. The habitus of Moroccan activists in the Netherlands had been shaped under these repressive conditions and this explains the militant syndicalism of KMAN and the aversion to mosque associations. These dispositions had helped Moroccan activists to survive in their country of origin but hindered them in the Netherlands where the government demanded transparency, cooperation and administrative prudence.

⁸² This is not to say that it was entirely unaware of such tensions. When a confrontation between some Amicales and some KMAN radicals escalated, the mayor visited the barricaded KMAN headquarters to review the situation. Civil servants were also aware of the many tensions. But when it came to the organization of corporatism, these insights did not play a role and a bureaucratic logic prevailed.

⁸³ While Mohammed Rabbae of the NCB (see Chapters 4 and 6) launched an attack in the media against the mosque federation UMMON for its alleged intimidation of dissidents and critics, KMAN and the local chapter of NCB (*Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders*, Amsterdam Center for Foreigners) openly stated that they considered the mosque federation a legitimate partner. Amsterdam was the exception: all local branches of NCB, including the one in Rotterdam, followed Rabbae's line. The Moroccan corporatist institutions in Amsterdam collapsed in spite of the cooperation between radicals and conservatives.

⁸⁴ The government established Argan with support of KMAN but it became a battleground between the old and young generation. Since it was first established in 1991, young volunteers and workers had complained about the presence and meddling of older men. There were conflicts within the space as well as in court to decide who would rule the center. When Argan relocated from Amsterdam East to New West, the older men and their influence disappeared. In the new location, street kids undermined the activities of the youth center. When Argan relocated again, from New West to Old West, the street kids and their influence disappeared. In its new location the youth center evolved into a vibrant institution but it could only do so because it had – quite literally – left behind the older generation and street kids, which illustrates the fragmentation of the Moroccan community.

⁸⁵ In the 1980s, the guest worker associations received structural subsidies from the municipality but also from the Ministry of Welfare and, occasionally, from the Ministry for Foreign Aid. They also received income from membership contributions, ticket sales for cultural events and donations.

⁸⁶ Project subsidies are allocated for specific activities. Periodical subsidies are allocated for specific activities during a particular time frame (usually 6 or 12 months but not more). Periodical subsidies have to be requested annually or bi-annually (several months before the decision is taken) while project subsidies can be requested throughout the year.

⁸⁷ In 2005 the only Moroccan association to receive subsidies was the Ibn Khaldoun Mosque. Turkish left-wing associations also suffered. In 2005 there were still two (out of four) associations that received subsidies but the amount was much smaller than in 1995 and 2000. These associations – HTIB and DVA – have managed to transform themselves from left-wing umbrella associations into associations that cater to specific segments within the Turkish community. The reason why Turkish associations suffered less than their Moroccan counterparts has been discussed above but these differences between ethnic groups are of limited importance compared to the much broader shift away from corporatist governance.

⁸⁸ On 22 November 2000, *Het Parool* published this characterization of Abdou Menebhi:

Status: professional Moroccan since as long as anybody can remember. Rushes to the scene as soon as there are subsidies. Or when Moroccans are at issue and when an opinion of The Moroccan Community is desired.

But does he speak on behalf of the whole community? Menebhi thinks so. But surely he speaks on behalf of the City Moroccan Council, of which he is a chairman. In broken Dutch, even though he has been here for over a quarter of a century. ...

Does he have a lot of recognition? Definitely. Especially outside of the Moroccan community. But don't be mistaken: he is an extraordinary authoritarian figure, with a lot of power within his own clan, Berbers from the Rif Mountains. He terrifies them. He hands out the tasks and they c-r-a-w-l for him.

But he loves dialogues so much. Really, he loves them. Especially "open" dialogues. Menebhi is split. For instance during the riots on the Allebei square. He does participate in the demonstration against police action but in the meantime he calls for an "open dialogue" with that same police. ...

What does this City Moroccan Council actually do? You're not the first to wonder. An obscure club. You only hear from them when the mayor really does not know who else he could turn to (*Het Parool*, 2000).

This fragment associates Menebhi with virtually every civil sin: opportunism, clientelism, authoritarianism, hypocrisy. But even this profile concedes that Menebhi is the last person the mayor turns to. At this point, there apparently were no people who could represent a stigmatized community without being stigmatized themselves.

⁸⁹ Walter Nicholls observes a similar process in his research of France's *politique de la ville*. He describes it as "associationalism from above" (Nicholls, 2006).

⁹⁰ The Hudson Institute is sometimes credited with the invention of diversity policy. In 1987, it stated that "the proper management of [a] diverse workforce is a key priority, not because enterprises are becoming kinder or gentler but because they want to survive and grow" (quoted in Sandon, 2006).

⁹¹ The most important difference is that Essed emphasized the structural dimension of racism and postulated that organized, white interests were standing in the way of equality and diversity. Ramdas directed his criticisms against spokespersons for minorities and emphasized that minority group cultures and solidarities were standing in the way of democracy and liberty.

⁹² The types of structural analyses that could be found in the policy framework of 1989 (see previous chapter) are completely absent from the diversity memorandum of 1999. However, the document is not entirely silent about high levels of unemployment, low educational performance and high poverty levels. It posits that policies to reduce disadvantages remain necessary in the light of these ongoing problems. But low educational attainment and unemployment are no longer seen as injustices inflicted upon certain groups but as a waste of talent and human resources. To remedy these problems is not "only social, it is most of all smart" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1999, p. 3). Racism and discrimination are also mentioned in the document but are now part of a more general – and less serious – problem of "mutual prejudice." Especially Moroccan boys and women with head scarves have been negatively portrayed in the media and this requires active efforts by the government and its partners "to create positive images of groups of Amsterdammers" (*ibid.*, 1999, p. 29).

⁹³ According to a municipal website, there were eight think tanks for social cohesion in November 2008 (Denktank Sociale Cohesie, 2009).

⁹⁴ This does not mean that no migrants work in these associations. The distinction between a "varied" and "Dutch" association is not clear-cut. I operationalized the ethnicity of an association by looking at the application and on the association's website. One foreign name would be enough to refer to an association as "varied." The labels may be debatable in individual instances but the overall pattern is clear: associations with Dutch (and to a lesser extent varied and Moroccan) leaderships win at the expense of those with migrant leaderships. Similar problems occur with the operationalization of the distinction between commercial bureaus

and civil society associations. None of the projects here are presented to the municipality as a “commercial” project and many depend on the efforts of volunteers. In this sense, no activity is purely commercial. However, very often consultancy fees are charged or there is a direct connection between the commercial activities of an agency and its subsidized activities.

⁹⁵ Individual organizations can apply for amounts of up to 50,000 euros but the company cooperated with other organizations in three different ventures.

⁹⁶ According to the subtitle of their website (TANS, 2009).

⁹⁷ This surge is high compared to Turks (130 per cent), Surinamese (60 per cent) and native Dutch (35 per cent). The number stood at 2,100 in 2005. Like students from other large migrant groups, Moroccans often choose for studies like law, administration and economics (O & S, 2007, p. 6).

⁹⁸ “Problem youth” appears mainly in policy discourse. “Street culture” is a popular term among the left and social scientists (e.g. De Jong, 2007). The media often report on Moroccan youth gangs. Geert Wilders speaks of “Moroccan street terrorists.” Ahmed Marcouch refers to “thugs.” Oudkerk first coined the phrase *kut-Marokkanen* (which roughly translates as “fucking Moroccans”) but it has since been euphemized into k-u-t-Marokkanen or put in between inverted commas.

⁹⁹ To which Cohen replied: “But they are *our* Kut-Marokkanen.”

¹⁰⁰ The city also ran a campaign against discrimination. In 2007, posters on the street showed people who look like a Jew, a Muslim woman, a Moroccan young man and a Surinamese man, with captions suggesting that they are discriminated against (“because of my creed”; “because of my head scarf”; “because of my name”; “because of my skin color”). The posters advertised the municipal reporting point for discrimination. While this showed that the municipality is concerned about discrimination, it also revealed that the government has monopolized the fight against it. Amsterdam did not politically or financially support associations struggling against racism or discrimination but instead established a reporting point in its own bureaucracy – in contrast to Rotterdam where the municipality provided structural subsidies to a monitoring center for racism and an agency against discrimination.

¹⁰¹ This phrase was originally associated with Joop den Uyl, Labor prime minister between 1973-1977, who said in 1986:

“Polarization” is an inappropriate term to capture the process of segmentation and defusion that currently takes place within our society. The effort to counter this process we can imperfectly describe as an attempt to renew integration and strengthen cohesion. To keep things together – that’s it.

The remark is cited on the back cover of a report on a conference on urban renewal in 1990, which in turn is cited by Jan Dirk Snel (Snel, 2007).

¹⁰² Cohen’s ideas did not suddenly change this situation as it is the alderman for diversity, not the mayor, who is responsible for integration policies. But Cohen’s ideas nevertheless had major symbolic importance.

Mediatization and politicization turned integration into much more than just another policy domain. It became the issue through which the position and identity of the administration was defined.

¹⁰³ This represented a conception of the city’s population already long in the making: the population is no longer composed of ethnic groups nor of diverse individuals but of more or less civil groups. The translation of these

conceptions into institutions is far from trivial for several reasons. Most obviously, it takes time for new political conceptions to materialize into bureaucratic categories and my research was conducted while this process was ongoing. Another reason is that the formal separation of Church and State disallows the government from directly subsidizing liberal Islam or any other form of religion. It is not uncommon to subsidize associations connected to mosques or churches but only for non-religious activities, like computer courses or language lessons. This means that the government can either not fulfill its desire to support liberal Islam or do so indirectly.

¹⁰⁴ *Unie voor Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Amsterdam en Omstreken*, Union for Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and Surroundings. The UMMAO was established as an alternative to UMMON (see Chapter 7), discussed in the chapter on ethnic corporatism. UMMAO has support from representatives of various Moroccan mosques in Amsterdam but lacks institutionalized relationships. It is an informal network without an office and when I conducted an interview with two representatives in 2006, the organizations had just lost their home base because a new and more conservative board did not want to maintain its (strong) relationships with UMMAO.

¹⁰⁵ Other members of the working group were writers Nazmiye Oral and Yasmine Allas – both non-practicing Muslims strongly in favor of making Muslims more self-critical. Pieter Winsemius of the right-wing Liberals (VVD) and Labor Party notable Felix Rottenberg also participated.

¹⁰⁶ According to a note to the municipal council of 16 November 2006, page 5.

¹⁰⁷ The philosophical legitimation for this is the principle of “compensating neutrality,” which stipulates that some forms of religion can be stimulated to increase choice. If one then accepts the idea that fundamentalist or radical Islam is much more powerful than liberal Islam, it is justified, according to the principle of compensating neutrality, to support the latter. It is an interesting paradox that the very same administrators who argue that most Muslims are not fundamentalist or radical argue that fundamentalist or radical Islam is so strong that the government needs to compensate for the weakness of liberal Islam.

¹⁰⁸ Surinamese and other “black” groups are generally absent.

¹⁰⁹ On one of the municipality’s poster campaigns, this discourse was sloganized as “*inburgeren, dat betekent meedoen*” – “civil enculturation, that means participation.” Participation is defined as participation in those institutions where native Dutch dominate. So participation in an ethnic association, in a household or in a network of friends is not, according to the conception of government policy, participation.

¹¹⁰ Attempts to civilize cultural practices through the mobilization of religious discourse were not unique to Slotervaart; throughout the city similar initiatives were taken, with and without government support. For instance, the women’s association of Milli Gorus received subsidies from the SIP Fund (see Chapters 8 and 9) for a project on emancipation. In this particular project, an imam explained to men that much of the behavior they consider as “religious” is, in fact, “cultural,” and quite possibly in contradiction to the Quran. The women’s website is full of texts (by men) that argue that the well-being of women is central to Islamic belief. Let me cite one particular instance of the appropriation of Islam for civilizing missions.

In the minutes of one meeting published on the internet we can read that two panelists – an imam and a chairman – start by asking what the life of others means to the assembled men. The men answer that their lives are never more important than the lives of others but that sometimes the lives of others are more important than theirs. Then they are asked what they think about when they hear the word “honor.” Most of the men think of

women, some think more specifically of wives, daughters or mothers. One also thinks of tradition and an old saying: the most important things in a man's life are a horse, a wife and a weapon. They then talk more about who exactly carries the honor (consensus: women) and who has to defend it (consensus: men). When the conversation moves to flirting, one audience member says that it is not allowed according to Islam, another feels it is allowed if the boy and girl marry. And what if honor is violated? One man has the impression that "she must die," others suggest marriage or prevention and one stresses that sufficient proof must exist (because the prophet emphasized this). Then comes the question what the men would do if someone from their family had lost their honor. Here I translate the report literally (with irregularities):

Participant 1: The person should question himself first. What is my share in this?

Participant 2: We raise the children. If my daughter does that, then I am responsible. But I did not raise my wife. What is my share [of the responsibility] when my wife walks down the wrong path?

[interruption] You should also question yourself to see if you give enough attention to your wife.

Participant 3: To give a frightening example, that person could be killed.

Participant 4: I would take a weapon and kill.

Chairman: You say "I will kill my wife or sister?" If it is your little brother, do you kill him too?

Participant 4: I mean, that is what society thinks.

Chairman: No, you talked on your own behalf. It has changed now, because it is about your brother.

Participant 4:?

Other participant: Why do we discuss? Because the Dutch want it that way? Our religion is pure and that is why it forbids these kinds of things.

Imam: I do not know what you are saying; what has this to do with the topic? These are our problems.

Chairman: We prepare these programs and questions. It has nothing to do with the wish of the Dutch.

The Dutch do not have honor and honor killings, but our society does. And such bad things are done on behalf of Islam. We work to prevent these problems. These programs are not made to please the people or the government.

Then the discussion moves to gender discrimination and gossiping and what to do when people say your honor has been violated (cited in Milli Gorus, 2006).

The association itself is responsible for the transcription and translation (from Turkish), so information may be distorted. Whether or not the account is precise, it is clear that Islam is mobilized against behavior considered uncivil according to standards generated in the Dutch civil sphere. It is all the more interesting that the imam, Osman Paköz, joined the association in 2004 after lobbying by the German headquarters of the European organization. According to Üzeyir Kabaktepe, this imam "seemed all right at first but then he protested more and more against our liberal policies" (cited in Dros, 2007). We thus see a deeply conservative imam (according to Kabaktepe) promoting an emancipatory discourse.

¹¹¹ As indicated in Chapter 8, structural subsidies refer to subsidies for which reservations are made in the municipal budget; this funding is secure as long as politicians do not ask the government to withdraw support and as long as civil servants do not have suspicions of fraud or misuse.

¹¹² I examine power relations mainly through data on subsidies and do not devote much attention to consultative bodies. As noted above, ethnic councils did not exist in Rotterdam. There was an advisory council for the multicultural city (*Stedelijke Adviescommissie Multiculturele Stad*, SAMS), established in 1999 and consisting partly of members selected by minority associations and partly of members selected by the government. The institution was in operation until 2003 when its members declared that there was no more need for a specific council for minorities or multicultural society.

¹¹³ PBR and SPIOR are the nodes that tie networks of associations together, the brokers between the government and civil society. They can thus be seen as powerful, though both organizations have internal mechanisms for power-sharing. Note that this is very different from the situation in Amsterdam where the most assertive groups monopolized the recognition and resources channeled to and through the advisory councils. Such monopolization was impossible in Rotterdam as civil corporations have elections and their credibility as intermediaries hinges upon their capacity to reach and organize large and diverse constituencies. Because power is spread over a large number of different associations, it is difficult to identify an elite, a group that clearly has more power than its competitors. The two corporations also balance each other. On the one hand, they constantly compete for the support of minority associations and recognition from the government. On the other hand, they have a productive relationship as they both win if the government seeks to support or target minority associations.

¹¹⁴ I do not think it is a coincidence that four Muslim women won the prize. More than natives (mostly men) or Muslim men, they have developed a discourse sensitive to the anxieties about Islam *and* to experiences of discrimination. Central to this discourse is the purification strategy (see Chapter 6) which helps them to cleanse religion of culture. They used this strategy to great effect during the debates while authorities like Tariq Ramadan backed attempts to draw a hard line between (uncivil and profane) culture and (civil and sacred) religion. The distinction provided these women and many other Muslims with the chance to undergo a process of simultaneous civil and religious purification – they argued that their communities may indeed have problems but these result from the pollution caused by tradition rather than from any inherent defects in their religion.

¹¹⁵ Although Muslims and the critics of *Leefbaar* had considerable discursive power, it was limited in time and space. The voting on the propositions was supposed to result in a civil charter stating the terms of conviviality between Muslims and non-Muslims but the government traded this idea for a “Rotterdam code” which had as its first rule that people should speak Dutch in public. Minister Verdonk enthusiastically supported the Rotterdam government and argued in the media that all people in the Netherlands should speak Dutch in public.

¹¹⁶ It is a public secret that there are groups of young Moroccan men and boys who prostitute themselves. One family in the northern part of the city had raised the issue and a number of individual associations, welfare organizations and professionals indicated that the problem was structural and that collective action was needed. A number of professionals and associations tried to assess the nature and extent of the problem, and their search led them to the circle around Pim Fortuyn who had never made a secret of his sexual relationships with young Moroccan men. When he was once asked whether he ever talks to Muslims he responded with the answer “Talk? I sleep with them!” Most commentators interpreted this remark as just another extravagant quirk but within the Moroccan community there was a rumor that the sexual encounters had been videotaped and that Fortuyn and other Rotterdam homosexuals made use of the services of a clandestine network that actively recruits young

Moroccans. The associations wrote several letters to administrators and police to demand an investigation. They were unsuccessful but a side-effect of this mobilization was that it created linkages between different segments of the Moroccan community and reinforced the ties of the most central associations with professionals and civil servants.

¹¹⁷ Abdou Menebhi, the leader of the Moroccan Council, once told me that KMAN encouraged Moroccans to vote “not because local elections are so important but because Hassan II had forbidden people to vote.” The associations united in the Turkish Council also actively encouraged people to vote.

¹¹⁸ The share of the population supporting the development of a multicultural society in which minorities retain much of their religious and ethnic identity has been remarkably stable since the late 1980s (Vijver *et al.*, 2007). Systematic, longitudinal data on opinions on Muslims has only been available since 2004 but there is no straightforward trend in the direction of more or less negativity (TNS-Nipo, 2008).

¹¹⁹ The existence of a mechanism that works against discursive monopolization may help to solve a puzzle that I alluded to in the beginning of this study: why did the growing power of Culturalism not result in more negative opinions about the feasibility of a multicultural society? I hypothesize that the reason for this is not simply that people are slow to change their opinions but that their opinions are shaped in a force field that does not decisively transform in one or the other direction.

¹²⁰ The analysis focused on the stark differences in the relationship between civil society associations and the government. But when we examine developments in civil society (and not civil society’s relationship to the government), there are striking parallels between the two cities. In both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the left-wing associations that had been dominant in the 1980s had lost much of their power by 2005. The network of progressive organizations in which they were embedded lost momentum: their base of support contracted while they suffered from increasingly strict administrative demands. Islamic associations, in contrast, were resilient or even gained in power. Mosque associations appealed to the conservative segments of the first generation while new associations were created by the second generation. The case studies showed that the ambiguous compulsion of the civil sphere also operates in local governance figurations: precisely because conservative and Islamic associations are relatively close to groups deemed to be outside society and beyond the government’s reach, these associations gain recognition as intermediaries and representatives. Moreover, younger generations are more likely to identify as Muslims than as ethnics. Civil Islam is still a marginal discourse in the national debate but among Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their offspring, it is a very strong discourse. Migrants develop interpretations that enable them to identify simultaneously as members of the Dutch civil community and as devout Muslims. While in the past secular associations distinguished themselves through the support of women’s emancipation and integration, such themes are now increasingly taken up by Muslims. Both in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants mobilized Islam against those civil sins that culturalists associate with minorities, including misogyny, authoritarianism, apathy, criminality and indolence.

¹²¹ Note that the method for coding relations could lead to the overestimation of power concentration (see Appendix 2). I do not think that a different method would generate substantially different findings but this would have to be verified.

¹²² In the debate on integration on the opinion pages but also, it seems, in Rotterdam during the Islam debates

(where the challengers of Leefbaar faced a diffuse yet sizeable opposition).

¹²³ The orthodoxy is not simply out there, waiting to be challenged. It is rather a discursive creation of the challengers who identify – through such floating signifiers as “multiculturalists,” “old politics,” etc. – and thereby construct orthodoxy with which they can then effect a break.