Innovation Ltd. Boundary work in deliberative governance in land use planning
Metze, T.A.P.

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In recent years, a surge in experiments with deliberative governance in land use planning in the Netherlands and around the world has occurred. In this form of governing, government interacts with businesses, non-governmental organizations and citizens to collaboratively solve problems. These more horizontal forms of decision making are tested, for example, in public entrepreneurial networks, scenario development, or communities of practice. Deliberative governance promises more credible decisions through an improvement of the quality of interactions between interdependent actors.

The study of boundary work in three cases of deliberative governance in land use planning, two in the Netherlands and one in the United States, demonstrates that credible democratic deliberative governance is limited: many participants resist to giving up their formal powerful positions, nor do they share experiences, exchange knowledge, or engage in collaborative inquiries. Deliberative governance and innovative solutions occur only in experiments that stage reflective conversations. To be more than an “innovation business”, participants have to be encouraged — by the setting and by the incentives from rules and regulations — to transcend boundaries around frozen discourse and practice. Moreover, a deliberative design and facilitators that are able to redirect conflict into reflective conversations are of great value. They enable critique and empathy in conversations and consensus in outcomes. These are vital ingredients to create credible, innovative and democratic decisions.

Tamara Metze conducted this PhD research at the University of Amsterdam in the department of political science. Since 1998 she has worked as a policy advisor for de Stad bv. She is an assistant professor at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration.
INNOVATION LTD.

BOUNDARY WORK IN DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN LAND USE PLANNING
Promotiecommissie

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After working for many years, first with volunteers in a cultural youth center, later with citizens in Zaanstad, and now with citizens, businesses and non-governmental organizations in a variety of interactive policy making settings, I am surprised again and again by two things. First, the eagerness of people from all walks of life to be actively involved in public policy making is a pleasant revelation. Even when they never learn the results, many people continue to participate. Sometimes this is because there is a lot at stake, but also because they want to improve their environment or even their society. Second, I am surprised by the strong belief that the “right people” at the table make it clear sailing for the democratic quality and the content of solutions to improve. Often, in interactive or network types of governing, good procedures are considered the solution to many problems. However, in a number of the projects in which I was (and am) involved, I also see that quality of content does not automatically result from improved procedures, even though it is dynamic in the sense that it has to be agreed upon by participants. Procedures are important but so is the creation and input of good content. Moreover, procedures and content can both include and exclude ideas and people. It is important to realize this, since policy makers and politicians sometimes use the argument of procedural inclusion in interactive policy making as a way to make decisions legitimate. Even in situations in which the content excluded many participants, they claim that the decision has support (in Dutch the decision has draagvlak) and that everyone had a chance to participate. This might be considered not only undemocratic but it can also put off the implementation of innovative solutions for problems in society. Even after I had left the university these two surprises fascinated me. I decided I wanted to go back in order to study this in depth and reflect on my work in the policy practice. I wrote a research proposal and Maarten Hajer and Willem Salet of the University of Amsterdam gave me the opportunity to start this challenging, rewarding and sometimes daunting journey.

This journey would not have been so wonderful and perhaps would never have ended without the continual support of colleagues, friends, and family, nor without the time and input that the many respondents gave me. I would like to express my gratitude to them now. First, I would like to thank colleagues in discourse analysis, in science and technology studies, and in the departments of political science and urban planning of the University of Amsterdam. I appreciate our inspiring debates, your comments, and your help in crossing disciplinary boundaries. I would especially like to thank my supervisor, Maarten Hajer, and co-supervisor, Jan van Tatenhove, who stimulated me to find my own way and to be a careful researcher. Also, many thanks to my colleagues at the Amsterdam Discourse Center, in particular Marcel Maussen, Christian Bröer, Kateryna Pishchikova, Margo van den Brink, and Katharina Paul. Your comments on drafts of papers and chapters encouraged me to further develop boundary work in a tradition of discourse theory. Kateryna and Katharina, a friendship has grown that I cherish. More chocolate in the future! Margo, now perhaps we can co-edit another special issue.

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The “transversals,” crossing boundaries seems to be our specialty. Barbara, our conversations have helped me reflect on differences and similarities between political science and STS. Thank you for your friendship. In a more practical but very important way, George Allez improved the American English used in this book. Thank you for making me smile about my mistakes.

Next, I am grateful to the colleagues at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration and at de Stad bv. I admire your passion for societal problems and their possible solutions. Thank you for sharing your wit and intellect. Thank you for crossing boundaries between work and private life. Jeroen, over the last 12 years you have been a great inspiration and motivator of my intellectual and personal development. You have encouraged me to cross many Rubicons. Frank, thank you for hiring me at the TSPB. Gabriel, thank you for being patient with this thesis. Sabine, thank you for taking care of organizational stuff and more.

Third, I would like to express thanks to all the respondents in the three projects that spent time talking with me and providing me with documents and experiences. Your interpretations of the cases have been very insightful. Some of you even participated twice or set up interviews and meetings for me. A special thanks to Jan Hoekmans, Jan de Wilt, Lucy Wassink, John Shenot, Thomas Eggert and Nancy Skadden. Without you, the data gathering would have been impossible.

Fourth, a warm thanks to my friends. Dan and Carmela. You welcomed me into your home twice when I visited Wisconsin to study the Dairy Gateway Project. Your hospitality made it a great journey! I hope we will share many more Wisconsin and Dutch dishes, pick apples, and visit farmers markets. The “babbelboot”: all three of you make my life more fun. Titia, you are a wonderful friend, and I am grateful we get to share our experiences as working women at the university as well as many more important aspects of life. Dear Utopians, Olaf, Helen, Marcel, Bregie, Petra and many more, I hope we can keep on dreaming about an utopia even though it has become more of More and less of youth culture. Sonja, I didn’t know where to categorize you. Of course, this is a good thing. Thank you for our passionate and in-depth debates about politics and the Political and for the support of the “god” of boundaries.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My grandmother at age 92 still is a role model to me. She is a strong woman with a big heart for people of all ages, races, and classes. I also would like to thank my father and mother for making me want to learn forever, and for pointing out the important things in life: happiness, laughter and warm relationships. Serge, I would like to dedicate this book to you since you own at least half of it. I treasure the beer glass mats on which we drew the outline of the book. You made sure I kept my priorities straight and that I did not drown in work. You take care of Luz when I am not around, and when I am around. We share the same passion for our little girl, and many more things. I admire how you always know what is most important and I am very fortunate to be with you. Now we can celebrate — you don’t have to compete for attention with this book anymore! Sweet Luz, the way you try to capture streams of water from the watering can with your bare hands makes me realize the wonder of trying to capture dynamic things. I promise I will not try to capture all.

Tamara
Amsterdam, September 2010
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Introduction: credible deliberative governance

“We bring to the table this notion of relationship and partnership, and that really changes the dynamics in how the [government] is working with individuals or a group of companies working together. We are not a regulator. We do not come in and say: you are going to do it this way or you are going to face the consequences. We come in and say: we are interested in securing the environmental performance” Governmental actor at (Kewaunee-Pro-Ag/Pro-Environment, 2004).

“Why doesn’t government take care of that?” or “Why does government interfere with this?” are two sentences that I often heard in discussions with citizens, local businesses, and governmental actors in the neighbourhoods where I took part as a community worker. Businesses asked for cost-sharing, grants, and subsidies as easily as they asked for regulatory relief and tax-breaks. Non-governmental organizations and citizens fought for individual freedom and choice as easily as they fought for more rules and regulations that limit these rights. Moreover, governmental actors ruled and regulated societal actors and at the same time needed to cooperate with them.

Working in communities and later on for regional and national governments, I also observed that governmental actors and scholars in public administration and politics are trying to formulate answers to these double demands on government. In policy practice they experiment with innovative forms of governing that in theory are referred to as governance. In this type of governing, the formation of networks between governmental and non-governmental actors, or between other forms of public and private cooperation are tested. This network formation enables government, together with citizens and non-governmental organizations, businesses included, to reach binding collective decisions in an ever more complex society in which government depends on other actors. Governmental actors acknowledge that they are depending on other actors for decision making and implementation. Moreover, theories on governance promise that new ways of government steering enhance the efficiency and effect of policies, and through that the legitimacy of governmental decisions (Rhodes, 1990; Klijn and Teisman, 1991; Thompson et al., 1991; Waarden, 1992; Kickert, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997; Hodges, 2005; Laws, 1998; Laws, 2001 et al.; Rhodes, 2003b; Sørenson and Torfing, 2007; Teisman et al., 2000).

In this thesis, I further develop one strand of governance, deliberative governance (Hajer, 2003a; Hajer et al., 2004). In this strand it is argued that democratic decision making can be improved through network cooperation that pays attention to the ways in which network partners interact and to the quality of these interactions. In deliberative governance as developed here, at least two of the ideals of deliberative democracy theory (Bessette, 1994; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Young, 1997, Dryzek, 2000b) are combined with insights from theories on network governance (Hajer, 2009).

First, as with deliberative democracy theory, deliberative governance theory promises an improvement of democratic decision making when actors in a network or in other forms of
public/private cooperation engage in conversations of a deliberative quality. This means that they are inclusive, decisive, reciprocal, and that actors have equal speaking time and equal enforcement power (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Deliberations that fit these criteria induce open, reasonable, and reflective\textsuperscript{7} interactions (Dryzek, 2000a, p. 2 and 78–9). More reasonable decision making and more representative decision making are the result. Moreover, these types of conversations encourage and empower all sorts of actors to participate in decision making, and enable them to be actively involved, responsible participants in society (Warren, 1992, p.8). All this leads to enhanced legitimacy of decision making.

Second, in deliberative governance, the role of government, as well as that of experts and other participants, changes. As is the case in governance theories, these actors are understood to be interdependent in decision making. Moreover, in deliberative governance theory, government should encourage cooperation and learning among actors in a network. Expert knowledge is no longer a given nor authoritative per se (Parkinson 2003) but rather part of the deliberations. The role of experts varies: their role is to facilitate public learning in deliberations (Fischer, 2000; Fischer, 2003, p. 224–5). Subsequently, deliberative governance promises that through deliberation the expertise, experience, interpretations and interests of other societal actors are better represented and included in decision making (Fischer, 1999; Dryzek, 1982). In deliberative governance theory, experts and governmental actors — or in more general terms, people in power — can encourage learning and the inclusion of minorities, local expertise, experience, interpretations and interests only if these minority views are included in the deliberation.

However, in my experience as a community worker and as a consultant, actors in policy practice do not necessarily accept these promises of a shift to deliberative governance. What I saw and still see happening in innovative participatory planning, interactive policy formation, scenario building, or projects of public/private cooperation is that many of the participants continue to maintain, in short, government discourse.\textsuperscript{7} They do not want to give up their formal powerful positions, nor share experiences, exchange knowledge, or engage in collaborative inquiries. Even though they agree to organize or participate in experiments with deliberative governance, many of the actors still want government or experts to maintain their authority, for example as the commander and controller, the prosecutor or the regulator who sets environmental standards. NGO’s want to keep their role as watchdogs, and businesses want to do business.

Therefore, I began to believe that it is in these experiments that actors accept, contest or reject the introduction of deliberative governance. It is in their conversations that are part of these experiments that they negotiate, test, reflect upon and accept a shift to deliberative governance. Hence, my thesis questions whether a shift from government to deliberative governance occurs in the policy practice and if actors in society, including government, accept the introduced alternative. Is deliberative governance a credible alternative to hierarchical government steering and is it gaining momentum and support in these experiments? This dissertation presents the results of a study of the credibility of deliberative governance. Credibility as a concept implies that in this analysis I assume that it is in deliberations that actors negotiate the authority and legitimacy of arguments and discourse that actors utter\textsuperscript{7} (see below). At the heart of this thesis lie the attempts of coalitions of governmental organizations, businesses, citizens, academic experts and non-governmental organizations to cooperate in networks and alter the quality of their conversations to improve land use and (urban) planning.

I have looked into three innovative policy projects that I identified as experiments with deliberative governance. I will discuss these experiments later. The conveners of these experiments — often governmental actors in cooperation with academics or consultants — introduced in a contextualized way a new “deliberative governance” vocabulary and practice. They wanted actors to cooperate in networks; they wanted them to coproduce policy outcomes, and to engage in learning processes rather than negotiations. In other words, the experiments were attempts to have a broad range of actors engage in and enact what I would call deliberative governance discourse.

In this thesis I question whether these attempts succeed and if deliberative governance gains credibility in the discursive interactions of these innovative projects. This injection of an alternative discourse in the three projects leads to credibility contests (Gieryn, 1999, p. 24) between government discourse and deliberative governance discourse among participants in the projects.\textsuperscript{8} It is in these contest that are part of deliberations (Dryzek, 2000a, p. 77) that participants settle what they think is the most credible way to govern and to solve issues. Hence, I consider government, governance and deliberative governance to be discourses that can gain credibility in policy practice. ‘The three innovative projects are part of a broader credibility contest between a dominant discourse on “government,” and an alternative, still recessive discourse on deliberative governance. The question in this study is:

\begin{quote}
Whether, and if so, how deliberative governance gains credibility in interactions between participants in experiments with it.
\end{quote}

First, I will describe the theoretical discussion on a shift from government to deliberative governance. I will establish how the government, governance and deliberative governance models in the literature relate to our understanding of enactment of these models as discourses. Second, I will establish what deliberative governance is in light of the discussion of the shift from government to governance. In addition, the concepts “credibility” and “reflectivity” will be further defined.

THE SHIFT FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE

To some scholars in politics and public administration, the shift from government to governance is an empirical fact, to some it is an analytical construct or a descriptive model, and to others both “government” and “governance” indicate prescriptive models. I study this shift not as a fait accompli but as a credibility struggle between two discourses. I consider it an empirical phenomenon that coalitions of actors such as those in government, business and NGO’s as well as scholars in public administration seek to achieve in experimental settings in a variety of policy practices. These experiments are normative attempts to innovate and thus change the way government interacts with society.
THEORETICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE

In general, in the theoretical debate on the shift from government to governance, “government” refers to specific models or theories of governing that have been dominant in most Western countries since the 1950’s-60’s. In almost all these Western countries it embodies the idea that government develops policies, sets standards, and regulates. Science provides information to government. Government can set standards and design rules based on this scientific knowledge. Citizens and the collective good are protected by government. Non-governmental organizations often function as watchdogs and are actively engaged in setting agendas. In government, businesses and other societal actors are both regulated and protected. In other words, government is:

“a collection of organizations run on hierarchical principles, funded through some form of taxation and whose authority is derived by the application of state-prescribed legislation” (Hodges, 2005, p. xi).

For now I will define the government model as the common understanding of a political authority. It is a ruling power (in the form of an organization but also as structure or institution) in society, through which the citizens’ interests — security and public order — are cared for. National government is the highest entity in the hierarchy and all other organizations fall under its jurisdiction.

The shift from government to governance in political science, first of all, was a shift from the study of governmental institutions and organizations to the study of the process of governing (Marsh and Smith, 2001). Recently, in political science and public administration, “governance” is further developed as an analytical, descriptive or prescriptive model (Tatenhove and Leroy, 1995; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes 2007). It presents an alternative to the traditional model of the manner in which governments govern. In addition to steering and regulating, in this model government interacts with societal actors in interdependent networks for more efficient, effective, or legitimate governance. Rhodes argued that changing the boundaries of the state meant the boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque (Rhodes, 1996, p. 666). Governance has almost become synonymous with governing in a network society in which conditions for governmental steering have changed. Scholars argue that in a network society government can no longer steer by command and control but that it needs to cooperate.

The idea of a network society gained momentum in the 1990’s and built on analysis by Robert Reich, for example, who demonstrated how economies were loosely connected to nation-states (Reich, 1991), and at the end of the nineties Kevin Kelly introduced the “network economy” as a new economic order in which connectivity is the most important part of success of businesses (Kelly, 1998). Perhaps most influential in thinking about a network society was Manuel Castells’ trilogy (Castells, 1996). Here he demonstrated empirically that due to globalization of trade and culture, and due to information and communication technology, the spaces of flows in the modern world had become less important than the places of power. Hence, in a network society geographical, administrative, and organizational boundaries have decreased in weight, while the significance of flows and processes in networks has increased. The concept “government,” or as some prefer, “network governance” (Hajer, 2009) signifies the changing role of government in this new type of society, a society that scholars argue government can no longer steer. Moreover, it implies that governmental actors are interdependent with others and need to collaborate in decision making for the common good.

In a network society, hierarchical relationships between government, businesses, science, citizens, and NGO’s are no longer considered a given (cf. Rhodes, 1990; Marsh, 1992; Rhodes, 2003a; Kickert, 1993; Kooiman, 1993; Teisman, 1997; Tatenhove and Leroy, 1995). Actors are understood to act interdependently and to operate in a complex, and to some extent, “unknown” world (cf. in Dutch Public administration: Gunsteren and Van Ruuyven, 1993). In networks, knowledge is plural, and government can no longer impose its measures and standards. Other actors also mobilize knowledge that can contradict the knowledge that governmental rules and regulations are built on. Moreover, businesses and societal actors and their knowledge resources are of great influence both in formation and in implementation of these measures. The interdependence of actors in networks and the difficulties to generate or claim certitude in these situations cause problems when government tries to regulate or steer (cf. Scott, 1998; Hajer, 2009). Further, a “hollowing out of the state” through decentralization and privatization demands that government to be able to steer in networks (Rhodes, 1994; 1997; 2007).

From the 1990’s onward, innovative types of interactions between government and society were no longer studied only as empirical realities; today they are stimulated and proposed as answers to a crisis or as more efficient, effective, legitimate, and democratic means to solve problems in network types of government. Scholars in public administration and political science further developed an alternative or additional model of governing — network government, recently more often referred to as “governance” (Kickert, 1993; Rhodes, 1996, 2000, 2003b, 2007). A majority of these models of governance focuses on improvements of institutional interactions within governmental organizations, between governmental and non-governmental organizations (“good governance” and “new public management”), and between different levels of government (multi-level governance) (Rhodes, 1996). Or these models may suggest more transparent rules and regulations, better formal procedures, and improved formal divisions of labor. Governance is both a way to describe a shift to a network society and the changing role of governments in it. It is defined as “new processes and methods of governing, and changing conditions of the ordered rule” (Hodges, 2005, p. xi). Governance means governing by “self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). Moreover, governance, or network governance, is cooperation in networks for decision making for the common good (Hajer, 2009).

In sum, in political science and public administration, the concept of governance first indicated a shift to the study of processes of governing, then became a model to describe and analyze the interactions of government with society. This was soon followed by the design of the ideal type of interactions of governance with society that were needed to improve efficiency, effectiveness in the democratic legitimacy of decision making. In this thesis I will further elaborate on features of governance as network types of interactions between government and society. One ideal type of interaction is the subject of this dissertation, namely “deliberative governance.”
**DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE**

“Deliberative governance” is one of the ideal solutions that scholars in political science and public administration proposed to deal with a “crisis in steering,” among other reasons. Deliberative governance, as I will develop, is influenced by deliberative democracy theories in which government and other experts facilitate and mediate collaborative learning of citizens, NGO’s and businesses; also by theories from science and technology studies (STS) about more democratic and more inclusive problem solving and knowledge production, such as inclusive or participative science or appreciative inquiry in the Dewey tradition; and by theories about reframing from the field of organizational learning and change. Deliberative governance theory promises at least two democratic improvements: first, reflectivity in individuals, conversations and decision making for more informed and supported decision making, and then, more credible decision making.

**IMPROVEMENTS: LEARNING AND CHANGE**

In the footsteps of deliberative democracy theory, deliberative governance theory argues that the quality of interactions in a network that includes both governmental and non-governmental actors can be improved (Bessette, 1994; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Dryzek, 2000b; Fung, 2005). Interactions should be open, reciprocal, and aimed at learning for better decision making. Deliberative democracy theory claims that participants exchange arguments and/or can reflect on different interpretations or frames. An exchange of arguments and reflectivity enable better informed decision making and collaborative learning and change (Dryzek, 2000a, p.78-79). It is the communicative style in interactions that needs to be improved to facilitate learning and change.

In deliberative democracy theory, scholars define criteria that should stimulate the deliberative quality of conversations, that is, exchange of arguments and reflectivity. They argue, for example, that these conversations need to be inclusive, transparent, and accessible, and actors need to have equal speaking time. Most of these theories also argue that they are less concerned with the facilitation of an exchange of arguments rather than with the exchange of interpretations, and as a result, learning. For example, Hajer, inspired by Gutmann and Thompson, defined the deliberative quality as “inclusive, open, accountable, reciprocal” and upright, “and when the participants learn through an iterative dialogue” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Hajer and Versteegh, 2005b, p. 176). Participants should have equal speaking time and equal enforcement power (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Or as Hendriks summarized, deliberation is “a social communicative process in which free, equal, and relatively impartial participants consider arguments on issues in view of the collective good” (Hendriks, 2006, p. 571 and 572).

In chapter 1, I will develop the notion of reflectivity as a way in which learning and change take place in settings that meet these criteria of deliberations. These procedural criteria might facilitate reflectivity for learning and change.

**IMPROVEMENTS: CREDIBILITY**

This thesis argues that more credible decisions will be the outcome of deliberations, as it is in deliberations that participants enact the legitimacy and authority of discourses and the actors and decisions that belong to it. There are several reasons for this.

First, in network governance, decisions can no longer derive legitimacy and authority from actors’ formal decision-making power, tradition, outside expertise, or the law only. The political setting is no longer a given but takes place in an “institutional void” (Hajer, 2003a; Hajer, 2009, p. 34) where there is a legitimacy deficit (Hajer 2009, p. 30). From deliberative democracy theory we learn that this is true for governmental actors and for academic experts (Torgerson, 1986; Parkinson, 2003). For example, Parkinson argued that “the legitimacy of expertise is derived from the discursively determined ends of the people at large, and is not internal to expertise itself” (Parkinson, 2003). This is even stronger in situations of policy crisis; otherwise authoritative standards no longer apply. It is these very standards and arguments that are being contested. It is “the appropriate classification itself [that] becomes the very stake of politics” (Hajer and Uitermark 2008, p. 6).

Second, scholars in science and technology studies (STS) have reasoned along similar lines and proposed ‘deliberative forums’ (Collins and Evans, 2002). In line with governance theory they argue that actors no longer take for granted scientific authority in decision making as it takes place in a network of interdependent actors that all have a share of knowledge. This is especially true for public issues that have inconclusive scientific consensus and where there is great social controversy. In these situations of “post-normal” science (Funtowicz and Ravets, 1992), deliberations are necessary to come to some conclusions for that moment. These scholars argued that scientific controversies might be resolved through public debate (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Bijker et al. 2009) or the public as end users should be included in technological discussions (Hisschemöller and Hoppe, 2001; Cozzens and Woodhouse, 1995; Bijker 1995) to achieve socially robust knowledge through mode 2 science (Nowotny, 2003). Participatory fact finding might lead to better knowledge through the inclusion of lay or local insights (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, 2003; Funtowicz and Liberatore, 2003; Fischler, 1990; Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Rip et al., 1995; Andersen and Jaeger, 1999; Guston, 1999a; Bijker et al. 2009). In all kinds of policy deliberations classifications are redefined. In this thesis the significance is that government discourse is no longer hegemonic and there are actors who attempt to disrupt it.”

Third, there is a normative concern. In deliberative democracy theory as well as in STS there are traditions that discuss the democratic quality of decision making and knowledge production and the authority of experts in them. In deliberative democracy theory as well as the tradition in STS that wants to democratize science it is argued that experts have too much authority and this should be counterbalanced by public involvement (Dryzek, 1990; Fischer, 1999, 2000); Woodhouse and Nieuwsma, 2001). The enhancement of citizens’ and other participants’ civic skills such as their reasoning can counterbalance bureaucratic, scientific, and political power (see also Fung and Wright, 2003a; Fischer, 1999; Fung, 2005). Scholars in deliberative democracy theory and in the third wave of STS (Collins and Evans, 2002) have argued that in decision making, expertise is taken for granted too easily. Politicians, administrators, citizens, and NGO’s should deliberate and counterbalance academic expertise. In the third wave of STS it is argued and empirically demonstrated that academic expertise is intrinsically political (Jasanoff, 2004; Hisschemöller et al, 2001; Petersen 1984, p. 6 and 7; Rip et al., 1995; Weale, 2001, and for an overview, see Collins and Evans, 2002). As Sheila Jasanoff put it, “The expert’s political power to define the issues and select the very terms of a deliberation has received too little notice” (Jasanoff, 2004, p.162). As we will see in chapter 1, Thomas Gieryn’s
work is part of this strand and he empirically demonstrates that through boundary work in interactions with other actors, experts as well as other actors attempt to protect the authority and interests of science (Gieryn, 1983), and it is through boundary work that they seek to gain “credibility, legitimacy and authority” for their arguments and practice (Gieryn, 1999). These scholars in deliberative democracy theory and in STS argue that a more democratic kind of science and policy should be sought on moral grounds: the public has to be included in technical decisions to counterbalance the power of science in public decision making.

These three lines of reasoning start from two premises; in one it is argued that academic expertise and government have lost their automatic authority in a network society while the second argues that academic expertise and government are still powerful, even in the seamless web of science and politics (Halfmann, 2003). Both lines of reasoning lead scholars in deliberative democracy theory and in the third wave of STS to the same solution. To be able to construct socially robust and more democratic decisions and knowledge deliberation is necessary. This means policy or science deliberation in the broad sense, that is, in all kinds of interactions between government, science and the public in which new classifications and procedures are defined (Hajer 2003, p.189-190; Hajer 2009, p. 181).

Deliberation also is necessary in innovative forms of cooperation. This is especially true in created settings to which actors of all sorts have access and in which they can contribute to improve the policy oriented conversations.

Hence, deliberation can be a way to redefine relationships and restore or alter credibility of arguments, positions and decisions in situations in which these no longer are taken for granted. Deliberation can also be a response to unbalanced power relations. For example, Dryzek argued that “outcomes receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question” (Dryzek, 1990, p. 126–32; Dryzek, 2001, p. 651; Parkinson, 2003). In 1996 James Bohman put it as follows: “Without this dialogue [between the deliberating public and the institutions] democracy loses its capacity to generate legitimate political power” (Bohman, 1996, p. 238-239). The promise of deliberation is that through this type of conversation credibility can be enacted, and thereby the authority and legitimacy of discourses can be produced.

Deliberative governance theory suggests that discourse — and the decisions and the actors that are part of it — need to gain credibility in interactions. Participants no longer immediately accept authority and legitimacy of actors and arguments based on (formal) arrangements and procedures. Participants have to become convinced in order to believe decisions. This is necessary from a democratic point of view, to counterbalance powerful authorities and discourses. And from the governance point of view that authority is no longer taken for granted and needs to gain credibility (cf. Hajer 2009, p. 182). It is in deliberations that participants have to consider actors’ arguments and knowledge credible. In a network society or in times of crisis and change this is true for experts, government and other participants as well. It is in interactions with governmental actors and experts that participants can become convinced. The conditions for deliberative governance facilitate this enactment and through that they stimulate an enhanced quality of decision making and legitimacy.

Hence, in deliberative governance theory an improvement of the deliberative quality of interactions between government, experts and other non-governmental actors is a way to improve the credibility of deliberative governance discourse. Deliberative quality in this study is defined as conversations in which actors are simultaneously empathetic with and critical of interpretations other than their own. This kind of reflectivity allows for the introduction of new concepts that contributes to collaborative learning and changes dominant discourse.

In this thesis I study a particular kind of interaction, namely, deliberations that are part of innovative forms of governing in the practice of policy making. I want to find out what happens to the quality of the conversations at these real time policy settings. Moreover, I want to know if this quality leads to credible decisions.

**INNOVATIVE GOVERNING: EXPERIMENTS WITH DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE**

The improvements of the deliberative quality of the interactions between government and others in the policy practice are often created in the erection of “institutions for deliberation” (Fung and Wright 2003b; Goodin, 2006). In the academic literature we see a range of such institutions. They vary from deliberative forums (Hendriks, 2005), citizens’ juries (Armour, 1995), and consensus conferences (Guston, 1999a; Carson, 2005; Gastil and Levine (eds.), 2005), to deliberative polling (Fishkin, 1991, 1995, 1996). These venues can improve the quality of interactions in “mini-publics” (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006) or at moments of “micro-deliberation” (Hendriks, 2006). I consider all these deliberative institutions as “interactive practices of deliberation” (Hajer 2003, p. 187-188).

In this dissertation I will refer to those innovative forms of governing as experiments with deliberative governance in the policy practice. This is to distinguish them from the ideal type of deliberative institutions in the theory of deliberative governance, as well as from the broader concept of discursive politics as an alternative or additional site of politics.

These experiments with deliberative governance have at least three features that distinguish them from usual policy making: they are erected temporarily around a policy problem; both governmental and non-governmental actors participate; and the experiments have a deliberative design. In this study three of these deliberative institutions are analyzed: Creative competition in the Bijlmerpark, consensus building in the Dairy Gateway project and scenario development in the Protein Highway Project.

First of all, these experiments with deliberative governance consist of deliberative settings that are outside formal decision making, institutional arrangements, or procedures and have a specific policy problem or issue as their subject that needs to be solved in a network. These Unidentified Political Objects [UPO’s], as Djistelbloem calls them, are policy problems that “manifest themselves at the boundaries of various domains” (Djistelbloem, 2007, p. 28). They might not have been identified as political issues before, but they may have proved unsolvable. Governmental actors, policy analysts, and, most often, consultants hired by governmental actors erect informal but organized deliberative settings temporarily to convene cooperation in networks (Mak and Tatenhove, 2006). It is this temporary state
that enables a crossing of the organizational and institutional boundaries that is needed in network forms of decision making and problem solving. Hence, these deliberative spaces are like tents erected for a vacation, in this case from formal institutional arrangements and procedures.  

A second feature of these experiments is that both governmental and non-governmental actors participate. The governmental actors can include several strata (Hendriks and Tops, 2001) as well as several functional divisions of government: for example law enforcement, planning, and policy development (Lemstra, 1997). Sometimes these actors are organized in committees that sit between layers of government (the "institutional void" (Hajer, 2003). On the non-governmental side a broad variety of stakeholders can participate: advisors, planners, scientists, analysts, citizens, groups organized for this specific occasion, social movement organizations (environmental, animal welfare, women’s rights, human rights), and representatives of business interests. In the literature, there is a discussion about who should or should not be involved: there is a continuum with the inclusion of all stakeholders — everyone with an interest at one end (Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998a) — and at the other end the inclusion of those who can influence the success of the decision, that is, shareholders (see for example: Brujin et al., p. 101). Choice for participation of stakeholders is usually made in the experiments that are more concerned with the democratic quality of the decision (both in deliberative democracy and in deliberative governance), while choice for influential participants is made in experiments that acknowledge an interdependence and aim at effective and efficient decision making (all types of experiments with governance).

Third, the experiments have their own specific deliberative design. A deliberative design consists of "conditions" and "standards of conduct" of a deliberation (Rosenberg, 2007b, p. 9). There is a broad variety of approaches in deliberative democracy theory such as organizational learning that define conditions for deliberation and propose techniques to enhance deliberation. For example, there is a group that is closest to Habermas’ ideal speech situations. The experiments in this approach attempt to organize more rational decision making and communicative rationality, for example in deliberative polls (Fishkin, 1995, 1996) or citizens’ juries (Crosby, 1995; Armour, 1995). The second cluster of approaches attempts to take into account the less cognitive parts of deliberation. These can be, for example:

1. The interpretations of problems through mapping of meanings and constructing frames (Rein and Schön, 1993). These interpretations are taken into account in, for example, collaborative planning (Healey, 1997b, p. 242), collaborative dialogue (Innis and Booher, 2003), stakeholder planning, interactive policy making, dispute resolution and consensus building (Susskind et al., 1999);

2. Creativity, uncertainty, and complexity, that can be dealt with (still cognitively) in scenario development in a Shell tradition (cf. Schwartz, 1996; Heijden, 2005); in gaming and simulations (Mayer et al., 2005, p. 403-423); and in interactive technology assessment (Grin and de Graaf, 1996a, p. 72-99; Asselt and Rijksen-Klopp, 2002, p. 167-184);

3. Distrust and anger that can be addressed in conflict resolution and consensus building (Fischer and Ury, 1981; Fischer and Shapiro, 2005);

4. Dramaturgical aspects: “Governance is then seen as much more than a matter of cognitive persuasion. It is about enacted social interaction and focuses on

the practices that are able to produce such successes, this time highlighting the dramaturgical dimension instead of a cognitive and argumentative process of claims and counterclaims” (Hajer, 2006, p. 52).

Each innovative form of governing in the policy practice has its own deliberative design that can build on one of these approaches. The criteria named in the literature, such as inclusion (equality), transparency, and impartiality are translated and contextualized in each experiment. The deliberative design includes the intensity and agenda of the deliberations, the settings, the participants, rules of entrance and exclusion. This design organizes the project, relates it to normal and formal decision making, problem solving or policy making procedures. Part of this design defines the meetings. The facilitation of the conversation at these meetings is another aspect of the process. A variety of techniques can be applied to facilitate communication between government and society. In experiments with deliberative governance, the deliberative design is the way to convene the process and organization of the experiment and it includes techniques to facilitate conversations at meetings.  

To conclude this section, I define experiments with deliberative governance as temporarily erected spaces that are organized around a policy problem or a policy conflict. These are settings in which governmental and non-governmental actors deliberate possible solutions. Each experiment has a deliberative design that addresses the conditions, rules and strategies for the interactions. This design needs to stimulate the deliberative quality of decision making so that both the decisions and the new way of decision making in deliberative governance are more credible.

CREDIBLE DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE?

The above sections defined government, governance and deliberative governance as three forms of governing. In “government,” governmental actors claim political authority and the right to make legitimate decisions based on (formal) arrangements and procedures. Governmental actors are a ruling power in society that can make decisions, and command and control to protect the common good. In governing through “governance,” decision making takes place in a network of interdependent actors that each have relevant knowledge and other resources to contribute to decisions for the common good. Deliberative governance builds on the idea of network governing through governance, but it pays attention to the quality of the interactions between interdependent governmental and non-governmental actors for two reasons: first, it is in deliberation that collaborative learning and change for better decision making can take place; and then, in network governance decisions can only become credible — and therefore authoritative and legitimate — through interactions with a deliberative quality.

In this thesis, I study whether deliberative governance indeed gains credibility in innovative forms of governing, the so-called experiments with deliberative governance. Do participants in these experiments start to believe in the discourse these experiments
injection, or do they prefer governmental actors as a ruling authority? I study the shift from government to deliberative governance as a credibility contest between a predominantly government discourse and a deliberative governance discourse. It is in the deliberations part of experiments with deliberative governance that either discourse can gain credibility.

The rest of this thesis is in two parts. In Part I (chapters 1, 2 and 3) a theory of boundary work is developed in order to study the credibility contests between government and deliberative governance discourse in conversations of participants in experiments. This is done in conjunction with a pilot case, Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark (chapter 3). I will argue that it is through a transcending of discursive boundaries or a drawing of boundaries that deliberative governance can gain credibility. Chapter 2 presents the research design. Part II presents a comparison of boundary work in two countries: the Dairy Gateway project in Wisconsin in the United States of America and the Protein Highway Project in the middle-east of the Netherlands. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions.
“Decision makers may gain as much from labeling the issue as "policy" as may scientists by labeling the issue as "science"” (Jasanoff, 1987, p. 198).

1.1. A TURN TO PRACTICE

Deliberative governance theory assumes that credibility of governments’ and other actors’ arguments and decisions, that is, discourse, is gained in interactions in practice. Actors need to believe in a discourse — and actors and arguments part of it. This way they enact its legitimacy and authority. Thus, to be credible, “politics constantly needs to be enacted” (Hajer, 2006). To study the gaining credibility for new discourse — in this case that of deliberative governance — demands a research approach that studies the policy practice and that studies the way actors deliberate in this practice.

The study of the discursive interactions in which actors enact the credibility of discourses is a turn to practice. As Wagenaar and Cook summarized in the field of policy analysis in 2003, a turn to practice is a turn to action that demonstrates that people “negotiate the world by acting on it” and that “what is known can be embodied in action” and is “inherently improvisational” but not random. In practice, the negotiation of the world takes place discursively when people interact “by telling stories about their and other people’s actions within the various elements of their community” (Wagenaar and Cook, 2003, p. 149 and 151). In the study of practice as a “dramaturgical act” (Turner, 1974; Hajer and Uitermark, 2008) the rational and emotional can be understood to be intertwined in the act. The cognitive and emotional aspects of enactment no longer necessarily need to be separated.

This turn to practice has taken place in several scientific disciplines in order to transcend dualist thinking, for example the dichotomies between science and politics, between rational and cognitive on one hand and the emotional, routine and tacit actions on the other, and between the discursive and extra-discursive (Schatzki et al., 2001). For example, in STS and the policy sciences the turn to practice has been a way to demonstrate empirically that scientific knowledge is not free from ideologies. It can “demystify” science by opening the black box of the production of scientific knowledge in action. Gieryn in particular studied how academics and others drew boundaries around science to gain credibility for their argument as well as for the discourse and practice of science within deliberations (Gieryn 1983; 1995; 1999). He concluded that these demarcations were an enactment, a reproduction, of dominance of science and scientific expertise (Gieryn, 1999, p. 84). He argued that science is what “sellers proffer truth and buyers choose to use/believe” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 12).

In this thesis, the dichotomy that the turn to practice transcends is the division between discourse and practice. In more everyday language I consider a study of practice at the same time a study of “words and objects” and “speaking and acting”. Although the turn to practice might suggest that the act becomes more important than the speech, this turn — at least in this thesis — has to be understood in the context of discourse theoretical thinking in which these dichotomies between the material and discursive world have been the subject of discussion for quite a while. Most often, discourse theorists refuse
to make these distinctions as they assumed that “all objects are objects of discourse, as their meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 107). Or as Hajer in 1995 argued, discourse is “produced and reproduced in practice” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). The turn to practice, and as such the study of enactment (cf. Weick 1988, Møl 2002, Hajer 2009) can be considered an attempt to do justice to these theoretical assumptions, and as a researcher not only to construct discursive structures based on a discourse analysis of documents and speech, as is often the case, but also to include the material world and indeed analyze text as the intertwining of words and objects, discourse and practice.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the details of these discussions. For now, it is important to know that I do study the policy practice and the enactment of government and deliberative governance discourse in it. Thus, government and deliberative governance are both understood as discourses that actors can enact and grant credibility in deliberative governance settings. In addition to being models in the analysis by policy scientists, I will empirically understand “government” to mean the dominant discourse that has been institutionalized in organizations and practices, and “deliberative governance” as the alternative discourse that actors attempt to enact in experiments with deliberative governance. I understand the process through which enactment takes place as a process of boundary work.

ROADMAP TO THIS CHAPTER

In this chapter I will first introduce boundary work as a discursive mechanism to gain credibility for a discourse. I will argue that boundaries are political frontiers that include and exclude meaning, knowledge, and actors. In this dissertation, in a Foucauldian tradition, the power of drawing boundaries around elements of discourse is derived from the power of dominant discourse. Second, I will argue that even though I consider the credibility of demarcations of discourse often to come from a tacit demarcation of dominant discourse, change of dominant discourse and of interpretations of concepts is still possible. Reflectivity allows for an alteration of dominant discourse through a transcending of boundaries in boundary concepts. Conversations that are of a deliberative quality can induce this reflectivity either through parrhesia — fearless speech — and/or through empathy for the plight of others. Third, I will discuss the bias toward a dominance of science over policy in the empirical studies of boundary work, and argue that in the study of experiments with deliberative governance this bias cannot be maintained as it is challenged in these experiments.

At the end of this chapter, boundary work is defined as a discursive mechanism through which participants in deliberations demarcate discourse to gain credibility for it. It is also considered a transcending of boundaries between discourses to alter dominant discourse. The result of boundary work depends upon the reaction of other participants that can tacitly accept, contest or reflect upon the boundaries drawn and transcended.

1.2. DISCERCIVE BOUNDARIES AS POLITICAL FRONTIERS

Boundaries in all shapes and forms have been studied in political science and public administration: administrative and policy boundaries; borders of countries and nation-states; social cleavages; organizational boundaries; class boundaries. This dissertation adds another type: boundaries between discourses. The discursive boundaries that interest me demarcate “ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Thus, struggles over the boundaries of discourse are contests over the fringes of sets of meaning. These sets of meanings are not localized geographically or organizationally but they float through society as they are embedded in language. Or, as Sheila Jasanoff claimed about boundary work: it is a means “to shift attention from institutions to language” (Jasanoff, 1987). The study of boundaries of discourses is the study of the connections between actors and how they are part of “systems of meaningful practices” (Howarth et al., p.3; Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 106) that are uttered in language.

Moreover, these discourses also divide actors. In this dissertation, the concept of “discourse” is theoretically positioned in a Foucauldian tradition. I assume that discourses are systems of meaningful practice that exert power. Discourses “exclude certain possibilities and construct relations between social agents” (Howarth et al., 2000, p. 4). Discourses construct “antagonisms” and they draw “political frontiers between insiders and outsiders” (Howarth et al., 2000, p. 4). Some people, objects and behavior belong to a discourse and others do not. Or, as Michel Foucault’s influential contribution to discourse theoretical thinking argued, discourses have the power to discipline. Discourses have productive power and construct people and, as feminist theories picked up on, bodies (Butler, 1997, p. 84 and 86; Butler, 1999, p. 235). Discourses “discipline” and “govern” and get institutionalized within individuals, and in all kind of practices and organizations (Foucault, 1991). As such, discourses are intrinsically political.

Discourse analysis in a Foucauldian tradition often leads to a historical construction of this contingent discursive structure. For example, with help of discourse analysis a dominant neo-liberal or market discourse has been reconstructed (Fairclough, 2000; Storey, 2000) or is demonstrated how language constructs women or women’s “issues” such as menstruation and sexual harassment (Wilkonson and Kitzinger, 1995)88. However, I will study the struggles between a dominant and a alternative discourse through a study of boundary work. This means that I study the negotiation of political frontiers of discourses. In 1999, Gieryn attempted to shift attention to these negotiations of boundaries around discourses through boundary work89 as he emphasized when he cited Foucault: “the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analyzed not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception or forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power ... deployed through...demarcations, control of territories and organization of domains” (Foucault, 1980, p. 70-71,79; quoted by Gieryn, 1999, p. 20).
Gieryn stressed that he wanted to shift attention to the study of resilient boundaries between discourses, for example in reference to the feminist thought of Donna Harraway. Gieryn agreed with Harraway that it is necessary to go beyond the “radical historical contingency and modes of construction for everything” (Harraway 1991, p. 184-87). According to Gieryn, “a better account of the social world begins with an appreciation for the contingent, constructed, and contested character of boundaries that demarcate legitimate knowers from illegimate, fact from hope, science from politics” (1999, p. 5 footnote). Gieryn was interested in the resilience of boundaries between discourses.30

The study of resilient boundaries between discourses enables me to focus on actors’ attempts to change historically contingent and dominant discourses, such as a government discourse.31 In this study, I engage in a detailed analysis of the negotiation over boundaries, in other words boundary work, to study how actors attempt to disrupt dominant government discourse by the introduction of a less common deliberative governance discourse. As such, I will deviate from Foucault’s genealogies, and I will engage in a detailed conversation analysis, something Foucault famously refused to do (Wetherell et al., 2001, p. 383). Thus, I combine a Foucauldian theoretical notion of discourse as a discursive system that disciplines with an analysis of the enactment of these discourses through boundary work in conversations and interactions.

In sum: I understand boundaries to be discursive. They are drawn around systems of meaning that include and exclude. To be able to analyze how dominant discourses such as government discourse can be disrupted, I turn to the study of boundary work. Boundary work is the negotiation of political frontiers between discourses. Actors that draw boundaries around a discourse attempt to gain credibility for this discourse and exclude other meanings, actors and objects. Actors can also transcend boundaries between discourses to attempt to alter the discourses and to include what had been excluded or vice versa.

1.3. THE POWER OF DRAWING BOUNDARIES

In this thesis, I am interested in the possibility of gaining credibility for an alternative discourse. Therefore, I develop boundary work in a way that enables a study of the negotiation of boundaries around discourse. This includes an explanation of the power of demarcations of discourse when they resonate with dominant discourse. Such demarcations limit change.

In this section, I will first give an overview of explanations for the power of drawing discursive boundaries that have been given in recent years in studies on boundary work. Second, I will argue that even though Gieryn aimed to analyze resilient boundaries between science and society, his work and more recent research on boundary work still have a bias toward obdurate boundaries. More specifically, these studies in science and technology empirically have a preference for analyzing obdurate boundaries between science and policy or between scientific disciplines.

1. Boundary work to study credibility contests

EXPLAINING THE POWER OF BOUNDARY WORK

The power of drawing discursive boundaries in conversations has been explained in at least four ways:

• The style of boundary work: a rhetorical act
• The content of boundary work: contextual cultural repertoires
• The content of boundary work: “frozen” institutions
• The content of boundary work: “frozen” discourse

The style of boundary work: rhetorical demarcations

The first explanation of the power of discursive boundaries was given by Gieryn in his early work. In this, he introduced the rhetorical style, “the pattern in the symbolic formulations and figurative language” that explains the power of demarcations (Gieryn, 1983, p. 782-3). Subsequently, Gieryn formulated a neo-Marxist sociological theory on interest-driven sciences that explains why scientists and others would want to contextualize and demarcate science. Inspired by Steve Woolgar and building on the work of Eliot Freidson (1970, 1986) and Magali Sarfati (1977) on interest-driven, rather than merely functionalist professions, Gieryn argued that science in itself is not unambiguously professional. Gieryn understood scientists as interested ideological actors and professionals. Just as Freidson and Larson had visualized the first contours of a “power approach to professions” (MacDonald, 1995, p. 4 and 5), Gieryn demonstrated that scientists and others act ideologically to protect the interests of sciences and scientists. He formulated a “power approach” to science. He considered boundary work the rhetorical act by which actors pursue the interests of science.

In Gieryn’s work, boundary work is a drawing of context-dependent and cultural demarcations of science to “upgrade” science and to maintain or gain its “occupational control” (Gieryn et al., 1985, p. 393). Gieryn claimed that scientists and others adapt the way they draw boundaries around science to the context in which they are acting. This makes the demarcation a rhetorically more powerful statement that protects the interests of science.

Based on a study of these rhetorical demarcations, Gieryn was able to construct context-dependent cultural repertoires about science and he illustrated that there was not one ideology-free story about science. For example in a discussion about religion, scientists and others emphasized the empirical grounding of sciences; in discussions about mechanics, scientists brought forward its theoretical character (Gieryn 1983). In Gieryn’s work, the process of contextual demarcating of science in interactions with others explains why science is the preferred cultural repertoire. These repertoires are cultural classifications. In later work, Gieryn compares these to maps that we draw to help us navigate (1999, p. 7). The cultural repertoires were a research result and not an analytical scheme or explanation for the audiences’ acceptance of the boundaries.

Other scholars in a similar tradition of science and technology studies — for example, Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, and later on Andrew McKinley and Jonathan Potter — also argued that it was the contextually uttered repertoires on science that made clear that science is interest-driven. Like Gieryn, these scholars studied the construction of science in culture and not the production of scientific norms. They all studied how science is defined culturally and in interactions. This was to demonstrate that science is divided and...
political and that it is not a universal story. Gilbert and Mulkay accentuated that they wished to “set free” the “different voices in science” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, p. 2). However, Gilbert and Mulkay argued that a specific variety of repertoires on science made it possible to “warrant” scientific beliefs (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982).

The content of boundary work: contextual cultural repertoires

This insight offers a second explanation for the power of boundaries drawn around science: the context-dependent content of the cultural repertoires. Gilbert and Mulkay applied discourse analysis to be able to tell an inside story about science to demonstrate that science is essentially political in character. According to Gilbert and Mulkay (1982, 1984) and later on, McKinlay and Potter (1987), scientists try to warrant scientific beliefs with various accounts of science that make up several “repertoires” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1982). Gilbert and Mulkay studied how in scientific culture some scientists or scientific results are excluded or included with the help of certain repertoires of accounts of what makes up good science. More specifically, they studied how biochemists working on oxidative phosphorylation justified “theoretical errors” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1982, p. 385), both their own and those of others. In interviews they looked for interpretative accounts by the biochemists. What Gilbert and Mulkay found was that the accounts scientists gave were not stable but depended on the requirements of the social situation. This is similar to what Gieryn found: boundaries around science were drawn in relation to the context. However, in Gilbert and Mulkay’s work they use the content of the repertoires to explain why scientists in interaction with other scientists tell a winning story. In certain situations scientists claim that scientific results are theoretical faults and in others the empirical work is not done properly.

Gieryn explicitly wanted to stay away from explanations for the power of science that included the content of science.31 He was hesitant to define science as a category; he wanted to study how it was defined. Throughout his work he emphasized the negotiated and contextual character of credibility, legitimacy and authority of science. In 1999 he argued that: “the epistemic authority of sciences exists only in its local and episodic enactment [my emphasis] as sellers proffer truth and buyers choose to use/believe” (Gieryn 1999, p. 12).

Although in more recent studies Gieryn puts less emphasis on boundary work as a means to protect the interests of science and considers that boundaries are drawn around science to protect its “cognitive authority” (1995) or “epistemic authority” and “credibility” (1999), in all of his studies boundary work is defined as a means to empower science. Gieryn repeatedly argued that science as a category does not exist: it is “empty until its insides get filled and its borders drawn amidst context-bound negotiations over what is scientific” (Gieryn, 1995, p. 403). All authors — Gieryn, Gilbert and Mulkay, and McKinlay and Potter — grounded the definition of science in empirical research and considered science not to be a fixed category but to be dynamic, culturally defined, and negotiated. However, there was a difference in focus: whereas Gilbert and Mulkay attempted to construct “categories of accounts” that scientists applied to gain support for their research result Gieryn focused on the localized and contextual demarcations and compared what accounts were given in what interactions with whom. Gieryn did not reconstruct the repertoires. Instead, he studied the rhetorical act of drawing boundaries, and the rhetorical character explained was a method to look for the constant negotiation of the power of science, and an ongoing process of defining what science is. Even though Gieryn shifted attention to practice and focused on the process of boundary work in interactions, he also spoke of “cultural repertoires” of science. At several places in his work Gieryn referred to a cultural or discourse theory interpretation of these “culturescapes” or “cultural maps” as he called them in reference to Geertz’ cultural analysis (Gieryn 1999, p. 4-6). Gieryn argued that to demarcate elements of these maps of science in conversations and interactions not only defined what science is, at the same time the demarcations of these elements were to be understood as attempts to gain or maintain credibility for the argument and for a “discourse on science.” Gieryn further argued that “any of the real sciences may be used to legitimate the next new map as accurate, but always tenuously so” [...] “it is always possible in principle to challenge the pertinence or applicability of some previous authoritative cultural map to the immediate credibility contest at hand” (1999, p. 20). Gieryn did not consider these maps to be discursive resources that the boundary workers are aware they have; the maps can only be interpreted as such. Hence, these maps or culturescapes can only be constructed with hindsight. They have to be understood as the constructions of science that analysts of boundary work can compose. With an exception of the mention of this type of “second order boundary work,” Gieryn stayed far from a deductive approach that might have been an explanation for the power of the demarcations based on their content.

However, it was the concept of repertoires that evoked discussion on the explanation of the power of drawing boundaries. If science as a category is empty and boundaries are drawn contextually, what explains the acceptance or rejection of certain boundaries around certain repertoires? Gieryn might have been able to explain why scientists and others draw boundaries, that is, to protect the interests of science, but not why these demarcations were accepted. Two explanations were given: a discourse theory one that I further endorse in this dissertation and a neo-institutional explanation that I will briefly discuss first as it has taken up a large part of research on boundary work in recent years.

The content of boundary work: “frozen” institutions

The third explanation of the power of drawing boundaries was given in a neo-institutional approach. In this approach, next to a study of resilient boundaries between science and religion or mechanics, scholars started to engage in a study of the more frozen boundary between science and politics or between scientific disciplines (Indyk and Rier, 1993; Bal and Halfmann, 1998; Guston, 1999b; Hopp, 2002; Halfmann, 2003). In this approach it was assumed that the institutionalized boundaries between science and politics gave boundary work in interactions its power. As Halfmann argued, “boundary work needs an institutional counterpart ‘boundaries’” (Halfmann, 2003, p. 69). Theoretically, this institutional counterpart explains the acceptance of demarcation of science in specific regulatory regimes or settings. It is due to the way the boundaries have been institutionalized in different countries or styles of decision-making that specific demarcations are accepted.

The main reason for these shifts was that it was no longer the main objective to demonstrate that scientists act politically, that they pursue their interests, and that they protect their autonomy or epistemic authority. The objective was to demonstrate that science has normative or political features, especially when applied to or developed for policy. The objective of many of these scholars in science and technology studies and public administration was to demonstrate that scientific judgment in a policy-making context is necessarily normative, in other words “political.” These scholars argued that
demarcations between science and politics always include normative judgments with political consequences about what is “fact or value, what is objective or subjective, rational or emotional” (Turnhout et al., 2006, p. 17). These studies attempted to refrain from what Halfmann typified as the “seamless web model” in which the distinction between science and politics is not made at all, and these at the same time aimed to not reiterate the “cage model” nor to draw the boundaries to purify science and or politics (Halfmann 2003, p. 45).

The boundaries between politics and science, or as Hoppe calls it, the “science-policy nexus” (Hoppe, 2005) have been studied in several ways. First of all, several scholars in science and technology studies analyzed boundary work of scientific advisors or experts in a specific policy problem or policy field. For example, Willem Halfmann studied boundary work by ecologists and toxicologists, but also by scientists and regulators in formulating regulations to control and prevent aquatic chemical hazards in three countries (Halfmann 2003). Second, boundary work about scientific models was analyzed. Examples are boundary work in the development of ecological indicators in the Netherlands (Turnhout et al., 2007), in European air pollution policies (Tuijnstra, 2006), or in econometric policy advice to the Dutch government (De Vries et al., 2010). Third, recent studies of boundary work in the science-policy nexus focus on the advisory organizations and committees that give advice to government. These so called boundary organizations (Guston, 2000; Hellstrom and Jacobs, 2003) sit on the science-policy nexus and have to make sure not only to operate as credible scientific experts but also as credible political advisors.34 A fourth way in which the boundary between science and politics was studied was an approach in which Hoppe tested whether analytically constructed arrangements of the science-policy nexus were present in the empirical reality of policy-making (Hoppe, 2005; 2008).

All of these studies were conducted to better describe and understand the relationships between science and politics, and how boundaries between them have been institutionalized in regulatory styles that include specific boundary configurations (Halfmann, 2003, p. 27-57), or boundary arrangements (Hoppe and Halfmann, 2005), or images of science-policy interactions (Hoppe, 2005, p. 201). These studies demonstrate that not only social conventions and culture, but also regulatory styles play an important role in how these boundaries and the labordivision between politics and science have been institutionalized. By making the boundaries between politics and science the object of empirical study either of policy problems or boundary organizations the scholars in science and technology studies were able to demonstrate that the boundaries between science and politics are real and can be studied in their institutionalized shape in organizations or, for example, in labor divisions. Moreover, in comparisons of these institutionalized boundaries, it becomes clear that these divisions, these boundary arrangements, vary according to policy field and country (Halfmann 2005).

The content of boundary work: “frozen” discourse

In 2003, Abby J. Kinchy and Daniel Lee Kleinman gave a fourth explanation for the power of boundary work. They argued that the content of boundary work — Gieryn’s cultural repertoires — can explain why demarcations go uncontested. Kinchy and Kleinman introduced “resonance” that they defined as the “taken for granteddominant discourse” as a notion from discourse theory that explains for the acceptance of demarcations (Kinchy and Kleinman, 2003, p. 871). They argued that “these historically resonant discourses are powerful resources in debates over the appropriate boundaries of science” (Kinchy and Kleinman, 2003, p. 871). As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, discourse includes and excludes people and behavior. In dominant discourse, certain things are unthinkable, unsayable, or unnecessary to be asked or uttered while others are more acceptable and considered appropriate or true. What Kinchy and Kleinman argued was that the demarcations of “science,” as Gieryn described in his empirical work, are powerful since they are drawn around a dominant discourse.

To explain the power of dominant discourse, discourse analysis in a Foucauldian tradition draws on concepts of bias; see for example Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Discourse analyses often describe how certain discourses have become hegemonic and sustained their hegemony through the mobilization of bias in dominant discourse (Schattschneider, 1960). For example, the analysis of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization aims to describe these structure-like, “frozen” features of discourse (Hajer, 1995, p. 60 and 61). It is the resonance of demarcations with dominant discourse that explains the acceptance of demarcations. When a discourse is dominant, demarcations of this discourse are accepted and in their turn sustain its dominance. In other words: the winning discourse wins by being demarcated because it is winning. Hence, boundary work can be considered a rhetorical act that draws on dominant discourse as a discursive resource. With the help of demarcations of elements of dominant discourse, actors, in the case of Gieryn, reproduce the credibility of science. It is due to dominant discourse that these demarcations are tacitly accepted, and reproduce dominant discourse.

As we saw in the first section of this chapter, I do understand boundaries to be discursive and boundary work as a political act of demarcating discourses that include and exclude. In the same line of reasoning as Kinchy and Kleinman, I apply the Foucauldian notion of dominant discourse to explain why participants in deliberations tacitly accept some demarcations of discourse and as such reproduce its credibility, and limit change toward an alternative discourse. However, since I am interested to study change of dominant government discourses through boundary work, I also need to explain how dominant discourse can be disrupted. Therefore, in the next sections I add to this theoretical explanation of reproduction of dominant discourse, the theoretical explanation of a change of dominant discourse. Moreover, I will abandon the study of science as a dominant discourse. I will develop an additional theoretical framework to explain how participants in experiments with deliberative governance can disrupt dominant discourse, in our case government discourse, with boundary concepts.

1.4. EMPATHY AND CRITIQUE: CHANGE OF FROZEN DISCOURSE

Gieryn and others who analyze boundary work have a bias toward the study of the dominance of science. This is due to their theoretical and empirical focus. For example, Gieryn’s theoretical assumptions are based on sociological theories on the pursuit of interests and epistemic authority of science. Their assumption is that science reproduces its credibility, legitimacy and authority through boundary work. This is also the outcome of
their empirical studies. Gieryn did not want to prove this assumption wrong. His research reiterates the idea that science reproduces its epistemic authority in interactions. This is not a problem, as his goal was to empirically demonstrate that science as an objective profession does not exist. Gieryn did not look into the possibility that actors can draw boundaries around other discourses that might challenge the dominance of science, as Jasanoff’s quote at the start of this chapter illustrates. Moreover, in the work of Gieryn and others, the possibility that the audience contests, rejects, or reflects upon the rhetorical demarcations of science, or other discourses, is underexposed.36

Therefore, I develop boundary work as discursive demarcations that actors can conduct to empower science. However, actors can also demarcate other discourses to attempt to gain credibility for them in competition with the science discourse or other discourses. The analysis of boundary work as a mechanism applies to all sorts of empirical problems that entail a struggle between discourses and not just the credibility struggles between science and policy.37 To be able to study challenges to dominant and more frozen discourse, I will have to explain the possibility of changing dominant discourse through boundary work.

This explanation can be offered in two ways. First, as we saw, it entails a turn to practice. It is in practice that discourses are produced and reproduced. To remain dominant, discourse needs to be enacted. Discursively drawing a boundary around it, is a way to do this. However, it is also in practice that an audience can contest, reject, or reflect upon dominant discourses or even produce new discourse. In this section I will argue that through reflectivity on dominant discourse in the policy practice, this more frozen discourse might be contested. I will build on the concept of reflectivity from deliberative democracy theory and STS, as it is reflectivity that enables learning and change.

Second, I need a theoretical explanation of how change of dominant discourse is possible through boundary work. How is it possible for actors to contest a discourse that is relatively frozen? The explanation for dissonance and change of dominant discourse are underexposed but present in the concept of parrhesia in discourse theory.38 It is through parrhesia that actors can transcend boundaries around discourses. In line with the previous section, I will first describe this theoretical explanation of change and then link it to the concept of reflectivity.

PARRHESIA

Foucault was mainly interested in discourses at the macro level of society. He demonstrated how these inescapably discipline individuals, limit their individual freedom, and make change of these discourses almost impossible. Foucault argued that the “Truth” does not exist outside these discourses and it cannot liberate us from dominant discourse (Taylor, 1984, p. 160).39 However, by the end of his life he introduced parrhesia as an “individual quality” that could disrupt dominant discourse (Foucault, 2001, p. 85). In “Fearless Speech,” a series of lectures, Foucault described how change and escape from dominant discourse is possible for an individual through parrhesia (Foucault, 2001). A parrhesiastes says what is on her mind. This is not without the danger of rejection, or of being considered strange, ill, or undisciplined (Foucault, 2001, p. 16). Parrhesia is to speak boldly. Parrhesia is “frankness in speaking the truth, it is free or fearless speech. [...] Parrhesia is a form of criticism, either toward another or toward oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor” (Foucault, 2001, p. 12, 17-18).40 To break the disciplining power of a particular discourse, to be able to dissipate rather than to resonate, actors have to speak freely. Fearless speech can disrupt dominant discourse and change power relations.41 Parrhesia as a concept from Foucauldian discourse theory makes it possible to study individual escape — at least for the time being — from the disciplining powers of discourse through fearless speech. Parrhesia makes it possible to introduce boundary transcending concepts.

REFLECTIVITY

I am taking the liberty of connecting the concepts of parrhesia and reflectivity, which reside in different philosophical and research traditions42, to help explain how groups of people can alter dominant discourse. In doing so, I may not be fully doing justice to these notions. However, it is in theories on reflectivity (cf. Lynch, 2000) that not only individual change of disciplining discursive powers can be studied — as Foucault attempted to demonstrate — , but it links this individual (temporarily) escape to a possible change of tacit understandings of groups.

Anger, frustration or sorrow may be reasons or ways to try to alter dominant discourse, but in this thesis I will focus on individuals and groups that reflect on dominant discourse in an attempt to alter it in a more cognitive way. Reflectivity in deliberative democracy theory is defined as being “empathetic with the plight of others; being more considered (more informed and more stable); and as more far-reaching in both time and space, taking fuller account of more distant times, more distant places and more distant people through long term goals and consequences” (Goodin, 2003). This kind of reflectivity presupposes the ability to articulate and think about one’s own interpretations and approaches and on that of others. Hence, reflectivity is also to:

- “criticize the tacit understandings that have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice, and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or uniqueness which he may allow himself to experience” (Schön, 1983, p.61).43

Reflectivity includes “problematization” and “critical thinking” at the individual level, group level and about society44 (Lynch, 2000). A problematization, of one’s own presuppositions but also of the group you belong to is necessary to be able to be empathetic with other groups, to be able to be more considered and to take a “fuller” account.45 Reflectivity as Lynch argued, can be considered the opposite of routine, repetition and tacit knowing, or in this thesis, as the opposite of discourse that is taken for granted. Reflectivity is understood to mean thinking about or knowing in action. It is the articulation of rules and procedures — and in our case meanings — that we usually apply tacitly (Lynch, 2000).46 Reflectivity concerns the possibility to “talk back” to oneself and to others with help of the articulation of the unsayable, or through a contest of interpretations that are part of a discourse. A situation, actors, and discourses can “talk back” in a way and through this cause dissonance (cf. Bröer, 2006, p. 50-62). It is “talk back” and dissonance that can lead to change.

REFLECTIVITY AND PARRHESIA

Through the idea of dissonance, reflectivity can be linked to the concept of parrhesia. A parrhesiastes can articulate tacit understandings to once mind, but also out loud. To articulate and critique a tacit understanding is causing dissonance. Not only to an individual tacit understanding, but also to a group’s understanding, or discourse. In Foucault’s “Fearless Speech” (2001) he distinguishes between moral parrhesia and political parrhesia to separate this individual level of reflectivity on one hand from the group and societal
level on the other. On the societal level, e.g. political parrhesia, you tell the “king or demos” the truth even if it costs you your head. With moral parrhesia you admit to yourself even if it can cost you your self-image (Flynn, 2002). Political parrhesia can be considered one way among other to encourage the reflectivity of a group. A parrhesiastes can articulate understandings that are tacit, taken for granted. These assumptions discipline not only individuals but also groups. Parrhesia, and the articulation of these taken for granted understandings, can evoke dissonance. This can induce reflectivity of a group and might lead to reflective conversations by the members of this group on these disciplining forces, e.g. dominant discourse.

However, dissonance can also cause conflict. Parrhesia concerns the possibility of speaking freely. This can change dominant discourse, either through conflict or reflectivity. But, a parrhesiastes always runs the risk of being ignored and excluded. Dominant discourse does not have to change. Foucault pointed out that a parrhesiastes must run the risk of being excommunicated. If this risk is not present the utterances must have been part of dominant discourse. In other words: when speaking freely results in a collective rejection of the utterance or exclusion of the individual, dominant discourse remains dominant. When parrhesia is ignored and the parrhesiastes is excluded, dominant discourse is being reproduced. It is only when conflict or a deliberative conversation that includes group reflectivity occur that an opportunity for change has been created by parrhesia.

In the study of boundary work in this thesis, this means that as soon as a demarcation of alternative or subordinate discourse is ignored or rejected, participants reproduce dominant discourse. Only when conflict occurs — as an overt and resisted attempt to exclude and dismiss the parrhesiastes — or when a reflective conversation takes place after a boundary has been drawn, is subordinate discourse indeed enacted and dominant discourse can be altered. In all other situations dominant discourse is enacted. Hence, I can recognize reflectivity in the conversations that I study in two ways: first, when a demarcation of an alternative discourse, in our case deliberative governance, is overtly contested but is accepted; and when participants overtly contest but also accept a dissolving of boundaries in boundary transcending concepts. Moreover, as a result, participants will start to further explore the boundary concepts collaboratively. Based on the quality of the conversation and its outcome, I will be able to conclude if new discourse — in this case, deliberative governance — became credible and dominant discourse was challenged.

To sum up the above, boundary work is an attempt to achieve credibility for a discourse. This can solely be successful when the audience accepts the boundary. Historical and cultural resonant discourses explain this acceptance. At the same time, boundary work is a way to explain change of dominant discourse. Fearless speech is a transcending or demarcation of boundaries that can both cause reflectivity (on a group level). This creates the possibility for the audience of contesting or rejecting boundaries that are drawn around dominant discourse, or, as we will see below, concepts that transcend these boundaries. Moreover, it enables an alternative discourse to become credible. Hence, boundary work is considered a mechanism of productive power through which participants in deliberations can reproduce existing power relations but they can also reflect upon and change these. The study of boundary work enables me to study the credibility contests between dominant government discourse and alternative deliberative governance.

Now that I have given a theoretical explanation for the change of dominant discourse and a way to study it in practice, I will elaborate the second way in which boundary work can be conducted: actors can dissolve or transcend boundaries to introduce new discourse.

**CHANGE THROUGH A TRANSCENDING OF BOUNDARIES**

Boundary work as I have defined it to this point is concerned with the drawing of political frontiers around discourses that include and exclude. The boundaries around discourses are drawn to gain credibility for a specific discourse. In other words, to make a specific discourse win. As we saw in the previous section, whether the demarcated discourse keeps on winning depends on the resonance or dissonance, and on the type of conversation that evolves after the demarcation. In addition to change through struggle between subordinate and dominant discourse, change can also occur through “seduction.” Theoretically, this seduction is still a political act and can be considered a means to gain credibility for a discourse. As Jasanoff argued, “boundary-defining language not only serves the immediate interests of social and political groups, but, through the creation of new conceptual categories, opens the way for extending those interests in larger or new domains” (Jasanoff, 1987, p. 199). However, empirically this seduction can be studied as attempts to cooperate and coordinate across boundaries. My dissertation studies this type of change as a transcending of boundaries in concepts situated between discourses. These concepts are multi-interpretable and align different discourses.

Scholars in STS have studied coordination and cooperation across boundaries between science and politics in several ways (cf. Star and Griesemer 1989; Bal et al. 2002; Halfman 2003; Gieryn 1999). For example, in his conceptual work on boundary work, Halfman considered “coordination” between practices to be a result of demarcations (e.g., the demarcation establishes what is appropriate behavior in what practice). Demarcations make interactions between different practices “possible and conceivable” (Halfman, 2003, p. 70). Gieryn saw cooperation and coordination not so much as a result of demarcations, but as a strategy to gain “jurisdictional control over a contested domain” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 16). Gieryn described it as the “expansion of a boundary” or the “expansion of frontiers.” Halfman and Gieryn consider the demarcations more as political and adversarial acts to protect interests and autonomy, rather than as cooperative acts. According to Halfman, cooperation or at least coordination can be the result of demarcations, not the theoretical explanation for these demarcations.

Other researchers in STS, for example, Star and Griesemer opened the door to the possibility of understanding a crossing of boundaries as a way to cooperate and coordinate between different social worlds. Star and Griesemer studied how through boundary objects “coherence” and “cooperation” were possible among different scientific disciplines, and among scientists and others (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 391), whereas Halfman considered coordination as a result, rather than an intention (let alone a theoretical understanding) to coordinate and cooperate across boundaries. Star and Griesemer demonstrated that at least at the organizational level it is possible for actors to coordinate and cooperate through a transcending of boundaries around social realms in boundary objects. They defined boundary objects as: “objects which are both plastic enough to adapt the local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured.
1. Boundary work to study credibility contests

in individual use” (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393).

Boundary objects are interpreted differently in different social words “but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation” (1989: 393). These boundary objects transcend boundaries between social worlds, for example science and politics, as they are multi-interpretable to actors from different discourses. Star and Griesemer gave the example of fossils in Mongolia, considered valuable by natives since these fossils are used in feng shui (human spirit meets with the spirit of the earth), and by paleontologists who consider these fossils equally valuable but for different reasons. Star and Griesemer demonstrated that the creation and management of boundary objects, next to a clear set of methods of discipline, is “a key process in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds” (1989, p. 404). These objects act as “anchors” or “bridges” across boundaries (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Thus, next to demarcations, a bridging of social worlds is possible in a transcending of boundaries between these social worlds. Translated into a discourse vocabulary, I consider this object to be a boundary concept that possibly relates to an object, for example a fossil, but that can also relate to a model or a plan. These concepts sit at the boundary between two discourses. Next to the demarcation of discourse that can result in coordination between discourses, a transcending of boundaries in a boundary concept enables change in the relations between discourses, and within a discourse.53

In discourse theory, the possibility to cooperate or to coordinate discourses,37 and to form discourse coalitions or even to enable change of dominant discourse have been theoretically developed and empirically studied with the help of linguistic-oriented concepts, for example, story lines (Hajer, 1995, p. 56), and on a sociological level, “empty signifiers” (Lacoue, 1996). These concepts explain coherence in discourse and at the same time the possibility of change. As is the case with boundary objects, their multi-interpretability is key to enabling this coherence within a discourse as well as the coordination with other discourses. This ambiguity makes a boundary concept, whether a story line or an empty signifier, both empty and filled with meaning. It is the emptiness, or as Star and Griesemer call it, the “weakly structured in common use” and the fullness, the “strongly structured in individual use” (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393) that enable concepts to sit at the boundary between social worlds or, in our case, discourses.

The boundary concepts in this dissertation are understood to be very similar to the study of story lines or empty signifiers in discourse theory; however, I focus on the interactions, the ongoing struggles between different discourses. To express this focus, I prefer the term boundary concept. It draws attention to the boundaries between discourses. I would also like to emphasize that a boundary concept is different from several other boundary devices introduced in STS. As I already established, a major distinction is that whereas I study boundary concepts discursively and understand them to sit at the boundary between discourses, in STS boundary objects, boundary organizations, and boundary people58 (Halfman, 2003) have been introduced mainly to study the interactions between politics and science or between scientific disciplines that are understood to be social worlds, practices, realms, institutions or actors. Moreover, boundary text, objects and people have been introduced as boundary devices that are not considered to be boundary transcending but more as devices that can be applied to demarcate practices (Halfman, 2003, p. 64-65). Rather than sitting on boundaries, boundary texts, objects, and people in Halfman’s work “mark” the boundary (Halfman, 2003, p. 60). An example would be an academic journal that marks and protects the boundaries around science. In this dissertation, I am interested in boundary concepts that are not applied to demarcate but that transcend boundaries. However, sometimes a boundary concept represents demarcation to gain credibility for transcending in the boundary concept.

In this study, I consider boundary concepts to enable a demarcation of discourses and at the same time to permit a transcending of discursive boundaries. For example, stewardship as a boundary concept can transcend the boundaries between the subdiscourse of environmentalism and the subdiscourse of entrepreneurship.59 At the same time the concept stewardship can mark a deliberative governance discourse and distinguish it from government discourse. This ambiguity enables coordination and cooperation between discourses. The multi-interpretability creates a sphere of engagement in which actors can ignore, reflect upon, or contest boundaries between discourses. It is through interactions in this sphere of engagement that discourse can be produced or reproduced. At the same time, the boundary concept can be one element of a discourse demarcated from other discourses to attempt to gain credibility for the discourse. Boundary concepts in this dissertation are considered a form of parhesisia. They provide an alternative interpretation of the boundaries between discourses to participants in experiments with deliberative governance. It is in conversations where consultants in collaboration with governmental actors often introduce the boundary concepts.60 Other participants ignore, reflect upon, or contest these concepts. Depending on the outcome, the boundary concept is enacted and a different interpretation of the boundary is accepted. The reaction is important to establish if the boundary concept is credible. When participants contest it, it can easily start to function as a “fracture line” concept that no longer transends boundaries but exposes the irreconcilability of discourses. For example, in the Netherlands a governmental organization, the Innovation Network introduced a “piggery apartment.” This concept aligned environmental discourse and entrepreneurship discourse. However, at the end of the 1990s it turned into a fracture line concept. It drew out the boundary dispute and made the environmental discourse less reconcilable with the entrepreneurship discourse.

Hence, boundary concepts create new discursive horizons that are multi-interpretable and as such can transcend boundaries between subordinate and dominant discourse. Participants can demarcate these concepts to gain credibility for the subordinate discourse. Moreover, participants can reflect upon, contest, and reject the concepts and by this means disrupt dominant discourse.

Figure 1.1. Boundary object that spans boundary between government and governance discourse and subdiscourses
1.5. CONCLUSIONS: BOUNDARY WORK AS A MECHANISM OF PRODUCTIVE POWER

In this chapter, boundary work is defined as a discursive mechanism through which participants of deliberations demarcate dominant discourse to gain credibility for it, as a demarcation of alternative or even subordinate discourse to disrupt dominant discourse, and as a transcending of boundaries between discourses by participants to alter dominant discourse. The result of boundary work depends upon the reaction of other participants who can tacitly accept, reject, contest or reflect upon the boundaries drawn and transcended.

I developed boundary work as a theory to explain the power of demarcations of discourse and a transcending of discourse in boundary concepts. Theoretically, the power of the discursive demarcations is explained by Foucauldian power that is embedded in dominant discourses. As soon as a demarcation resonates with this dominant discourse it is accepted and the dominant discourse is reenacted. However, as I am interested in the study of change of dominant discourse, I also developed the possibility that actors demarcate subordinate discourse, and reflect upon or reject demarcations. The concept of parrhesia in Foucault’s work allows a change in dominant discourse by a parrhesiastes, someone who is willing to take the risk of being excommunicated by speaking freely. I connected this concept to studies on reflectivity and argued that reflectivity might be induced by parrhesia. When this occurs, a conversation with a deliberative quality can take place. This means that taken for granted discourse is articulated and discussed. I can study this empirically when the demarcation of a discourse is contested. This contestation can lead to conflict but also in reflective conversations. Subsequently, I introduced the possibility of transcending boundaries as a way to introduce new discourse. Participants can transcend boundaries between discourses in boundary concepts.

In the empirical study of the reenactment or change of dominant discourse, the reaction to the demarcations or boundary concepts is crucial. Are they contested, reflected upon or rejected in conversations and other types of interactions? See table 1.1 for an overview of theoretical possible forms and outcomes of boundary work in conversations and interactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary work</th>
<th>Reaction in interaction</th>
<th>Type of conversation</th>
<th>Result on site of interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation of dominant discourse</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse is reproduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>Change in direction of subordinate discourse is possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation of counter discourse</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>Change in direction of subordinate discourse is possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>No parrhesia: it was already dominant discourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Transcending of boundaries in boundary concept (elements of alternative discourse are altered) | Ignored | “normal” | Change is accepted: was already dominant discourse |
| | Contested | Deliberative | Change is possible |
| | Adversarial | Unsettled |
| Accepted | “normal” | Change is accepted: was already dominant discourse |

Table 1.1. Possible forms and outcomes of boundary work in conversations and interactions

In this chapter, I made the following theoretical changes to boundary work:

- I explain the power of demarcations in a Foucauldian tradition (and not institutionally) and consider a demarcation powerful when it resonates with dominant discourse and is accepted without contestation. Demarcations can also be ignored or contested.

  - Powerful demarcation of subordinate discourse as well as contestation of demarcations of dominant discourse theoretically became a possibility with the concepts of parrhesia and reflectivity. Parrhesia might be accepted or contested. When it is contested, a deliberative conversation or conflict might occur.

- I no longer exclusively focus on the reproduction of dominant science discourse; therefore, I can study the struggles between dominant and alternative discourse.

- I no longer exclusively study the reproduction of dominant ‘science’ discourse; therefore, we are able to analyze the production of new discourse that transcends boundaries between discourses.

Thus, with boundary work, I will study how government or deliberative governance discourses are enacted, are challenged and protected in interactions between actors. I focus on the dynamics of the interaction of discourses, the actions by which they are enacted. It is in these interactions that change of dominant discourse might take place. In this case, I study how a “freshly” injected deliberative governance discourse challenges the dominant government discourse in experiments with deliberative governance, and how the dominant discourse is protected or changed. Boundary work enables the study of these contests between dominant and subordinate discourse and to establish what discourse become credible.
Boundary work enables the study of alteration and reinforcement of discourse. It elicits the following question:

*Can boundary work explain when and how deliberative governance discourse gains credibility in innovative forms of governance in land use planning in the Netherlands and the United States?*

Sub-questions are:

- What boundary concepts transcended boundaries between government and deliberative governance?
- Did these concepts gain credibility?
- What demarcations of government and/or deliberative governance discourse took place?
- At what moments did these demarcations take place?
- What are similarities and differences in boundary concepts and demarcations in the two projects with innovative forms of deliberative governance?
- What does this tell us about the possibilities of mainstreaming innovative forms of deliberative governance?

In chapter two I will further define the sub-questions with help of the methods by which I constructed the data (see section on research steps).
In the introduction I described my understanding that innovative forms of governing are an injection of deliberative governance discourse into dominant government discourse. These innovations provide the opportunity to study the credibility contest between the two discourses and the outcome of this struggle. It is obvious that one form, government discourse, is dominant and can draw on long routinized understandings of how institutions are supposed to function. This is a relatively frozen discourse. The other discourse is new and lacks such resources. I want to establish if change toward deliberative governance takes place, if it becomes more credible.

In chapter 1, I described how through boundary work I interpret these contests. I gave a theoretical explanation for the power of drawing and transcending boundaries around discourses. In this chapter, I will describe the choices I made for specific experiments with innovative forms of governing in the practice of policy and public administration. Questions that will be answered are: What shape do these experiments, institutions for deliberation, have in public administration? Why did I select three different experiments, one in an urban area and two in rural areas? Why one foreign case? Were these experiments in the past or ongoing, and why did I make this selection? How did I interpret the observations, documents and interviews, and construct boundary work in these? In short, this chapter presents the research design, the methods by which I collected, constructed and interpreted the data.

2.1. REFLECTIVE RESEARCH DESIGN

“Tell me, and I will forget. Show me, and I may remember. Involve me, and I will understand” (Confucius, 450 B.C.).

Just as the turn to practice in the study of policy deliberations in experiments with deliberative governance, my reflective research design fits into the emerging strand of deliberative policy analysis. In this tradition, a mutual inquiry and phronesis — practical wisdom — are the target. In deliberative policy analysis it is argued that phronesis should be established in interactions with policy practice. This practical wisdom can “inform us on what to do” (Loeber, 2004, p. 21) and “must be up to the task of understanding and furthering the interests of real world, conflict-ridden, living communities” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p. 21). Phronesis goes beyond scientific and technical knowledge. It is a “true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man” (Aristotle, 1976, chapter 5).

The co-production of practical wisdom is very different from mainstream policy analysis that attempts to “speak truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979) and that considers close interactions between policy and analysis as a danger to production of “pure” scientific knowledge. In contrast, in this case I aim at the production of practical wisdom that enables and includes judgment (Dewey, 1939; Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 2; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Once I adopt the idea that policy analysis should contribute to practical judgment, I also commit to a “mutual inquiry” and “mutual discourse” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p. 23). It is in a mutual inquiry rather than in an ivory tower that policy analysts can produce practical wisdom.
we saw in the introduction, this fits the view of deliberative policy analysis in which expert knowledge becomes part of deliberations and experts have to engage with practice.

Philosophically, a mutual inquiry may be considered inevitable and inescapable for the production of phronesis. As Hillary Putnam argued: in everyday situations, fact, value and theory are “interpenetrated” (Putnam, 1981; 1995). When we take practice as a unit of analysis, policy analysis is necessarily deliberative and intertwines fact and value, and theory and practice (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, p. 20-23). Indeed, philosophically this is true. However, the social realms and the procedures of policy analysis, politics and public administration are, to a certain extent, separated. This is empirically supported by research on institutionalized boundaries between policy and science (see chapter 1). Moreover, I can distinguish different types of knowledge, for example theoretical, empirical and experiential, within the social realm of policy sciences and in the realm of politics and public administration. Thus, even though philosophically it is understood that fact and value and theory and practice feed into each other in the policy practice, the scientific and political realms can be distinguished socially as well as by their different types of knowledge produced in and for these realms. These distinctions enable me to design a research process in which types of knowledge “talk back” to each other and induce reflectivity, and at the same time produce phronesis.

In this dissertation, I aim to engage in a mutual inquiry to produce phronesis. The reflective research design not only presupposes but also organizes the iterations between types of knowledge and social realms. In other words, I deliberately went back and forth between the concept of boundary work and theories in policy analysis on one hand, and on the other hand the practice of experiments with deliberative governance. This type of iteration between practice and theory is described in Kolb’s learning cycle. It assumes that different types of knowledge can feed into each other to create a learning process that leads to experiential knowledge which is similar to phronesis. Kolb starts the cycle with immediate or concrete experiences that can be observed and reflected upon. These reflections can be assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts which produce new implications for action. These actions in their turn can be actively tested (Kolb, 1984, p. 21).

The learning cycle I created not only includes my observations of practice; it also involves a dialogue with people in practice. As such, I attempt to move “... from the role of controller to that of collaborator” (Guba, 1989; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 260). I engage in a dialogue, a mutual inquiry, about the substance and the methodology of the analysis. With a reflective research design my ambition is to produce a learning stance with regard to:

“the substance of the subject; the normative position of the researcher; the research method and how it might be biased toward a certain normative position; the methodology, specifically how the analyst learned from and was of influence” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).

With this reflective research design, I presuppose that the actors in different realms of policy analysis and policy practice can act as parrhesiastes AND that different types of knowledge — not necessarily connected to one social realm — can create reflectivity in both researcher and practitioners when types of knowledge are crossed over. For this, I draw on Schön’s argument that situations “talk back” to practitioners (Schön, 1983, p. 135). This induces the “practitioner,” (in this story both the researcher (me) and participants in the experiments with deliberative governance), to reflect on this “talk-back” that might lead to a “new understanding” or “reframing” (Schön, 1983, p. 135). Thus, reflection comes from interactions between social realms (Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. 102-103) as well as from interactions between types of knowledge. This can lead to a reframing of the problems and to “new understanding” and judgments by practitioners and analysts on how to solve policy problems. As such, I consider reflectivity a result of interactions between analysts and practitioners and as a condition to create phronesis in a mutual inquiry. This reflective design describes how I organized the interactions between conceptual knowledge, experiential knowledge and empirical knowledge, and how I organized the social interactions between researcher and practitioners.

This type of ethnomethodological reflexivity( Lynch, 2000, p. 33) should not be confused with standpoint reflexivity (Lynch, 2000, p. 31) of critical policy analysis that is closely related to deliberative policy analysis. Scholars in this tradition Fischer, Pung and Wright, and Dryzek, among others, argue that policy analysts should deliberately take a stand in democratic debate. They should be normative and support those who are not in power, for example environmental organizations or citizens’ groups, to stand side by side with and empower powerless citizens. Otherwise policy analysis is always at risk of reproducing the status quo. However, in this research I refrain from taking this normative stand. For example, I do not take the viewpoint that experiments with deliberative governance are a way to depoliticize conflict in order to benefit people in power. Instead, with the reflective research design, I attempt to be aware of and criticize my assumptions as a researcher by engaging in a dialogue with the research subject. Moreover, this type of ethnomethodological reflectivity can help awareness and correct for a bias in research toward, for example, a group or a discourse.

As described above, I developed a research design (see figure 2.1) that is inspired by the hermeneutic cycle proposed by Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Kolb’s learning cycle (Kolb 1984). The reflective research cycle describes how I iterated between different types of knowledge, as Kolb proposes. It also illustrates how I included interpretations of practitioners, as Guba and Lincoln propose. Moreover, in this research design I introduced a third way to create reflectivity: a comparative case study. Hence, three types of iterations were organized: first, between theory and practice to increase learning in both; next, between researcher and practitioner to increase reflectivity of both; and finally, between two cases to learn from different contexts.

The cycle I created started with the experiential knowledge that I gathered while organizing and advising in experiments with deliberative governance in the Dutch context, and with some theoretical notions on boundary work. Based on these I reconstructed boundary work in a pilot case at the local level in which I had been incidentally involved as a consultant. This case concerned an experiment with interactive citizens’ participation for the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark in Amsterdam. In this pilot case I tested the theoretical approach to boundary work. The theoretical notion allowed me to study the case from a specific point of view, and to be held accountable both by practitioners and researchers for the way I analyzed it. This created reflectivity on my part, which was necessary since the pilot case had been facilitated by the company I was, and still am, working for. The theoretical approach allowed me to evaluate it differently than from the
The results from the analysis of the pilot case led me to fine-tune the theory and shaped how I analyzed the data in the comparison between two ongoing experiments with consensus-building and “visioning” on the regional level. In this comparison I introduced a case of consensus building: the Dairy Gateway project in Wisconsin, USA. This international dimension caused me to reflect on a possible bias in my thinking on the Dutch planning practice. Moreover, it helped me to explore whether change of dominant discourse takes place through boundary work in different contexts and if so, how. The results of this comparison fed back into theories on boundary work and governance. This helped me to formulate recommendations to intervene in a learning network on redevelopment of old industrial sites. However, some results of the application of recommendations in this policy practice can be accessed through the following publications: Metze 2009 and Metze 2010.

2.2. CASE SELECTION

The reflective research design enhanced my thinking in three ways: through iteration between theoretical and empirical knowledge; through iteration between the social realm of science and practice; and through iteration between two cases of which one was outside the Netherlands.

I started with an exploratory single case study (Yin 1994, p. 4): Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. This was a project of citizens’ participation in which they drew up plans for the park and competed to be selected by the district council. This case was explored to understand its complexities (Stake, 2005, p. 444) and to use that understanding in a reflective way, that is, to “challenge, confirm, or extend the theory” (Yin 1994, p. 38).

The second stage was concerned with innovative forms of governing in regional planning that included farmers’ and environmental issues in rural areas. In the A1 Protein Highway project in the Netherlands a vision for the region had to be developed in deliberation with businesses, non-governmental organizations and citizens. In the Dairy Gateway project consensus building took place in deliberation with farmers, farmers’ representatives, the dairy industry, environmental organizations, and citizens. These cases were both operational experiments with deliberative governance. By choosing a foreign case, I introduced a comparative component that first and foremost provided an opportunity for me as a researcher, but also for the people in policy practice, to reflect on the specificities of the Dutch cases and that of the Wisconsin case. The Wisconsin case is an instrumental “control” or “reference case” (Stake 2005, p. 458) and provides valuable insights on its own terms.

I selected the three innovative forms of governing based on criteria that I developed from the theoretical definition of experiments with deliberative governance from the introduction. I analyzed the project descriptions, minutes of meetings and interviews about the start of the project, which enabled me to conclude that these projects can indeed be understood as operational experiments with deliberative governance.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIMENTS WITH DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

In the introduction, I positioned experiments with deliberative governance in a theoretical debate; in this section I will answer the question: what do these experiments look like in practice? In the introduction, I defined these experiments as settings that are temporarily erected, organized around a problem or a conflict, and involve at least one governmental and one non-governmental actor to resolve the problem or conflict with help of a deliberative design that addresses the rules of conduct and strategies.

This definition was translated into three criteria that I applied in order to select typical cases of deliberative governance that were as homogeneous as possible. As we saw in the introduction, I expect that participants in experiments with deliberative governance conduct boundary work on these two discourses as the experiments “inject” deliberative governance discourse into a government discourse. Hence, the deliberative governance discourse is easier to identify in these experiments than in other types of policy discourse. In this research I selected in an “information-oriented” way cases that I understood to be the “most likely” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 78-79) to include boundary work on government and deliberative governance discourse. The three cases I selected all represent the best example, synecdoches (Becker, 1998, p. 67; Stone, 2002, p. 137, 138) of the theoretically-defined experiment with deliberative governance. I selected three very similar cases to be able to understand how through boundary work dominant government discourse might or might not be disrupted in these cases. The three criteria were: cases were experimental and temporarily erected; there were both governmental and non-governmental interactions; and projects had a deliberative design.
First, I selected projects based on the criterion that they had to be part of the policy practice but not part of normal decision making. The projects were experimental and temporarily erected. The governmental actors and others involved defined the projects as, for example, "different" in the Bijlmerpark (Stad bv, 1998, bijeenkomst 1, V 1); "innovative" in the case of the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project (Bunt and Rijnconsult 2003), or as something "beyond command and control," as was the case in the Dairy Gateway project (DNR, 2003, Grant application Joyce foundation). Hence, "experimental" does not mean that I designed a scientific experiment, but rather that the projects are not part of normal and formal policy-making practices. To be able to judge if these projects fit this criterion, I conducted exploratory research in which I reconstructed what governmental actors and consultants considered "normal" vs. "experimental." This analysis also provided the contextually defined elements of government discourse and deliberative governance discourse. From this analysis, I concluded that all three projects were temporarily erected, experimental and situated in a real-time political context:

- **The redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark in Amsterdam.** In this project the district council wanted to organize a participatory process in which citizens were more actively involved in policymaking. The local government financed the project in which citizens drew up plans for the park and competed for a winning design.

- **The scenario development for the Protein Highway: Make it Happen.** Here scenario development about an area around the A1, a main artery in the Netherlands, was initiated by Oost NV, a development agency, and financed by two provinces to stimulate entrepreneurship in the region. These scenarios were to be built by stakeholders, entrepreneurs, environmental- and animal-welfare organizations and citizens and had to result in a appealing and viable vision for the region that might enhance its economic and environmental quality.

- **The consensus building in the Dairy Gateway project.** This was facilitated by the Bureau of Cooperative Agreement of the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR). In this project, consensus building for better relationships between entrepreneurs, environmental organizations and citizens, as well as better and more sustainable environmental and business results were the intended result.

A second criterion to determine if the cases were experiments with deliberative governance was that both governmental and non-governmental actors had to participate in the projects. As we saw in the introduction, it is in this institutional ambiguity (Hajer, 2003) and in a network of interdependent actors (Tatenhove, 1995; Teisman, 1992; 1998) that the shift from government to governance takes place. The three projects were all situated in this institutional ambiguity:

- Creative competition in the Bijlmerpark was initiated by the district government when an impasse occurred in decision-making over the redevelopment of the park. In addition to the district council, the central government of the city of Amsterdam and the province of Noord Holland were involved. The park was part of the Dutch "ecological main structure" (ecologische hoofdstructuur). Policy domains that were included were economic affairs, housing, traffic, as well as natural resources. Moreover, citizens living near the park were involved, as were local environmental organizations, social workers, schools, urban and landscape planners, and physical education coaches.

- The A1 Protein Highway: Make it Happen project focused on regional development of an area around the A1 artery. The regional focus facilitated cooperation between two provinces; a Dutch bank, the Rabobank; the national Platform Agrologistics and a national Innovation Network for the agricultural sector. Policy domains involved were urban and rural planning and land use, environment, animal welfare, agriculture, traffic and transport. Land use conflicts had to be resolved in the region. Moreover, environmental organizations, animal welfare organizations, agrobusinesses, farmers' representatives, tourist industry representatives and citizens of the region were to be involved.

- The Dairy Gateway project was initiated to improve the environmental quality, the economic viability, and the communities of a region that included three counties (Manitowoc, Kewaunee and Door). The regional focus brought together these three counties, the state's Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP). The regional focus not only linked the policy domains of natural resources and agriculture, but also environmental organizations and the agricultural and dairy sector in this area. State and local environmental organizations were involved, as were farmers, farmers' representatives and citizens living in the three counties.

A third criterion was that the selected projects had to have a deliberative design that included rules of conduct and strategies for deliberation to convene and facilitate the deliberation between stakeholders. This criterion allowed ruling out beforehand projects that were developed to create support for policies, or to increase policy efficiency only. In this case, I was interested in projects that were also concerned with the deliberative quality of the conversations that they organized. A deliberative design indicates that the initiators aimed at an improvement of the deliberative quality of the conversations. Each of the three project proposals included a deliberative design based upon academic research and referred to the type of, or the quality of, the conversation that was the goal.

- In the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark, the deliberative design was inspired by the method of creative competition that had been developed by Geert Teisman at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. A consultancy firm de Stad bv, hired by the district government, used this method to develop a deliberative design that decided how many meetings were to be convened, with what participants, and with what objectives. In three meetings, citizens were to draft landscape designs for the park. They were organized in consortia that had to gain support for their ideas and that had to make the plans more feasible with the help of experts. At the last meeting the district council had to choose one of the plans and develop this into a feasible project. Each meeting was facilitated by an external consultant.

- In the Dairy Gateway project, consensus building was applied as a method to organize interactions between government, citizens, environmental organizations, farming businesses and the dairy industry. This method was developed by Lawrence Susskind (among others) at the Consensus Building Institute in cooperation with the Harvard Program on Negotiation and MIT. The concept of Public Entrepreneurship Networks was also tried out (Laws, 1998; Laws et al. 2001). The DNR hired two local mediators who convened and facilitated the interactions, and two national mediators and one national policy advisor to construct a deliberative design.

- In the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project, scenario development in the
In this section I describe in detail how I generated, constructed and analyzed the data in each of the cases.

DATA GENERATION

I generated the data for the exploratory pilot case, Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark, in a different way than I did for the comparison of the two cases in rural regions in the Netherlands and the United States. The pilot case was reconstructed in retrospect and I was not involved as a researcher when the project was ongoing. I was an “onlooker” (Patton, 1990, p. 206). Although at the time I was working for a consultancy firm, I only sat in on one internal evaluation session of this project, together with Professor Teisman. The data generated were (policy) documents from the archives of both the contracted consultancy firm, de Stad bv, and the local administration of the district. These documents included field notes of the project assistant who worked on the project at that time. Subsequently, I interviewed fifteen people (see attachment 3.2. for an overview). These interviewees included citizens and representatives of citizens’ groups, the two external project managers, two public administrators, the politically responsible alderwoman, spatial planners and landscape architects who were involved, and a student who was an intern in the administration of the district government.

I generated the data for the exploratory comparison between the A1 Protein Highway: Make it Happen project and the Dairy Gateway project in three ways. First, I engaged in a “naturalistic inquiry” (Patton, 1990, p. 203) that included participatory observations in the field while the two projects were ongoing. Second, I reconstructed boundary work in (policy) documents and third, I conducted interviews.
attended by the project manager of the Dairy Gateway project; and fourth, through a presentation I held where I discussed preliminary results at the Innovation Network.

Subsequently, I organized interactions between the two projects; the project manager of the Dairy Gateway project once visited the Netherlands to participate in one of the meetings with the Knowledge department at the Ministry of Agriculture, at which I presented preliminary results. In addition, the two project-managers also met outside this meeting to discuss the specifics of their projects.

DATA CONSTRUCTION

After generating the data, I organized them in a specific way. This is what I call data construction. As I am interested in the response to boundary work, the type of conversation that evolves, and the results of boundary work, I needed to maintain a chronological order in the data construction and I divided each case in two stages:

a. The first stage was the drafting of the proposal in which the advisors and government, and sometimes other societal actors were included and a change-leading coalition negotiated the objectives, the deliberative design, and the financing of the experiment.

b. The second stage was the deliberations between government and society. These included the meetings that had a deliberative governance design.

Next, I organized the data into research sites. These sites transcended the geographical encounters between actors, and transcend social groups or practices (Metcalf, 2001). In my capacity as a researcher, I created the coherence of a site. A site in this case is a unit of analysis that includes all types of interactions between specified actors and that transcends geographically-located and other types of real-time interactions. The site of interaction as a unit of analysis is not necessarily “a group of people with the same understanding, a community, or a discourse community” (Yanow, 2000, p. 27); neither is it shared “socially established human activity” (Macintyre, 1982, p. 187, cited in: Wagenaar and Cook 2003, p. 146). A site of interaction includes all types of interactions between specific types of actors. This type of ordering “has the advantage of leaving open the possibility that a variety of cultural practices may coexist there, any of which may or may not extend beyond the site” (Metcalf, 2001, p. 165). Hence, the interactions at these sites take place face to face, but also in documents, phone calls, emails, and recordings. They expand with the length of the time period. I distinguished three research sites:

1. Interactions between government and society, e.g. interactions that include at least three actors other than government (citizens, NGO’s, businesses, advisors). This site of interaction included the deliberative meetings and was analyzed in all cases.

2. Interactions between government and business; at this site of interaction no NGO’s or citizens participated. I was able to construct this site of analysis only in the Dutch and U.S. cases. The meetings that were part of this site of interaction did not have as a motive the improvement of the deliberative quality of the conversations.

3. Interactions between government and advisors. This site of interaction was studied in all cases, as it was mostly the two actors who negotiated the proposal for the project in the first stage. Again, at this site of interaction no deliberative quality was intended.

I analyzed boundary work in these two stages and at the three sites and compared the results per project and across all three projects, especially between the two cases of the comparison.

DATA ANALYSIS

In Chapter I I developed a conceptual framework to interpret conversations and interactions of participants of experiments with deliberative governance. This conceptual framework enables me to study how government discourse is disrupted. As we saw, it is through participants’ boundary work, work that is accepted immediately in one meeting or leads to conflict or reflectivity at others where a possible change takes place. A conversation of a deliberative quality, a “normal” conversation or an adversarial conversation might occur. When participants demarcate boundaries, both an adversarial and a deliberative conversation might lead to the change of dominant discourse. A normal conversation reproduced dominant discourse. When some participants transcend boundaries and other participants do not contest this transcending, dominant discourse is disrupted. When a deliberative conversation or an adversarial conversation follows, change is possible. In the case of a deliberative or adversarial conversation, I need to interpret the content of the conversation to be able to conclude if dominant discourse was disrupted.

To be able to interpret boundary work in the data, in the section that follows I develop a format to look for boundary work in the documents and conversations. Subsequently, I develop a format to analyze the responses to these demarcations and to the boundary objects. This format enabled me to identify critical moments in the conversations and interactions, it enabled me to establish the quality of the conversation that evolved and whether participants disrupted government discourse.

Demarcations

According to Gieryn, demarcations can be recognized as a “pattern” in language. One of those patterns is the literary device of the foil (Gieryn, 1983, p.791). The “foil” in literature is a character in a story who contrasts with another character, a protagonist and antagonist, for example. This is to bring out the characteristics of one character more clearly. In a comic duo this device is often also applied: the straight man (in Dutch de ‘aangever’) is the comic foil to the funny dumb and clumsy character. Similar to the analysis of the device of the foil is the analysis of an antagonist and protagonist — or scripting and counterscripting. Hajer and Uitermark applied the concepts of scripting and counterscripting in an analysis of the performance of authority after the murder of Theo van Gogh (Hajer and Uitermark 2008). Hajer and Uitermark, as is common in literature, applied the device of the foil to characters, or in this case, the actors. They studied how antagonists and protagonists in Dutch public policy and politics scripted and counterscripted to be authoritative politicians in a situation of crisis (Hajer and Uitermark 2008). In this dissertation I do not study the device of the foil in connection to actors and their position, but rather in connection to discursive attempts to gain credibility for a discourse. In other words, I do not study how politicians become authoritative, but how discourses do through boundary work by participants.

According to Gieryn, there are at least three styles of the literary device of the foil. In the analysis I applied these three to recognized boundary work in texts:
• **heightening contrast.** These are utterances that include, for example: “This is different from that, because...”;
• **exclusion.** These are utterances that include, for example: “This is not politics, because...”;
• **blaming.** These are utterances that include, for example: “It is due to the slow decision-making procedures of government that...” (Gierey, 1983, p. 791)\(^3\)

In the analysis of boundary work in conversations, documents and interviews, first and foremost I looked for the “heightening of contrast” and “exclusion” in utterances. “Blaming” as a literary device required more interpretation than the two other devices but I also looked for those types of demarcations.\(^7\)

These three literary devices served as an “entrance” into the data and enabled me to interpret which discourse was demarcated from which discourse.\(^6\) Each time I came across one of these three types of utterances in the text, I interpreted them in at least one of the ways that follow.\(^7\)

First, I interpreted whether the demarcations “stood alone,” which means that they are not contrasted to other discourses. I interpreted these types of demarcations so as to provide me with a definition of an element of a specific discourse. For example, an actor might claim that “this command and control is part of governments’ responsibility,” without further defining what is not. However, often demarcations are contrasted to “something that it is not.” In discourse theoretic terms, demarcations not only define what are elements of one discourse, they also exclude elements of the “other” discourse. Therefore, a demarcation simultaneously defines what the other discourse is. Hence, every time I came across an utterance that stated that something is “different” or excluded or blamed, I questioned and necessarily interpreted what it was contrasted to, excluded from or blamed. Second, I interpreted these utterances and used them to indicate the moments at which participants demarcated a discourse. This enabled me to construct patterns of boundary work. Third, I also interpreted and judged whether these demarcations concerned dominant government discourse, deliberative governance discourse or perhaps did not address these discourses at all. Subsequently, when I came across these demarcations, I interpreted the responses to the demarcations. A section below will address how I interpreted the responses to demarcations and to boundary objects. First I will describe how I searched for boundary concepts.

**Boundary concepts**

In order to establish whether boundaries between discourses were transcended in boundary concepts, I could lean less on detailed conversation analysis. I had to interpret if stretching of a boundary, as Gieryn referred to it, took place. To be able to construct and interpret concepts as boundary concepts, I first looked for a device that is almost opposite to the device of the foil, that is, the rhetorical figure of a mixed metaphor or a “catchphrase.”\(^9\) Catachresis means to use a word to signify something different from its normal meaning. It is a word used out of context in a paradoxical way or with contradictitory logic. Catachresis is an illogical mixed metaphor.\(^9\) For example: “Honey, you are a regular nuclear meltdown. You’d better cool off.” -- Susan Sarandon in the movie Bull Durham.\(^3\) Next to this rhetorical figure, in the analysis I searched for concepts or short sentences that included elements of discourse. For example, the statement “this is political knowledge” or “farmers are environmentalists.” From these types of utterances, I constructed boundary concepts and analyzed what boundaries were being crossed, or might become demarcated.

I also analyzed and interpreted actors’ responses to the boundary concepts. As we saw in chapter 1, participants in the projects could accept, contest or deliberate on the (inappropriate) inclusion of elements of discourse. When they accept a boundary concept this means that dominant discourse is changed. However, when participants contest the blurred boundary and, for example, people start to claim that the opposite is true, or that the idea is refutable, this may lead to severe demarcations of elements of one discourse from the other. When participants contest a boundary concept it may turn into a fracture line concept. A fracture line concept draws out the boundaries between discourses more clearly rather than it transcends or blurs them. The boundary concept no longer creates coherence and transcends the boundaries, but causes fracture lines to become more visible (see also chapter 1).

**Demarcations and boundary concepts**

As we saw in chapter 1, participants in projects can demarcate boundary concepts to gain credibility for them. This creates an extra layer in the analysis, that of alignment of subdiscourses in deliberative governance discourse. Boundary concepts can transcend boundaries between subdiscourses and at the same time participants can demarcate these concepts to gain credibility for them. For example, entrepreneurship as an element of deliberative governance discourse can be a boundary concept that sits at the boundary between government subdiscourse and business subdiscourse. Within the governance discourse the concept of entrepreneurship aligns businesses and government.

![Figure 2.2. Example of demarcated boundary concept](image)

At the same time I can interpret the boundary concept of entrepreneurship being demarcated from government discourse to gain credibility for “entrepreneurship” as an element of governance discourse. As such, the concept of entrepreneurship is multi-interpretable for certain actors who interpret it from certain subdiscourses and it is part of governance discourse.\(^5\)

**Responses to demarcations and boundary concepts**

Since I wanted to analyze the demarcations and transcending of boundaries between discourses and to include the responses to boundary work, especially in the interactions between government and society, I introduced the concept of critical momentsof
boundary work. These moments critiques (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1999) can refer to the "critical activity of persons" as well as to the "unusualness of the moment of crisis." At a critical moment "there is a realization that something has to change" (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999, p. 359). This can lead to a violent conflict but also (and more commonly) to a discussion. Boltanski and Thevenot speak of "moments of justification;" "moments that are transitory because they break the ordinary;" moments that "involve action too" (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1999, p. 360). Whereas Boltanski and Thevenot establish these moments with help from the participants and asked them to pinpoint what the critical moments were in a project or process, I constructed these moments in the interactions in hindsight. I established what responses occurred after boundaries were drawn or transcended. In chapter 1 I already introduced three possible types of reactions to demarcations and transcending of boundaries:

- Acceptation: the demarcation of discourse was already part of dominant discourse; an acceptance of the boundary concept leads to change of dominant discourse;
- Contestation-conflict: demarcation remains part of subordinate discourse or dominant discourse may be disrupted;
- Contestation-conversation with deliberative quality: demarcation or transcending is reflected upon and change of dominant discourse may be the result.

Each time I came across a demarcation or transcending event, I interpreted the response and categorized it in one of the previous three categories. Subsequently, based on these interpretations I was able to point out critical moments of boundary work. These were the moments at which change of dominant discourse became possible. Moreover, based on the content of the responses, I could interpret whether dominant discourse was indeed disrupted.

To summarize the research steps

1. I gathered (policy) documents, minutes of meetings, notes of facilitators, and I interviewed a broad range of actors involved. In the comparison I was also able to observe, participate, record and transcribe meetings and to interact with actors.
2. I ordered the documents and other data chronologically.
3. I divided them into two stages: (1) the formulation of the proposal for the project, and (2) meeting the stakeholders, that is, the deliberations.
4. I also divided the data into three sites of interaction:
   a. interactions between government and society (the deliberative settings);
   b. interactions between government and business;
   c. interactions between government and advisors (scientific experts as well as consultants);

Data analysis

5. I looked for discursive demarcations and transcending of boundaries in the two stages and at these different sites of interactions.
6. I created several types of databases of boundary work. I created tables in Word in which I build a time line of events that was linked to documents that were created at or for those events. In this time line I also documented the most important boundary work at those events. For the detailed analysis of boundary work I used Nud-It (for analysis of the documents of Creative Competition) and Transana Software 2.21 (for analysis of the recordings of meetings in the comparison), and

Table 2.1. Format for the analysis per case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Site 1,2 and 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting the actors</td>
<td>Demarcations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical moment:</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Deliberative Conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical moment:</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Reflective c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Elements (un)changed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4. TO CONCLUDE: ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIVITY IN ITERATION

This chapter introduced the research design and the method for generating data, data construction and data analysis. To enhance ethnomethodological reflectivity in this research, I explicitly created an iteration between the theoretical concept boundary work and the empirics of experiments with deliberative governance. I designed an iteration both between theoretical and empirical knowledge and between the social realm of science and the social realm of politics and public administration. Moreover, this chapter explained how I selected three cases that I argued to be synecdoche of experiments with deliberative governance.
The first case, Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark, Amsterdam, is a pilot case and helped me to reflect upon the concept of boundary work as I developed it in chapter 1. Chapter 3 describes this case and it includes a reflection on chapter 1. Subsequently, I introduced a comparison of a Dutch project and an American project that have a similar deliberative design, but that differed in their context. This difference can give some explanation for differences in patterns of boundary work in the two projects that go beyond features of the deliberative design. Chapter 4 and 5 will present the results of the study of boundary work in these two cases. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions.
CHAPTER 3

BOUNDARY WORK IN THE BIJLMERPARK: CONTESTED FEASIBILITY AND EXPERTISE

"Urban planners and we architects aren’t the visible symbols of oppression, like the military or the police. We’re more sophisticated, more educated, and more socially conscious. We’re the soft cops” (Robert Goodman, After the Planners, 1973).

This chapter describes the results of the analysis of boundary work in Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark. This innovative planning project ran from 1998 until 2001 and involved citizens of Amsterdam Southeast as the artistic designers and local experts in the redevelopment of the park (see attachment 3.1. for a timeline).

3.1. THE BIJLMERPARK IN THE SOUTHEAST OF AMSTERDAM

Collective spacious greens, roomy private apartments in numerous blocks of high-rise that were laid out in a honeycomb structure, and good connections to the central city (Hootsen, 2006, p. 14); in a nutshell those were the most important features of the 1965 urban plan by a group of designers led by G.S. Nassuth of the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department (Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening) for the city expansion in the southeast of Amsterdam (Luijten, 1997). The ideas of the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne, the CIAM movement, of which the Swiss architect Le Corbusier was the leader, had inspired these planners to develop an area that could house the growing middle-class families in the Amsterdam area that wished to move outside the small homes in narrow streets in the inner city. Repetition, regularity, symmetry; the separation of functions; the use of open blocks; communal facilities; nature on a large scale; high-rise buildings and so on were the principles of this collective of architects (Mentzel, 1990, p. 369; Helleman & Wassenberg, 2004, p. 4). The Bijlmerpark was to be the jewel in the crown of the Bijlmermeer district. The park had to provide fresh air, collectively shared green fields, playing grounds, and flora and fauna for the residents of this area.

In 1970, two years after the completion of the last blocks of flats, the first critical report, the “Nota Matteman” appeared (Luijten, 1997). Many more followed, especially when the apartments remained partly empty; when the area attracted mostly lower class, immigrant families and Antillean families; and dilapidation of the area progressed.

By the mid-1980s the housing corporation ‘Nieuw Amsterdam’ was at the edge of bankruptcy. In 1988 for the first time the district government and the housing corporation proposed a rigorous physical reconstruction. Earlier, smaller social cultural and economic interventions were implemented but hardly led to satisfying results (Helleman & Wassenberg, 2004, p.6-7). In 1986, a report on the future of the district, the “Nota de Toekomst de Bijlmermeer,” presented several scenarios for the future of the district (Luijten, 1997). These gave reason to the city council to create the Werkgroep Toekomst Bijlmermeer (Working Committee ‘Future of the Bijlmermeer’). Two years later, in 1990, the working committee presented their report in which they claimed that all small socio-economic and cultural interventions had had their effect. However, to be able to drastically change the image, the safety and the quality of living in this district, “physical reconstructions” were necessary. The Working Committee proposed to demolish 25 percent of the houses (Afdeling-SO/VH, 1990).
The city council accepted this proposal and it instigated a complex reconstruction process. In 1992 the city council, the district council, and the housing corporation Nieuw Amsterdam, with help from the Central Public Housing Fund (Centraal Fonds Volkshuisvesting), agreed to start the reconstruction. This reconstruction began and still is taking place in two stages: 1992-1999 and 1999-2012 (KEI-Centrum, accessed 2008). In total 6500 houses will be demolished and 7450 houses will be rebuilt. The table below shows exact numbers on demolishing, rebuilding, and renovation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demolishing</th>
<th>6500 houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be built</td>
<td>7450 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renovation</td>
<td>4000 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale/Repurposing</td>
<td>2000 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Space</td>
<td>Redevelopment of 400 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tearing down parking garages</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping centers: demolition and new</td>
<td>All three</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1. Total of the reconstruction in numbers (www.kei-centrum.nl)

Many eloquent studies and articles describe this thirty year process of ambitious, sometimes described as “Utopian” planning in the mid-60’s (VPRO, 1998), the dilapidation that followed, and the reconstruction in the 1990’s (see, for example Mentzel, 1989; 1990; Veghel 1999; Reijndorp, 1997; Wassenberg, 2002; Bruijne et al., 2002; Helleman & Wassenberg, 2004; Hootsen, 2006). In this chapter, I will focus on a small part of this redevelopment: that of the Bijlmerpark. More particularly, in this chapter I will study the innovative part of the planning for redevelopment of this park that fits the theoretical criteria of an experiment with deliberative governance: Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark.

First, I will give a short description of the planning process of the park since 1997 to explain how it relates to the grant development of the Amsterdam Southeast district. This is to understand why the district government initiated a participatory planning process, as the people involved referred to the project with Creative Competition. Second, in this chapter I will present the results of the analysis of boundary work in this participatory process. It is studied in two stages: first, the drawing of the proposal, then the implementation of the participatory trajectory. The study is at three research sites: interactions between government and advisors; government and society; and government and government.

I studied the project Creative Competition to understand how deliberative governance gained credibility. It also served as a pilot project to test and further develop the conceptual framework of boundary work. At the end of this chapter I will draw lessons that will refine the conceptual work before it is used to analyze the comparison of two cases in rural areas of the Netherlands and the U.S.A.

3.2. CREATIVE COMPETITION: PARTICIPATORY PLANNING FOR A PARK

“The park encircles a central sports facility and residential units along the flanks facing the park. [...] The housing faces the park, providing eyes and ears for the park.” (Hoedemakers, 2007).

I will start with the story of boundary work in the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark in 1997. In March of that year the district council discussed the artistic design, a “structure vision,” of the architect Ashok Bahlota of Kuipers Companions with residents of the area. This design met with a lot of resistance among residents. Some of them were organized in the citizens’ group “Bijlmerpark Naturally” (Bijlmerpark Natuurlijk). This group had maintained the park voluntarily since the early 1990s when the district council decided no longer to invest in the park as it was going to be renewed in the coming years. This group of active citizens was supported by other residents. They objected to the idea of turning the park into a lake and to adding approximately 2000 houses. Bijlmerpark Naturally had strong links to political decision makers and political parties, especially to the social democratic Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid) that was the biggest party in the district government, and to the Green Party (Groen Links) (Interview-Hofstede, 2003; Interview-Verheijden, 2003; Interview-Lutchman, 2004). The district government decided that the concerns of the citizens needed to be addressed.

At the same time there was a lack of resources on the part of the district government to finance redevelopment. The district council argued that building of new houses in the park was inevitable, as this would provide financial resources for redevelopment. Moreover, the district government was involved in a power struggle on the redevelopment of this park.
with the Project Associations Renewal of the Bijlmermeer (Project Bureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer). They disagreed as to whether the park should be redeveloped as part of the whole Bijlmermeer renewal or redeveloped by the district itself (Raadsvoordracht-Zuidoost, 1997; Interview-Verheijden, 2003; Interview-Janssen, 2003; Interview-Bux, 2003). As a result of this struggle, the Bijlmerpark was taken apart and a discussion within the district evolved on how to further plan for the redevelopment of this park. Moreover, evaluations of the planning process so far had demonstrated a gap between the professional knowledge of planners and the interests of the citizens. This was one of the reasons for the district government to explore in what ways these residents could be involved in the redevelopment of the park.

The planning process for the Bijlmerpark mostly followed the formal planning procedures of the local district that had been formalized in the Planning and Decision Making Procedures for Spatial Measures, the “PlaBeRum” (Plan en Besluitvormingsproces Ruimtelijke Maatregelen). However, in 1998 some civil servants of the district department of spatial and economic development (Dienst Ruimtelijke en Economische Ontwikkeling) proposed to experiment with this procedure. The civil servants took the time to explore three possible scenarios and they wanted to experiment with the manner in which it should be redeveloped (Hofstede, 1997; Verheijden, 1997). As one of them explained in an interview, the civil servants wondered what to do with the strong and organized resistance: “How to break through? We estimated that we could not do that if we, very traditionally, would have civil servants make a little plan and push that through” (Interview-Hofstede, 2003). Another reason to experiment was that the civil servants and local government realized that these civil servants were not up to the task of redeveloping the park (Interview-Hofstede, 2003; Interview-Bux, 2003; Interview-Verheijden, 2003; Interview-Janssen, 2003). The civil servants spoke with Dirk Frieling, a professor of urban planning. He advised engaging in a participatory process and to contact de Stad bv, a small new consultancy bureau run by Jeroen Saris, the former Green Left alderman, on urban planning of the central city (Interview-Hofstede, 2003; Interview-Verheijden, 2003; Interview-Saris, 2003).

This consultancy bureau recommended a process of ‘Creative Competition.’ The bureau had been inspired by professor Teisman, a professor in urban planning, who had developed the idea of “creative competition” to facilitate more complex planning processes and to stimulate diversity in solutions. He strongly opposed, and empirically had demonstrated that in Dutch planning procedures, early selection of planning options led to a “funnel” vision that excluded possible, and perhaps more efficient or desirable solutions for planning challenges early in the planning process (Teisman, 1997). Teisman, in his research, proposed to work in ‘creative competition’ in which consortia of citizens, experts, businesses, financiers, and government would develop different ideas into feasible plans. At the end of the planning process, government would have a choice of several feasible plans (Teisman, 1997; 1998). It is this type of creative competition that de Stad bv proposed for the Bijlmerpark: citizens from areas adjacent to the park were to be included in the drawing of plans, and they had to compete to create the most desirable plan. Or, as de Stad bv formulated it in the 1998 proposal:

“Creative competition is a method to maximize the creativity of all those interested including the decision makers for an enrichment of solutions, and to enable the governors to select from multiple possibilities” (de Stad bv, 1998, p. 2).

With hindsight I can reconstruct two rounds of citizens’ participation in the Creative Competition project. The first round ran from March 1998 through July 1998 and it consisted of four public meetings that had a deliberative design inspired by the creative competition format. At these meetings, on average 50 participants participated in a process in which they formed five consortia that, with support of experts, went on to design five out of a total of 15 ideas presented for the park. At the first meeting, the consultant presented the rules of conduct for the deliberations and for the whole project and six residents already presented their ideas in the “speakers’ corner” (“op de zoekplicht”). At the second meeting, participants developed seven more ideas and presented those in the speakers’ corner. At this meeting, participants formed five consortia that further developed combinations of ideas presented at the first two meetings. At the end of the project, the consortia presented the finalized ideas at an exhibition and a public meeting at the park. This exhibition ran several weeks. At the last public meeting of this project, the consultant invited the district council to respond and select one winning plan (see attachment 3.3. for an overview of the planned meetings for Creative Competition I).

Civil servants of the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department (in Dutch: Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening (DRO)) bundled the results of this first round. In cooperation with the consultant and professor Teisman they created the “Bijlmerpark Working Book” (Werkboek Bijlmerpark). Later on the DRO transferred ifirst into a catalogue and later on it became the Preliminary Report (Startnotitie) which was the official end result of phase o of the PlaBeRum. At the end of the summer of 1998 the consortia discussed the Working Book together with representatives of the district council. At these extra meetings the district government decided to continue the project and de Stad bv organized a second round of Creative Competition.

The second round that ran from January–June 2000 was an improved participatory round that the district government initiated after two special committee meetings of the district government in which both participants and council had expressed the desire to continue working in this participatory fashion. This second round consisted of three deliberative meetings: the work-conferences (werkconferenties). I estimate that the number of participants averaged 40. This estimation is based on interviews and the minutes of these three meetings. The first work-conference was attended by 29 people; the second one was poorly attended and had probably less than 20 participants (Linthout, 1999-2001); the last conference was video-taped and was attended by 60-100 people (Stad bv, 2000). At the first work-conference, participants gathered the “hitches, potencies, and desires” in plenary sessions as well as in five workshops organized around five themes. The themes were: (1) sport; (2) life-line, which dealt with the connections between the park and the shopping and leisure area of the Amsterdam Arena; (3) living and working; (4) green issues, water, ecology; and (5) connections that dealt with traffic and transport to and through the park (Verslag te Werkconferentie 2000, 2000). These ateliers resembled deliberative venues; however, the experts’ input and the presentation of expert knowledge was central. Residents, mostly participants from the previous round of Creative Competition were involved as local experts.

At the second work-conference the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department presented the categorized, integrated and elaborated elements from the first work-conference.
Participants commented on this integration and deliberated about the research results again in five thematic ateliers. They explored possibilities and feasibilities for the park for each theme (VZ 24 Verslag 2e werkconferentie, 2000). At the last working-conference, the Bureau of Spatial Planning presented one integrating “concept” for the park and three “developmental models” (ontwikkelingsmodellen) (Verslag 3e werkconferentie, 2000).

So far I have sketched the context and scope of the participatory process Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark. Now I will present the results of a detailed analysis of critical moments of boundary work.

**BOUNDARY WORK IN THE FIRST STAGE OF CREATIVE COMPETITION**

In February and March 1998 the civil servants of the Southeast district, together with the consultant from de Stad bv and professor Teisman from Erasmus University, drafted a proposal for this participatory process. The drafting of the proposal is what I consider the first stage. In this stage only interactions between government and advisors took place. From these interactions I constructed a pattern of critical moments of boundary work. First, the consultant and the professor demarcated a “new” from a “normal” way of decision making to gain credibility for the deliberative governance discourse. Second, the civil servants acted as gatekeepers and they demarcated “normal” government discourse to re-enact its credibility. However, this also made the deliberative governance discourse more credible. In response, the advisors introduced a boundary concept, in this case “feasibility,” that transcended the boundaries that the advisors and the civil servants had demarcated. This concept enabled a coalition to emerge between the two discourses and, therefore, between the advisors and civil servants. The coalition facilitated continuation of the project.

**“Normal” versus “New”**

In the proposal to the district government, the consultant of de Stad bv described a process in which consortia of citizens and non-governmental organizations were to be formed around creative ideas for the park. Both in the proposal and in an extra document for elected officials, the external consultant and professor Teisman explained the method more profoundly. The advisors, both the consultant and the professor, conducted boundary work to define and to gain credibility for the approach. They contrasted a “new” way of working to a “normal” way of policy formation. The new way was intended to maintain diversity of ideas whereas the in the normal way, in which government develops a single feasible plan, the “diversity of solutions” is lost (T1 1 Teisman, 1998; Stad bv, 1998; B1 12, 1998; V1 18 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998).

The advisors argued that normal policy making procedures are not equipped for the more “complex policy issues caused by, among other things, European rules and regulations, developments in IT, more vocal citizens, and a crisis in presentation by political parties.” As we saw in the chapter on methods, I consider this type of blaming to be boundary work as well. It is a way to gain credibility for the new discourse. According to Teisman and Saris, there is a “multiplicity of problem definitions and of goal intertwinement” that allows for “a variety in problem definitions as well as in solutions” (Stad bv, 1998; B1 12, 1998). Other elements of the deliberative governance discourse that the advisors introduced in this first stage were “active involvement of citizens in consortia,” “competition between ideas,” “diversity of solutions,” “politicians as a jury,” and the “supportive role of the professional” (T1 1 Teisman, 1998; Stad bv, 1998; B1 12, 1998).

Hence, the external advisor and the professor argued against government discourse in the proposal. They demarcated “normal” policy making from the alternative they presented and they blamed changes in society for the failure or inefficiency of these normal procedures.

**Feasibility: fracture line or boundary concept?**

Civil servants and the elected officials of the district council did not accept all elements of the deliberative governance discourse. Two elements became subject to negotiations: the “consortia” and the “(open) planning procedure.” In addition, the civil servants, politicians and advisors discussed the meaning of “feasibility of plans.” In this first stage it was mostly two civil servants of the department of Spatial and Economic Development (Ruimtelijke en Economische Ontwikkeling) who protected the contested government discourse. They acted as a gatekeeper. In this initial stage, they attempted to keep the gate closed against what can be interpreted as an attempt by the advisors to accelerate the planning procedure, and they kept the gate closed for the advisors’ attempts to empower citizens.

In the draft proposal the advisors defined feasibility not only as “technically and financially” sound, but also as having “enough momentum” and “enough support of possible financiers” and “conforming to existing political conditions” (O1 Offerte, 1998). On top of that, the external advisor proposed that the consortia had to prove that their plans met these criteria of feasibility (O1 Offerte, 1998). This was a way to accelerate the planning procedure. The civil servants attempted to limit the creation of this type of feasibility in two ways.

First of all, the civil servants demanded the elimination of the section with the definition of feasible plans from the proposal. This was at the instigation of the responsible political member of the board of the district council that decided that the “acceleration” to develop “feasible” plans was not necessary (Interview-Verheijden, 2003; Interview-Hofstede, 2003). Or, as Verheijden stated in a fax to de Stad bv:

“The assignment is explicitly limited to the phase of a preliminary report. The next phases (2 and 3) probably will be conducted through the normal procedures with a project organization that, with help of the preliminary report, will produce the phase 2 product” (F1 Fax, 1998).

In this excerpt, the civil servant stressed that Creative Competition deviates from normal planning procedures. It should be restricted to the first exploratory phase of the PlaBeRum. The advisors did not contest this argument and accepted the deletion from the draft proposal.

Hence, this is a successful attempt of the civil servants to protect normal planning procedures that are part of government discourse. As a consequence, a change toward deliberative governance discourse was limited. However, this demarcation of the planning procedure also enabled a continuation of the experimental participatory planning process. The gatekeepers limited the experimental way of working to the first planning phase and this constrained and enabled a gaining of credibility for deliberative governance.
A second way by which the civil servants constrained a shift to deliberative governance discourse was by limiting the professionalism of the citizens’ plans. In the draft proposal the advisors spoke of “professional support” to make the designs “more feasible” (O 1 Offerte, 1998). The civil servants demanded elimination of this passage with the argument that this was not part of the first step in the formal planning procedure. Subsequently, they argued that “government is not able to support these groups to visualize or calculate the plans, and there is just a small amount available to finance professional support to these consortia” (V1 18/19 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998).

Besides the objections of the district politicians to accelerate to the second phase of the planning procedures, there was a second — perhaps the main — reason why the civil servants did not want to develop feasible plans. They were afraid that Bijlmerpark Naturally would “win” after all. In a meeting to discuss the proposal they argued that they “have to watch out that Bijlmerpark Naturally will not be the center of attention. They have good connections and are very professional” (V1 18/19 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998). In response, the advisors encouraged the civil servants to have all consortia work toward feasible plans. As the advisors argued, it is better to have all other groups develop similar professional and feasible plans as Bijlmerpark Naturally might have, than to have but one professional plan (V1 18/19 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998). As a result of this discussion, the civil servants and the advisors agreed to have the consortia develop feasible plans with support of professionals. They agreed that the consortia could “professionally visualize” the plans, with some financial resources for the consortia (II.3000,-) to cover the costs and to “attract experts.” The civil servants and the consultant were going to help the consortia make “connections with government and businesses,” for example, with financiers and project developers (V1 18/19 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998).

Hence, participants could interpret the feasibility concept in several ways. It was a professional visualization of the plans, but it might also be considered a financially feasible plan. The consultant and civil servants did not discuss the meaning of feasibility at length. This illustrates that the concept was no longer a fracture line concept. It was multi-interpretable and it enabled a transcending of boundaries between government discourse — enacted in this stage as the demarcation of the exploration phase in the planning procedures — and deliberative governance discourse — in this case, meaning to accelerate the planning procedure and build plans that are financially sound and feasible in phase 0 of the PlaBeRum. Moreover, in the deliberative governance discourse that the consultant introduced, citizens were considered to be producers of professional plans. They agreed that the consortia could “professionally visualize; the plans, but it might also be considered a financially feasible plan. The consultant and civil servants did not discuss the meaning of feasibility at length. This illustrates that the concept was no longer a fracture line concept. It was multi-interpretable and it enabled a transcending of boundaries between government discourse — enacted in this stage as the demarcation of the exploration phase in the planning procedures — and deliberative governance discourse — in this case, meaning to accelerate the planning procedure and build plans that are financially sound and feasible in phase 0 of the PlaBeRum. Moreover, in the deliberative governance discourse that the consultant introduced, citizens were considered to be producers of professional plans. They agreed that the consortia could “professionally visualize” the plans, with some financial resources for the consortia (II.3000,-) to cover the costs and to “attract experts.” The civil servants and the consultant were going to help the consortia make “connections with government and businesses,” for example, with financiers and project developers (V1 18/19 Bijeenkomst sdZO de Stad bv, 1998).

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Critical moments in stage one

When I interpret these initial instances of boundary work conducted in the first stage of the Creative Competition project, I have to conclude that this stage was not an enactment of deliberative governance discourse. Rather, it was an attempt of the consultant and professor to form a change coalition and convince civil servants and district governors of the credibility of this discourse. To do this, the advisors first demarcated elements of the deliberative governance discourse and introduced citizens’ participation in consortia that were to develop feasible plans. The gatekeepers of normal government discourse, the civil servants, immediately restricted this. In the second draft of the proposal the consultant added a second interpretation of feasibility: next to technical and financial feasibility, democratic feasibility might be sought. In the discussions between the advisors and civil servants, the feasibility concept first drew out the fracture lines. It made it evident that the gatekeepers insisted that the formal planning procedure should be followed, and that there would be no professional support to make the plans more feasible. With hindsight, these demarcations can be understood as an attempt of the civil servants to reenact government discourse and to make sure that citizens cannot make their plans feasible. If the citizens’ ideas were not feasible at the end of the Creative Competition, it would be easier for the district government to dismiss or ignore the consortia plans, or to argue that more steps needed to be taken to develop the plans into (financially and technically) feasible plans. However, in this first stage the feasibility concept became a boundary concept. The advisors and civil servants could interpret it in different ways. Feasibility meant professional visualization; it also meant financially feasible. The inclusion of financiers and project developers as members of the consortia opened the door for citizens to develop financially feasible plans. This multi-interpretability enabled the formation of a change coalition and allowed for a continuation of the project. At the same time it constrained how much change toward a deliberative governance discourse was realized.

Figure 3.1 below demonstrates what elements of government discourse and deliberative governance discourse the advisors and civil servants demarcated and transcended in this first stage of Creative Competition. This figure also demonstrates how the advisors defined deliberative governance discourse, and what elements of government discourses they wanted to disrupt.

Figure 3.1. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in first stage of Creative Competition

GOVERNMENT MEETS SOCIETY: BOUNDARY WORK IN THE SECOND STAGE

Between the 16th of April and the 9th of July 1998 the consultant and civil servants organized four public meetings. At these meetings, participants presented ideas, formed consortia, and further visualized and discussed their plans with professionals such as youth workers, coaches of team sports, school officials, and at the last meeting with elected officials of the district. In this section I present the results of an analysis of deliberations of government with society. I reconstructed a pattern of critical moments of boundary work in these deliberations.

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Demarcating citizens’ input from professionals

First of all, at the start of the meetings, especially at the first and second meetings, members of the change coalition demarcated the deliberative governance discourse from government discourse in a general way. For example, one of the civil servants stated that “this time we do not follow the normal trajectory” (V1 3 startbijeenkomst CCI, 1998). He did not explain what is normal and what was different, and the audience did not ask for an explanation. However, at all four public meetings, the consultant, politicians and civil servants did demarcate one specific element of deliberative governance discourse. The “input of citizens” had to be “central” (V1 2 verslag 2e bijeenkomst CCI, 1998). As the alderwoman explained, “professionals give support. Project developers or housing corporations can respond to ideas of citizens” (V1 2 verslag 2e bijeenkomst CCI, 1998). I interpreted this to mean that in government discourse input by citizens usually does not have the lead but that in this project it would have.

In response to this invitation at the first two meetings, the citizens did not immediately take their leading role for granted. For example, citizens expressed concern that their plans would not be able to compete with one professional plan that a landscape planning bureau already had developed for the park. It was only after the consultant promised that all citizens were going to be “provided with quality knowledge (kwaliteitskennis) to prevent unfair competition” (V1 3 startbijeenkomst CCI, 1998) that the citizens accepted this element of deliberative governance discourse.

I interpret the concept “quality knowledge” that the advisor introduced to be related to the boundary concept “feasibility” from the first stage. It was through this concept that civil servants, politicians, and other professionals were able to consider citizens as experts that drew up feasible plans.

Enactment of citizens as experts

After the first demarcations and citizens’ reflection on this element of deliberative governance discourse, participating citizens were convinced.105 They took up their new role and developed their ideas into plans.106 Most of the plans included the building of new houses in the park, with the exception of the design of Bijlmerpark Naturally.

At the third and fourth meeting the consultant no longer demarcated deliberative governance discourse. Participants also did not ask for explanation of the procedures and goals. Hence, for the time being, deliberative governance gained credibility. This is not only visible by the absence of contestation of the deliberative governance discourse, but also in content and process. First of all, the content: citizens developed their ideas further into designs that most often presented integrated ideas for the park. Most plans included ideas for sport facilities, leisure, nature, bike and foot paths, but also included housing and commerce. Some plans emphasized one of these themes but always integrated housing at least, and usually more functions as well. All plans included the building of new apartments, as this was a requirement, except for one: Bijlmerpark Naturally. In their initial plan Bijlmerpark Naturally reiterated their idea that a park should be kept just a park without any new housing. Although at the last meeting they had integrated some other functions, for example sports and culture, I could argue that, at least in content, they rejected the idea that housing and nature and environment needed to be combined in the plans.

Second, the process: all consortia accepted the deliberative governance discourse with regard to the procedures. They were ahead in the plan development and they asked for financial support. For example, the consortium of Bijlmerpark Naturally, with support of residents’ associations Kelbergen, Huntum, Hofgeest, and Hoogoord, wrote a letter in which they ask for 40,000 guilders to finance Copijn Landscaping (Tuin- en Landschapsarchitecten). The residents asked these professional landscapers “for a proposal for the facilitation of the further development of the vision for the Bijlmerpark” (B1 13 brief, 1998).107 One other participant also wrote a letter to the district in which he reflected on the first or second meeting and stated that he left the meeting reassured. “The irritation that I had so far with the former governors are hopefully in the past with this good initiative. One word of regret: it is ridiculous that the government does not have money to maintain a park of 34 hectares whereas the Vondelpark can spend several grants” (B1 16 brief, 1998).108 These responses and the fact that citizens continued to develop integrated plans indicate that citizens accepted their leading role. They had become part of the change coalition that was advocating the deliberative governance discourse. Even Bijlmerpark Naturally played with the possibilities offered in this process to convince others of their ideas. This can either be interpreted as strategic behavior of Bijlmerpark Naturally, who used this as a new channel to protest against building houses in the park, or it can also be understood as their adaptation to the deliberative governance discourse.

Boundary concept feasible plans

At the start of the third and fourth meeting, citizens’ input in the forefront, and politicians and professionals such as school teachers and youthworkers supported the consortia. At the third meeting, five members of the district council responded to the question of what they wanted to achieve with the new park. For example, a member of the labor party stated that “the Bijlmerpark is not functioning; it is isolated and is enclosed by avenues; . . . the park should become a well-used park”.109 In response to the same question a member of the Green Left argued that “we know that houses will be built in 1/3 of the park is going to be built for. The park should become a park again.”110 Finally, one of the politicians from a political party in the opposition, argued that “the park has to be multi-functional, building can be eliminated”111 (V1 1 verslag 3e bijeenkomst CCI, 1998).

As we can see, the responses of the political parties remained rather vague. They did not commit to one of the plans. They were divided about building houses in the park and they did not articulate what mattered most to their party in the redevelopment of this park.

The civil servants of the district also remained silent at this meeting. In hindsight I can interpret this abstaining from substantial comments as a non-vocal demarcation of normal government discourse in which politicians do listen to the public but do not engage in a deliberation. Such deliberations or debates are preserved for official committee meetings and the meetings of the council. This third meeting could have served as an occasion for the consortia to judge if they had included the necessary components for a feasible design in their plans. However, the politicians did not put this information on the table. Moreover, the elected members of the board of this council were in the process of making an estimate for the deliberation. All participants accepted this. Hence, if these politicians had given more information about their preferences, the consortia could have used this third meeting to improve their plans and to make them more convincing to the politicians. Instead, the politicians only listened. As a result deliberations about the central conflict of houses versus trees in the park were avoided.
In contrast to the politicians, professionals from the area did respond to the plans with demarcations of their own subdiscourses. These professionals were more overt on what needed to be included in the citizens’ plans to get their support. For example, the youth-worker was impressed by “etnoville” but added that “youngsters should be involved in the further development of the plan” (V1 verslag 3e bijeenkomst CCI, 1998). Another example is that the Environmental Department (Milieudiensten) argued that “the most important environmental problem, the traffic on the Gooiseweg” should not be forgotten (V1 verslag 3e bijeenkomst CCI, 1998). Both are examples of suggestions to improve the plans in ways that would gain support of these professionals. It gave citizens the chance to argue why and how these issues are, or are not, being addressed in the plans. Thus, at the third meeting, it appeared as though the deliberative governance discourse was enacted. Politicians and professionals were to present their preferences as suggestions to improve the political and professional feasibility of the plans. However, the interesting contradiction was that the political parties remained vague and did not demarcate their political subdiscourse at this meeting at which they re-enacted government discourse. Other professionals did demarcate their subdiscourse and thus engaged in deliberations and enacted deliberative governance discourse.

Feasible plan as a fracture line concept

The consultant organized the fourth and last public meeting in a huge tent at the Kwakheuvel 1998. At this meeting the consortia presented six final plans. All consortia, including Bijlmerpark Naturally, worked toward an integrated concept for the park. In their presentation Bijlmerpark Naturally demonstrated that they had listened to suggestions to make their plan more feasible and they “included more functions in the park design” and stressed that their plan aimed at a “safer” (veilig) park. Still, they did not include any housing (V1 20, 1998). The consortium that developed the “Mixed Plan” (Mengplan) divided the park and redeveloped one part into a residential area and the other part into a park. They paid attention to the connection with the shopping center and to a connection to the national ecological main structure [Ecologische Hoofdstructuur] that aimed to connect all varieties of green spaces in the Netherlands. “Tivoli” was the plan designed as a multi-cultural park. This concept was linked to the multi-cultural background of the residents in this area. Just as in the Bijlmerpark Naturally—plan, no housing was provided. A fourth plan was that of Stonfutu, a group of Surinam women connected to Belliot, the alderwoman of the labor party. Their plan was not developed into a three dimensional model but it included apartments being built. The fifth plan that a consortium presented was a plan to turn parts of the park into water and have house-boats on the water. Finally, the sport-consortium created a park with sports as the main theme: “Sports not only for teams and clubs, but also for individual athletes” (V1 20, 1998). (See attachment 3.5 for an overview of the plans). In their plans and presentation, all consortia addressed the political conditions and policy issues that the district council formulated at the start of the project, and that professionals stressed at the third meeting. The consortia presented “feasible” plans.

In a response to the presentations, the politicians turned their silent enactment of government discourse of the previous meeting into a vocal demarcation of government discourse. The elected officials proposed to combine the plans of the citizens into ONE plan. They did not choose one of the plans. As the Greens (de Groenen) argued, “all plans have something beautiful. A combination might be the best” (V1 20, 1998). Or, as Green Left (Groen Links) said, “we would like to ‘complete the initiatives.’ Green Left will pay attention to the environmental issues. The park should be maintained in the shape of a compromise” (V1 20, 1998). Subsequently, in their response, a second element of normal government discourse was enacted by some of the politicians: financial and technical feasibility. Or as one of the alderman of the district argued, “we first have to calculate if something like that [an association for park-maintenance] is financially feasible” (V1 20, 1998). At this last meeting, politicians and civil servants put government discourse back in place.

However, participants also re-enacted two elements of the deliberative governance discourse: citizens’ participation and the inclusion of thinking about park maintenance in the development of the park. At the fourth meeting, politicians expressed their appreciation for the citizens’ input; for example, the political party Livable Southeast (Leefbaar Zuidoost) said, “Tonight it has become clear that citizens are well equipped to deliver plans” (V1 20, 1998). Most of the elected officials including, as we have seen, an alderman of the Southeast district and the civil servants from the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department, appreciated the proposed solutions to reduce the costs and to optimize park maintenance in a public-private “maintenance association” (beheersmaatschappij). As the alderman of the central city argued: “The solutions brought forward in the plans, for example park management and a connection of investments to park maintenance, are, in themselves, fine,” even though he claimed that the financial feasibility had to be calculated (V1 20, 1998). Or, as one of the people in the audience suggested, “I am in favor of a maintenance association that combines the plans of the consortia, and in which the district council as well as the consortia participate” (V1 20, 1998). These suggestions show appreciation for one element of the deliberal governance discourse that combines park development and maintenance in the renewal of the park. In formal planning procedures these two are usually separated. Moreover, government is usually responsible for the park development and maintenance. The suggestion to have government share financial responsibility with the consortia is an enactment of deliberative governance discourse. In the improvised transference from the results of the participatory part to the formal decision-making settings of the district-council the district government and consultant maintained this change in government discourse (see below).

Critical moments in deliberations between government and society

The pattern of critical moments of boundary work in deliberations between government and society was as follows: first the change coalition demarcated the element of deliberative governance discourse, “citizens’ input,” from the element of government discourse, “professional input.” Second, citizens contested, reflected upon, and then accepted this demarcation and indeed, they drafted designs for the park. I interpreted these plans in themselves to be a boundary concept that participants interpreted from their subdiscourses, for example, a sports discourse, an environmental discourse, and so on. Third, the professional planners, teachers and community workers tested the plans. At this critical moment politicians at first did not engage in the deliberations and consortia did not receive information that would have enabled them to make their plans more feasible. The district politicians silently re-enacted government discourse. Professionals did engage in the deliberation and this helped the consortia to make the plans more feasible. At the last meeting, the district politicians vocally demarcated two elements of government discourse. They argued that it is only professional experts that can determine what a
feasible plan is, and they wanted one feasible plan to be further developed by professionals. The participants and the advisors accepted these demarcations of government discourse.

At the same time the politicians expressed their desire to continue citizens’ participation, and to investigate the possibility of a public/private partnership (ppp) that included park maintenance in the park development.

To conclude: in the deliberations between government and society feasibility was a boundary concept that participants interpreted in different ways. First, the change coalition interpreted it as democratic, financial and technical feasibility that was to be established by experts, politicians and citizens; then it became feasibility that citizens with support of experts might be able to produce; and in the last meeting the elected officials defined feasibility again as something only experts could provide. This last interpretation demoted the active citizens to passive onlookers according to government discourse: they should be heard but their input can be dismissed because they are not experts. Figure 3.2 summarizes what elements of government discourse and deliberative governance discourse participants enacted in the second stage of Creative Competition.

Figure 3.2. Elements of government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as enacted in the second stage of Creative Competition

IMPROVISING THE TRANSFER FROM THE EXPERIMENT TO FORMAL DECISION-MAKING

After these public meetings, the consultant, with support of the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department, bundled the consortia plans into a Working Document (Werkboek). They redeveloped this into a “Catalogue” which is a format professional planners also use. In the catalogue, the urban planners and the consultant teased out similarities and differences in the consortia plans. In this way the results from the public meetings were “filtered” before they were absorbed in the normal and formal planning procedure (Edelenbos, 2001, p. 351).

Participants discussed the catalogue at a public meeting at the end of August, 1998. After this meeting, de Stad bv turned it into a Preliminary Report (Startmootie) that included procedural proposals for the following planning step. In January, 1999, the Preliminary Report was discussed in two extra district council committee meetings. All members of the district council and over 60 interested parties and consortia members discussed this Preliminary Report (Uit1 1, 1999). At both meetings criteria for one plan were established and an agenda for the following planning stages was agreed upon. The following criteria were formulated: water quality, nuisances, connection to Gaasperplas, division of park into different areas, building, lifeline, connections. Some of these criteria would need further research. The committee of spatial planning made some adaptations and advised the council to commence with the next planning phase (V1 4, 1999; V1 5, 1999). This final Preliminary Report was the formal result of this step in the planning procedure.

On the 15th of June the district council decided to continue the planning process. At this meeting, the district council decided that 1/3rd of the park be destined for sports, 1/3rd for housing, and 1/3rd for renovation of the park. They also decided that the participatory approach had to be continued in the next step of the formal planning procedure: the drafting of a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten). They also agreed to explore the possibility of erecting a public-private association for the maintenance of the park.

As we will see, in this transition period government discourse and deliberative governance discourse co-existed. They were not integrated or aligned in boundary concepts. In the formal procedures government discourse prevailed, and in the interactions with citizens, the consultant, civil servants and politicians enacted deliberative governance discourse.

In the transference from one formal planning phase to the other, deliberations between government and society continued in improvised participatory settings, except for the district council meeting at which the council made a formal decision.

Demarcating government discourse: one expert plan

Government discourse and deliberative governance discourse co-existed in this transition. Uncontested elements of the government discourse were, for example: the Working Document, the Catalogue that was turned into a Preliminary Report. Moreover, the formal procedures were also followed for committee meetings that advise a district council and for the district council that makes decisions. At the same time the consultants, civil servants, politicians and citizens enacted the following elements of deliberative governance discourse: the input of citizens was continued in one public meeting at the end of August and two extra committee meetings in January and February, 1999. A quote from a public meeting in August illustrates this co-existence of government and deliberative governance discourse:

“The meeting ends by concluding that the decision-making process is not so different from what used to be normal (gangbaar); the only difference is that hearings are organized in an alternative revolutionary approach” (V1 21, 1998).

Another example of the co-existence of discourses comes from one of the two extra meetings in January and February. The alderwoman who was responsible for Creative Competition demarcated government discourse. She claimed that the district council “take over this proposal of the external adviser not necessarily” (V1 4, 1999). She also emphasized that “the plans have to be explored and we [the council. (TM)] have to chose what we think is the best plan” (V1 4, 1999). She demarcated government’s formal responsibility and she insisted on combining the plans. This became more evident at the second extra meeting in February when her party, the Labor Party, concluded that “Stonfutu’s plan, of what should be where, will be combined with routes (the connections through the park), and sport” (V1 4, 1999).

Whereas political parties agreed with the demarcation of government discourse, some citizens contested it. Some of them rejected the decision of the district council to combine the consortia plans into one feasible plan. For example, at the first extra public meeting, the designers of Tivoli withdrew their plan. They disagreed with the production of one plan.
and did not want their plan "to be split up" (gesplit worden) (V1 21, 1998). However, this contestation of government discourse had no consequences for the planning process. Government discourse remained dominant.

At the second meeting, the district council was no longer to choose one out of five plans. Participants discussed elements of the five plans (V1 4, 1999). Moreover, the district council wanted to have planning experts explore the technical and financial feasibility of these elements further. Even though, the consortia attempted to maintain their lead and offered to further investigate the "feasibility and controllability" of their plan, the council decided that it "wants to use the specific knowledge of each consortium but does not want to give up control of the overview" (het geheel uit handen geven) (V1 5, 1999). The council decided that "we have to start working more professionally with the help of expert support — for example, the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department that is able to conduct good studies" (V1 5, 1999) (my emphasis). I interpret the addition of "more" to "professional" as the district council’s interpretation of the participatory process as non-professional. As had been the case at the end of the four public meetings of the participatory round, the politicians demarcated the citizens’ input from that of experts. They rejected the possibility that the consortia could produce professional and feasible plans. This indicates that the drafting of one (feasible) plan still was part of dominant discourse. The district council as well as the consultant, the civil servants and citizens abandoned the governance element of "diversity of plans".

Demarcating deliberative governance discourse: citizens’ participation and PPP-park maintenance

In this transition period, the members of the district council, the advisors and citizens also enacted an element of deliberative governance discourse. At one of the meetings the district council claimed they wanted the "alternative revolutionary" (revolutionair andere) approach of citizens’ participation to be continued (V1 4, 1999). And the council also concluded that they "have to think of a construction in which the consortia and residents can participate alongside the district government and experts" (V1 5, 1999). The district council made a commitment to a continuation of the participatory approach.

In the period after the extra committee meetings two things happened that supported this commitment. First, the civil servants of the district generated extra money for the participatory project from two national programs: Stimulation of Experiments with Housing (Stimulering Experimenten Volkshuisvesting) and Stimulation of Intensive Land Use (Stimulering Intensief Ruimtegebruik). Second, the report on the results of the two extra meetings (Uitkomsten) included a proposal to continue the participatory approach. The district government was going to include citizens advice as a sounding board (klankbordgroep) (Uit 1, 1999).

This proposal was made public in two formal hearings (17 and 27 of May 1999). The first public hearing was organized to provide information and seven residents attended this meeting (V1 22, 1999). At the second public hearing, ten people asked for official time to comment on the proposal. It was at this meeting that participants reflected on the first round of Creative Competition and especially on the proposal to further explore the feasibility of the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark into "a park of the 21st century, intensively used, surrounded by urban areas, with inviting safe and logical routes that connect the park to its surroundings" (Uit 1, 1999). Neither the civil servants nor politicians engaged in this conversation. At this meeting, Stichting Bijlmerpark Naturally pointed out that they had been involved in the maintenance of the park for several years. They argued that they were "surprised that groups participated that had never been heard of and that had never demonstrated any interest in the park" (V1 23, 1999). In a reply, one of the Stonfutu members (Dhr. Frerichs) argued that he earned his degree in 1990 from the Delft Technical University based on a plan that was called “Bijlmerdreef, boulevard of broken dreams.” The Bijlmerpark was part of this plan. “It is this plan that Stonfutu further developed” (V1 23, 1999). He also argued that Bijlmerpark Naturally insisted on redevelopment of the complete area into a park, and that therefore a coalition between Bijlmerpark Natuurlijk and Stonfutu had been impossible (V1 23, 1999). Unfortunately, from the minutes of these meetings, I cannot conclude what the results of this conversation among participants were, nor how this discussion was reflected upon by council members. I can conclude that the advisor, in response, offered a way in which consortia participants could continue their participation. In this second round of Creative Competition they were no longer artistic designers but actors with local expertise. Their knowledge and expertise should be acknowledged (V1 23, 1999).

In December 1999 the district council gave the consultant the assignment for a second round of Creative Competition. This was right after the Ministry of Housing assigned the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark as an exemplary project (voorbeeldstatus). This second round had to result in a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten).

Critical moments of boundary work in the transition period

The transition period in itself was a critical moment of boundary work at which the struggle between government discourse and deliberative governance discourse continued. The two discourses co-existed. Government discourse about the steps in the planning procedures was dominant. The consultant felt the need to express that nothing really different was done. At the same time, the district council, the consultant and citizens enacted deliberative governance discourse when they concluded that citizens’ participation and public/private partnership in the maintenance of the park was to be continued. Moreover, the citizens should remain included as local experts to create feasible plans. This last element was stressed by the advisor and confirmed by several politicians. To think of the consortia as experts enabled their participation in the production of professional plans. Figure 3.3 summarizes the two elements of deliberative governance discourse that remained credible in the transition period.

Figure 3.3. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in transition stage of Creative Competition.
BOUNDARY WORK IN THE FORMULATION OF A PROPOSAL: PART II

After the transition period, the consultant was assigned to draft a second proposal. In a memo the civil servant suggested that the project:

"continue in this spirit [...] I also propose to ask that bureau Stad bv hire a black projectmanager"129 who, as an employee of this bureau, can manage the process. I recommend planner H.J." (N1 6, 1999).130

In this same memo, the civil servant also proposed to ask the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department "to take care of the urban planning part" (N1 6, 1999).131 The consultant included these ideas. In early December 1999 the district council discussed a draft proposal by de Stad bv. In addition, the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department drafted a proposal. The consultants from de Stad bv wrote a proposal for the production of a "Plan of Conduct" (plan van aanpak); the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department drafted a proposal for a "Draft List of Guidelines" (ontwerp Nota van Uitgangspunten) as a part of the Plan of Conduct.

Demarcating deliberative governance discourse: a strategy not a plan

An analysis of boundary work in the interactions between government and the consultant demonstrated that one element of the deliberative governance discourse was lost: both proposals no longer included the production of a variety of plans. The objective of the second round was "creativity and commitment of experts and stakeholders to the chosen themes" (O2, 1999).132 The consultant and the planners from the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department re-introduced deliberative governance discourse when they proposed to produce a "strategy." In this step, rather than the production of a blueprint, experts and citizens were to develop a strategy "for the transformation of the park into a city-park" (O2, 1999).133 The consultant explained how the components of this strategy in a Plan of Conduct made it different from the normal planning procedure that had to result in a List of Guidelines:

"This alteration of the name represents movement at three points [...] the ambition to give the park an additional benefit that is of taking into account the culture, the emancipation and the perspective of the Bijlmer residents. Secondly, an acceleration of the redevelopment [...]. Last but not least, the Plan of Conduct will contain proposals for a developmental structure that intertwines the wishes and the competences of the variety of parties, the district council, and the external parties" (O2, 1999).134

The Amsterdam Urban Planning Department also included the idea of developing a strategy in their proposal. It said: "the List of Guidelines design is not an urban plan but more a developmental strategy, a document that points out the most essential choices and possibilities" (O2-2, 2000).135

Multi-interpretable citizens’ participation

The consultant and the planners in their proposals interpreted citizens’ participation differently. The consultant wanted to include citizens’ local knowledge in the research of the urban planners, and in the production of a Plan of Conduct. The Amsterdam Urban Planning Department proposed to separate the two. They wanted to produce a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten) separate from citizens’ participation. They also separated decisionmaking over the two plans: "the council first has to decide on the List of Guidelines before it is included in the Plan of Conduct" (O2-2, 2000).136 Both proposals for the next round of Creative Competition blurred what role citizens were to play in this second round. As we will see below, this blurring was continued at the second and third meeting, and participants contested it more severely at each meeting.

Protecting government discourse: committees and manager

This time the civil servants did not alter the proposed changes to the formal planning procedures. However, the civil servants did put in place the guardian of government discourse. They erected a steering committee137 and a project group of civil servants (ambtelijke begeleidingscommissie). Moreover, they attempted to instruct the project manager that the formal planning procedures had to be followed. As this manager explained in an interview, "The civil servants stressed that they needed a plan that fitted in the Plaberum-process" (Interview-Lutchman, 2004).138 According to this projectmanager, "The two civil servants of the district department of spatial and economic development talked to me about this point for two hours. They explained it to me. The Plaberum was inherited from the previous chair of the district and had to be honored" (Interview-Lutchman, 2004).139 The civil servants attempted to protect government discourse with the help of a steering committee project team and by having the project manager protect the formal planning procedures. Subsequently, the civil servants started regular meetings between the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department and the project group (E MZ-2, 2000). This reinforced a separation of the professional planners’ trajectory and the participatory trajectory.

Critical moments in drafting a second proposal

In comparison to the first proposal for the first round of Creative Competition, few critical moments of boundary work took place in the drafting of the proposals for the second round. The civil servants and district government accepted the intention to produce a Plan of Conduct. Moreover, they agreed that citizens’ desires and local knowledge were to be included in this second round of Creative Competition. At the start of the second round of Creative Competition the concepts of strategy and expertise were multi-interpretable (see figure 3.4.). However, the civil servants put in place a steering committee project team and instructed the project leader as gate keepers of government discourse.

![Figure 3.4. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) at the start of Creative Competition part II](image)

GOVERNMENT MEETS SOCIETY, PART II

The consultancy firm that convened the first round of Creative Competition also convened and facilitated the second round. They hired a black project manager to facilitate the
participation of citizens. The white project leader convened the meetings between the 
experts from the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department and the citizens. In this second 
round, no longer were the citizens in the lead. However, their local expertise had to be 
integrated with expert knowledge of the Planning Department. The consultants organized 
three tracks: a programmatic track, which meant discussions about what facilities and 
functions should be included in the park; research on land use; and a track in which “in 
a meeting of residents, researchers and experts, the results of land use research and the 
programmatic developments confront one another” (O2, 1999).

The consultants, together with the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department, organized 
three working conferences. At the first meeting participants explored citizens’ desires. 
These were gathered both in plenary sessions and in five workshops as well (Verslag 1e 
Werkconferentie 2000, 2000). At the second meeting professional experts and local experts 
tested the feasibility of these desires. At this meeting, the Amsterdam Urban Planning 
Department first presented the research results. Then citizens and experts discussed these 
results in five thematic ateliers (V2 24 Verslag 2e werkconferentie, 2000). At the last 
meeting, the goal was to integrate the desires and the research results. At this conference, 
the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department first presented one integrated “concept” 
for the park that combined all themes, and three possible PPP “developmental models” 
(ontwikkelingsmodellen) for the Bijlmerpark (Verslag 3e werkconferentie, 2000). These 
were to be discussed in workshops. However, these workshops never took place, as the 
concept and developmental models caused conflict among participants. Below I present 
the results of the analysis of boundary work at these three meetings.

**Boundary concepts: professional plans and expertise**

At the first public meeting on the 20th of January, the consultant and the alderwoman 
stressed that this round had to result in “financially feasible” (financieel haalbare) and 
“professionally designed” (professioneel ontworpen) plans (V2 0, 2000). The alderwoman 
argued, “The process is getting more complex. There will be more parties involved: 
professionals of the central city that will conduct research, and the district council will 
be more important. Furthermore, the financial picture will be upfront” (V2 0, 2000).109 The 
citizens were no longer in the lead. The consultant argued that “the professionals are more 
important. The council makes decisions. However, the residents will be upfront as they are 
the future users of the park” (V2 0, 2000).110 The consultant and the alderwoman sent a 
mixed message in their introduction: the urban planners will be more important, but the 
residents are still important. As had been the case in the transition period, government 
and deliberative governance discourse co-existed.

In response, the citizens contested their diminished role. A conversation in which citizens, 
the consultant and the district government reflected on what would happen in the next 
step evolved. In this reflective conversation the two discourses continued to co-exist. For 
example, one participant asked if “the tempo is not too high?” (V2 0, 2000).111 The answer 
was that “the audience in this round does not have to do much” (V2 0, 2000).112 Not much 
later in the conversation, another participant asked, “Will there only be professionals 
attending the work-ateliers?”113 The planners from the Amsterdam Urban Planning 
Department answered that they “know [that] private people are very knowledgeable” and 
they want to “use this knowledge” (V2 0, 2000).114 Hence, participants interpreted “professional plans” in a variety of ways. From a 
government discourse the alderwoman argued that professional planners would be more 
important to develop a professional and feasible plan. But, the Amsterdam Planning 
Department argued that citizens are knowledgeable and that their knowledge will be used 
also. As a result of this reflective conversation about a professional plan, citizens were 
invited to the workshops and the following work-conference as “external experts” (V2 0, 2000). However, the concepts of experts and expertise remained multi-interpretable. 
For example, on the 3rd of February 2000 the first conference was organized. At this 
meeting the participants actively gathered dreams and desires for the park. To convince 
participants that their contribution was valuable, the consultant argued that the Urban 
Planning Department “will take care of expert input by designers to integrate the desires 
and interests. [...] Residents, who are future users of the park and who have the most 
expertise, are cordially invited to participate in [two] work-ateliers” (V2 1, 2000).115 At 
the same meeting, the Amsterdam Planning Department presented four artistic designs 
for the park that were not related to any of the plans produced by the consortia in the 
first round. Subsequently, the planners presented themes that had been distilled from 
the citizens’ plans. But these were not explicitly connected to the consortia plans (V2 1, 
2000). It was only in one of the subgroups that a professional planner mentioned the 
consortia plans. In all other subgroups, new desires of citizens and professionals, all 
of whom were experts, were gathered (V2 1, 2000). By acting in this way, the planners 
presented themselves as the leading experts of this round so they could dismiss all expert 
knowledge gathered before.

In the course of the project, the concept of expertise remained multi-interpretable. 
However, gradually the expertise of the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department became 
more dominant. At a second working conference they presented models for the park 
that they developed based on thematic workshops.116 These workshops in themselves are 
multi-interpretable as “expert” meetings, since planners and government listen to citizens 
because they are “knowledgeable” but at the same time the planners do not have to include 
citizens’ expertise in their plans. The planners — and government — remain the ones to 
decide what should or should not be included in the plans. This led to a conflict at the last 
public meeting.

**Professional plan and expertise as fracture-line concepts**

A couple of weeks after the thematic work-ateliers, the consultant organized a second 
public work-conference. This work-conference was poorly attended. Because of this, 
one of the district council members proposed to postpone this meeting (V2 23, 2000). A 
cartoon attached to the minutes of the conference illustrates this: a citizen asks where are 
the people? (V2 23, 2000). The suggestion to postpone was not followed. The consultant 
replied that “attendance up till now has been very good, and today there is a slight increase” 
(V2 23, 2000).117 One of the residents also argued that “the people who showed up cannot 
be sent home” (V2 23, 2000).118 The work-conference continued. An expert planner from 
the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department kicked off and presented the three models 
(Island, Strip and Ring-model). The planner stressed that these three models are not the 
final plan “Comments are welcome” (V2 23, 2000).119 Subsequently, participants of the 
thematic work-ateliers presented benefits and disadvantages of each of the three models 
(V2 23, 2000). This facilitated the discussion on the three models, and included other 
professionals and citizens in the deliberation. To enhance this deliberation the consultant
informed the participants once more that they do not “have to chose a model” but that their comments were to be integrated in the models before the last work-conference (V2 23, 2000).

The minutes of the conference consist mostly of the results of the meeting and not so much of the deliberations. They include the dilemmas the thematic groups presented, and critique of the three models in cartoons. These cartoons express the concerns of participants and some of their ideas: should there be more levels in the park; should there be more than one “island,” for example, a variety of sports islands; was there enough coherence in the ring-model; should there be a tower in the park; are there too many utilities being pressed into the park; are there enough trees left to look like a park (V2 23, 2000)? As these cartoons were the only expression of the deliberations I had access to, I can only guess what type of conversation evolved.

However, with hindsight I can conclude at least one thing: a fracture line between expert planners and the participating citizens had evolved. Expertise no longer was a boundary concept that connected them, but it illuminated the fracture lines between governance and government discourse. Moreover, government discourse won for the time being, and participants considered the professionals’ expertise more credible. I can conclude this for several reasons.

First of all, I understand the small number of participants to be an indication that they had not been convinced by the organizers claim of citizens’ inclusion as local experts. Second, even though the consultant encouraged participants to give comments, to criticize and to present ideas, the meeting continued to resemble the settings of public hearings. A work-conference would have meant a re-enactment of citizens as experts and a mutual search for models, and thus “ownership” (Bruin, 1998) for the models. This did not take place. A third reason to conclude expertise turned into a fracture line concept is that citizens started to act as opposing rather than cooperating participants. They also found other channels to express their concerns. This happened for the first time after the second work-conference. On the 17th of May one of the residents that had been actively involved as a facilitator in the previous meeting, was quoted in a newspaper article: “The next time I will participate, but then as a resident of the Bijlmermeer. It is my park. I do not want to be associated with the bad public hearing procedures” (Echo, 2000b). The chair of the district government was also quoted. She acknowledged that “this is a rather abstract story with technical concepts. I can understand that people get itchy about those [concepts], when it appears that they are not being involved” (Echo, 2000b). She did the opposite of what the project leader had attempted to do before: she did not approach citizens as experts but as lay-people that have difficulties in understanding what is going on. For the first time, she demarcated experts’ technical concepts and blamed those for the impossibility of satisfactory citizens’ participation.

A fourth reason to speak of a fracture line “expertise” concept is that it appeared to be difficult for the urban planners to combine the different types of expertise in the models. They had a hard time demonstrating how the consortia plans from the previous round were included in these models. They had been included as unintegrated themes. Fifth, the minutes of the meetings indicate that the planners’ expertise had become the dominant interpretation of the expertise concept. The minutes did include the criticism of participants on the expert models, but only in the form of cartoons. This can be understood as a reproduction of dominant government discourse in which criticism of these models could only been included with the help of the use of humor and irony (Forester, 2004; Eisterhold et al., 2006). The cartoons made it possible to express and include critical remarks without entering a conflict. At this point this enabled a continuation of the second part of Creative Competition. At this second meeting the integration of three tracks — research, programmatic work and citizens’ participation — in the boundary concept “expertise” started to fall apart. This continued at the last work-conference that turned into a conflict in which governmental actors and planners together were the winners. Government discourse regained its dominance.

Dominant government discourse: professionals’ expertise

The last work conference of round two of Creative Competition took place on the 25th of May. At this conference the urban planners presented the integration of three models. According to the chair of the district government these were “equally important” (even belangrijk) (V2-26, 2000b). The Planning Department developed three plans for the Bijlmerpark with additional “preferences and dilemmas”(VO2-1, 2000). The district council had to chose from these three plans (VO2-1, 2000). At this last public meeting, many people participated. Among them were many concerned citizens who had not participated before and who had been activated by the former project manager, Lutchen, and by organized citizens’ groups.

At the meeting the consultant explained that the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department was first going to present the three models. Second, the participants would comment on these models in subgroups and one of the questions to be answered would be if participants still recognized their own ideas in these models (V2 24, 2000). After the urban planners presented the three models, some of the participants started to protest that they did not recognize their own plans. As one of the participants stated, “What is left of our wishes?” Another participant said, “We do not recognize our input.” Yet another participant argued “The DRO keeps saying ‘we believe’ “ (V2 24, 2000). The consultant answered that they had listened and learned from the citizens’ input. The project leader attempted to let the planner finish his presentation. The planner started to demarcate his professional planning subdiscourse to gain credibility for his presentation and argued that they had “analyzed” all the input and eleven dilemmas were the results of this analysis (Video Bijlmerpark, 2000).

At this crucial moment in the process, the planner acted as a technocrat and gained credibility for the departments’ arguments in references to professional expertise and method. The project leader contributed to this demarcation by not addressing the criticism of participants immediately. Citizens contested this demarcation in several ways. First of all, they started to criticize the procedures of the project and the project leader. One participant referred to a newspaper article on a similar project in Amsterdam-Noord that claimed that this project had a “neo-liberal approach, appears to be participatory but in reality everything is directed and decided up front. The top-dogs weigh and advise” (Video Bijlmerpark, 2000; V2 24, 2000).
Second, participants demanded more inclusion of citizens’ ideas in the models. One participant attempted to gain support for this claim by enacting an element of deliberative governance discourse by considering the citizens as the experts. The videotape of this meeting demonstrates that this woman was almost screaming that “her expertise as a citizen is not being respected” (Video Bijlmerpark, 2000).

In response to this, the alderwoman drew on normal government discourse to calm down the audience, and to gain credibility for the plans. She said, “I have to admit, I do not see our scenarios reflected in the models. But, that is your stupidity and mine” (Video Bijlmerpark, 2000). Moreover, she argued that “these models are not the definitive version. You should not have sleepless nights over the Bijlmerpark, where you should dream. The type of housing is not yet decided, but that houses will be built is. [...] Saris does not have the last say, it is the council that decides. Keep faith” (Echo, 2000a).

At this critical moment, the alderwoman could have demarcated differently, and could have adopted elements of the new deliberative governance discourse: for example, she could have claimed that the expertise of citizens had indeed not been respected in the plans. Instead, she enacted elements of dominant government discourse in which experts produce professional plans and the council decides on building in the park. Moreover, she blamed the project leader. Participants accepted this enactment of government discourse and applauded. The local newspaper Echo wrote on the front page: “Hannah Belliot saves the evening: Bijlmer residents critical of work-conference renewal of the Bijlmerpark” (Echo, 2000a). In this article it was also emphasized that the presentations of the experts had been too technical, “so that hardly anyone could still understand what it was all about” (Echo, 2000a). By the end of this last work-conference participants enacted government discourse: professional planners in a coalition with the council should determine what will happen to the park.

**Dominant government discourse: a plan, not a strategy**

In the aftermath of this public meeting, on the fifth of June the steering committee evaluated what went wrong and decided how to continue with the process (V2 sq., 2000). The alderwoman of the Labor Party as well as the consultant attempted to control the damage. A continuation of the participatory approach was out of the question. At this meeting it was decided that the consultant was to contact the consortia to talk to them bilaterally. Special attention needed to be paid to the residents that live at the fringes of the park (V2 sq., 2000). Moreover, the consultant finalized a Plan of Conduct (Plan van Aanpak).

When the consultant presented the Plan of Conduct, a new head of the district department of Spatial and Economic Development argued that this did not resemble a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten). The consultant had not fulfilled the assignment to come up with a product for the second step of the formal PlaBeRum. The department demarcated an element of government discourse: the formal planning procedures. In a response to the new head of the district department the consultant defended this Plan of Conduct. He wrote: “The trajectory has been discussed with you. For months you knew the examples that would justify the denial of the label ‘List of Guidelines’ (Nota van Uitgangspunten) according to the PlaBeRum” (B3, 2001).

The district government attempted to not pay the external advisor based on the argument that the Plan of Conduct failed as it did not fit the formal planning procedures. The consultant kept referring to the steering committee as a co-responsible party, and to the expertise of outside professionals that had argued this plan could be used as a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten). The district government decided to further develop the Plan of Conduct internally.

Early in 2001 civil servants discussed the three models (V3 2, 2001) and decided that elements of these models should be put together as the “program did not fit” (V3 2, 2001). This meant that the functions of the park were not put in the right place, or not put in place at all, according to the civil servants. The civil servants argued that “sports do not belong in a park” and that “sports should be north of the park and not in the south.” Moreover, one of them argued that the ambition should not be to develop a city park but to develop a sports park (V3 2, 2001). As a result of these discussions, the district government decided to write a ‘Final Plan of Conduct’ which was used as a condition in a competition between three urban designers. The district government enacted their government discourse. No more participation and deliberation was asked for outside normal public hearings.

**Critical moments in the second round of Creative Competition**

I constructed a pattern of critical moments of boundary work in the deliberations between government and society in this second round of Creative Competition. A first moment was the drafting of a proposal in which the consultant introduced a ‘strategy’ rather than a plan. Moreover, the consultant and others proposed to include the expert knowledge of citizens. They were to be considered the experts. Civil servants and politicians accepted these elements of deliberative governance discourse. Both “strategy” and “expertise” functioned as boundary concepts that enabled the continuation of the project. Both concepts were interpreted in two ways.

The district government and the local planners interpreted expertise as their professional planning expertise, and citizens’ contributions as desires and interests. The consultant interpreted citizens’ expertise as valuable knowledge of equal importance to the planners’ expertise. A similar difference in interpretation by the district government and the planners on one hand and that of the consultant occurred in the case of the “strategy” concept. The district government and the planners from the Amsterdam Urban Planning Department interpreted it to consist of three separate tracks: a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten), a participatory process, and a track in which government and project developers would explore possible public/private partnership. The consultant considered the Plan of Conduct to integrate the three tracks. The participatory process would be the place to integrate the three tracks and thus the three types of knowledge. This blurring enabled the start of the second phase of Creative Competition.

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3. Boundary work in the Bijlmerpark: contested feasibility and expertise

At a second critical moment, these different interpretations became eminent when at the deliberative meetings and at the end of the project, the boundary concept “expertise” and “strategy” became fracture line concepts. Even though the civil servants had acted as gatekeepers and protected the formal planning procedures through the instigation of a steering committee, and by instructing the new black project leader, they still needed to come forward with their interpretation of the concepts. At the end of the last public meeting, the alderwoman demarcated professionals’ knowledge from citizens’ stupidity. The audience accepted this demarcation, since she also blamed the consultant for the bad plans that included housing.

With regard to the “strategy” concept at the end of the project, the civil servants in meetings and letters demarcated the formal planning procedure in which they interpreted this strategy as not fulfilling the criteria of a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten). This discredited the Plan of Conduct. The advisor responded with a demarcation of expertise of a professional planner who had judged the quality of the plan. This was to alter the interpretation: it was a Nota van Uitgangspunten. This resulted in a compromise in which the civil servants would reform the Plan of Conduct into a List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten) and thereby facilitate a return to a normal situation in which government discourse is credible. Figure 3.5 illustrates this.

Figure 3.5. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) at the end of Creative Competition part II

3.3. CONCLUSIONS: BOUNDARY WORK IN CREATIVE COMPETITION

My conclusions do not summarize in detail demarcated government and deliberative governance discourse of participants (see tables throughout the chapter); rather I will discuss the critical moments of boundary work. I will answer what elements of deliberative governance discourse became credible.

CREDIBLE GOVERNMENT DISCOURSE: TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY WINS

In the end, government discourse won in the case of Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark. Despite the attempts of a change coalition to gain credibility for the deliberative governance discourse, none of the elements of this discourse survived the experiment. Several more conclusions can be drawn.

First, the analysis of boundary work in “Creative Competition” demonstrates that the consultant, the professor, the civil servants, the alderwoman, participating citizens, businesses and planners successfully disrupted government discourse for the time being. They easily accepted elements of deliberative governance that were directly related to a more horizontal form of decisionmaking: participation and cooperation of citizens in public/private partnerships for park maintenance. These procedural elements of the deliberative governance discourse lasted throughout the whole project and actors did not overtly contest or reflect upon these.

Citizens of Amsterdam Southeast, especially those living at the fringes of the park, are protesting against the building of houses and the cutting of 8500 of the 9500 trees in the park. These people are organized as the Foundation to Keep Southeast Green (Stichting Behoud Groen Zuidoost). Citizens produced several amateur movies that illustrate their protests.

YouTube - demonstratie bijlmerpark 2008
YouTube - De Bijs in het Bijlmerpark 2008
YouTube - Bijlmerpark (Alice Rose) 2008

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Second, the consultant and professor introduced several of what I understand to be boundary concepts. They stretched the meaning of “feasibility” and “expertise.” Actors interpreted these boundary concepts from both a government and a deliberative governance discourse perspective. This multi-interpretability at first enabled a temporary credibility of deliberative governance discourse. However, in the course of the experiment it drew out fracture lines between discourses.

Third, actors engaged in a discursive struggle about the two interpretations of the boundary concepts. This became the core struggle in this experiment with deliberative governance. Rather than fight about building houses or maintaining trees, the question was whether professionals had the expertise to make up a feasible plan, or if citizens had an equally important contribution to make with their local expertise. In this discursive struggle, the participants argued about the “quality” of citizens’ participation. In other words, the actors agreed that citizens had to participate. However, the analysis of boundary work demonstrated that actors engaged in a less visible but continuous struggle about what kind of contribution citizens could make.

Fourth, I conclude that this discursive struggle about the interpretation of expertise and feasibility was caused by the consultant’s attempt to stretch the boundary around a “learning” discourse. The consultant attempted to gain credibility for the deliberative governance discourse through the inclusion of citizens as experts. Demarcation of this learning discourse gained credibility for deliberative governance. However, the professional planners and the governmental actors contested and successfully rejected this stretching of a boundary around science discourse. Their interpretation of expertise and feasibility as professional expertise was accepted and they reenacted science discourse. Citizens did not protest being called ignorant. The learning discourse did not become credible.

This also leads to a fifth conclusion: even though I wanted to go beyond a study of demarcations of science, science discourse was to some extent present in this experiment. Participants demarcated it and attempted to stretch its boundary and turn it into a learning discourse.

REFLEXIVE DESIGN: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF TWO ONGOING CASES

The analysis of boundary work in this pilot case both supports and refutes several theoretical premises. These have consequences for the conceptual work and research design of my dissertation.

First, the pilot case supports the idea that the analysis of boundary work adds a dimension to evaluations of experiments with deliberative governance. Next to an evaluation of procedural elements such as numbers of participants, the assembly of a change coalition, the type and number of deliberative venues organized, and so forth, the analysis of boundary work in this pilot case demonstrates that we can connect procedural elements of deliberative governance discourse to the content of the problems at hand. The analysis of boundary work in this case made visible that the conflict about a choice between trees and houses developed into a discursive struggle about the meaning of expertise and feasibility. The analysis also demonstrated that even though all actors accepted the citizens’ participation, they continued to struggle over the interpretation of the quality of this participation. In other words, the actors accepted and enacted the procedures of deliberative governance. However, at the same time some of the actors did not interpret expertise to include citizens’ local knowledge. Furthermore, we saw that the assembly of the change coalition that was leading in the attempts to gain credibility for deliberative governance discourse varied according to the stage of the project. The consultant formed the core of this coalition, but he aligned with a variety of actors during the project. He attempted to mobilize other participants of this change coalition to interpret what was going on from a deliberative governance perspective. The assembly of the change coalition and data about how many citizens did participate reveals how big the “movement” was, and the analysis of boundary work tells us what this coalition attempted to change. In the comparison, I will attempt to tease out these connections between procedural elements and the content of discourse.

Second, this pilot case demonstrated that indeed demarcations and transcending of boundaries are closely connected. A boundary concept can become a fracture line concept. Whereas it first aligned elements of different discourses, it can start to illuminate differences. In the case of the Bijlmerpark expertise, feasibility and strategy all turned into fracture line concepts. In this case, in the end, all participants interpreted these related boundary concepts from a dominant government discourse. However, in theory, a fracture line concept might induce a reflective conversation. This may have happened in the two other projects that are part of my study.

Four conclusions from this pilot case lead me to reflect on my presuppositions. First, I underestimated the role of the gatekeepers to protect this dominant discourse. In the theory I mainly spoke of parrhesiastes that disrupt dominant discourse. In this case, the change coalition acted as parrhesiastes. However, the gatekeepers are equally important in the process of change. Moreover, gatekeepers can become part of the change coalition. For example, in the case of the Bijlmerpark the civil servants and the alderwoman acted as gatekeepers but also became part of the change coalition. The gatekeepers and the change coalition facilitated the gaining of credibility for deliberative governance discourse but were also able to limit it.

Second, to this point I did not pay much attention to a drawing of boundaries around subdiscourses. In this pilot case, I considered subdiscourses as elements of normal government discourse. These subdiscourses often come from policy sectors, scientific disciplines, and organizational subdiscourses, such as environmental, business or sports subdiscourse. In government discourse these subdiscourses constantly struggle for dominance. However, in deliberative governance discourse, these subdiscourses might merge in the deliberations. This is what we saw happen in the case of the Bijlmerpark: participants merged their subdiscourses in the plans for redevelopment. However, to make the plans more feasible, the change coalition organized a clash of subdiscourses at a meeting in which professionals were to express to the consortia what they thought were elements that needed to be included to make the plans more feasible. In deliberative governance theory, the clash of these subdiscourses is usually thought of as “deliberative breakdowns” (Fung, 2001), or accounted for as an uneasy relationship between strategic action and deliberative settings (Dodge, 2009; Warren, 1996). Here it seemed as though this facilitated clashes, improved the deliberative quality AND the quality of the plans. The demarcations by professionals enabled the citizens to draft more integrated and
more convincing, and even more feasible plans. In the analysis of the two ongoing cases in the next chapters, I will take consider the demarcations of subdiscourse as possible deliberative breakdowns, but also as a way to improve the quality of the outcome in content, for example, the plans and the visions of experiments with deliberative governance.

A third result from the pilot case is that I discovered a dominant discourse that seems to be more dominant than government, governance, or deliberative governance discourse: “expertise.” In the previous section, which asked which discourse won, I already argued that science as a discourse was dominant. In the next two cases I will pay more attention to the possibility that either learning discourse that alters science discourse or science discourse is more dominant.

Finally, the results from the pilot case made me reflect on the way I generated and constructed data. First, as I had foreseen in the research design, I did not have transcripts of all meetings, nor was I able to observe these meetings. Therefore, not all boundaries drawn and transcended could be studied in detail. I was more actively involved in the next two cases, and this will lead to a more comprehensive picture of boundary work in action. Second, I analytically distinguished three sites of interaction: between government and society, between government and businesses, and between government and advisors. In this pilot I found that stage one consisted of interactions only between government and advisors. Moreover, the site of interaction business and government was hardly present. I can draw at least two conclusions from this: first, in this project, alteration of interactions between government and businesses did not have a priority for the change coalition, and citizens’ participation was more important despite the fact that an outcome of the first round was that businesses needed to be included in the park maintenance. Second, I have demonstrated that the construction of these research sites can provide me with information about what elements of deliberative governance discourse have priority. In the case of the Bijlmerpark, the priority was interactions with citizens. Hence, from this moment onward, I will include this type of information in the results of the analysis of boundary work.
4. Dairy Gateway project: credible learning and stewardship

This chapter describes the results of the analysis of boundary work in an experiment with deliberative governance in the Midwest of the United States of America: the Dairy Gateway project. This innovative project ran from 2003 until 2006 and involved farmers, environmentalists, and citizens of the state of Wisconsin in consensus building and conflict resolution (see attachment 4.1. for a timeline).

4.1. INTRODUCTION TO A WISCONSIN CONTEXT

The scenery of Northeast Wisconsin resembles the hilly landscape in Northern France with traditional family farms, red barns, and an occasional industrial farm. Highway 57 brings you from Green Bay, a city with approximately 120,000 inhabitants, to Door County, situated on a peninsula that stretches into Lake Michigan. The peninsula is the touristic part of this area and includes two other counties, Manitowoc and Kewaunee, that are sites of many dairy farms: Manitowoc County and Kewaunee County (see attachment 4.2. for overview of large industrial farms in these counties). Tourists from nearby cities; Chicago, Milwaukee, and Madison, spend their vacation on the peninsula and build second homes or move to this area to escape the city. “Urban Sprawl” is what the original inhabitants, dairy farmers, and county officials call these developments.

To Dutch planners it is almost impossible to imagine that this urban sprawl causes problems similar to those of the densely populated Netherlands. However, the environmental quality of this area is under pressure due to the effects of modernization. Many of the small scale and mixed-use “ma-and pa” farms were transformed into industrial, intensive dairy operations, especially in Manitowoc and Kewaunee Counties. These industrial farms and the small and medium sized farms can cause manure spills that contaminate the rivers and the drinking water of nearby residents. Modernization also entailed increased...
urbanization and tourism that contribute to the pollution of air, water, soil, and the scenery. The increased pollution and strains on land use led to more adversarial relationships within the area’s traditionally strong farming community in at least three ways.

First, the farming community became more divided. Small farmers feel pressured to compete with the industrial operations and have a hard time surviving. As in the rest of the Western world, in the Northeast of Wisconsin, there is a tendency for small farms to disappear and to be replaced with larger operations that produce the same amount of milk. A second reason for more adversarial relationships is that farmers and non-farmers more often enter into conflicts. Sometimes non-farming community members hire professional environmental organizations, like Midwest Environmental Advocates (MEA), to represent them. These organizations are habitually located in urban areas such as Madison and act as watch-dogs for environmental pollution in rural areas. They feel the need to protect the environment that is a victim of the villains: the industry. In their turn, farmers feel that these accusations by environmental professionals increasingly harm their business. They respond with adversarial reactions or they withdraw from communication with the rest of the community.

In the United States, the neo-liberal, pluralistic style of decision making encourages the professionalization of the environmental movement. In this style, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) have to lobby, protest, and go to court more frequently than in, for example, the Dutch, neo-corporatist style of decision making (Vogel, 1986; Renn, 1995; Halfman, 2003). The U.S. style of decision making fosters conflict. In comparison to Europe, especially the Netherlands and Germany, but also the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. has a reputation of being more activist and adversarial. Grass roots organizations and other activist organizations have little space for collaborative efforts or cooperative problem solving as they depend more on financial resources from their members. The members often wish to see instant results (Carter, 2007; Roots, 1999; Interview-Hanson, 2004; Interview-Skadden, 2004). Finally, the ‘imported’ or returning ‘city folk’ who bought parcels of land near farms to build ‘trophy homes’ contributed to the land use conflicts in the communities. These more urban residents ran into conflicts with their farming neighbors (and local residents) as they were not prepared for the rural nuisances and environmental problems: contamination of their drinking water by manure spills, the smell of manure, noise from trucks, the mud on the roads, fish kills, and danger of cladophora. Conflicts between farmers that need to expand to survive economically, and their neighbors or environmentalists that want to prevent the farms from expanding were not an exception (DNR, 2003).

In addition to this increasingly complex situation, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) experiences difficulties with the “command and control” of pollution by the agricultural industry. There are several reasons for this. First, it is hard to prove non-point source pollution. This is pollution of air or water that is diffused. Regulators use the term “non-point” to describe sources of pollution that are individually small, but numerous enough that cumulatively they can have a large impact. The second reason is the relative novelty of smart growth plans and regional or state zoning plans. Nature conservation areas or areas for development are not planned for as intensely as in the Netherlands. This sometimes leads to random policies for farm expansion, especially in combination with relatively powerful town boards that can refuse the location or expansion of an industrial farm despite the fact that the farm had already acquired a license from the DNR. These licenses are obligatory for farms with over 1000 animal units (Wisconsin Act 235, 2003; Farm Act, 2002). This randomness causes uncertainties for both farmers and their neighbors. A third difficulty in the application of the command and control system is that the DNR has experienced a lack of manpower and financial resources that makes it more difficult to conduct sufficient on-site inspections (Interview-Shenot, 2005; Interview-Eggert, 2004; Interview-Smoller, 2004) and why it received the nickname of “Department of No Resources” (Interview-Skadden, 2004).

Some actors in state government and stakeholders from industry and NGO’s acknowledge the limits of environmental regulations for the dairy sector and for other businesses such as electric generating plants, paper mills, or the scrap metal industry. For example, in 1997, the Department of Natural Resources, as a member of the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Performance (MSWG) that consisted of representatives from government, business, and environment established a list of “policy gaps” and “unmet environmental needs” (Policy statement DNR George Meyer, 1999) (see figure 4.1).

The MSWG concluded that only 20% of the environmental aspects of businesses were regulated and that 80% of the aspects caused “problems and opportunities” (Policy statement DNR George Meyer, 1999). Despite its inaccuracy, this chart illustrates that the environmental regulatory landscape of Wisconsin can be considered relatively empty. The MSWG argued that the command and control system should be in place but that in an increasingly complex situation this system is not sufficient. It leaves a policy gap of 80%. Moreover, under this system, farmers and other businesses are not encouraged to improve their environmental performance. As the special assistant to the State Secretary argued in 2004:

“There is this deep-seated ... the American environmental movement is based upon victims and villains. Everybody’s a victim and the villains are very clear, and they’re businesses or they’re large farms etc. Also to understand that in some cases there may be truth in that or has been truth in that, and command and control has made a
The environmental pollution caused by farms; the more adversarial relationships among farmers; an increase in conflicts between farmers and neighbors; the professionalized environmental NGOs; and the strategically produced chart that pointed out the policy gaps for environmental solutions; these all were reason for the Department of Natural Resources to start consensus building and the formation of public entrepreneurship networks (Laws 1998, Laws et al 2001) in the Northeast of Wisconsin. “The competing visions of the rural idea” (interview-Bellman, 2004) that caused conflict in this area might be mediated and resolved.

The idea of consensus building was also applied in the Green Tier Law. This law at first was not directly related to the Dairy Gateway project but in the course of the project became more important. Wisconsin Act 267 is the official name of the Green Tier Law. This law adds an extra tier to normal environmental regulations. It encourages voluntary actions and does not prohibit and punish pollution but gives incentives to businesses to voluntarily strive for a “superior environmental performance” (DNR, 2004a; DNR-CEA, 2006). The Green Tier law offers a carrot rather than a stick, and as such this law was the first of its kind. A Wisconsin scholar in policy analysis typified this law as a transplantation of a neo-corporatist style of decision-making in a pluralistic context (Wilson, April 2002).

The Green Tier law was also Wisconsin’s first law drafted in a consensus-building process (Wilson, April 2002; Laws and Amengual, 2004). Representatives from industry, environmental organizations and government formed a Green Tier Advisory Committee and they collaboratively constructed a proposal for this law. This consensus building process was a bumpy road. Environmental NGO’s and some people in government were afraid the bill would enable regulatory relief and, as Senator Mark Miller said: “the environmental community [was] concerned that it [would] weaken compliance” (Interview- Miller, 2005; Amengual, 2005).

Despite the controversies about this law, the governor signed the final version in April 2004. The law was operational from that date until the end of 2009 and it was reauthorized on the July 8, 2009. The Green Tier program became permanent with the signing of Wisconsin Act 30. The law consists of two programs: the environmental results program and the environmental improvement program (State of Wisconsin, 2004). The DNR executes both programs. The environmental results program enables state government to provide incentives, for example, businesses that can demonstrate that they go beyond environmental regulations to improve their environmental performance can display a logo and undergo the minimum number of required inspections (State of Wisconsin, 2004). Businesses or associations that want to enter the program can do so in two steps. In the first tier they are required to have an environmental enforcement record and have to implement or commit to implementing within a year a monitoring and auditing system, an environmental management system (EMS) to track and record their environmental improvements. To enter tier II, the EMS has to be operational and the business “has demonstrated a record of ‘superior environmental performance’ and will maintain or improve this performance” (State of Wisconsin, 2004). Benefits for the participants in Tier II have not been specified, but the DNR is directed to create incentives “proportionate to the environmental benefits” (State of Wisconsin, 2004).

The environment improvement program is the second part of this act. It provides the means to consider violations not as deliberate, but as mistakes that need time to be corrected. This part of the law “encourages regulated entities to check their compliance with environmental regulations and correct any violations discovered during their audits” (State of Wisconsin, 2004). It enables the DNR, in cooperation with the Department of Justice, to punish environmental violations in a less severe manner than under normal current law. As the law states: “a participant that corrected the violations in a timely manner may not be required to forfeit more than $500 for each violation, regardless of the number of days during which the violation continues” (State of Wisconsin, 2004).

Businesses that want to enter the green tier program sign individual contracts with the DNR but they also can engage in a charter with, for example, a business association or a factory and its individual suppliers. Such an association of, for example, cheese factories, signs a contract with the DNR and all its members are required to enter Green Tier and have an EMS. The association of factories takes care of the yearly monitoring and auditing of the EMS. They can become an accredited third party or they can hire a third party. The DNR audits the monitoring once every three years (DNR-CEA, 2004).

The DNR Bureau for Cooperative Environmental Assistance (CEA) prepared this law in the Environmental Cooperation Pilot that started in 1999. In this Pilot Program six businesses developed a cooperative agreement with DNR-CEA. In 2002, two years before the law was officially signed, agricultural applications for Green Tier came in, and DNR-CEA and the University of Wisconsin explored the possibilities of drafting EMS’s for agriculture.

**4.2. THE DAIRY GATEWAY PROJECT**

In 2002, DNR-CEA, in cooperation with employees of the State Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP), scholars of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Pennsylvania Law School, the LaFollette School of the University of Wisconsin, the local NGO Lakeshore Natural Resource Partnership (LNRP) and the environmental consulting firm Madison Environmental Group (MEG) drafted a proposal for the Dairy Gateway project. This project was to be located in the Northeast of Wisconsin — the Dairy Gateway area — and had to build a “public entrepreneurship network” (Laws 1998, Laws et al. 2001) among farmers, neighbors and others. This proposal was submitted to the Joyce Foundation, a philanthropic organization in Chicago that is, among other issues, concerned with the water quality of the Great Lakes. In the spirit of the Green Tier concept, this coalition agreed that adversarial types of interactions between the dairy business, citizens, and environmental organizations in Wisconsin needed to change into cooperative ones. A change in relationships might prevent and resolve land-use conflicts, improve environmental quality, especially the quality of ground and surface water, and maintain an economically viable dairy sector in the area. This change coalition agreed that the command and control system and the attempts of farmers to
improve their environmental performance were not sufficient. They believed that a change in relationships would lead to more sustainable and better environmental results and to a more sustainable community.

In Wisconsin there was not one event that triggered this project as had been the case in the Bijlmerpark. In this case a group of actors that usually have conflicting interests agreed that the conflicts needed to be prevented or solved in order to improve the environmental performance of the state. Encouraged by academics and government, they stated their ambition to achieve a “sustainable community, environment and economy” (DNR, 2003). The Green Tier concept provided a framework for this group to start the Dairy Gateway project, which in its turn was also a way for the DNR to promote the concept.\(^{200}\)

The Dairy Gateway project intended to stimulate “voluntary compliance to self-created environmental standards by networks between farmers, government and possibly networks of environmental organizations and processors of products” (DNR, 2003, Joyce Foundation grant application). In the grant application to the Joyce Foundation, the objectives of this project were stated as follows:

“The Dairy Gateway is a project to develop grass roots networks linking profitable farms and quality community life, and translate that insight into actions that all must do so all can gain. The project will engage local stakeholders to develop a vision for the project area and to seek consensus on specific commitments and programs that foster economic growth, environmental gain and community participation. [...] New leaders will emerge, with entrepreneurs dedicated to continual engagement and improvement maintaining a constructive dialogue even when the problems seem most difficult” (DNR, 2003, grant application Joyce Foundation).

In 2003, the Joyce Foundation agreed to co-finance the Dairy Gateway project.\(^{201}\) They contributed in two rounds: from April 2003 until April 2004 (Joyce-Foundation, 2003) and from April 2005 until April 2006 (Joyce-Foundation, 2005, Joyce-Foundation, 2005; www.thejoycefdn.org).\(^{202}\) Both rounds contained a “lakeshore basin-wide granting program” through which the local organization Lakeshore Natural Resource Partnership (LNRP) disseminated financial resources among local network initiatives that improved the water quality in the area. Only the first round financed a farm/neighbor meeting process “for the purposes of inserting dialogue as an additional recourse to a community when local environmental concerns conflict with agricultural practices” (DNR, 2004a, executive summary). These Farm-Neighbor Meetings (FNM)\(^{207}\) were meetings that had a deliberative design. At these meetings participants engaged in a dialogue and a joint inquiry into farm practices that improve the environmental quality of the farms and the area (DNR, 2004a, FNM Program).

In 2003 the first round of the Dairy Gateway project started. Two local mediators, Nancy Skadden from the LNRP and Harry Weine-Behrman from Wisconsin Environmental Initiative (WEI) (see attachment 4.4. for overview of project structure), organized and facilitated deliberations between farmers, their neighbors, and environmental organizations in the three counties and at the statewide level. They received support from two Harvard-trained mediators that advised on the deliberative design and conducted a “convening assessment” that explored the problems in the area. Ms Skadden first held numerous interviews and attended several local and state meetings that concerned the dairy industry (DNR, 2004a). Next, she organized twelve farm-to-farm and farm-to-

neighbor meetings. At these meetings farmers deliberated with farmers and government (6 meetings), and owners of small, medium and large farms deliberated with their neighbors (6 meetings). In the second round of the project the other local mediator (from WEI) organized three statewide meetings. Those were attended by farmers’ representatives and environmental NGO’s, including Midwest Environmental Advocates. The Department of Agriculture organized one more farmer-to-farmer meeting. In both rounds, the facilitator applied ‘mediation’ as the deliberative design at the farmer-to-neighbor meetings. At the statewide convening, the facilitator applied consensus building as a design to encourage deliberations.

At the six farmer-to-neighbor meetings on three different farms, farmers and neighbors developed hands-on solutions for environmental problems. At three farmer-to-farmer meetings, farmers in cooperation with government representatives worked toward the development of individual environmental management systems (EMS’s). Two meetings took place in 2004 and one in 2005.\(^{203}\) The statewide convening consisted of three meetings. These were all organized in 2005. At those meetings farmers and environmentalists\(^{205}\) collaboratively constructed generic environmental standards for voluntary on-farm environmental improvements. For example, participants talked about performance on manure spreading, manure digesting, reduction of hazardous waste, and prevention of soil erosion. Farmers that participated in the Dairy Gateway project or wanted to enter the Green Tier program could include these standards in their specific environmental management systems. Moreover, these standards could be used in the monitoring and auditing of the EMS’s of participating farms. At all these meetings, the neighbors, environmentalists and farmers, together with government officials, deliberated on how to collaboratively encourage more environmentally friendly farm practices (see attachment 4.5. for an overview of the data generated for the Dairy Gateway project, and attachment 4.6. for the participants in all meetings).

Out of these meetings I constructed two sites of interaction. The first site of interaction was that between government and society. These interactions took place in the local farmer-to-neighbor meetings and a statewide convening.\(^{206}\) The second site of interactions was that between government and businesses. These interactions took place at the farmer-to-farmer meetings. Subsequently, I analyzed interactions between government and advisors. These interactions mostly took place in the design team. They met a few times and held conference calls at the start of the project. This design team interacted closely with members of what later became the Investors Club.\(^{207}\) This was very different from the Bijlmerpark-case — and as we will see, from the Protein Corridor — in which societal actors were not included in the drafting of the design of the project.

I analyzed boundary work in documents and meetings that took place or were produced between the drafting of the proposal in 2002 and the last farmer-to-farmer meeting in October 2005 in Cleveland, Wisconsin. At this last meeting farmers of different size dairy operations agreed to start building and implementing an EMS to be able to enter a green tier contract. It was not until 2006 that the results of the state wide convening materialized in a document (DNR-CEA, 2006). I included this document in the analysis. In 2007 the Dairy Business Association-Green Tier Advancement Project (DBA-GTAP) signed a charter with DNR for their members in the dairy sector. In 2009 the DNR presented the first environmental results of the Green Tier program.
4. Dairy Gateway project: credible learning and stewardship

4.3. BOUNDARY WORK IN THE DAIRY GATEWAY PROJECT

This section contains the results of the analysis of boundary work in the Dairy Gateway region. It first presents the results of boundary work in a group of stakeholders that DNR-CEA put together to form what I call, a change coalition, that would later become the Investors’ Club. Second, this section presents the results of boundary work at the venues that mediators designed to convene deliberations between government and society and between government and businesses. The change coalition that was formed in the first stage inserted elements of deliberative governance discourse at these venues.

BOUNDARY WORK IN THE FIRST STAGE

In the first stage, the DNR and DATCP first discussed and negotiated the proposal to the Joyce Foundation with societal actors, for example, the Milk Marketing Board and River Alliance. When the grant proposal was awarded, an Investors Club was formed. The Club examined three contracts that worked out in detail how the Dairy Gateway project would take place.

First, the LNRP proposed a deliberative design in which mediation was the standard of conduct and provided rules for interactions at the local level. Second, the Collaborative Initiative, in cooperation with the Wisconsin Environmental Initiative (WEI), proposed consensus building and visioning for participation at the statewide level. Third, the Madison Environmental Group (MEG) proposed a baseline measurement to compare farm practices before and after the project in three areas: economic, community and environmental issues. In the first stage of the project these actors built and established their coalition. They did so by discussing and defining what I call deliberative governance discourse.

As we will see, the formation of the change coalition took place through boundary work on deliberative governance discourse. Some participants, mostly governmental actors and academics, attempted to gain credibility for this discourse. Boundary work in this stage followed this pattern: first, some members of the potential change coalition deliberated about the meaning of the boundary concept “dialogue” that they simultaneously demarcated from conflict, and that I consider an element of government discourse. Second, the members of the change coalition defined and elaborated the boundary concept “stewardship.” Third, they demarcated “academic expertise” and “foreign experience” – both concepts we consider elements of science discourse — to gain credibility for dialogue and stewardship in interactions with the Joyce Foundation and other potential coalition members.

Demarcation of dialogue from conflict

In the grant application to the Joyce Foundation, the DNR-CEA described the Dairy Gateway project as “a literal gateway to Wisconsin’s most notable geographic feature – the Door Peninsula – and its philosophical gateway into a new way of thinking about the community and environment” (DNR 2003, grant application Joyce Foundation). According to the writers of the proposal, this new way of thinking was distinct since it considered the ecosystem as interconnected rather than as isolated problems of water, air, and soil pollution. Moreover, it would facilitate civic entrepreneurship, which means that community members would voluntarily improve their environmental performance, rather than merely meet minimal environmental requirements (DNR, 2003 grant application Joyce Foundation). To facilitate this entrepreneurship, the DNR-CEA wanted to organize stakeholder engagement and:

“Out of this stakeholder engagement to develop and implement stakeholder-based management processes that provide economic growth, environmental gain and community participation. Dairy Gateway Network of the state will grow, linking people throughout the project area and beyond to develop a proactive “yes we can” strategy that examines the region’s diversity of interests and variety of needs. The network will maintain the integrity of those diverse interests but will develop and use new tools to find common ground, establish shared expectations and realize shared goals. New leaders will emerge, with entrepreneurs dedicated to continual engagement and improvement maintaining a constructive dialogue even when the problems seem most difficult” (DNR, 2003 grant application Joyce Foundation).

The design team that consisted of DNR-CEA, MIT and the two Harvard-trained mediation experts formulated the objectives of the project as a reduction of conflict, and a way to recognize “environmental improvements and community-building potential” (Design Team, 2004a). Moreover, the local mediators of LNRP and WEI proposed dialogue and stakeholder participation. For example, LNRP argued that “a key component of the Dairy Gateway initiative is to engage stakeholders and involve communities in order to prevent and minimize rural conflicts” (DG Report, Attachment C Scope of Work - Expanding Local Involvement in Dairy Gateway (Grant NMD652)). At the statewide level the mediator proposed to organize “information sharing among participants (and resource people) regarding the opportunities being considered; and to begin to critically examine these possibilities within an atmosphere of respectful, collaborative inquiry” (Webne-Behrman, 2004).

Hence, the local mediators and the design team all brought forward some form of dialogue. They interpreted this boundary concept in several ways, for example, as a community building process or as a collaborative learning effort. The members of the change coalition all preferred dialogue to the normal adversarial relations and conflict. They agreed that to be able to improve environmental quality of the area a dialogue or a collaborative inquiry was necessary. It is striking that the coalition did not formulate a common solution or goal for the environmental problems. Rather, they aimed for different kinds of cooperation or procedures. Subsequently, they proposed a more holistic approach to the environmental problems and solutions in the boundary concept “stewardship.”

Interpreting the boundary concept stewardship

The DNR-CEA, in cooperation with the academics, introduced a second boundary concept in the proposal to the Joyce Foundation: stewardship. This concept established a new interpretation of farmers no longer as polluters, but as protectors of the land.

It transcended boundaries between, on one hand, environmental subdiscourse in which all industrial farms are considered the main source of pollution in the area, and on the other hand farming subdiscourse in which environmentalists are viewed as people that want to run farmers out of business. Subsequently, this alteration of the interpretation of farmers also enabled potential members of the change coalition to interpret the interactions between government, businesses and society differently. If farmers are no longer the
main polluters, government can also start to encourage their attempts to improve the environment. If farmers can be stewards, government can engage in a dialogue rather than punish. Moreover, polluters other than the farmers needed to be prosecuted.

Thus, the DNR-CEA and academics argued that environmental problems are not only caused by (industrial) farms but also by other aspects of modernization such as urbanization and an increase in tourism. For example, “[there are threats to] the groundwater resources that are highly vulnerable due to the geology, and surface waters, tributaries to the Great Lakes, that are vulnerable to unplanned growth and commerce” (DNR 2003, grant application Joyce Foundation, p. 2). Moreover, pollution of ground and surface water would not be solved by regulating only industrial farms. Therefore, the change coalition wanted the quality of ground water and surface water of the lakeshore basin of Lake Michigan to be a communal concern to farmers, environmentalists, citizens, and to government. The rivers and creeks in Wisconsin in a way were liquid threads, a concept that DNR-CEA borrowed from Denny Canef from River Alliance (Interview-McDermid, 2004) that connect farming, urbanization and economic growth in the cause of controlling water pollution. The change coalition translated the problem with control of non-point-source pollution and made clear that it is not only a problem to control this pollution but that it is a problem for the public. For the change coalition, the new “governance” interpretation of the water problem made stewardship a possible solution. Farmers, in cooperation with citizens and possibly NGO’s, together hold the key to better environmental quality that cannot be obtained by governmental measures.

However, the members of the change coalition interpreted stewardship differently, and mostly to their own benefit. Some environmentalists did indeed consider stewardship as a way to engage farmers in protection and conservation of the land. For example, LNRP believed that stewardship could “foster community partnerships, provide funding and a forum for public dialogue, and promote and support other activities that advocate a balance between land use and protection and conservation of our natural resources” (LNRP, 2004d). Some participating farmers interpreted it as a way to make sure they could continue farming rather than sell their land to project developers. For example, stewardship was interpreted as: “[…] a mission […] to save farmland from being permanently converted into something else. And in this country it is almost invariably housing or shopping malls” (Interview-Canef-Denny, 2005).

Moreover, the Joyce Foundation, the funder of the project, emphasized the new regulatory approach and interpreted stewardship as an integral part of the new approach: “to deal with the non-point source pollution problem and hopefully in a context of continuous improvement that would be beneficial to the farmer as well as to the society. So, it is not just someone on the outside saying: this is what you have to do. But he or she is actually finding efficiencies and, you know, ways to improve material use efficiency and things like that by applying that kind of management approach” (Interview-O’Dell, 2005). Thus, these different interpretations became more apparent when the members of the change coalition further discussed and developed the proposals. This culminated in a conflict when LNRP turned to the farm mediation program of the Department of Agriculture for recommendations on who should be involved in the farm-neighbor meetings. This prompted the viewpoint by one of the participants, the River Alliance, that the project was in favor of industrial agriculture. This meant that they could no longer sustain their interpretation of stewardship. According to the mediator “the most advocacy oriented environmental group in the project […] pulled out of it” when they figured that the project was in favor of industrial agriculture (Interview-Skadden, 2004). In an interview in 2005 the member that left the Investors’ Club still was skeptical about the Dairy Gateway project: “The mediation that Bellman was sent out to explore, ask questions about, the conflict is still going, nothing has happened. That farm, Maple Leaf Dairy, is still offending everybody; […] the legacy of DG was a hugely lost opportunity” (Interview-Canef-Denny, 2005).

Although the River Alliance was previously convinced of the boundary concepts dialogue and stewardship, after LNRP approached the Farm Mediation Program they no longer believed that their environmentalists’ interpretation of stewardship was credible within the change coalition, and they left. They did not want to be associated with an interpretation of stewardship that in some way or another stimulated industrial farming.

Demarcation of academic expertise and foreign experience

In two more ways the DNR-CEA attempted to gain credibility for the boundary concepts of dialogue and stewardship. They demarcated academic expertise and foreign experiences in the proposals to the Joyce Foundation. I did not come across this type of demarcation in the discussions about the proposals of the local mediators. To gain credibility for the project and the problem definitions and solutions it proposed, the DNR-CEA argued that they will involve academic partners that will “affirm and facilitate” the project’s “credibility and replicability” and that they “will manage a learning and sharing system of enduring consequence” (DNR, 2003, grant application Joyce Foundation). Moreover, they would build on previous experiences and experiences from abroad:

“But it is important to note that the [Wisconsin] Partnership will build on experiences and directions already put in place within the Wisconsin agricultural community, which has had a long term relationship with the dairy industry in The Netherlands. Indeed, the Wisconsin Agricultural Stewardship Initiative and the Discovery Farms (private farms testing environmental practices) and Pioneer Farm (a systems farm at the UW-Platteville) had their origins in The Netherlands. Through MIT, the Dutch government, universities and private farms will identify and manage, for the generation of best practices and new knowledge, up to three case studies that will complement the Dairy Gateway” (DNR, 2003, grant application Joyce Foundation).

A reason for DNR-CEA to demarcate this type of expertise was that “the Joyce Foundation had never previously given grant money to a state regulatory agency. We wanted to reassure them” (email Shenot, August 2010).

I mention these two demarcations, as they appear to be part of government discourse in which academic expertise is a normal part of the setting of standards for rules and regulations, for example in environmental policies (Halfmann, 2003). However, the DNR-CEA supplemented this interpretation of academic expertise with a possibility of involving academic expertise in the creation of a learning system. Thus, academic expertise and experience supported the ideas of dialogue and stewardship. This was to continue the Joyce Foundation of the credibility of these two concepts. At the same time DNR-CEA proposed a different type of involvement of academics: to enhance the learning of all actors, including that of the academics. As such, DNR-CEA introduced a third element of deliberative governance discourse: next to dialogue and stewardship the DNR included expertise and experience.
Conclusions: credible deliberative governance
The DNR-CEA and academics successfully redefined the problems and possible solutions in the area. In this first stage, the DNR and academics convinced other members and the Joyce Foundation of the boundary concepts dialogue and stewardship that I consider part of deliberative governance discourse (see figure 4.2 for an overview of elements of deliberative governance discourse). Moreover, the newly formed change coalition no longer interpreted government solely as a protector, businesses as polluters, and citizens and the environment as the protected. The coalition adopted deliberative governance discourse and believed that all these actors were to act as protectors and engage in a dialogue or learning process. The demarcation of academic expertise and foreign experience stimulated the Joyce Foundations’ acceptance of these boundary concepts. However, potential members of the change coalition also struggled with different interpretations of stewardship in “normal” conversations. When large industrial farms explicitly were included in the project, one potential member of the change coalition no longer interpreted stewardship from an environmentalists’ subdiscourse. This stakeholder left the change coalition. The possible members of the change coalition did engage in “normal” conversations. Their meetings did not have a deliberative design, and I did not come across conversations with a reflective quality.

Figure 4.2 Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in first stage of Dairy Gateway

BOUNDARY WORK IN DELIBERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY
In the second stage of the Dairy Gateway project, facilitators that represented the change coalition convened three types of meetings with a deliberative design: farmer-to-farmer meetings; farmer-to-neighbor meetings; and meetings that were convened statewide. At the three types of meetings, I discerned the following pattern of boundary work:
1. Introduction of the boundary concepts “dialogue” or “learning” and demarcation of them from elements of government discourse ‘conflict’
2. Contextualizing the boundary concept ‘stewardship’
3. Struggles about interpretation of boundary concepts: reflective conversation or conflict?
4. Credible deliberative governance discourse?
A close look at boundary work at these two sites of interaction demonstrated that variations in this pattern took place.

Introducing boundary concepts and demarcation
The twelve meetings that were part of the Dairy Gateway project all started with the mediators’ introduction of “dialogue” that I consider an element of the new deliberative governance discourse. At the farmer-to-neighbor meetings dialogue was sought in three ways. First, attendees had to sign a Participants’ Agreement in which they promised to engage in a dialogue. The mediator defined dialogue as follows: participants had to “be here if possible; listen; speak truth” (LNRP, 2004; FNM report 2004-2005). Second, to introduce dialogue, the mediator applied a strategy of indirection (Forester 2000; 2009) and let participants engage in conversations about their community and have them share their rural history. The mediator asked participants not to raise issues of conflict but to start by sharing stories about their history in the community and to tell what they love about rural Wisconsin. For example, the mediator at the first farmer-to-neighbor meeting about the Dairy Dreams farm explicitly demanded:
“Let’s leave all the issues of Dairy Dreams out of it right now and just talk about the rest of where you live and why you’re here, and how your life brought you to this place. Let’s just take a minute to get to know each other a little better” (LNRP, 2004a, 1st meeting Dairy Dreams).
Third, the mediator invited participants to sit in a circle. The chairs had to be altered from the normal theater setting in the town hall to a circle that would enable a dialogue. As the mediator explained at one of the meetings:
“This is going to be a dialogue, so let’s take all the chairs that no one is sitting on and make a circle so you can see and hear everyone else” (LNRP, 2004a, 1st meeting dairy dreams).
4. Dairy Gateway project: credible learning and stewardship

Environmentally conscious farmers are also crucial in gaining the public’s trust as well as creating a social license to operate. The environmental management system was a way to facilitate a transition toward the farmer’s voluntary efforts and environmental improvement targeted by environmental NGO’s.

Stewardship at the farmer-to-neighbor meetings: practical solutions

At the farmer-to-neighbor meetings, the mediator, a governmental actor, or an expert introduced stewardship. Experts came either from the University of Wisconsin (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco) or from a private firm (EMS-meeting, 2005). These actors translated stewardship by accompanying it with a more formal tool that would enable farmers to demonstrate their concern for the environment: the environmental management system (EMS). This system had to convince government, the farmers’ neighbors, town officials, and environmental organizations that the farmers could be stewards of the land. The environmental management system was a way to facilitate a transition toward the deliberative governance discourse as it combined some form of government control with farmers’ voluntary efforts and environmental improvement targeted by environmental NGO’s.

At the farmer-to-farmer meetings, the farmers first had to be convinced that this tool could benefit them. The mediator had to alter the farmers’ interpretations of government instruments. Their normal “government” interpretation is that government comes in and tells them what to do and either shares their costs for putting these measures in place or punishes them if they don’t comply. In this case, farmers had to be convinced that governmental actors or the experts introduced the EMS as an instrument to help farmers set their own environmental goals, and to monitor and audit them. The mediator and experts argued that this would lead to better environmental performance, to social and governmental acceptance of the farmers as stewards, and it would have financial benefits.

Stewardship at the farmer-to-farmer meetings: EMS

At the farmer-to-farmer meetings, members of the change coalition presented what I analyzed to be three distinct interpretations of the EMS to farmers. First, the EMS was a social license to operate. Participation in the Dairy Gateway project and the development of an EMS would give farmers more easily societal and governmental approval of their operation. Through a logo or a label and the acknowledgement of the DNR that a farm had superior environmental performance, the public would be able to better trust these...
farmers. As the project caretaker argued:

“We talk about the social license to operate. I mean, businesses and other operations need legal licenses to operate but you also need to get the social approval of the town governments and your neighbors . . . .” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco)

Second, members of the change coalition argued that government relationships with farmers would be altered in this project, and that farmers would decide for themselves how much they wanted to improve environmentally. Farmers would formulate their environmental objectives rather than follow set governmental standards. Even the monitoring and auditing could be done under their own supervision with government only coming in once every three years to check the audit. As the project caretaker argued at one of the farmer-to-farmer meetings, with help of a demarcation with the normal situation:

“Instead of saying: you will do this; it is we can do this. There is a difference in the ownership of the environmental performance” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco).

To convince farmers of this interpretation of the EMS, some members of the change coalition argued that the quality of the EMS resides in the fact that it is a track and tracing system. It enables a gathering of facts rather than arguments. It is a “system” and not a plan, it is a “process” and not a “project” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco). The expert argued that this information-gathering allows improving relationships with the community and government. For example, as a DATCP employee argued:

“[…]the EMS process is based on an international standard called ISO 14001. ISO 14001 came out of Europe […] basically saying: here is a way that if you behave with respect to your business, your business will be more successful, it will be more integrated, it will be a network. So, if you do one project you see the effects across your whole business. And you can also explain those effects to your neighbors, to your government regulators, whoever needs to see your operation, can see it relatively transparent. Rather than deal with perceptions you can deal with some realities” (EMS-meeting, 2005).

A third interpretation of an EMS was to consider it an instrument to increase financial benefits. Due to the social license that separates them from other farms, farmers with an EMS will be able to charge more for their products. For example, as a DATCP employee argued:

“What DATCP is interested in, is the small cheese plant would have a [label] that would include the producers. So, the producers would be performing to their best environmental performance […] and you put that on a label of a cheese product that says: this product is produced in an environmentally friendly manner and you will get a price that will get you additional dollars back and that will increase their pay price” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco)

To convince farmers to develop an individual EMS the mediator and other members of the change coalition also introduced actors that have “expertise about” or “experience with” these ways of working. For example, at both farmer-to-farmer meetings two experts elaborated on the EMS. At the first meeting this was a researcher from the University of Wisconsin. At the second meeting in 2005, two consultants from a firm that specialized in ISO 14001 training and certification were invited. In both cases, they introduced themselves as ‘experts’ on the environmental management system. For example, one of the participating experts explained:

“I worked in the environmental field for about 6,7, maybe 8 years now. I graduated with a degree in Madison, in [civil] environmental engineering, but I have mainly done environmental work in industry. And now also other organizations [such as] home builders, developers, dairy farmers...” (EMS-meeting, 2005).

To convince farmers to start working with an EMS the mediators also invited experienced farmers. For example:

“it is to me... maybe I can summarize it quoting Ken. He was asked a question last week: [...] the question was do you see value in Green Tier in marketing products and how can you use Green Tier? Ken answered that ‘I am going to use it to stay in business.’ I thought, man, that is right on the money.”(EMS-meeting, 2005).

The mediators gave examples of experiences with EMS outside the farming community, for example, for scrap metal recyclers or home builders (EMS-meeting, 2005). As we will see, these experiences and the participation of experts did not prevent struggles about the interpretation of stewardship and the EMS.

**Stewardship at the Statewide Convening: generic environmental standards**

At the Statewide Convening, the change coalition attempted to gain credibility for the interpretation of farmers as stewards of the land. In order to achieve this, they introduced a contextualized version of stewardship: *generic environmental standards*. Participants were to collaboratively develop these standards, which were to define “superior environmental performance” (DNR-CEA, 2006, p. 8). The change coalition sketched the contours of this generic EMS. These contours created a sphere of engagement for participants at the statewide convention. Unfortunately, the notes of the mediator and the minutes of the statewide meetings only present the outcomes of these interactions, that is, the standards that were developed. Therefore I cannot present possible interpretations of these standards. I can only conclude that the generic standards could be used as guidelines or minimum requirements to enter Green Tier. Moreover, governmental actors or third parties might use these minimum requirements to monitor and audit whether environmental improvements that individual farmers aimed for indeed contributed to improve their environmental performance and led to improved environmental results in Wisconsin.

This collaborative effort to formulate standards in itself illustrates a shift from government discourse to deliberative governance discourse; in the normal situation government, together with scientists, would set the environmental standards. In this new situation, government included farmers and environmental organizations to set standards. These generic standards not only gave farmers an instrument to self-regulate, as we saw above, but they also gave some control to the environmental organizations and government over this self-regulation. This makes the application of an EMS more credible, not only to the environmentalists and government but also to the farmers.

**Struggles about stewardship: reflective conversation or conflict?**

After the introduction of stewardship and EMS, a critical moment occurred at all three types of meetings. When participants of the three types of meetings deliberated on the contextualized boundary concepts, two types of conversations evolved. Some participants engaged in a reflective conversation in which they talked about the differences between their “normal” — what I call government — interpretations and the new interpretation. Other participants began a conflict about different interpretations of stewardship. In these cases stewardship became a fracture line concept that drew out differences between interpretations.
Struggles about stewardship at the farmer-to-neighbor meetings

At one out of six farmer-to-neighbor meetings where the farm were of medium size (400 cows), the farmers’ stewardship was immediately acknowledged. At five out of six farmer-to-neighbor meetings, the neighbors contested the possibility of stewardship of farmers. At four out of six meetings, participants accepted farmers as good stewards or they used humor in their dialogue about stewardship. At the same time they deliberated on the failure of these attempts. This enabled a collaborative search for better solutions. For example regarding the flow of electricity that might be produced with the digester:

Neighbor: “Wouldn’t it be a more consistent flow [of electricity] than if you would be dependent on the wind?”
Farmer: “Yes, there is variability in the flow. But it’s uh, obviously, manure is constant. So it should be more uniform in its function. Uhm.”

At none of the farmer-to-neighbor meetings did the conflicts run out of control. Rather, farmer and neighbor explored collaboratively possible solutions. They agreed that the interruption altered the conversation and turned it back to a deliberative one. The ‘dialogue’ concept:

To make sure conflict would not continue, the mediator referred to the earlier introduced neighbor got more adversarial.

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neighbor got more adversarial.

Participants contested the idea of farmers being stewards most severely when discussing manure spills that had happened in the past. These spills can cause water contamination and odor nuisance. Especially when there had been incidents in the past, the conversation ran the risk of evolving into a conflict style of conversation. For example, at one of the farmer-to-neighbor meetings, conflict was brought back to the table when one of the neighbors expressed her concern about the manure spills that she believed had grown more severe since the establishment of the industrial farm:

Gaby: “I agree with both of you but my concern is the water. I live on [X], Junior and Blossom live on the home farm. It is 110 years old. They raised six children there, they had their own farm, they had cows. Two years now, the first year [since the industrial farm was established], Willard’s water […] turned color. There is always runoff. This year, last year, it was undrinkable. We let it go. This year again you put manure on that field right before the rain. Junior and Rose’s water was contaminated. They could not use their well. Willard and his daughter were both ill. Willard’s 91 years old. Who cares about a 91-year-old man? He had a heart attack. It could be he’s just sick. Junior has a very bad heart. He is not going to cause any problems. I think you went over there and looked at it, talked to him, Josh [farmer]? Did you look at the runoff?” (LNRP, 2004a, minutes of 1st meeting DD).

Farmer: “Yes, there is variability in the flow. But it’s uh, obviously, manure is constant. So it should be more uniform in its function. Uhm.”

At one out of six farmer-to-neighbors meetings where the farm were of medium size (400 cows), the farmers’ stewardship was immediately acknowledged. At five out of six farmer-to-neighbor meetings, the neighbors contested the possibility of stewardship of farmers. When I interpret the statement of the industrial farmer from an environmentalist’s point of view I would have a hard time going over there and saying: you are not doing a good job. You are out” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting Casco, 2004).

At a meeting a year later, these same farmers interpreted the EMS as a possibility of writing their own regulations. The farmers agreed that an EMS was an opportunity for all farmers to change their interactions with government, and a means to write their own regulations:

“Industrial farmer: “We are writing our own regulations.” [Talking]
Industrial farmer: “Creating regulations” (EMS-meeting, 2005).

These farmers did want to set their own standards, but they did not want to audit other farmers. When I interpret the statement of the industrial farmer from an environmentalist’s point of view I would have a hard time going over there and saying: you are not doing a good job. You are out” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting Casco, 2004).

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At the majority of the farmer-to-farmer meetings participants deliberated in a reflective style. The farmers reflected upon two possible meanings of stewardship. First, the farmers, governmental actors and experts reflected on the different types of relationships between government and businesses that stewardship and the use of an EMS introduced. The mediator argued that the DNR was not going to command and control but that farmers would self-regulate, monitor and audit. The farmers reflected on and struggled with this interpretation of stewardship. For example, when a DNR employee contrasted his new role as facilitator of environmental performance to his normal role as inspector, in reaction to this one of the farmers said:

“This helps to erase the DNR’s stigma of that you have to be afraid of the DNR. I was always scared that you guys would find me doing something wrong. [Laughing, talking] That is different from coming to rely on the DNR and to ask questions and to be more supportive” (Farmer-to-Farmer-meeting Casco, 2004).

Farmers did not reject this interpretation of an EMS that allows government to take up a new role. However, they discussed the possibility of self-monitoring at greater length. In the drafting of the Green Tier Law, environmentalists also had contested this element the most. They feared the farmers would “take the low road” and just wanted regulatory relief (Interview-Terrell, 2005). Farmers contested the possibility of “self-regulation” but from a different interpretation. Their concern was over who was going to monitor and audit the environmental management systems. Farmers were reluctant to police each other, or have environmental organizations play this part, as had been proposed by the change coalition. For example, at one of the meetings one farmer said:

“I would have a hard time going on, I know most of the producers in Kewaunee County, and I would have a hard time going over there because: you are not doing a good job. You are out” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting Casco, 2004).

At a meeting a year later, these same farmers interpreted the EMS as a possibility of writing their own regulations. The farmers agreed that an EMS was an opportunity for all farmers to change their interactions with government, and a means to write their own regulations:

“Industrial farmer: “We are writing our own regulations.”
[Talking]
Industrial farmer: “Creating regulations” (EMS-meeting, 2005).

Thus, farmers did want to set their own standards, but they did not want to audit other farmers. When I interpret the statement of the industrial farmer from an environmentalist’s point of view I would have a hard time going over there and saying: you are not doing a good job. You are out” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting Casco, 2004).

Second, farmers talked about the idea of a social license that the EMS might grant to them. This idea might be especially credible if environmental organizations were involved in the monitoring of the EMS’s. As one of the farmers said:

“We talk about all these things we can do to make this work and be socially accepted but if the public doesn’t know or doesn’t understand what we are doing and why we are
doing it, all of this is gonna do no good (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco).

In response, the EMS experts gave examples of how public involvement in the development and monitoring of an EMS would solve that problem too. If the public would be involved in drafting the EMS, especially on subjects where they have knowledge, for example, wildlife habitat, this might benefit the farm. The EMS expert proposed that they no longer consider the public as adversarial but as complementary:

“Like with this wildlife stuff I mentioned, umh, you guys aren’t the experts on upland birds or whatever. You get people out there to help you think about that and all of a sudden they’ve become a spokesman for all this wildlife stuff not you. There is this birdwatcher that says: you know you have this Pagel farm, we have a project going on and there is a hundred so and so [...] this spring, you know. That is gonna be some huge stuff” (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco).

After some deliberation, one of the farmers concluded that this type of public involvement, or at least the logo to prove the stewardship of farmers might work as a social license:

“So, if you have that logo up there and you have been audited, then, I think, that just in itself that means a lot [...] They know that you are doing it, they see you putting manure on the field. They have confidence that you are doing it properly because you are being audited” (Farmer-to-farmer meeting, 2004, Casco).

The farmers’ reflective conversations about the interpretations of the EMS paved the road for them to act as stewards. At the end of all meetings, and especially at the last meeting, farmers collaboratively started to explore how they can be stewards. They summed up several practices to implement, for example, to go beyond minimum required levels of soil erosion (t= tolerable soil erosion), to save energy, to set water quality goals for the lakeshore basin; to encourage variety in wildlife habitat (Farmer-to-farmer-meeting, 2004, Casco). At the last farmer-to-farmer meeting this resulted in a collaborative effort to enter a process to formulate individual EMS’s for each farmer.

**No struggles at the Statewide Convening**

In so far as I can judge based on the analysis of minutes of meetings and the final report from 2006, participants at the statewide convening did not engage in a reflective conversation. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that participants enacted both government and deliberative governance discourse. The deliberative governance discourse that they enacted was not only discursive. I interpret the mixed composition of the group and their engagement as “experts” in a collaborative search for policy priorities as a shift toward deliberative governance discourse. The deliberative governance discourse that they enacted was not only discursive. I interpret the mixed composition of the group and their engagement as “experts” in a collaborative search for policy priorities as a shift toward deliberative governance discourse. Participants cooperated to generate all types of environmental standards that went beyond normal rules and regulations. For example, the top priority that these participants agreed on was:

“There needs to be better enforcement of existing laws and enhanced monitoring and BMP (best management practices) enforcement from all agencies. BMP’s need to be continued after funding ceases” (FNM report DNR-LNRP, 2004).

This was prioritized collaboratively, which meant that farmers and environmentalists agreed on it. At the statewide meetings participants agreed that it was government’s responsibility to enforce regulations. Thus, all stakeholders demanded reinforcement of the command and control system and enacted these elements of government discourse. They also produced several minimum requirements of environmental improvements before diary producers could be granted a logo. This was an enactment of an element of deliberative governance discourse.

**Collaborative inquiry and agenda setting**

After the critical moment in the previous step, the fourth and last step at the three types of meetings was that participants engaged in collaborative agenda setting and did this in a reflective way. Participants collaboratively established the issues that should be dealt with, what experts should be involved, and what time-line they would follow. They reenacted this element of deliberative governance discourse and they continued dialogue and learning. Participants at the three different types of meetings also transcended discursive boundaries between their subdiscourses when they further explored how stewardship should be interpreted.

At the farmer-to-neighbor meetings and the Statewide Convening the participants established the credibility of the deliberative governance discourse in a similar way. The mediators encouraged them to avoid conflict and to engage in dialogue and learning. At all meetings participants agreed to this. However, at one farmer-to-neighbor meeting the participants agreed that issues had been solved and for now they need not continue dialogue. In the Statewide Convening in this last step, participants agreed that this had been a fruitful way to cooperate. In the final report, one of the seven suggestions was to “continue collaboration” (Webne-Behrman, 2005a; 2005b). Hence, at the end of the meetings, both at the farmer-to-neighbor meetings and at the Statewide Convening participants agreed to continue dialogue and learning.

Moreover, at both sorts of meetings participants agreed to continue to explore the meaning of stewardship. For example, the participants of the Statewide Convening reproduced the idea of stewardship in four of their collaboratively established recommendations to improve and monitor farmers’ environmental performance. In addition, they made two suggestions to government to facilitate stewardship: to invest more in planning by changing a part of the Federal Farm Bill, and to move away from production incentive payments to conservation enhancing payments (Webne-Behrman, 2005a).

It was interesting that at all farmer-to-neighbor meetings it was the farmers that first had to re-emphasize that they were committed to stewardship and that they wanted to continue dialogue with the neighbors. One of the industrial farmers strongly connected this to the sustainability of the community:

“We don’t want to cause problems for anyone else and want to be here and happy with our neighbors. Nothing is more precious than having good friends and good neighbors. There are times when we rely on each other a lot. It’s a system that takes care of itself if everyone works together, like a church group, club, or organization” (LNRP 2004, minutes of 2nd meeting Olson farm).

At most meetings the neighbors confirmed that the farmer was a steward of the land and of their community. Most of the neighbors felt confident that they would be able to continue this type of interaction with their neighboring farm.

Subsequently, when farmers, neighbors, and governmental actors could not resolve issues, they agreed on how to proceed after the meeting. The mediator initiated this agenda, stating that all meetings would consist of three points: what issues are going to be discussed, who needs to be invited, and what experts need to be included? For example, at one farmer-to-
neighbor meeting a farmer announced that he was going to apply for a permit to expand the farm and that “issues” in the community with this expansion could be addressed at the next meeting (LNRP, 2004b, Fenendael farm). At another meeting, all participants agreed to collectively monitor odor nuisance and improve the solutions of the farmer to reduce it. The farmer planned to test a straw cover of the manure pit to reduce the nuisance (LNRP, 2004a, Dairy Dreams).

In addition to the issues, the mediators initiated reflective conversations about how dialogue and learning should be continued. For example, participants discussed who should be involved, what experts were acceptable, and why. The next excerpt gives an example of how participants in one farmer-to-neighbor meeting established who was an acceptable expert.

Mediator: “ [...] a couple of times people have said, ‘Well I don’t know this,’ or ‘I don’t know that.’ It seems to me that if we’re going to resolve situations, we need to have as much specific information about each situation as we can [...] I mean the farmer can’t make a difference unless we know specifically what we’re talking about. At the next meeting I would like to invite DB to be here. He’s the DNR person who’s in charge of things like this. He will not be here in a role as someone to enforce things or do things, but he will be an enormous amount of information for us (LNRP 2004, minutes of 1st meeting DD).

This proposal to invite a DNR employee, even though the mediator explained that the expert’s role at this meeting was to be different from his normal role as an enforcer, was successfully contested by both the neighbors and the farmers:

“...as you mention DB, I sort of looked around the room and I saw at least five sets of eyes roll. A lot of people in this room have some experience with DB and it has not been a good experience” (LNRP 2004, minutes of 1st meeting DD).

After this remark, the participants agreed that this DNR person was not welcome. However, they did accept a proposal of an industrial farmer to invite a local conservation agent:

Industrial farmer: “[... and TK, you know if anybody wanted somebody else to come up, he’d be a good guy to ask questions of, being a field unit man, if we were going to continue to bring somebody else in. He doesn’t have to, he’s not a DB [DNR] or AW [Conservation Agent], he’s a field unit guy. I mean he’s got a 30-cow farm south of Kewaunee, so he understands” (LNRP 2004, minutes of 1st meeting DD).

This agent was more credible to the participants, as he was not part of the DNR and perhaps more importantly, he was an experiential expert since he has experience as a farm owner.

Hence, at the statewide meetings and at all farmer-to-neighbor meetings, the participants agreed to continue the deliberations. Indeed, at the local level indeed several meetings followed. I do not know if after the three statewide meetings, this group continued to meet but I expect not with the same composition nor with an agenda that continued the learning process.

At the farmer-to-farmer meetings, the mediator encouraged farmers to collaboratively set the agenda for the next meetings and to agree in what fashion and with what timeline they would further develop the environmental management systems. The farmers responded with some reservations, for example, they argued that they needed to speak to other farmers before they could promise anything. However, at both meetings they also decided to proceed with the development of an EMS. For example, they agreed to design generic EMS’s for three different sizes of farms. These could serve as an example to other farmers:

“I think what we need to do is to build a general EMS program and then, I’m just going to throw an idea out: we’re going to design a general EMS program for Thomas [small] and Dave [medium-sized] and my [large] farm and then we’ll try to put that together and see if that would work in tier, whatever it is, 1 or 2 or 3” (Farmer-to-farmer meeting Casco, 2004).

At the farmer-to-farmer meeting in Cleveland a year later, farmers took more steps to continue the development and implementation of EMS’s. As such they gave substance and commitment to their role as stewards of the land. Already a couple of farms had developed and implemented an EMS, and at this meeting more farmers were persuaded to implement one. Participants set up an EMS training schedule.

At all three types of meetings, the mediators facilitated the enactment of dialogue, learning and stewardship. At the end of the meetings, participants agreed to continue a dialogue or the learning effort. In most cases farmers, in cooperation with their neighbors, governmental actors and even environmental organizations, further explored how they could be good stewards, and as such participants enacted this boundary concept also.

Conclusions: enactment of stewardship, dialogue and learning

In deliberations between government and society that in this case consisted of the farmer-to-neighbor meetings and the Statewide Convening, and in deliberations of government and businesses in the case of farmer-to-farmer meetings, the mediators or other actors introduced the boundary concepts of dialogue and stewardship. From the above, I can conclude that participants for the most part engaged in reflective conversations and enacted the dialogue concept without any doubt. There was but one example of a meeting in which conflict occurred, and as I did not observe the statewide meetings I cannot conclude what type of conversation took place.

Dialogue and learning

The mediators adapted the boundary concepts that the change coalition had formed in the first stage of this project to the particulars of the different deliberative venues. For example, they introduced dialogue in the interactions of government with society at the regional level and learning at the farmer-to-farmer meetings and the statewide convening. I interpret this difference as an indication that learning is a concept that relates to a sense of professionalism and expertise that participants at the statewide level and at the farmers-to-farmers meetings have. In addition, this concept is more closely related to problem solving which among professionals might be more convincing. The meaning of dialogue is more closely related to community building, citizenship, and to the democratic quality of decision making. These issues might be of greater concern to citizens than to professionals in organizations that represent interests of farmers or environmental organizations.

In addition to these adaptations of the boundary concepts to the participants of deliberative venues, the mediators applied strategies of indirection (Forester, 2000; 2009) to gain more support for the boundary concepts. At the local level in farmer-to-neighbor meetings the consultants asked participants to share their community and history, and at the statewide level the participants searched for core values about Wisconsin. As far as I can tell, at the farmer-to-farmer meetings these strategies were not applied. I interpret this to mean that the farmer-to-neighbor and Statewide Convening took place in a more
adversarial context than the farmers’ meetings. To gain credibility for deliberative governance and to disrupt government discourse in these more adversarial contexts, the mediators took this into account in their deliberative designs.

The mediators’ introduction of dialogue and learning was very successful. Participants never contested learning and dialogue. There were a few moments at which conflict re-entered the conversations, but the mediator successfully asked participants to avoid animosities. The participants of all three types of meetings enacted the boundary concepts of dialogue and learning. I can also conclude that the mediators used these concepts to avoid and redirect conflicts about the interpretation of stewardship.

**Stewardship, hands-on solutions and EMS**

At the three types of meetings, mediators and other members of the change coalition also translated the boundary concept *stewardship*. For example, in deliberations between farmers and neighbors, the mediator asked the farmers to present hands on solutions to solve environmental issues. Another example is that at the Statewide Convening and in deliberations between farmers, the mediator invited experts to explain how farmers could be better stewards of the land when they developed an EMS. At the statewide convening the mediator asked all participants to enable farmers to be better stewards and collaboratively produce generic standards that could be applied in individual EMS’s.

The translation or contextualization of the concept *stewardship* was a way by which the change coalition attempted to alter the interpretation of farmers as polluters to farmers as conservers. They created a sphere of engagement with this concept and with the proposal to further develop an EMS and generic standards for these programs. At some meetings, participants struggled with these different interpretations. As we saw, at the farmer-to-neighbor meeting, the neighbors contested stewardship to mean the responsibility of farmers to improve the environment. Another example is the farmer-to-farmer meetings at which the explanation of an EMS enabled farmers to no longer consider government only as a prosecutor and environmentalists only as being in the business of ruining farmers. Farmers became more convinced that government could instead consider farmers to be stewards. Moreover, farmers interpreted an EMS as self-regulation but also agreed that government or environmental organizations still were needed to monitor or at least audit these regulations.

At the statewide level I lacked detailed documents to see how the generic standards were deliberated on, but it appears as if every participant could bring his own interpretation to the table and draw boundaries around these subdiscourses. These boundaries enriched the discussion as they were all acknowledged for their expertise. Rather than blocking the conversations, they were understood as a presentation of interests. At the farmer-to-neighbor meetings — except for one meeting at which participants acknowledged the stewardship of farmers immediately — participants struggled with the interpretation of stewardship of farmers and with their proposed solutions for environmental issues. At one of the meetings both a farmer and a citizen fell back into their unreflective adversarial conversations. The mediator turned this conflict into a deliberation.

In general, at the farmer-to-neighbor meetings the struggles about the interpretations of stewardship resulted in an enactment of this concept. Farmers and neighbors further engaged in conversations about how to improve the environmental quality of their community.

Cautiously I conclude that the enactment of dialogue facilitated a setting in which participants could struggle about the meaning of stewardship. Participants did not contest or negotiate the meaning of dialogue and learning. These concepts merely enabled participants to engage in an interpretive struggle about the meaning of the boundary concept of *stewardship*. As a result of this struggle, stewardship and dialogue became credible concepts. However, participants also enacted two elements of government discourse. Those were the role of government in monitoring and auditing (especially at the farmer-to-farmer meetings participants agreed on this), and its role in creating standards (especially participants of the statewide convening demanded this).

The mediators’ introduction of boundary concepts contributed to a crossing of boundaries by participants between their subdiscourses and between government and deliberative governance discourse. In addition, the mediators “translated” (Fishchikova, 2006) the boundary concepts to the specifics of the different types of meetings. Finally, the mediators applied strategies of indirection (Forester, 2000; 2009) to gain support for the boundary concepts. As a result, participants could more easily negotiate the meaning of the boundary concepts and coproduce deliberative governance discourse.
The 2007 annual progress report on the Green Tier lists fifteen participants in the Green Tier Program of which three had charters with business associations; one company was under tier 2; and eleven were in tier one (DNR-CEA, 2007, p. 10). Holsum Dairies was one of the Tier 1 companies. Even though Holsum Dairies had supported the Dairy Gateway project and participated at the last farmer-to-farmer meeting that I included in the analysis, none of the farmers from the Northeast of Wisconsin signed a contract with the DNR until May 2007. However, on the 29th of November 2007 DNR Secretary Matt Frank and association executive director Laurie Fischer of the Dairy Business Association signed a Green Tier charter between the DNR and the DBA (DNR NewsRelease, 2007). This charter applies to all members of the DBA and it will monitor the EMS’s of its members. Once every three years an independent auditor will audit the monitoring. All farmers that participated at the farmer-to-farmer meetings were members of the DBA. One CAFO-owner was and still is on the board of directors of the DBA. In addition, this charter includes elements of “superior environmental performance” that had been identified at that Statewide Convening. The picture below shows that at least three farmers involved in the Dairy Gateway project were present at the signing event. However, to my knowledge, none of the environmental organizations were part of the drafting of the charter, or of EMS’s for individual farms. However, DNR-CEA met with these environmental organizations several times to review early drafts of the charter. “The charter in its final form includes several changes requested by those groups” (e-mail Shenot August 2010).

A 2009 evaluation of the Green Tier Law suggests that in some areas environmental performance improved. For example, it appears as if Green Tier companies reduced their hazardous waste more than non-Green Tier companies between 2005 and 2006 (see figure 4.4). Further, the report concludes that “averages for volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxide were statistically different between Green Tier and the rest of the state. In both cases, the average for the Green Tier program was higher than the rest of the state. The averages for particulate matter, hazardous waste, and sulfur dioxide were not statistically different between the two groups” (WDNR, 2009, p. 89). Hence, the Dairy Gateway project resulted in the development and implementation of EMS’s at several farms. Their environmental performance and the positive impact on the environment cannot be confirmed yet.

4.4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF BOUNDARY WORK IN THE DAIRY GATEWAY PROJECT

In my conclusion I present the similarities and differences in types and content of boundary work across the two stages of the project, and across the sites of interaction and their various deliberative venues. This provides an answer to the questions of whether participants accepted, reflected upon or rejected boundary work and gives the results of these conversations. In other words, did participants think deliberative governance was credible and thus disrupt dominant government discourse? This section also provides some conclusions in relation to the reflective research design.

CREDIBLE DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE DISCOURSE

In the first stage, the drafting of the proposal for the Dairy Gateway project, a change coalition was formed. The member interacted and the pattern of boundary work I constructed from their interactions was introduction of boundary concepts of dialogue and learning; the demarcation of these concepts from conflict; the introduction of the boundary concept of stewardship; struggles about interpretation of stewardship; and agreement on the three boundary concepts. The change coalition defined the three boundary concepts: dialogue, learning and stewardship. Potential members of the change coalition interpreted these concepts in a variety of ways. This was especially true of their different interpretations of the concept of stewardship, which caused some struggles. One of the potential members of the coalition left when the majority of the coalition turned to the Farm Mediation Program. This potential member no longer considered the interpretation of stewardship credible as it now included stewardship of industrial farmers. At the end of this first stage, the environmentalists’ interpretation of stewardship became less powerful.

However, participants in the farmer-to-neighbor meetings, the Statewide Convening, and the farmer-to-farmer meetings believed that industrial farmers could be stewards of the land and community. At these meetings, mediators and other members of the change coalition
such as academic experts translated and contextualized stewardship to the participants. Mediators also applied strategies of indirection to encourage participants to enter a dialogue about the interpretation of stewardship. Moreover, a possible suspicious actor, such as an industrial farmer or a governmental actor, introduced stewardship. At the same time these actors demonstrated how they were going to be stewards. At the farmer-to-neighbor meetings it was the farmers of industrial farms that had to prove their credibility as stewards. In interactions between government and farmers it was a governmental actor who had to prove the government was going to act differently. They had to prove that stewardship also meant that government would trust farmers to set their own environmental standards.

Hence, the introduction of the boundary concept of stewardship by suspicious actors, the translation of stewardship to specific deliberative venues, and the strategies of indirection were all successful. Participants accepted various interpretations of stewardship. For example, farmers gained credibility as stewards and stewardship was no longer the privilege of small- and medium-sized farms. Government gained credibility as a facilitator of environmental improvements through stewardship. Farmers also interpreted stewardship to mean that they would themselves create regulations above and beyond governmental regulations AND that government would ‘police’ these regulations. However, it remained vague whether environmental organizations or neighbors might be involved in the monitoring or policing. To some extent participants disrupted government discourse and started to believe in deliberative governance, but they also granted credibility to some elements of government discourse such as government’s monitoring and auditing.

**SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE RESEARCH DESIGN**

The analysis of boundary work demonstrates that gaining credibility for deliberative governance discourse through boundary work is a contextual activity. In the Dairy Gateway project it was a successful way to get elements of deliberative governance discourse accepted: dialogue, learning and stewardship. Participants interpreted the boundary concept *stewardship* in various ways but were very straightforward in their acceptance of dialogue and learning as new ways that we term deliberative governance.

The adaptation of dialogue and learning made it possible for participants to further engage in a struggle about the interpretation and implementation of stewardship. Participants did accept the interpretation of stewardship to mean that farmers, and even industrial farms, can voluntarily improve their environmental performance. The easy adaptation of dialogue and learning can be explained in several ways. Perhaps the demarcation of dialogue and learning from conflict was the most convincing. It could also be said that the mediators did an excellent job and were convincing through their strategies of indirection. Perhaps the translations to the specific deliberative venues did the trick. Perhaps farmers were already considered to be stewards of the land. There is another explanation that has not yet been addressed. Perhaps a demarcation of learning and dialogue was successful because they were part of another dominant discourse, namely, the “learning discourse.” I can describe this as the idea that it is always a good thing to enlighten, to learn, to educate, or to improve. This conclusion resembles the idea from chapter three in which we saw that participants related their demarcations and transcending to a discourse on expertise. It is possible that boundary transcending is successful when it relates to some form of learning. In the next chapter, and especially in the comparison of the Dairy Gateway project to the Protein Highway Project, I will pay extra attention to this.
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of boundary work in an experiment with deliberative governance in the Middle East of the Netherlands: the Protein Corridor Project: Make it Happen. This policy project ran from the end of 2002 until June 2005 and involved farmers’ representatives, retailers, environmental and animal welfare organizations, and financiers in building scenarios for the region. The plan of the consultants was to include citizens in this process too, but this did not happen (see attachment 5.1 for a timeline).

5.1. INTRODUCTION TO A DUTCH CONTEXT

“If the agro-sector of Gelderland wants to continue to be of importance in the long run, radical change is necessary”* (ATO: Goossens, 2003, p.3).

The Province of Gelderland and the Province of Overijssel, in cooperation with academic experts, constructed the “A1 Protein Corridor” as a region. This region covers an area of approximately twenty kilometers on each side of the A1 artery between Amersfoort in the middle of the Netherlands and Hengelo in the East. In comparison to the Dairy Gateway, the area around the A1 between Amersfoort and Hengelo is densely populated and houses many modernized industrial agriculture businesses. There are almost 4500 relatively small-scale farms in the area. Pig farms for pork production are located mostly in the east of the area, calf farms for the production of veal in the middle, and chicken farms for eggs and meat in the west around Barneveld. Slaughterhouses, meat processors, animal feed production, and transporters are located close to the highway on which one out of every three trucks transports agricultural products (LEI: Jahae, 1999, quoted in Platform Agrologistiek, 2007; KLICKT Chain networks, 2004). Although modernization, regulations and rural planning in this area can be regarded as one step beyond those in the Dairy Gateway area, along the A1 “Protein Highway” there still are small country roads that run through meadows, over dikes, through the polders, and through the heather fields in the “De Hoge Veluwe” national park. This natural park intersects with the A1 artery (see figure 5.1. with a map of the area).

The issues with nature conservation, land use, and agrobusinesses in this region resemble those of many rural areas in the Netherlands. Over the last 10 years the additional value to the gross national product of the agricultural sector in the Netherlands, especially the intensive livestock farming, decreased by 12% (LNV, 2004, p. 8). Even though only the United States and France export more agricultural products, and the transport and processing of agricultural products still slowly increases, the sector has a difficult time competing on the European and global markets (LNV, 2004, p. 5 and 8). This decline of the economic value of the sector together with an increase in strains on land use in this “differentiated landscape” (Reten, 1999; Lachapelle et al., 2003) have been reasons for Dutch planners to speculate about a disappearance of the agricultural sector from the Netherlands (Vereijken, 2004; RPB, 2005). The projected “economic implosion” (economische implosie) of the countryside made it possible for governmental actors and planners to think of new scenarios for Dutch rural areas. If these areas were no longer to be used as agricultural landscapes — production landscapes —, they might be used as
consumer landscapes with means for recreation, housing, and combined functions such as farming and recreation, or farming and social or medical care.

Plattelandsvernieuwing ("innovation of rural areas") is what the Dutch government calls this. It is the answer of the National Ministry of Agriculture and Food Quality, and the agricultural sector to an increase in its importance. Agriculture should become more sustainable and combine several functions to revitalize the Dutch countryside (LNV, 2004; LNV et al. 2004). In addition, in 2001 the Ministry of Agriculture in the Agro-Logistics Vision proposed agro-logistical innovations to reduce the strains on land use by the agricultural sector. Among these innovations were clustering of the remaining agrobusinesses, and a facilitation of cooperation in networks and chains (LNV, 2001). On top of that, in 2002 the Reconstruction Law became operational. This law was initiated in response to animal welfare and food quality issues, for example, an outbreak of swine fever (1997/1998) or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), in combination with the difficulties of preventing this and other diseases from spreading. With this law the Dutch National government instigated a process in which governmental actors in cooperation with other societal actors developed "Reconstruction Plans." These plans took care of zoning and planning for development of agriculture and businesses, or for nature conservation.

In 2004 the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel presented the results of their coproduced reconstruction plans. Stakeholders and shareholders from the areas, including representatives of the agro-sector (LTO), nature conservationists, environmentalists, and representatives from the tourist industry deliberated over these plans and cooperated intensively to reach consensus. In response to the issues addressed in the plans the province of Gelderland together with its development agency and researchers from Wageningen University Research began a process in the middle eastern part of the country that established the A1 Protein Corridor as a region. According to them, this area had specific problems with spatial differentiation that could be solved with the help of clustering of agribusinesses.

The construction of the A1 Protein Corridor as a region was an incremental process that involved many actors. I reconstructed three steps in this process that each relate to provincial and national policy developments. Each of these steps increased the deliberations between government, academia, businesses, and other societal stakeholders. The last step, scenario-building in "Protein Highway: Make it Happen" was the most deliberative part. I analyzed boundary work in this part. Before we turn to the results of this analysis, I will shortly describe the two preceding steps that illustrate the cooperative culture in which the attempt to innovate policy formation took place.

**Step 1: The Protein Corridor as a region**

In the first step, the Departments of Economic Affairs and Rural Development of the Province of Gelderland applied what they called an "expert approach" (ATO: Peter Smeets, 2003, p. 10). They hired scientists from Wageningen University Research (Agrotechnologisch onderzoeksinstiut (ATO), Alterra, and Landbouw Economisch Instituut (LEI)) to collaborate with "experienced experts of consultancy firms" to "facilitate and stimulate a process of change" (ATO: Goossens, 2003, p. 3). The experts produced a document in which they developed two scenarios for the region: one with cluster development and one without. With help of images of the region, the scientists claimed that cluster development was inevitable whether or not the agro-industry was to be maintained in the region. Not only a diminishing of the primary sector — the farms — was a risk, so was a diminishing of the sector of agro-processors and transporters. Moreover, the quality of the landscape and scenery were under pressure. The scientists concluded that governmental actors had to stimulate and facilitate cluster development and the formation of three types of agroparks, the agro-production park, the agro-production satellite park, and the rural park (see pictures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The Province of Gelderland took up the gauntlet and declared itself a "catalyst" for these developments (ATO: Goossens, 2003).

These types of cluster development should work as a "space-pump" (ruimtepomp) (ATO: Goossens, 2003, p. 3) and were intended to create more land for nature conservation,
housing, and recreation, and also for other types of economic activities. The suggestions in this scholarly document not incidentally resembled solutions presented in the national Agrologistics Vision: Cluster, Connect, Direct (Ministry of LNV and V&W, 2001). Provincial government and the academics from WUR were looking for a way to promote and implement the ideas in this Vision, as well as ways to receive financial support for these efforts, for example, from the national government.

**Step 2: Agroparks in the Protein Corridor**

The results from the first step were used in a proposal for a projected part of the KLICT program (Wagenberg, 2003). KLICT is an abbreviation for Ketennettenwerken, Logistiek & ICT (Klict:200) that translates into “Chain-networks, Logistics and Information Communication Technology.” This national program was created to stimulate implementation of the Agrologistics Vision. In the proposal to KLICT, governmental actors and academic experts continued the planned construction of the region in two ways. The first was the expert approach in which they produced three academic positioning papers, and they introduced what they called “action research” (WUR et al., 2003, p. 11).

In the three positioning papers, the researchers presented a problem analysis of agriculture and land use issues in the region. They addressed the tension between the economical and social significance of the agro-food sector on one hand, and the increasing economical and societal problems on the other (WUR, 2003, p. 22). Moreover, the academic experts spoke of the A1 Corridor in which a “blanket of odor circles” (deken van stankcirkels) “locks development in the region” (regio zit op slot) (ATO: Goossens, 2003, p. 3). In contrast to the “policy gaps” in the USA, in the Netherlands the experts blamed an abundance of government rules and regulations for the increase in economic growth in this sector.

The researchers also presented alternative solutions for the region: the A1 Protein Corridor concept and cluster development that included cooperation in (business) networks (Broeze, 2003a, p. 9). They addressed these issues as “systems innovation” that they defined as “complex innovations” in the sense that “a variety of stakeholders (operations, societal organizations, governments) together have to innovate” (Broeze, 2003b, p. 5). In other words, it would be innovative not to depend solely on government but to cooperate with other businesses, societal actors, and with government to increase efficient use of energy and land and to reduce waste. The academics invited entrepreneurs, government and societal actors to engage in deliberations in five thematic arenas (see attachment 5.2. for participants in these arenas). They called this “network-steering”. The arenas facilitated “coalition-formation,” an “inventory of questions,” and a “test of feasibility” of concepts (WUR, 2003, p. 34).

From the above I can reconstruct the elements of deliberative governance discourse as they had been established so far (see figure 5.2 for an overview). The normal situation was that the importance of Dutch agriculture and related industry declines; government usually contributes to this process as it limits entrepreneurship and technological innovations by rules and regulations that protect the spatial quality, environment and animals. Moreover, businesses do contribute to this process since they do not cooperate or share knowledge. Subsequently, environmental and welfare organizations contribute to this decline as they form coalitions with government to further protect the environment, animal, and spatial quality. A new situation might be systems innovation that includes cooperation in networks, coalition formation and the further elaboration of the ideas for cluster development to improve the spatial quality of the area and the prospects for businesses that university faculty had come up with.

![Figure 5.2. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in the first two steps of regional development](image-url)

In the third step, the participants of the five arenas continued to be involved and the organizers asked them to take up an even more active role in cluster development. The struggles over the interpretation of the elements of deliberative governance discourse evolved.

### 5.2. AN EXPERIMENT: A1 PROTEIN HIGHWAY: MAKE IT HAPPEN!

The third step that I reconstructed in the development of the Protein Corridor region was the project “Protein Highway: Make it Happen.” In this step, the regional development increasingly became part of the implementation of the provincial Reconstruction Zoning Plans. As we saw, in 2002 the Reconstruction Law became effective which meant that the southern and eastern provinces of the Netherlands commenced a process of collaborative planning. Stakeholders in the rural areas on sandy soil were involved in the designation of agricultural “intensifying” (intensivering) and “extensifying” (extensivering) areas, areas respectively in which agricultural activities were to be further developed and areas in which nature conservation and recreation should be stimulated. The provincial actors wanted to develop and test options for cluster development in pilot projects. They considered cluster development as a way to implement the zoning plans. They instigated a process of “voluntary relocation” of agrobusinesses — another term for cluster development — that not only would benefit the scenery, land use, nature conservation and the environment but also agrobusinesses in the area. Protein Highway: Make it Happen was one of the ways to test and implement the relocations, and to test other ways to improve the “spatial quality” of the area.
At the start of this third step, a steering committee was formed by academics, consultants and the two provinces Overijssel and Gelderland, with help from their economic development agency Oost NV, several (non-paying) supporters from agrobusinesses, and a bank. They mobilized more financial resources and drafted a proposal for the project. Subsequently, the Innovation Network, a national governmental body that was formed to stimulate system innovation and sustainability in agriculture, got involved. Besides these financial resources, the project also received support from the Platform Agrologistics that is a joint effort of the agricultural corporate world and the Ministry of Agriculture to implement the Agrologistics Vision (LNV, 2003). Both the Innovation Network and the Platform became members of the steering committee. I consider this steering committee, together with the two consultants, Oost NV, and the academics that participated in KLICT to be the change coalition in this case.

The consultants attempted to gain support for the continuation of the development of the Protein Highway among participants from the five arenas from the previous KLICT project. In order to keep these entrepreneurs involved and have them engaged in pilot project that had been developed in the KLICT program, the consultants organized three “entrepreneurial deliberations.” These formed a bridge between the KLICT project and Protein Highway: Make it Happen. The consultants included input from these deliberations in the proposal for Make it Happen. Moreover, some of the entrepreneurs that agreed to start experimenting with cluster development in pilot projects stayed involved in “plenary sessions” (plenaire bijeenkomsten), also referred to as kwartiermakers. These sessions formed a bridge between the steering committee and their vision project and the implementation and tests of cluster development in the pilot projects.

The A1 Protein Highway project ran from the end of 2002, when the consultants drafted the first proposals, until June 2005. The steering committee agreed that in Protein Highway: Make it Happen the three concepts that concerned the agro-clusters and the pilot projects from the position papers and the arenas of the KLICT project had to be developed and more support (draagvlak) had to be created (see attachment 5.3. for an overview of the pilot projects and attachment 5.4. for the project-structure). Moreover, scenario development in the Shell tradition in which possible futures are explored together with stakeholders from the region, had to result in “a seductive perspective” that is recognizable for citizens and other users of land (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). The change coalition also agreed that special attention had to be paid to the “inclusion of more stakeholders, also from outside agriculture.” The ambition was to “find pacesetters that are oriented toward new solutions and not to “more of the same” (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). Two consultants, Van de Bunt and Rijnconsult, who specialized in scenario development and the agricultural sector respectively, convened and facilitated the scenario development. They organized a one-day scenario workshop that resulted in policy options for this region. From these scenarios the consultants subtracted a seductive perspective that was supposed to be, but never was, deliberated in arenas with all kinds of stakeholders.

I analyzed this stage of the project in greater detail starting at the end of 2002 through the end of 2005 (see attachment 5.5. for an overview of interviewees and observed meetings). I started the analysis with deliberations of governmental actors with businesses that had been involved in KLICT. At the same time the formation of a steering committee took place. I ended the analysis of boundary work when Oost NV and LTO-Oost erected a Platform for the Protein Highway. As in the case of the Bijlmerpark and Dairy Gateway projects, I analyzed this project in two stages: the drafting of the proposal and the implementation of the deliberative design. Next, I analyzed boundary work at three research sites:

- Interactions between government and advisors (these interactions took place solely in the first stage, the drafting of the proposal);
- Interactions between government and businesses that included an analysis of the meetings of the entrepreneurs (interactions in the first stage were the deliberations of entrepreneurs and in the second stage this included an analysis of plenary sessions);
- Interactions between government and society that included a detailed analysis of the scenario development.

5.3. BOUNDARY WORK IN THE PROTEIN HIGHWAY: MAKE IT HAPPEN PROJECT

This section first presents the results of boundary work within the change coalition, the steering committee and the “entrepreneurial deliberations” that led to the final proposal. In this stage the change coalition defined and enacted elements of deliberative governance discourse. Second, this section presents boundary work at the deliberative venues that consultants organized for the scenario workshop. These venues had a deliberative design. Besides these deliberative venues, I have also analyzed boundary work in the plenary sessions and steering committee meetings in which interactions took place without a deliberative design.

BOUNDARY WORK IN THE FIRST STAGE: INNOVATION AND SCENARIOS SAVE THE PROJECT

When the KLICT program finished, the Province of Gelderland together with a consultant and Oost NV — at the time still the Gelderse Ontwikkelings Maatschappij (GOM) and the Overijsselse Ontwikkelings Maatschappij (OOM) — undertook several activities to commence the third step in the development of the region. As we saw, they mobilized the business leaders from the area; they mobilized other policy actors; and they drafted a proposal for an organizational continuation of the collaborations that had been initiated by the KLICT program. The consultants Rijnconsult and Van de Bunt reworked this “multiple-year framework” (meerjarenkader), into a proposal for a scenario study in the region.

Business-leaders in the lead: cluster development for entrepreneurs

In this stage deliberations with business leaders from the region took place at three meetings. At the first meeting, the development agency presented the results of KLICT (GOM, 2003, 28 January 2003 Huis Nieuwe Rande; Oost NV, 2003). At the second meeting the facilitator evoked a discussion amongst GOM and the businesses about proposed solutions in KLICT (GOM, 2003, 6 June 2003 Huis Nieuwe Rande). At the third meeting on the 4th of November 2003 at the Hotel Hoog Holte (Oost, 2003) two consultants of Buck and Arcadis were invited to present their ideas on cluster development. They presented
three of the pilot projects from the KLICT project: "Rural Park," "Agro-logistics," and "Optimization of feedstreams."

The analysis demonstrated a pattern of boundary work that led to the acceptance of one element of governance rather than deliberative governance discourse: businesses should take the lead in cluster development. Their entrepreneurship should be stimulated. In greater detail boundary work at the three meetings took place as follows: At all three meetings, first the province of Gelderland and Oost NV presented a doomsday scenario. At all three meetings, Oost NV presented a “shrink scenario” for the agro-sector. This scenario, as Oost NV argued:

“can lead to a disappearance of all cattle farms from the area and with them to the economic downturn of processing and food industries that depend on those farms” (Oost NV, 2003).

Second, Oost NV and academics presented innovation and cluster development as possible solutions. These new solutions transcended organizational, knowledge, spatial and discursive boundaries. They were multi-interpretable. Therefore I will consider them boundary concepts. For example, at one meeting with the entrepreneurs a consultant made this boundary spanning explicit:

“Economic interests and land use/planning in rural areas are always on strained terms. We have to bring these two worlds together. This group can play a role in that” (Oost, 2003).

The concepts that Oost NV and consultants introduced encouraged participants to transcend boundaries between three different agro-sectors, those of calves, poultry and pigs, for the benefit of all. Moreover, Oost NV attempted to span the boundary between government discourse in which spatial clustering would be a government responsibility and governance discourse in which entrepreneurs also might take up responsibility for the spatial quality.

Hence, Oost NV argued that innovations of all kinds were necessary to prevent the doomsday scenario from coming true. Business-leaders could interpret these possible solutions, innovation and cluster development, to mean various things. For example, cluster development meant working together in the region; it meant the development of agroparks; it meant spatial cluster-development; it meant organizational cluster development. Participants could interpret innovations as systems innovations but these could also be all sorts of technological innovations to improve the economic and spatial quality of the region (Oost NV, 2003).

Third, in response to the introduction of these concepts, some of the business leaders contested the concepts. The business leaders marked a business subdiscourse in which government is considered to limit entrepreneurship and innovation. For example, the business leaders would argue that government should withdraw. The rules, regulations, and zoning were the cause of the problems in the region. Therefore, businesses should be leading in cluster development.

Dumeco: “The initiative has to come from industry. Politics is the greatest threat to agriculture in the Netherlands” (GOM, 2003).

Or zoning had to be less strict. It should be easier for agrobusinesses to expand:

Nutreco Holding NV: “The scale of the companies and their space for innovation are crucial. Moving and clustering of businesses are not the only answers. Entrepreneurs should get land.space at places where it is already possible” (Oost, 2003).

Thus, business leaders did not accept the boundary concepts immediately, but contested them.

Fourth, in response to these demarcations of entrepreneurial subdiscourse, Oost NV argued that the relationships between government and businesses could change. Government no longer wants restrict entrepreneurs but wants to facilitate them. For example, the development agency of the province of Gelderland cited itself as an example of this change in government:

GOM: “But something is changing. In Gelderland one is thinking of a development agency for rural areas. We want to stimulate entrepreneurship” (GOM, 2003).

This demonstration by example of the possibility of this element of governance discourse, namely, “government facilitates rather than restricts,” continued in a collaborative search for how government can help businesses through cluster development. Oost NV: “What do you need, for example, for cluster development?”

Dumeco: “You can choose cluster development from two points of view: on the one hand, to reduce the cost (the closer together the better). On the other hand from a marketing point of view as PR for the region” (GOM, 2003).

Cluster development functioned as a boundary concept as it allowed governmental actors, Oost NV, to introduce their changed role as facilitators rather than restrictors of entrepreneurship. The participating businesses leaders interpreted this concept as something that governmental actors introduced to benefit their entrepreneurship, their business and sector.

In these interactions, the participants also established that cluster development did not mean active involvement of businesses in spatial planning/reconstruction. This more ambitious element of deliberative governance discourse did not gain credibility:

Van Drie Groep: “It has nothing to do with the reconstruction?”

GOM: “The reconstruction was not a reason to start this project. In fact it has nothing to do with it. We are focussed on the primary industry” (GOM, 2003).

Hence, while the change coalition argued and demonstrated that government is changing toward facilitation rather than restriction of “entrepreneurship,” businesses did not want to be involved in spatial planning. That was considered government’s job. While the business leaders acknowledged that cluster and chain development might be in their own interests, they also claimed this was nothing new and they wished to remain far from spatial development.

Thus, the change coalition made an effort to introduce a new element of governance discourse: government facilitates (schept voorwaarden) and most business leaders were convinced. However, participants rejected elements of deliberative governance discourse that pointed toward a direction that businesses together with government would be able to improve the use of land and the spatial quality in the area. They rejected this deliberative governance interpretation of cluster development. Governmental actors argued with the business leaders that the most important objective was to facilitate entrepreneurship. In this setting actors formed a coalition around this idea of entrepreneurship which was a boundary concept in this setting (see figure 5.3, for an overview).
The steering committee silently disagrees about scenarios and innovation

The steering committee members were entangled in an interpretation struggle similar to the entrepreneurs. Members interpreted cluster development in the protein corridor in different ways. For example, they discussed whether the scenarios for the protein corridor were to be seductive perspectives to convince business-leaders to instigate relocations? Or were these to be developed into several possible scenarios in which relocation might be one feature but other possible solutions for an improvement of the area might also come up? The Innovation Network interpreted the development of the protein corridor to include an improvement of the spatial and environmental quality as well as economic viability as a shared responsibility of businesses, government and other stakeholders in the region. As one of the people from the Innovation Network argued:

“In vision development, in our interpretation, you have to start as broad as possible. You will have to try to include stakeholders in the area, try to create a movement. The agro sector will not be able to convince the rest of the world that they are doing the right thing. Then it is a PR story. You have to dare to really discuss. The conclusion of these deliberations might be that it is not such a great idea to develop clusters. But the people have to come up with those ideas themselves” (Interview-De Wilt I, 2004).

The two provinces interpreted these concepts mainly as a way to convince businesses to take the initiative to re-locate to designated intensifying areas that were designed in coproduction to improve the spatial quality and economic viability of the area. They wanted “practical results” (Interview-De Jager, 2004; Interview-Folkerts, 2004). As one of the consultants said:

“The administrator argued: ‘yes, we need both feet on the ground.’ The elected official needs to be able to score with this project” (Interview-Van Waes, 2004).

Thus, Innovation Network wanted to continue coproduction in networks to implement the reconstruction plans. The provinces wanted to activate businesses to take up responsibility to implement the reconstruction plans. These two different interpretations can be understood to represent elements, first, of deliberative governance discourse in which a broader network of actors, especially “counter-power” actors (Grin, 2007) such as animal welfare organizations should be included in a bottom up development of the problem definition and solutions, and second, as an element of normal government discourse in which communication of academic and governmental solutions came from the top down.

On several occasions members of the steering committee demarcated these two interpretations when they discussed the proposal. Two critical moments that resembled a critical moment in the Dairy Gateway project occurred when, first, the financiers formalized their financial contributions and second, when they selected the consultants. These consultants were to represent the steering committee, draw up the deliberative design, and facilitate the deliberations. Innovation Network demanded the inclusion of a consultant that was less involved with the agro-sector and specialized in scenario development in the tradition of the Shell oil company in which possible scenarios rather than one vision are developed together with a broad range of stakeholders. As Oost NV argued:

“[InnovationNetwork] thought that Van de Bunt would do better on this. I do not necessarily agree on that. But [they] thought that Rijnconsult was focussed too much on the businesses and too little on other important stakeholders and interests” (Interview-Hoekmans, 2004).

On the other hand, one of the provinces did not want to finance the visioning part of the project but only the implementation of the pilot projects. As, among others, the Innovation Network argued in an interview:

“Well, [the province of] Gelderland did not like a vision. They did like the concrete projects. But they thought the vision too vague. It was most of all elected official Aalderink, he had had some bad experiences with ICES/KIS projects in which a lot of consultants had been involved. He thought there were too many consultants and wondered where the businesses were” (de Wilt I, 2004).

To overcome these demarcations, Oost NV proposed some practical solutions, for example, to hire an extra consultant, and the provinces proposed to change the finance structure into one in which he province of Gelderland financed the project indirectly through the development agency. Next to the practical solutions, the consultants introduced two new boundary concepts, scenarios and innovation, that spanned the government-governance boundary that divided the steering committee.

Boundary concept scenarios

In the three positioning papers the university experts had already developed scenarios. They constructed a doomsday scenario for the region, and they provided solutions in a possible scenario of cluster development in the protein corridor. In the proposal for Protein Highway: Make it Happen, yet a different possible interpretation of scenarios was introduced: plausible scenarios that could be used as a tool in deliberations. Thus, at this point members of the steering committee could interpret the concept “scenarios” in at least three ways:

1. As the seductive perspective; created by academics in cooperation with government and some businesses in previous steps of development of the region;
2. As a fearful perspective; predictions were used to convince other stakeholders of the seductive perspective and proposed solutions in it;
3. Finally, scenarios were a tool to induce deliberations and explorations of possible futures and options in those futures.

To start with the first two interpretations: this is how scenarios had been interpreted in the two previous stages. Academics developed the doomsday scenario as well as the seductive perspective to raise “awareness” of the problems and solutions in the area. At the same time these scenarios had to convince the actors of the necessity of the proposed scientific solutions for this region already in the position papers. The consultants presented the "seductive perspective" of the protein corridor to convince other actors. They wanted to create support (draagvlak) for this perspective through deliberations:
“Elements that need to be elaborated are a clear vision of the spatial, economic and social developments of the area that result in a ‘seductive perspective’ in which citizens and other land-users can recognize themselves, a good integration and coordination with current initiatives and policy frameworks”(Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003, p.2).

The consultants presented the third interpretation of scenarios as a way to organize the deliberations. They designed the scenario workshops in the tradition of the “Shell” scenarios that are plausible but uncertain futures rather than predictions or desirable perspectives. Participants at the scenario workshops had to develop a shared understanding of the possible future of this region in deliberations, and they had to develop possible innovative actions and options. In this stage, the goal was to let a broad range of actors be part of the problem analysis and solution for the region:

“The ambition is to create a communal awareness about what might happen in the A1 corridor, what is plausible, what cannot be prevented, what is to be feared. In the scenarios we will look primarily at developments in which actors do not have any influence (the cases that we can influence are part of the next step). In fact it is problem-recognition and problem-acknowledgement but from a much broader perspective”(Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003).

According to the consultants, a communal deliberative development of the scenarios would focus the discussion not on conflicting interests but on a possible common future.

“The appealing thing about scenarios is that they are not about whether one agrees or not. They are about things that could happen”(Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003, p. 6).

In an interview one of the consultants elaborated this. According to this consultant, scenarios encouraged a discussion on what might happen and what might be done rather than a negotiation of interests or desirable futures:

“Because of how we work with those [scenarios], we are not engaging in a discussion of interests. So, we say: what if this happens and that, what does the world look like at that moment according to you? What will happen? So, we keep those two things apart in the scenarios: the policy-making part and the . . . ehm . . . You can say, the scenarios are not normative”(Interview-VanWaes, 2004).

Subsequently, the consultants argued that different types of stakeholders needed to be included to develop new options for the future of the region. These “unusual suspects” might introduce different views and ideas. This interpretation contradicts the first interpretation in which the ambition is to create support for the perspectives and solutions already developed.

In what the consultants offered, two of the above interpretations of scenarios were present: the seductive perspective as well as a tool to induce deliberations and explorations of possible futures and policy options. The multi-interpretability aligned the elements of government discourse with elements of deliberative governance discourse and as such enabled a coalition of the provinces with the Innovation Network. In hindsight I can conclude that the two provinces and the business leaders interpreted scenarios as a way to convince stakeholders of the seductive perspective and solutions they had developed in previous steps. The Innovation Network had the ambition to deliberate with a broad range of stakeholders and not to produce “more of the same.”

**Boundary concept innovation**

“It is important that the vision and activities are highly innovative, for example, concerning the spatial, technological and institutional aspects. We must prevent that we only sanitize [the agricultural sector in the area] or choose more of the same. We need real innovation with sustainable solutions to bend the current problematic situation into a strategic advance with international allure.”(Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003, p. 2).

University experts introduced the idea of innovation in the previous steps in the development of the protein corridor. In the positioning papers they distinguished three types of innovation of product, process and system (Broeze, 2006b). In the proposal for PH: MIH, the consultants did not define these three types of innovation. As we will see below, this created room for participants to interpret them in at least two ways: as practical innovations of product and processes, and as systems innovation of interactions among actors in the region.

From the analysis of boundary work, I can reconstruct that business leaders and the two provinces desired first and foremost to develop and implement *product and process innovation* that would benefit the agricultural sector. As an employee of one of the provinces argued:

“The hypothesis behind the A1 protein corridor is that you should not accept what is going on, not accept a ‘cold’ sanitization. Innovation can offer new chances to the sector to make it blossom and grow again”(Interview-De Jager Dick, 2004).

On the other hand, the Innovation Network and later on, the Platform Agrologistics, interpreted innovation as the desire to cooperate in new ways. They aimed at *systems innovation*. They wanted innovation that was going beyond technological innovations of products and beyond innovation of cooperation between the usual business partners or even between normally competing agricultural businesses. Systems innovation included attempts to no longer impose top-down technological innovations to society whether from government, academia, or the agricultural sector. Based on their experiences with the public debate on piggery apartments, which are controversial high-rise buildings that contain clustered pig farms (see artistic design in picture 5.4.), the Innovation Network wished to include other societal actors in the development of product and process innovations. This was to prevent societal resistance in a later stage. The next quote illustrates that the consultants also included this interpretation of innovation in the offer:

“…a form of network government with rules of the games, systems and abilities other than the usual”(Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003, p. 6).

In the final proposal both interpretations of innovation were possible. The consultants did not specify the meaning of innovation and its vagueness was a way to bring together the actors who had argued in favor of one element of government discourse with the other actor who had emphasized one element from deliberative governance discourse: that of systems innovation.

In November 2003 the consultants presented the final proposal. All financiers accepted it. A financial structure in which one of the provinces indirectly participated through its development agency (Oost NV) was necessary to proceed, as was the hiring of a second consultant. Finally, the introduction of two boundary concepts, *scenarios* and *innovation* aligned government and deliberative governance discourse (see figure 5.4. for enacted elements of government and deliberative governance discourse in the steering committee).
5. A1 Protein Corridor Project: credible governance by entrepreneurs

Figure 5.4. Elements of government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as enacted in the steering committee in the first stage of PH:MiH

Conclusions: the Protein Highway: Make it Happen continues due to boundary concepts

In the drafting of the proposal for the PH: MiH consultants planned a more deliberative approach than in the previous steps of regional development. This third step included deliberations with other stakeholders from the area. In preparation for this step, the economic development agency organized three meetings with business leaders to keep them involved and continue their efforts from the KLICT Program. These meetings did not have a deliberative design. The provincial development agency, Oost NV, attempted to convince business leaders of the idea of cluster development. The business leaders interpreted this as a helpful way to reorganize their businesses but not as a way to contribute to spatial development. In their opinion this was the task of government. Most of the business leaders agreed to continue to work on pilot projects for cluster development and accepted the idea that government could also facilitate entrepreneurship and innovation.

In addition, Rijnconsult drafted a proposal for the project Protein Highway: Make it Happen. A second consultant, Van de Bunt, got involved. The deliberations with entrepreneurs were directly linked to the first document that Oost NV drafted, but not directly related to the drafting of the consultants’ proposal. The members of the steering committee and the consultants discussed about the content of the proposal. At the start of this third step in the construction of the protein highway as a region, the two provinces, the Innovation Network, Oost NV, the RaboBank, the Platform Agrologistics and the consultants defined what I understand to be deliberative governance discourse.

In the discussions about the draft proposal a critical moment in the pattern of boundary work occurred almost immediately. The provinces and business leaders both desired practical innovations. This collided with the desire of the Innovation Network to create a new system of interactions between government, businesses, and citizens. The Innovation Network wanted to include a broader group of societal actors, not just agricultural businesses. To overcome these differences, the consultants — in addition to a financial arrangement — introduced two multi-interpretable concepts: scenarios and innovations. The provinces and business leaders interpreted scenarios as a seductive perspective which I consider to be an interpretation from a government discourse perspective as it is top-down communication of a perspective developed by government and academia. The Innovation Network interpreted the concept scenarios as plausible futures that needed to be developed in deliberations. The provinces and business leaders interpreted innovation as product and process innovation. The Innovation Network interpreted it as systems innovation. Hence, the vagueness of these two concepts made it possible to span boundaries between actors and their different interpretations. This enabled the consultants to proceed with the experiment. The change coalition was expanded and they defined the following elements of deliberative governance discourse (see figure 5.5.).

Figure 5.5. Government discourse (left), deliberative governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in the first stage of PH:MiH

Boundary work in the second stage of the Protein Highway

In the second stage of the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project governmental actors deliberated with businesses and farmers’ representatives. This second stage was made up of steering committee meetings and the “plenary sessions” in which business leaders and governmental actors discussed the pilot projects (see attachment 5.6. for an overview of participants). Participants in the plenary sessions talked about the progress in the pilot projects and how these related to the scenario development. They related concrete
examples of cluster development to a strategic vision. Subsequently, in this second stage, the consultants organized a one-day scenario workshop with a deliberative design. At this workshop consultants included animal welfare and environmental stakeholders in the deliberations between governmental actors, financiers, retailers and farmers’ representatives (see attachment 5.7 for a list of participants).

This section is based on an analysis of the minutes of meetings, observations and transcripts, documents, and interviews. The results of the analysis in this chapter are exploratory and limited because I could only observe a one-day meeting with a deliberative design, the scenario workshop. The consultants had planned for four public meetings to deliberate over these scenarios. However, the consultants argued that the financial resources were absorbed by the organization of the steering committee meetings and bilateral conversations with business leaders. The majority of the analysis is based on meetings without a deliberative design. I had access to minutes of three steering group meetings out of the four that were all organized in 2004. The last meeting in early 2005 was cancelled. I also analyzed the minutes of three plenary sessions that were all organized in 2004. I observed and transcribed one of these plenary sessions. On the 9th of July 2004 consultants organized four plenary sessions and six workshops in which participants built scenarios. I analyzed observations and transcripts from the four plenary sessions, and two out of the six workshops. There were no minutes of the four other workshops. I had access to the questionnaires that the consultants used to prepare the scenario workshops. They also had bilateral conversations with business leaders but no minutes were kept of these.

Demarcating practical results from system innovation.

Boundary work at the steering committee meetings and the plenary sessions followed a similar pattern: transcending in boundary concepts; contestation through demarcations; silent enactment of the boundary concepts, and in one instance enactment of the concepts after a reflective conversation.

Boundary concepts innovation and cluster development

At both types of meetings, the consultants or other actors first presented a plan that included the boundary concept innovation, or a translation of the boundary concept cluster development. For example, consultants “translated” cluster development into a rural park. At the steering committee meetings, the consultants introduced the more generic boundary concepts of innovation and scenarios, although they often interpreted scenarios to mean the seductive perspective of an “A1 Protein Highway.” For example, at the first meeting, one of the steering committee members introduced the A1 Corridor as an area to mean the seductive perspective of an “A1 Protein Highway.” For example, consultants “translated” cluster development into a rural park. At the steering committee meetings, the consultants or other participants translated the more generic boundary concepts protein corridor and innovation into contextualized boundary concepts relevant to participating business leaders. These were examples of the different types of agroparks and cluster development such as “poultry center” and “rural park” (Provincie Gelderland, 2004b). The consultants introduced these concepts to seduce participants to cooperate together, and to gain credibility for the idea that the region could benefit from cooperation between business sectors. Moreover, they presented possible solutions for the regions problems.

Demarcation of practical results from too much deliberation

After these presentations, participants in the two types of meetings demarcated their interpretation of the boundary concepts. The steering committee members especially struggled over two possible interpretations. For example, at the steering committee meetings, members, especially the business leaders and the two provinces, demarcated “practical results” as something that should be different from what they called “normal government planning.” They were concerned that the project would remain in a planning stage and would include “too much deliberation” with other societal actors as had been the case in the development of reconstruction plans. For example, the elected official of the province of Overijssel emphasized that it is important:

“not to repeat parts of the reconstruction process. This reconstruction plan is a given. The Project A1 Protein Corridor should generate dynamics within the chain to help realize the goals of the reconstruction (such as physical relocation of functions)” (Rijnconsulent, 2004b).

The steering committee members wanted businesses to take the lead in cluster development and the development of agroparks. They wanted businesses “to act as leaders of innovation.” (Rijnconsulent, 2004a). A majority of the steering committee members interpreted innovation and scenarios as concepts that enable support to be gained from businesses for cluster development. They believed this was the fastest way to have practical results.

This contrasted with the interpretation of the Innovation Network that had the desire to innovate the system, which meant that not only businesses but other societal actors needed to be included in cluster development. They wanted to continue deliberations that had been started in the reconstruction process. According to the Innovation Network, it was necessary to create societal support for the implementation of agro clusters and agroparks. At the steering committee meetings, the Innovation Network stressed this point. However, the majority of steering committee members wanted practical results and to achieve them, they were convinced that businesses needed to take the initiative for cluster development. The dominant interpretation of cluster development was government was no longer to take the lead, businesses should do it. The steering committee members rejected one element of deliberative governance discourse — system innovation — but they accepted another: business involvement as innovators.

At the plenary sessions, participants immediately enacted a similar dominant interpretation of the boundary concepts. They agreed that businesses should take the lead in cluster development, the development of agroparks and therefore, of the region. It should not be a “government top-down plan,” participants argued. They agreed that the “real innovations have to come from the pilot projects” (Provincie Gelderland, 2004b). The participants in the plenary sessions, mostly business leaders and some governmental actors, were convinced that plans should lead to practical results and should not be developed together with other societal actors. The participants at the plenary sessions more or less silently agreed that businesses should be allowed to further develop their plans to make them more concrete. They never discussed the possible interpretation of innovation to include environmental or spatial quality. In the end, both the steering group members and the participants in the plenary sessions agreed that businesses should take the lead in the innovations in the region. They enacted one element of deliberative governance discourse: businesses had to cooperate with government. They did not think,
however, that it was a good idea to include other societal actors and ideas. The Innovation Network could not stretch the governance idea that businesses had to lead the innovations. Deliberative governance discourse that includes other non-governmental organizations did not gain credibility.

**Government discourse enacted: Businesses develop clusters and govern the area**

A next step at the steering committee meetings was that consultants attempted to gain credibility for the desirable scenario that had been developed for the region (see below for the way the scenarios had been developed). At the plenary sessions, the next step was that consultants gained credibility for cluster development and the various forms it could take: the agroparks.

The participants engaged in the collaborative exploration of cluster development that had been fleshed out in projects such as the rural park. Moreover, at one meeting the participants engaged in a reflective conversation about how government and businesses interacted in this project and how it was different from their normal interactions. In this conversation, participants demarcated **practical results** from a top-down government approach. Furthermore, they acknowledged that they could interpret cluster development in various ways. From a government top-down perspective, they argued, the protein corridor was the “development of an area”. Or, it could be considered the “development of business chains” (Provincie Gelderland, 2004a). The participants briefly deliberated these two interpretations. They all agreed that area development was the responsibility of government and that the development of the business chain was the responsibility of businesses. This interpretation made clear that in this project cluster development would not include spatial development and that societal actors would not be included in cluster development by businesses.

At the steering committee meetings, the consultants and Oost NV either created urgency to cooperate with the help of the doomsday scenario or they demarcated expertise of academics or of participants in the scenario workshop. In an attempt to gain more credibility for both interpretations the consultants sketched the doomsday scenario and they argued that a seductive perspective and innovations were necessary to prevent this scenario from coming true. Subsequently, they demarcated expertise of academics and of participants of the scenario workshop to convince the steering committee of the credibility of the scenarios and innovations. For example, the consultants would claim that:

“At the base of this project lies a report of WUR, in which scenarios have been developed based on statistical information. Also within the current trajectory a lot of attention is being paid to scenario development and in connection with that, to the ‘mediale verbeelding’ [video representation]”(Rijnconsult, 2004b).

Or the claim was made that “experts” that participated at the scenario workshop had contributed to the scenario development, and that they had not “fallen from the sky” (Rijnconsult, 2004c) which means that these did not appear out of the blue. At three out of four meetings, the steering committee members accepted these demarcations of expertise. This can be understood to mean that “expertise” is part of dominant government discourse, or is an element of a dominant discourse on science or learning.

At the last steering committee meeting, the consultants attempted to find out whether the innovations they aspired to should include systems innovation. The steering committee members engaged in a reflective conversation. For example, in response to a statement of one of the elected officials that the “green and blue [environmental and water] services are very important but should not be involved in the A1 cooperation” (Rijnconsult, 2004c), one of the consultants argued that it might be necessary to “include these issues, since the way in which they will be involved depends on the choice of scenario (Rijnconsult, 2004c).” When the conversation continued, the elected official agreed that societal organizations needed to be included, but questioned in what way. He was afraid that “half the world needed to sit at the table” (Rijnconsult, 2004c). The steering committee member that represented Platform Agilogistics agreed with the elected official and argued that “the inclusion of nature conservation and environmental organizations does not guarantee that problems will occur later on in the process” (Rijnconsult, 2004c). The representative of the Innovation Network argued that it was not necessary to invite these organizations as members of the change coalition, but that some other type of involvement might be the solution. The conclusion of this reflective conversation was: “Keep the platform lean and mean and organize it around the pilot projects”(Rijnconsult, 2004c). In other words: involvement of actors outside the agricultural sector is not desirable in the opinion of the steering committee. All actors agreed that the project did not aim at system innovation in which countervailing powers are included. The project focussed on helping businesses to innovate in products and processes. Hence, the steering committee agreed that businesses needed to initiate cluster development and agroparks, rather than government. This can be considered governance discourse. However, the exclusion of other societal actors in these developments also meant that deliberative governance discourse was only partially enacted. As a consequence, scenarios were only to be interpreted as seductive perspectives that needed promotion.

**Conclusions: countervailing powers excluded due to practical results**

At both type of meetings, the participants’ biggest ambition was to achieve practical results, in contrast to all the plans that had been made in the previous steps of the redevelopment of the area AND in the deliberations with societal actors that had led to the reconstruction plans. Participants agreed that businesses had to take up responsibility for cluster development to achieve these practical results. At the steering committee meetings, members struggled with two different interpretations of the boundary concept **innovation**. Was it also system innovation? At the plenary sessions this possibility remained unspoken. At the last steering committee meeting, the consultants invited the members to engage in a reflective conversation about this question. As a result, actors agreed that societal actors need not be included. Moreover, cluster development in this project was interpreted as cooperation in business chains and not necessarily as spatial clustering. From this I conclude that system innovation was no longer a credible interpretation of innovation, nor was spatial development. At the plenary sessions, these demarcations did not take place. Actors immediately but silently agreed that participation of social actors was out of the question and that businesses had to take the lead for practical results on cluster development.

As a result of these debates at the site of interaction between government and businesses, governance discourse gained credibility. Actors agreed that businesses had to take over part of the government’s responsibilities. However, the change of government discourse
did not go as far as the Innovation Network had wanted. From the fourth steering committee meeting onwards, the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project is no longer an experiment with deliberative governance if judged by the criteria formulated in the introduction and in chapter 2. It has become an experiment with governance. Up until this point the steering committee members blurred the concepts of scenarios and innovation to include the interpretation of the Innovation Network. The reflective conversation made clear that dominant discourse in the steering committee was the facilitation of businesses to help initiate and implement cluster development. Figure 5.6 summarizes the outcomes of the interpretative struggles so far. As we will see at the site of interaction between government and society, a similar thing happened at the scenario workshop.

**Figure 5.6. Government discourse (left), governance discourse (right), and boundary concepts (middle) as defined in steering committee and plenary sessions of PH:MiH**

### Boundary work in the scenario workshop

The research site of “government and society” interaction consisted of a one-day scenario workshop. This was the only workshop with a deliberative design. Consultants applied a design for the meeting to enhance deliberations with a deliberative quality among participants. The consultant had planned for four more meetings (keuzeconferenties) (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). These meetings never took place and neither did the preparatory sessions with stakeholders.

The one day workshop consisted of four plenary sessions and two blocks of parallel sessions that each consisted of three parallel groups. In the morning, participants explored certain and uncertain trends and they further explored three scenarios that the consultants had prepared in advance based on interviews with participants. First, the consultants asked participants to name certain and uncertain trends for the region. “Certain” trends, for example were: 50% reduction of intensive farms; liberalization of spatial planning and land use; the Netherlands will go from high to low population density; rural areas will be used more and more for tourism (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). “Uncertain” trends were, for example: (no) technological innovation; consumer behaviour ((no) willingness to pay); (no) changes in the production chain; and (no) changes in rural scenery and rural living. Second, the consultants clustered these trends and asked experts what trends would have the most impact on the region (Oost NV, 2005, p. 9). The consultants placed the uncertainties with the most impact on the region on two axes. This quadrant produced four possible scenarios:

- Technological innovations
  - Willingness to pay
- No technological innovations
  - No willingness to pay

**Figure 5.7. Quadrant of two uncertain trends in the agro-sector in the Protein Highway area (Oost NV, 2005, p. 13)**

In the afternoon participants developed several actions and policy options for governmental actors and businesses in the area within the three possible futures. I observed and transcribed four plenary sessions, and two out of six parallel sessions. I did not have access to the four other parallel sessions other than through the reports in the plenary sessions. The consultants presented the results in a trend report and in the final report “Oost Nederland zet in op Vitale Veehouderij-Ketens: A1 eiwitcorridor brengt nieuw élan in de productiekolon” (Oost NV, 2004). In English: “The Eastern Netherlands aims for a Vital Livestock chain: the A1 Protein Highway brings new élan in the production column.” Moreover, the consultants produced a DVD to further promote the vision of the region.

As we will see, the overall pattern of boundary work of the one-day workshop, and of each individual workshop, was that consultants demarcate academic expertise or experiential expertise of participants to gain credibility for boundary concepts; participants engaged in a collaborative inquiry in which they demarcated interpretations of the boundary concepts that related to government discourse or deliberative governance discourse. In all sessions, a majority of participants enacted the boundary concept scenarios from a government perspective which means they interpreted a scenario for the region as a seductive perspective that governmental actors gained support for in a top-down approach; and the participants slightly changed the meaning of cluster development toward a (partly) voluntary relocation and clustering of businesses in agroparks, for example, which adds up to the enactment of government discourse with the addition of one element of governance discourse.

**Consultants gain credibility for scenarios and cluster development**

At the start of the deliberations in the parallel morning session, the consultants blurred what sort of scenarios they presented. This blurring had commenced in the drafted proposal and it continued in the deliberations. The participants could interpret the three scenarios from a deliberative governance discourse or government discourse perspective, as possible scenarios or as desirable scenarios respectively. First of all, the consultant presented the scenarios as possible futures. The scenarios had to simulate a deliberation among “experts” about what should be done in case any of the scenarios would come true:
“It is not a case of the most votes counted. That is irrelevant, but you are all experts in your own field. [...] The question is: if this happens, what will we do?” (Transcript SWPL1, 2004).

However, the consultant also interpreted the scenarios as desirable outcomes of actions. The names of the scenarios reveal this: ‘laissez faire,’ ‘act locally,’ or — it comes as no surprise — this was the desired scenario: “roll up our sleeves” (handen uit de mouwen) which means action! Moreover, in the presentation the facilitator blurred these two interpretations of the concept scenarios. He argued that they present what will happen in five years, but also that they present what MIGHT happen in five years:

“Why do we start this way? We start this way to see whether we can jump into the future. What will it look like in five or ten years? That is what we will do this morning. Why? He who knows the future will be very rich. But also, there are many sectors in the Netherlands, ship building, textile industry, that employed a lot of clever people [...] but still they disappeared or returned in a different guise Therefore, to think about what might happen to this area is very important” (Transcript SWPL1, 2004).

After the facilitators presented the trends and the scenarios, participants asked several questions. First, these questions contested the selection of the trends. Second, participants contested the scope of the scenarios: do they concern the protein highway region or the entire Netherlands? Do they concern just the agro-sector or other policy sectors? The facilitator answered the first question with a demarcation of expertise, of both the participants but also of the people who built the scenario development method. At least six times, for example, the consultant referred to the participants and their role as experts in the development of these documents:

“It is a matter of you together saying: well, if this happens it will have a big impact on the area. [...] We do not want to convince you it is going either way” (Transcript SWPL1, 2004).

This type of demarcation of (experiential) expertise was effective and participants did not ask any more questions. Moreover, one of the participants started to explore one of the scenarios a to find out what this scenario would mean for the agro-sector in the Protein Highway-region. This was the moment at which the facilitator closed the plenary session and announced that three groups were going to discuss the three scenarios in parallel session.

**Exploration of the scenarios**

At the one plenary morning session that I observed, six participants in all[further explored the scenario schaalvergroting (“upscaling”) that was also referred to as handen uit de mouwen (“roll up the sleeves”). In this scenario, the assumptions were that technological innovations would be made; that consumers would perceptually exhibit a “willingness to pay” for quality products, including animal welfare and environmental benefits; that there would be an “up-scaling;” an expansion of businesses; and that small businesses would start to cooperate or disappear; Finally, in this scenario the scenery of the area would change due to this up-scaling. There would be larger nature conservation areas and specific concentrated areas for the agro-sector — this coincided with the wishes of the Provincial Reconstruction Plans (Provincie Overijssel, 2005; Provincie Gelderland, 2005a; 2005b).

**Struggles about the interpretation of the boundary concept scenarios**

After a brief introductory round, the facilitator of the WUR encouraged participants to share with the group what kind of images and ideas this scenario evoked, and then to collaboratively explore what this scenario would look like for the region. In this exploratory round, participants interpreted the concept scenarios in two ways that represent a struggle between government discourse and governance discourse.

On one hand, a civil servant from the province of Gelderland and a banker of the RABO-bank demarcated the government interpretation of scenarios. They both interpreted the scenario as a desirable perspective for the region. For example, the banker argued that he would like this scenario to come true:

“So, yes, this quadrant appeals to me. There is no nonsense: the entrepreneur runs a business; government facilitates and determines what the rules of the game are; and the society and consumers introduce ‘emotions’” (Transcript SWPA1, 2004).

This excerpt also demonstrates that the banker is in favor of a specific type of cluster development, and thus not only is it an interpretation of the concept scenarios from a government discourse perspective, but also an interpretation of cluster development. This banker enacts government discourse in two ways. As a response, the Innovation Network brought forward the deliberative governance interpretation of the scenario concept. As had been the case in interactions between government and businesses in the steering committee, the Innovation Network considered the scenario as a possible rather than a desirable scenario. For example, they argued that this scenario was possible but not necessarily true or desirable:

“So, all agendas, the political agenda, the provincial agenda, those of the corporate world, of knowledge institutes, of research all point in the same direction. They all agree. So, I think it is a continuation of a one-dimensional techno-economic orientation. There are no image problems, no public debates, no complicated issues with decision making etc.. It is a little bit maakbaar (steerable!) and it is the creation of an optimal situation that we assume to be feasible solutions in this (world) context” (Transcript SWPA1, 2004).

Both interpretations remained on the table and participants agreed that the scenario is definitely not a prediction. Moreover, in the debates, participants did not have to worry about the feasibility of the scenario. In response to the Innovation Network’s question, the facilitator answered: “We now assume that we can steer everything” (Transcript SWPA1, 2004). In the remainder of this workshop, participants considered the scenario as a tool to further develop a desirable scenario where everything is possible. The scenario is interpreted not as an uncertain and unimaginable future, but as a desirable and even designable future that all actors need to agree on. As a steering committee member argued:

“Well, in this scenario we would like to make a master plan. This plan needs to be debated and we have to organize together so that we have the guts to say: well, this is the perspective we want to work toward. If we can’t agree on that, than we’d better stop. Throw out the A1 corridor, and work toward different networks” (Transcript SWPA1, 2004).

Participants treated the scenario as a tool to deliberate a desirable future. Participants were encouraged to engage in a collaborative inquiry, which turned out to be a collaborative inquiry of the concept of cluster development in the protein corridor region.

**Struggles about the interpretation of the boundary concept cluster development**

When the participants of this parallel session engaged in deliberations over the cluster development concept, a struggle between government and deliberative governance discourse...
again took place. At the heart of the deliberations was a struggle between a government and deliberative governance interpretation of the boundary concept of cluster development:

was it a voluntary relocation initiated by businesses and facilitated by government, or was it a spatial redevelopment in which other actors, such as the tourism sector and nature conservation agencies should or needed to participate?

The Innovation Network made these two interpretations visible when it claimed that there are two domains for clustering:

- the domain of food-production in large clusters and the domain of the quality of life. In the latter, combinations can be made: *zorgboerderij* (this is an operational farm that also provides care to, for example, elderly or disabled persons) [...] are a business but they also provide a function that exists in society*

Moreover, this same employee argued that these two domains also entail two different interpretations of the landscapes in the region: production landscapes and consumer landscapes. Actors in the domain on food production consider landscapes as production-landscapes that are “oriented toward food production and the consumer.” Actors in the domain of the quality of life consider a consumer landscape as oriented "toward green and the citizen"*

It is interesting that the Innovation Network defined both landscapes in economic terms — consumers and food production — but that this did not prevent an employee of the Province of Gelderland from arguing that cluster development in this project is a challenge for actors in food production. As a response, all other participants, including the representative of the agrarians (LTO) argued that a one-sided focus on large scale food production in the area would be impossible. Society would not accept a clustering without further enhancement of the “quality of life” in the area: “You will not get these clusters accepted in society. You will have to take into account the other story”*

A compromise was reached and all participants concluded that cluster development, interpreted as the relocation and cooperation of businesses, needed to be "well embedded in the scenery" (Transcript SWPA1, 2004). Businesses from the food domain should initiate and implement cluster development and these should have "esthetic qualities" and be "socially accepted" (Transcript SWPA1, 2004). Actors agreed that this "embedding" (Transcript SWPA1, 2004) of large clusters of businesses in the landscape was a business responsibility.

As had been the case in the steering committee and in the plenary sessions, participants interpreted cluster development as something businesses could initiate and implement. They also agreed that government remained responsible for spatial clustering. However, businesses should also be made aware that their clustering should be "ingebed" (integrated) to be acceptable to other societal actors. In other words, government sets the conditions for cluster development, but it was not the responsibility of business to initiate it.

During the last ten minutes of the session the H+N+S landscape architect took up a pencil and in deliberation with the others started to draw an artist’s impression of the region. The actors engaged in a conversation in which they put together a scenario, the master plan that resembled very much the scenario for the region that professors from WUR had created in previous steps of the development of the protein corridor.

H+N+S: “I had just started [drawing]. Perhaps we can, but we have to […] It is simple: can we draw a diagram that represents the A1 and how we imagine it to be?”

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**Figure 5.8.** The charcoal sketch by H+N+S and the participants of the scenarioworkshop

WUR= Wageningen University Research, TU= Twente University

To conclude: the pattern of boundary work in this session was that participants demarcated boundaries around government discourse and deliberative governance discourse in deliberations on the scenarios concept and on the cluster development concept. The results of this boundary work were an enactment of government discourse interpretation of scenarios as seductive, and an enactment of cluster development from the perspective of government discourse with the addition of one governance element: initiative by businesses to cluster. After this enactment, the participants briefly engaged in an exploration of the desirable scenario for the protein corridor.

**Plenary deliberations: interpretation of scenarios revisited**

The facilitators of the morning workshop presented the results of the exploration of the three scenarios at a plenary session at the beginning of the afternoon. After these presentations the consultant presented the program for the afternoon. He asked participants to answer “how questions” for three possible solutions: (1) how to finance developments in the “handen uit de mouwen” scenario; (2) how to form coalitions in the “laissez faire” scenario; and (3) how to name the developments in the region in the “local for local” scenario. These were the three questions for the afternoon sessions (Transcript SWPL3, 2004).

Before the plenary session split up into three parallel sessions, one of the business leaders asked how to deal with the scenarios and the trends in relation to the three "how" questions. This again evoked a struggle between government and government discourse among participants. In his response the consultant interpreted the concept scenario from a deliberative governance discourse perspective. He argued that the scenarios were a deliberative tool to enable participants to go beyond individual interpretations and their own interests:

“The function of scenarios is, as I understand from most people who work with scenarios, that bankers think in terms of money, farmers in terms of pigs, researchers think about projects, road-builders about asphalt, and the rest of the world, I am
exaggerating, stays out of the picture. What you attempt to do in scenarios is to create a broader picture which allows things from outside to come into the picture. O.K.?” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

However, the provincial delegate from Oost NV wanted to be able to choose one of the scenarios as the most desirable and answer the questions for that scenario. This is in line with a government discourse interpretation of scenarios. This struggle was not settled in the short plenary introduction and both interpretations remained credible.

**Parallel workshop: financial instruments for cluster development**

At the afternoon parallel session that I observed, four people participated. The objective of the conversation was the “how question” and how to organize “financing of desirable developments, whatever these may be” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). These deliberations were first and foremost a collaborative inquiry into financial instruments. Participants in this session did not engage in a credibility struggle between government discourse or deliberative governance discourse. They enacted dominant government discourse with one additional element: businesses needed to take initiative in cluster development.

The consultants had designed this collaborative inquiry. One of the facilitators of the deliberations introduced the boundary concept innovation. The desirable developments had to be innovations. In a short conversation, participants explored what the innovation concept meant and set the agenda for the afternoon. They agreed that it concerned financial innovation for cluster development; it concerned financial instruments for blue and green services – blauwe groene diensten – that is, water and nature conservation by agribusinesses. In other words, “how to keep the cow in the meadow?” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). Third, participants agreed that in the afternoon they would try to develop financial instruments to finance product innovation or technological innovation. Participants contextualized the boundary concept innovation. They translated innovation into more specific financial instruments that would facilitate businesses in their attempts to improve the region. Each of the translated boundary concepts induced a discussion among participants about who should pay for what: government or businesses? Again, actors struggled between two interpretations of these contextualized boundary concepts: on one hand interpretations from a government discourse in which government would pay for the demanded cluster development or product innovations (either through traditional government instruments or more governance-like market mechanisms), or on the other hand, governance discourse in which businesses, government and societal actors would initiate and finance these innovations.

**Struggles about the interpretation of the contextualized boundary concepts**

First of all, the WUR professor proposed as a more specific form of innovation in financial instruments the “transferable development rights.” This is a governmental instrument that builds on the logic of scarcity that is part of a market mechanism to finance relocations of businesses through cluster development. As such it is a boundary concept that aligns traditional governmental steering and financing with market-driven financing. According to the WUR expert these transferable development rights would enable government to “capitalize space” (kapitaliseren van ruimte) (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). It works as follows: within designated areas that government wants to be developed there are set limits to the volume (per lot), in other words, limits to how big the homes may be. Government can sell rights to develop more than these limits in specific areas – for example, by building an extra story on a house. This extra money might be used to improve the landscape by relocating businesses and remove them from areas that are designated as residential or nature conservation areas. As the researcher explained:

“In ten years time this many houses will be build. You can estimate how many of those are vrijstaande [single] homes in the rural areas and what the limit to the volume [per home] is. Over ten years there is more than a hundred million per province [in euros] to capitalize space.” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

The researcher argued that transferable development rights are a way to generate extra financial resources for government to compensate relocations of businesses:

“It is about extra willingness to pay. You [government] command additional planning limits and this creates scarcity [of space] for citizens.” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). The facilitator attempted to gain credibility for this instrument by demarcating “foreign (US) experience” with these rights that are “being implemented at more than 140 locations” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

However, this demarcation of foreign experience was not convincing, and the provincial actor together with the financier opposed the idea of transferable development rights as a solution to finance relocations of businesses. This provincial actor argued that these financial resources usually are used to cover shortages in the balance of local communities. He claimed that it would be difficult to use that money for relocations of agribusinesses:

“Towns, especially those that have built a lot in recent years, are in the habit of covering shortages in their own budgets with this money, to put it in simple terms. If we tell those people that we will direct that money stream somewhere else it will temper the optimism” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). Moreover, the provincial actor argued that rather than government, businesses, especially the business chain, in cooperation with banks and other financiers, and with help of government, should finance relocations of businesses. He argued that these businesses have known for many years that they cannot expand at these locations, so they are partly responsible for the move. Moreover it is to the benefit of the whole business chain to support these relocations, he argued:

“Those companies have been located at the wrong place for 10 to 15 years. The reconstruction plans bring nothing new. These are generic rules and regulations. These farmers have bad luck but more parties need to have a willingness to pay. The whole chain needs to know that these farmers — the primary sector — is of importance to them. They all have a stake” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

The provincial representative attempted to gain credibility for this argument, not by bringing in outside expertise, but by example. He gave an example of a business initiative of ABCTA that partly financed relocations with help from the government. Moreover, the province argued that the national government supports this approach, and that some government money and other resources (e.g. help with the permit process) is available to facilitate the cluster development that is initiated and perhaps co-financed by members of the same business chain. The province called this institutional innovation, in which government no longer commands and controls (or subsidizes) these relocations but in which chain participants initiate cluster development out of their own interests (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

The provincial proposal disrupts traditional government discourse slightly more than the proposed transferable rights in which government still takes the lead. The provincial actor, backed up by other participants, proposed a shift to governance: businesses should be partners with government rather than be commanded or taxed by government. Participating actors agreed that the latter was the preferable, more convincing alternative.
Thus they collaboratively enacted governance discourse with regards to innovation in financial instruments for cluster development.

Second, a financier introduced labelling, taxing and excises as means for government to finance blue and green services of farmers. The financier argued that this was different from the normal situation in which “public” money goes into nature conservation or recreational services delivered by the agrarian sector. In the new situation, the consumers needed to pay directly for these services. This “willingness to pay,” as the WUR academic called it, needed to be used to finance nature conservation and the maintenance of the traditional rural scenery. Participants did not contest these proposed instruments. Participants agreed that there were several possibilities. These were summarized as follows:

“There are three variants for the green and blue services: type of labelling [...] membership as “friends of” [this or that farmer]; developmental rights” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004).

An addition was made by the financier. He argued there were a fourth and fifth possibility that were less vulnerable to free-riders: taxes, for example, a tourist tax in a fund for nature conservation, and excises on products. Thus, at the start of this deliberation, the financier demarcated the solutions that he proposed from normal government discourse, in my terms, in which public money, money from citizens was used to finance nature conservation. He introduced new government instruments that would use consumer money to finance these same goals. However, both types of financial resources would go through government. Government would have to initiate, command and control both the collection of money and its spending. Thus, the proposal of the financier that other participants agreed with only slightly disrupted government discourse and can be considered an enactment of governance discourse.

Thirdly, the financier introduced “knowledge brokers” as a possible solution for more innovation. On this subject, participants together established that in the normal situation, the OVO triangle — Onderzoek (research), Voorlichting (communication and PR), Onderwijs (education) — used to take care of the innovation power in the sector (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). This means that in agriculture the university and businesses cooperate closely to innovate and promote the sector. The participants also agreed that this system is no longer operational, although there are still close ties between Wageningen University Research and the agricultural sector. In the new situation, national government still finances a lot of research, either through the universities or through special programs such as ICES/KIS. However, the participants agreed that this knowledge is often “left on the shelves” (Transcript SWPA2, 2004). In the case of stimulating product innovations and technological innovations for the agro-sector businesses, government does not have to intervene. Rather, businesses should be more willing to adopt new technologies, and researchers should be stimulated to market their knowledge. “Knowledge brokers” might enable this dissemination of knowledge. In this case, the participants concluded, it is not so much a financing problem as it is a problem of knowledge distribution. On this subject, actors agreed and I did not construct struggles between interpretations from either government discourse or deliberative governance discourse.

Finally, at the end of the meeting, the facilitator took ten minutes to sum up. He concluded that:

- Cluster development needs to be a business initiative, partly financed, that government can facilitate (with planning space);
- Government might use “willingness to pay” and not consider people as citizens that pay general taxes for nature conservation but as consumers that pay specific taxes through labels, as members of “friends of” organizations, or for specific “services”;
- Government might finance “knowledge brokers” to stimulate a knowledge exchange between universities and businesses for product innovation.

In the last ten minutes, elements of governance discourse were enacted. In cluster development and relocations of businesses, the chain initiates, government facilitates, businesses invest, and banks and financiers finance. This was different from normal government discourse in which government would finance these relocations since it was its reconstruction plans that demanded the relocations.

The pattern of boundary work in this afternoon session evolved as follows: (1) the consultant transcended boundaries in the innovation concept and participants enacted innovation in agenda setting for discussion; (2) innovation of financial instruments for cluster development, nature, water and scenery conservation and product innovation; (3) participants contextualized the boundary concept innovation into new instruments, for example, “transferable development rights”, “labeling” and “taxes” that go into “green funds”; (4) participants struggled with government and governance interpretations of these financial instruments; (5) participants agreed with proposed financial instruments and enacted one element of governance discourse. As a result of this pattern of boundary work, government discourse was altered. Participants no longer considered it the responsibility of governments to finance cluster development; rather it should be cooperation of the businesses together with governmental actors.

The end of the workshop: plenary interpretative struggles

At the last plenary session of the workshop, three parallel groups presented the results of their deliberations. The group that had deliberated the concept A1 Protein Corridor kicked off. The second presentation was by the group that had engaged in a collaborative inquiry into coalition formation. Finally, one of the participants presented the possible financial instruments to finance innovation in cluster development, in blue and green services and in products.

Plenary struggles of steering group members about the interpretation of protein corridor

In the presentation of the first group, the employee of the Innovation Network contested the “A1 protein corridor.” The group concluded that this concept is perfect to attract intensive livestock farmers. However, other agricultural entrepreneurs, nature conservationists, and the leisure and tourism industry might not be drawn to it. As the Innovation Network said:

“The name A1 Protein Corridor, we concluded, is in itself attractive for the original [target group] intensive livestock farming. It is innovative to market to these protein producers and to mobilize them. But, when you take a look at the other target groups: agriculture, leisure, water, and nature, then you need to realize that your objective, namely, to improve the spatial quality, is what you want because that also benefits the agro-sector [...]. If this is your objective, then the A1 protein corridor is very small as a concept and as an angle of approach” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

The facilitator of the second group, the consultant of Van de Bunt, responded. He first presented the group’s results and then argued that a broader concept for this region was not necessary. His group on coalition formation had also discussed this concept but had
approached it differently. They had answered the question of who needed to be part of the coalitions in the region to stimulate cluster development. They agreed that the protein corridor needed to focus on cluster development of the primary sector and to focus on activating the business chain.

“The start is the reconstruction that took place in both provinces and in which all parties participated, including nature conservationists and environmentalists. [...] The idea is not to continue such a broad spectrum in this project. That is very ambitious. We know what nature conservationists and environmentalists want. But, aim [the project] at the primary sector and processors; there lie the biggest challenges, and then the name is perfect” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

Thus, on one hand, the argument of the first group indicates that in a deliberative governance interpretation the protein corridor concept was not successful since it did not transcend boundaries between environmental and animal welfare subdiscourse on one hand, and business subdiscourse on the other. This group’s argument was that the protein corridor reproduced the subdiscourse of the businesses. On the other hand, the facilitator of group two considered the concept to, in our words, transcend boundaries within the agricultural sector. Moreover, he argued that the interests of other actors will be included as well as the primary sector and the processors, because the consultants know what these other actors want and also because the reconstruction plans sketch the framework for development of the region. Both groups interpreted the protein corridor in a governance way. However, the interpretation from a deliberative governance perspective that, in this case includes systems innovations, did not gain credibility.

Plenary struggles of steering group members about the interpretation of cluster development

In the conversation, the Innovation Network explained why their group thought it would be difficult to convince the agro-sector of the necessity of initiating cluster development without the inclusion of the “spatial challenges” (ruimtelijke opgave) in the area. The Innovation Network was convinced, from a deliberative governance interpretation of the project, that to stimulate the agro-sector to initiate cluster development, these spatial challenges that society poses to businesses need to be addressed. These create urgency for businesses. As the Innovation Network argued:

“The question is if we can get this movement [to enhance spatial quality TM] from within the agro-sector, or whether we need other functions such as recreation and nature, to stimulate this movement” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

A little further into the conversation, the Innovation Network argued more strongly that indeed this “spatial quality,” (ruimtelijke kwaliteit) which will also benefit the agro-sector, can only be defined in combination with other actors:

“If you have the desire to achieve spatial quality, you just need these other groupssuch as agriculture, recreation, water, nature. This [quality] also benefits the agro-sector, through a broadening of functions [of the countryside and agriculture TM]” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

The consultant, who presented the results of the second group, took a different turn and interpreted cluster development differently. He argued that the provinces claim that this “spatial challenge” is taken care of in the reconstruction plans.

“The reconstruction concerns the whole scope. The A1 is solely for the primary sector and the processors. They need to meet some challenges that in the end help nature and environment in the areas of intensifying agriculture.” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

One representative of the province intervened and argued that the spatial quality is “not taken care of” but that “zoning is in place.” He argued that the province wants to know how the agro-sector will use the space for development in the optimal way (Transcript SWPL4, 2004). The consultant, who also facilitated the deliberations in the plenary session, concluded this discussion on cluster development by summarizing as follows:

“Change and mobility need to be achieved first and foremost in the primary sector and with the processors. We will keep in mind what the other sectors want in terms of nature and environment. They do not need to sit at the table all the time. We can go back to them in a year and ask what they think of it” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

None of the participants contested this conclusion that re-enacted the consultants’ interpretation of the boundary concepts of protein corridor and cluster development. The consultant wanted to make sure that both provinces would also agree on this. The facilitator directed this question to the provinces, especially the province of Gelderland. This province responded and argued that the “power of the A1 concept lies not only in the processing but also in the logistics.” Both provinces reassured the consultant that indeed their elected officials would also agree that this project focuses on cluster development and network cooperation in the primary sector (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

The struggle over the interpretation of cluster development that the steering committee members had started in the drafting of the proposal had finally come to an end. In the first stage the consultants introduced the boundary concepts scenarios and innovation that formed a temporary consensus between the steering committee members and the change coalition. In the second stage, the plenary debates between steering committee members and other participants, who were mostly involved as an audience, resulted in an enactment of elements of government discourse and the exclusion of one element of deliberative governance discourse. With the silent approval of participants, the members of the steering committee no longer were able to interpret the boundary concepts of protein corridor and cluster development from a deliberative governance perspective. The Innovation Network, who had defended this interpretation, had lost, and so was system innovation.

Participants agree on interpretation: Businesses initiate and implement cluster development

After these struggles on the interpretation of the boundary concepts of protein corridor and cluster development, the deliberations at the last parallel session continued as a collaborative inquiry. The facilitators from the second group on coalition formation and the third group on financial instruments presented several ways to facilitate cluster development among businesses in the primary agro-sector and the processing industry. The second and third group applied the government interpretation and automatically excluded nature and environment in their interpretation of cluster development. For example, the third group presented the financial instruments that they discussed and in this presentation considered cluster development as the relocation of businesses that the businesses chain would initiate, governmental actors were to facilitate, and the entrepreneurs should invest in:

“We designed an engine for relocations: the chain initiates, government facilitates, and the entrepreneur invests” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

The second group that had discussed possibilities for coalition formation also focussed on suppliers or consumers that might be able to create and facilitate urgency for this type of cooperation within the primary sector:
“When you want to form coalitions in the primary sector, the actors farther down in the chain, for example slaughter houses, or at the start of the chain, for example, the suppliers [of feed or animals] can be people who forge this, so to speak” (Transcript SWPL4, 2004).

Thus, both groups in their plenary presentations interpreted cluster development as cooperation in networks in the agro-sector. They both argued that consumers or suppliers in the business chain should be the actors who demand that the primary sector, the farmers, relocate or cooperate with other farmers. At this plenary closing session there was little deliberation on the results presented. Other participants merely listened to the presentations. Participants no longer contested the government interpretation of the boundary concepts of protein corridor and cluster development. It had been settled (enacted) that the protein corridor was to focus on relocation and cluster development of the primary agro-sector and the processors.

Conclusions of the plenary afternoon session

The pattern of boundary work at the last plenary session was as follows: (1) participants contested boundary transcending in the protein corridor concept: it was not transcending boundaries between environmental subdiscourse and entrepreneurial subdiscourse; (2) enactment of government interpretation of the boundary concepts of protein corridor and of cluster development. As a result, one element of governance discourse was added to dominant government discourse: businesses rather than government should take the initiative to facilitate cluster development. However, they should do so from a business perspective and not with the desire to improve the spatial quality of the region. Up till then, the Innovation Network had interpreted the boundary concepts protein corridor and cluster development to include the improvement of spatial quality as a collaborative effort of governmental, business, and environmental actors in the region.

Conclusions: Innovation means businesses that initiate cluster development

The one day scenario workshop was the only meeting with a deliberative design in the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project. At this workshop, the consultants introduced boundary transcending concepts scenarios, cluster development, and innovation.

Participants interpreted the scenarios concept from a governance and government discourse perspective. These interpretations coincided with the different goals. On one hand, the Innovation Network wanted to apply these scenarios as a tool to deliberate on what possible developments could take place in the region in order to develop a broad range of policy options with a broad range of actors. On the other hand, the aim of the provinces and Oost NV was to develop a desirable scenario that would convince businesses to initiate cluster development for their own benefit. These two interpretations had been at hand from the start of the project and continued to be present at the meetings. However, at the end of the morning sessions and in deliberations in the plenary session, what we are calling the government interpretation of scenarios gained most credibility. Participants agreed that the scenarios had to be further developed into a seductive perspective to convince businesses to initiate cluster development.

At the parallel afternoon session participants engaged in a collaborative inquiry on three themes: financial instruments for cluster development, coalition formation for cluster development, and the search for the right name for the project. Two of the three groups interpreted cluster development from a government perspective and searched for ways to stimulate businesses to initiate cluster development. Governmental instruments such as taxes could be applied, but also consumers and suppliers in the business chain could demand relocations and cluster development of farmers. The Innovation Network demarcated an element of deliberative governance discourse, the inclusion of other types of actors for cluster development to innovate the system — e.g. the way organizations cooperate — and to improve the spatial quality of the region in a different way. In response one member of the steering committee argued against the inclusion of this element. This member argued that the reconstruction plans would take care of the spatial quality of the area. There was no need to include this interpretation in innovation or cluster development. The audience did not contest this interpretation of cluster development.

What was interesting is that at the scenario workshop only members of the steering committee engaged in a struggle about the interpretations of the protein corridor and of scenarios. Other participants were not involved. The fracture line between interpretations of the these concepts was not considered, nor did it create a conflict in the drafting of the proposal. This hidden conflict within the steering committee only became manifest and was settled in the plenary sessions of the workshop. At that moment the two conflicting members of the steering committee used the deliberations in the parallel sessions to support their interpretation of the boundary concepts: it was their group that had agreed with the interpretation, for example, of the inclusion of spatial quality in the protein corridor. This turned the outcomes of the deliberations in the parallel sessions into “political” outcomes that were strategically applied in the steering committee’s struggles about a government or deliberative governance interpretation of innovation and cluster development. The interpretation of the provinces and businesses won because the majority of the change coalition was in favour of that interpretation and the Innovation Network stood alone. Moreover, the consultants who had designed and facilitated the deliberative setting had silently agreed and reproduced the interpretation of cluster development, innovation and scenarios from a government perspective. The conversations at the scenario workshop were a collaborative inquiry into these options; however, they lacked deliberative quality as participants did not engage in reflective conversations about different interpretations of the boundary concepts (see figure 5.9 for an overview of the credible interpretations in these deliberations).

Overall, I consider the scenario workshop an enactment of the seductive perspective “A1 Protein Corridor.” In previous years, this perspective had been developed by WUR researchers. The scenario workshop can be considered an attempt to have participants internalize and enact what had already been created by this coalition of government and WUR faculty, and later on by a few businesses. Deliberations were applied to create support for the solutions that already had been decided for the region. Most of all, this was cluster development initiated by the business chain. Innovations that included animal welfare and environmental benefits as well as other stakeholders, for example healthcare, tourism and spatial solutions for nature conservation and the improvement of the scenery, were either excluded in reference to the reconstruction plans, or it was argued (and accepted) that the experts at the table would know how to take care of these interests. At this site of interaction, the protein corridor, cluster development, and even innovation were no longer interpreted in such a way as to transcend boundaries between nature conservation and
5. A1 Protein Corridor Project: credible governance by entrepreneurs

Planning on one hand and business development on the other. The provinces, Oost NV, and businesses, in alliance with the consultants and with mobilized support of participants at the scenario workshop had excluded a deliberative governance interpretation. Governance by entrepreneurs had become credible discourse.

EPILOGUE OF THE PROTEIN HIGHWAY: MAKE IT HAPPEN!

In 2005, the Gelderse Agriculture and Horticulture Organization and Oost NV continued the A1 Protein Highway: Make it Happen project and formed a Platform A1 Protein Corridor. To gain support for this Platform they had bilateral conversations with business leaders. The seductive perspective was part of these conversations (Interview-Hoekmans II, 2005; Interview-Roemaat II, 2006). This platform is up and running and the two provinces are still involved. The platform is a network of agribusinesses and it attempts to “stimulate innovation” (Agrologistiek Magazine, 2009). A quick scan of policy documents of the two provinces demonstrated that the Province of Overijssel absorbed (Edelenbos, 2001) the results from the A1 Protein Highway project into the Provincial program of the Province of Overijssel: “Program A1-zone” (Triou, 2007) together with several other projects along the A1.

In August 2007 Wageningen University Research/Alterra made public an evaluation of the Reconstruction Law. It announced that at fourteen places in the Netherlands farmers had made plans to start a cluster of businesses (Boonstra et al., 2007). The researchers demonstrated that many public and societal organizations resisted and still resist mega-businesses. In a press release the researchers argued that this resistance came as no surprise, as government has a double agenda. “Provinces on one hand stimulate clustering of industrial farms, on the other they do not want farms bigger than 20,000 pigs in their province” (Alterra, 2007). Moreover, the researcher found that that elected officials were prepared for these cluster developments even though they publically announced that they had no ideas (Alterra, 2007).

The results of the report were taken up in national newspapers. Those articles argued more strongly against the Reconstruction Law. As the Volkskrant wrote: “failing law leads to mega-pig stables” (Volkskrant, 14 August 2008). In a quick analysis of all major newspapers of the Netherlands and several local ones (in Lexis Nexis), reports were found in the Volkskrant, Eindhovens Dagblad, Financieel Dagblad, Trouw, NRC, AD, AD/Haagse Courant, Telegraaf, Het Parool. These all reported that neighbors as well as other farmers and environmental organization were very critical of cluster development, which the journalists again referred to as “piggery apartments.” Societal resistance against mega-farms, or clusters, had not been prevented through cooperative plan-making in the reconstruction law, nor had it been prevented in the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project.

A possible explanation for this uproar is that opposing views — countervailing powers — had not been further included in the development of the concepts of cluster development and protein corridor. Governmental actors did not continue the collaborative planning under the Reconstruction Law. On the contrary, governmental actors and businesses used this collaborative planning as a legitimization of the idea that other societal actors no longer needed to be included. In the case of cluster development in the Protein Corridor, the two provinces and businesses in the region kept conflict out of the deliberations. As a result at least the same amount and perhaps even more societal resistance against cluster development of industrial farms persisted until at least 2007.

Even though spatial cluster development is still controversial, some of the individual pilot projects that aimed at process and product innovations have been successful. For example, the Dutch Poultry Center stimulated cooperation between five slaughterhouses to utilize meat by-products and generate energy from this process (Agrologistiek Magazine, 2009; Universiteit Twente et al., year of publication unknown).

5.4. CONCLUSIONS: BOUNDARY WORK AT THE PROTEIN HIGHWAY: MAKE IT HAPPEN PROJECT

In conclusion, I present the similarities and differences in types and content of boundary work across the two stages of the project, and across the sites of interaction and their various deliberative venues. This provides an answer to the questions of whether participants accepted, reflected upon or rejected boundary work and the results of these conversations. In other words, did participants believe in a deliberative governance discourse?

CREDIBLE GOVERNANCE BY ENTREPRENEURS

Throughout the whole project participants, especially steering committee members, struggled between a government and deliberative governance interpretation of the boundary concepts of scenarios, cluster development (and its translated version, agroparks) and innovation. These boundary concepts were a heritage from the two previous steps in the development of the region. University experts had developed those, together with a doomsday scenario. Oost NV, two provinces, the Innovation Network, Platform Agrologistics, and the Rabobank undertook a third step to develop the region. They agreed to the “Protein Corridor: Make it Happen Project” to further develop the A1 Protein Highway as a region and to stimulate cluster development and innovation in it.
In the first stage of the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project, two types of meetings took place: the entrepreneurial deliberations that formed a bridge between earlier regional development and the new project, and the steering committee meetings. In the entrepreneurial meetings it was clear that the business leaders from the region stood united on the interpretation of cluster development. They interpreted it from a government discourse viewpoint and considered, for example, government responsible for the environmental quality of the region. However, those same business leaders added one element to this discourse: the business leaders were willing to initiate cluster development through development of agroparks and cooperation in networks but only to their own benefit. They believed in an “entrepreneurial” governance discourse in which government and businesses work together for entrepreneurial benefits.

At the steering committee meetings in this first stage, the consultants enabled the members to interpret cluster development, scenarios and innovation differently. The potential members and potential financiers were divided on what elements of deliberative governance discourse should be introduced: was it only to be business initiative for cluster development that is, innovations of products and processes, or should system innovation through deliberations of possible scenarios be the goal? The steering committee members did not agree whether actors from tourism, environmental organizations, and animal welfare organizations needed to be included to improve the spatial quality of the region in the deliberations in this project. The consultants blurred this struggle about the inclusion of system innovation as an objective of the project. In the offer for the project they introduced two boundary concepts to span the boundaries. These were innovation and scenarios. Rather than speaking of cluster development in a specific way, the boundary concept aligned the different interpretations of the provinces, on one hand, and on the other, the Innovation Network. This also happened with the concept scenarios that could be interpreted as a seductive scenario and a doomsday scenario, as well as plausible scenarios that would be developed to prepare for an uncertain future that needed a variety of policy options, not only a specific type of agro-clusters or agroparks.

Boundary work in this first stage took place at several critical moments. First of all, the consultants introduced the boundary concepts to the potential steering committee members and to the entrepreneurs. Second, the two provinces and the Innovation Network, as well as the business leaders, contested the boundary concepts. Third, the consultants and Oost NV introduced scenarios and innovation as boundary concepts to transcend the demarcations of the steering committee members. But in the interactions with business leaders Oost NV had agreed with an interpretation of cluster development as reorganization between businesses to improve their bottom line.

In the second stage, consultants organized a one-day scenario workshop that included deliberations between government and society. In these workshops animal welfare and environmental organizations participated. In this stage, the steering committee members continued to struggle with conflicting interpretations of the boundary concepts. The one-day scenario workshop with a deliberative design turned into a “political” instrument for the steering committee members: they used support of participants in parallel workshops to gain credibility for their conflicting interpretation of the boundary concept. Interesting is to notice that at this point it the consultants did not demarcate “learning” or “innovation” as a strategy to redirect the conversation to a reflective one. The consultants and other members of the change coalition demarcated participants’ expertise and their consent to gain credibility for it. Hence, hidden conflict between two interpretations became manifest and was fought out at these deliberative venues. Deliberative governance never gained credibility. Only some elements of a governance discourse were picked up.

This was best visible in the interpretations and contestations of the name of the project, the protein corridor, and struggles about the meaning of cluster development. Participants easily granted credibility to these concepts and to the scenarios as tools for deliberation. However, at the third plenary session that day, the steering committee members’ struggles between a government and deliberative governance interpretations of protein corridor and cluster development were decided. An employee of the Innovation Network, with support of the outcomes of the discussions in his parallel group, and one of the consultants, with support of the outcomes of discussions in his parallel group, engaged in a public struggle about who and what should or should not be included in cluster development. The discussion started with the name “protein corridor” which the Innovation Network argued, was not sufficient as it excluded other stakeholders and shareholders in the area that needed to be involved. The Innovation Network attempted to endorse what I consider the deliberative governance interpretation of cluster development that includes a concern for the spatial quality that has to be achieved through involvement of other societal actors. In response one of the consultants argued in favor of the interpretation of cluster development in which businesses needed to take the initiative and it was not necessary to include the aim to improve spatial quality. The reconstruction plans were taken care of that quality. Participants agreed that businesses and the business chain could not be considered responsible for spatial planning, nor for animal welfare or nature conservation. These were government’s responsibilities that were specified in rules and regulations (or in this case spatial plans) that businesses needed to respect but were not required improvingfurther. Businesses did not feel the need to go beyond what is required by government.

The interpretation of the consultants and thus that of the provinces and businesses won. Participants enacted governance discourse but only as a form of network governance in which business and government cooperate to the benefit of businesses. The credible discourse had become governance by entrepreneurs. As had been the case in the interactions with business leaders in the previous stage, spatial cluster development was separated from organizational cluster development in business chains. This helped to gain credibility for cluster development for businesses. At this point, deliberative governance discourse disappeared from the project: inclusion of other stakeholders and shareholders was no longer considered necessary. The governmental actors agreed with this interpretation. Hence, they agreed that the A1 Protein Highway project was to benefit businesses, and that spatial plans and governmental regulations were in place. They agreed with the businesses that there was no need to make businesses feel responsible for the improvement of the spatial layout, animal welfare, or nature conservation of the area with means other than government rules and regulations.

Overall, the scenario workshop made clear that cluster development should first and foremost benefit businesses and the economic viability of the region. Governmental
actors did not attempt to include businesses as contributors to the public good. Nor did they attempt to have these businesses gain a “social license” to operate. In this project a boundary between government and businesses was transcended: government facilitated rather than demanded, and businesses initiated cluster development. Governance by entrepreneurs had become credible and excluded deliberative governance.
In cooperation with scholars in public administration, governmental actors in planning and land use often innovate in their ways of governing. They facilitate cooperation in networks for various reasons: to resolve stuck debate, to stimulate efficient and effective policies, to produce better reasoned, better informed, or more legitimate and credible decisions (Rhodes, 1990; Klijn and Teisman, 1991; Thompson et al., 1991; Waarden, 1992; Kickert, 1993; Rhodes, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997; Hodges, 2005; Laws, 1998; Laws et al., 2001; Rhodes, 2003b; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; Teisman, 2000; Tatenhove and Leroy, 1995; Forester, 2000; Dryzek, 2000a; Hajer et al., 2004; Hajer, 2009).

In the introduction I distinguished government theory from governance and deliberative governance theory. In government theory, governmental actors are considered to have political authority and make legitimate and authoritative decisions based on formal arrangements and procedures. Governmental actors are a ruling power in society that can make decisions, and command and control to protect the common good. In governing through “governance,” decision making takes place in a network of interdependent actors that each have relevant knowledge and other resources to contribute to decisions for the common good. “Deliberative governance” builds on the idea of network governing, but it pays explicit attention to the quality of the interactions between interdependent governmental and non-governmental actors for two reasons. First, it is in deliberation that collaborative learning and change for better decision making can take place. Second, in network governance, decisions can become credible through interactions of a deliberative quality. Deliberative governance theory as developed in this thesis argues that actors in a network engage in conversations of a deliberative quality for collaborative learning and change that leads to credible decision making. I defined the deliberative quality of conversations as reflective which means that in those conversations actors can be empathetic with other interpretations, and can afford to criticize dominant discourse (that is, be parrhesiastes). This kind of reflectivity contributes to collaborative learning and to a credible change of dominant discourse.

I studied if, and if so how, deliberative governance discourse gained credibility in policy practice. Many scholars in public administration and political science establish an observable shift to network governance, and some even prescribe this shift. However, we often don’t know if and how this shift occurs in policy practice. We know that practitioners design and implement experiments with (deliberative) governance, but does government alter its interactions with society in these experiments? How do other actors such as businesses, non-governmental organizations, and citizens become partners in a network? Moreover, do all these actors start to consider deliberative governance to be a credible way of governing, and if so, why? This thesis studied the three theoretical models as discourses that participants produce and reproduce, in other words enact, in policy practice. The three discourses strive for dominance in credibility struggles.

To be able to establish which discourse became credible, I studied the details of the interactions between government and other actors in their conversations in three experiments with deliberative governance: Creative Competition for redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark, the Dairy Gateway project that aimed at a more sustainable region, and the Protein Highway Project: Make it Happen that wanted to improve the spatial quality of a region. These experiments injected deliberative governance discourse. They were temporarily erected, they engaged participants from several governmental layers, several
policy domains, several scientific disciplines, and the experiments included a variety of actors from society such as citizens, businesses and non-governmental organizations. These experiments also had a deliberative design with standards of conduct and strategies to convene and facilitate conversations of a deliberative quality.

### 6.1. EXCLUSIVE DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

To study the credibility struggles between government and deliberative governance discourse, I introduced a conceptual framework of boundary work. Boundary work is either a demarcation or a transcending of boundaries around discourses. By studying boundary work in conversations, we could analyze how participants challenged or protected government discourse or deliberative governance discourse. There are at least two types of boundary work. First, there is the introduction of boundary concepts that span boundaries between discourses. For example, in the Dairy Gateway project the concept of stewardship connected government discourse with deliberative governance discourse. It enabled an interpretation of farmers not only as polluters — as is common in government discourse — but also as protectors of the land. Hence, boundary concepts can enable a change of more frozen discourse. They sit at boundaries between discourses and provide alternative interpretations of policy problems and of their solutions. Second, actors can demarcate a discourse. In doing so, they attempt to gain credibility for their interpretation of, for example, a policy problem or a boundary concept. For instance, in the Protein Highway Project, the concept of scenarios was interpreted from a government discourse to mean a vision for a region that governmental actors and academic experts developed and promoted. Actors demarcated this meaning from a deliberative governance interpretation in which scenarios were considered a way to facilitate deliberation about possible developments in the region and policy options to stimulate or dampen these. I explained that discursive boundary crossing and demarcating is powerful with help of a Foucauldian notion of power. I considered a demarcation of discourse or a transcending of boundaries particularly powerful when it resonated with more or less frozen, that is, more institutionalized discourse. Participants accepted these demarcations or transcending without articulation or contestation. The frozen discourse was reproduced.

However, alteration of more frozen discourse was also possible in conversations. This could happen when people started to reflect on demarcations or boundary concepts. The concept of parrhesia — fearless speech — theoretically enabled the introduction of alternative discourse. Parrhesia is a possible escape from discursive disciplining powers and at the same time introduced new ones. It is fearless speech that can induce a contestation of, or a reflection on, more frozen discourse or new discourse, for example, boundary concepts. These reflective conversations are a condition for frozen or new discourse to become credible.

Hence, I focused on the dynamics of the credibility struggles between government and deliberative governance discourses in policy practice. This meant that I first described the innovative projects: the agenda, the number of deliberative venues (Fung, 2006, p. 64), the scope and depth of participation (Berry et al., 1993; Fung, 2006, p. 65), and the way participants were engaged, for example, in consortia that drafted a plan or built scenarios for a region, or in a dialogue about conflicts between environment and agriculture. Second, I looked into the details of the conversations of participants in the experiments. I established if the content of their conversations was altered and if the interpretations of actors changed. More specifically, I determined if the participants started to believe in and enact a deliberative governance discourse.

In the three innovative policy projects I reconstructed patterns of boundary work in two stages: the drafting of proposals for the experiments, and the experiments themselves. In the first stage, governmental actors, often together with a consultant or academic experts, started to form a change coalition and introduced boundary concepts. In the second stage, other non-governmental actors were invited to join deliberations. The change coalition applied a deliberative design for this stage. In both stages, patterns of boundary work evolved. I reconstructed these patterns with help of a research format and Transana software. In addition, I interpreted and typified the kinds of conversation participants engaged in and what the outcomes of these conversations were.

#### STAGE 1: PATTERN OF BOUNDARY WORK IN DRAFTING THE PROPOSALS

In the first stage of each project a group of actors drafted the proposals for the experiments. In the two Dutch cases this change coalition was formed by consultant(s), academic expert(s) and civil servant(s). In the Dairy Gateway project these actors were accompanied by representatives from agribusinesses and environmental organizations. In this stage the potential members of the change coalitions conducted boundary work in three steps: (1) demarcations of deliberative governance discourse from government discourse; (2) introduction of boundary concepts; (3) a) demarcations of interpretation of the boundary concept stewardship, or b) introduction of two more boundary concepts: scenarios and innovation.

In the case of Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark, the consultant and an external academic expert formed a change coalition that demarcated the “normal” versus a “new” way of policy formation. They argued that the “new” way would produce a variety of feasible plans for the Bijlmerpark and that citizens were to be considered experts. They contrasted this to the making of one feasible plan through which, as they argued, diversity of solutions and local knowledge gets lost. The consultant and academic expert introduced several new procedural elements of deliberative governance, for example, the inclusion of citizens’ expertise. They also altered the meaning of feasibility and expertise, which became boundary concepts. From the analysis I conclude that a feasible plan came to mean a financially, technically and democratically agreed upon plan. In this case, the concept of feasibility spanned the boundary between government and deliberative governance discourse.

In the Dairy Gateway project in Wisconsin, governmental actors, academic experts and societal actors collaboratively drafted a proposal. In this proposal these participants demarcated dialogue and learning from conflict, and they demarcated stewardship by farmers from farmers who pollute. In their conversations, potential members of the change coalition, which included environmental organizations and farmers’ representatives,
demarcated their interpretations of dialogue, learning and especially stewardship. This resulted in a conflict and one of the environmental organizations left the coalition. This organization no longer believed that industrial farmers could be considered stewards of the land. Hence, it no longer believed in this element of deliberative governance.

In the case of the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project it was mostly governmental actors, consultants and some businesses that drafted the proposal. The members of this change coalition first demarcated a doomsday scenario for the region from a desirable perspective that included cluster development. Cluster development was interpreted as a spatially bringing together of agribusinesses that would benefit these businesses, but also as a way to put less strain on land use in the area. It was even thought to be a way to increase animal welfare and the environmental quality of the region. Second, the change coalition introduced the boundary concepts animal welfare and the environmental quality of the region. It was even thought to be a way to increase spatially bringing together of agrobusinesses that would benefit these businesses, but also perspective that included cluster development. Cluster development was interpreted as a change coalition first demarcated a doomsday scenario for the region from a desirable actors, consultants and some businesses that drafted the proposal. The members of this change coalition introduced the boundary concepts scenarios and innovation; these were also were multi-interpretable. The concept of scenarios was interpreted as a “seductive perspective” that was to be promoted while others interpreted it as being a tool for deliberation. Innovation meant the innovation of products of businesses in the region, for example, new ways to use chicken feathers. Innovation also meant new ways of cooperation between agrobusinesses, and it was interpreted as being an innovation of the “system” in which government, businesses and non-governmental actors operate. Third, the change coalition enabled the its members to blur their different interpretations of the concepts innovation, scenario and cluster development. Table 6.1 illustrates the three steps of boundary work in the first stage of the three projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creative competition in the Bijlmerpark</td>
<td>Demarcation of deliberative governance discourse from government: new versus old</td>
<td>Boundary concepts: Feasibility and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Gateway project</td>
<td>Demarcation of deliberative governance discourse from government: dialogue versus conflict</td>
<td>Boundary concepts: Dialogue, learning and stewardship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protein Highway: Make it Happen Project</td>
<td>Demarcation of deliberative governance discourse from government: doomsday scenario versus desirable scenario</td>
<td>Boundary concepts: Innovation and scenarios</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1. Three steps of boundary work in the first stage of the three cases

Hence, in all projects the change coalition introduced boundary concepts that challenged a more frozen government discourse. They all criticized and provided alternatives to this discourse. The change coalitions proposed to improve the interactions between government and society. These proposals paved the way to explore new content, for example, cluster development and stewardship. In the two Dutch projects a blurring of the interpretation of the boundary concepts feasibility, innovation, and scenarios enabled the continuation of the projects. In the first stage of the Dairy Gateway project demarcations of interpretations of stewardship induced conflict and one potential coalition member left. In this case the remaining members of the change coalition all interpreted stewardship from a deliberative governance discourse. In all three projects a change coalition was formed, and the acceptance of the proposals marked the transition to the organization of deliberations with a broader range of participants.

**STAGE 2: PATTERN OF BOUNDARY WORK IN DELIBERATIONS**

In the second stage of all three projects, a variety of participants engaged in deliberations that consultants had designed. Creative Competition for redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark had a design that brought together a consortia of citizens and professionals. These consortia drafted plans for the park and competed to win. In the Dairy Gateway project the consultants applied a deliberative design that consisted of mediation in regional farmer-to-neighbor meetings, farmer-to-farmer meetings, and consensus building at a statewide convening. This design included rules of interaction and facilitated conversations. Deliberations took place between governmental actors, businesses, business representatives, environmental organizations, and both organized and unorganized citizens. These deliberative venues covered a large part of the project. In contrast, in the end the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project did not include many deliberative venues nor did organized or unorganized citizens participate. At the start of the project consultants had proposed organizing scenario workshops and public arenas that would include a broad range of societal actors. However, these never materialized. Instead, the consultants invited a few of the professional environmental and animal welfare organizations to the one-day workshop. Moreover, at the majority of the meetings in the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project, governmental actors interacted with businesses from the agrosector. Below I will address my conclusions on the design and number of deliberative venues, and the scope and depth of participation in relation to boundary work. But first I will present the reconstructed patterns of boundary work in the second stage of the three projects. This will reveal that boundary work led to credible government discourse in the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark. In the Protein Highway Project governance discourse became credible, and in the Dairy Gateway project deliberative governance discourse.

**The Dutch cases: hidden interpretative conflict becomes overt**

In both Dutch cases the change introduction boundary concepts. In the case of the Bijlmerpark the two concepts, feasibility and expertise, were interpretable from a government and a deliberative governance discourse. In the case of the Protein Highway Project, the concepts innovation and scenarios were introduced. In the conversations at the deliberative venues organized in each project, the following pattern of boundary work could be reconstructed:

**Step 1: Boundary spanning concepts**

In both Dutch cases, the facilitators introduced the new discourse and participants immediately engaged in a collaborative inquiry into boundary concepts such as a feasible plan and cluster development. The participants did not negotiate the meaning of these concepts, but started to design feasible plans for the Bijlmerpark, and in the Protein Highway project developed instruments for cluster development. Hence, participants in the Dutch cases seemed to enact deliberative governance discourse and engage in mutual learning. However, in the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project participants only briefly discussed the meaning of the concept of scenarios and of innovation. Were scenarios desirable futures, or possible futures that would help to explore options? For most of the project, these interpretative struggles were not settled. The meaning of scenarios and
innovation remained blurred when participants engaged in a collaborative inquiry into cluster development.

**Step 2: Conflicting interpretations: demarcations of discourses**
In both Dutch projects, the boundary concepts became the subject of an interpretative conflict. At the last meeting of Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark participants entered this conflict. Citizens claimed they could not recognize any of their expert input in the plans that professional planners presented. The alderwoman settled this conflict. She claimed that they did not recognize their input in the professional plans because of the citizens’ ignorance and her own. The participants accepted this interpretation and the policy formation returned to the usual planning procedures in which professional planners resumed their roles as experts. This case demonstrates that more institutionalized and rather frozen discourse can resist change.

At the scenario workshop of the Protein Highway project, there was one instance at which the steering committee members started to discuss their conflicting interpretations of cluster development and innovation. So far, this interpretative struggle had been hidden. They argued whether cluster development was about relocation of businesses to improve the economic viability of the area, or about relocation of businesses (and others) to improve the economic viability AND land use. In relation to this question, they discussed whether a broad range of stakeholders had to be involved in the deliberations or not. In this discussion the steering committee members demarcated their interpretation of innovation and cluster development. To gain even more credibility for their interpretations, they referred to the support they had gained in their parallel workshop. The hidden conflict about meaning became overt. It was settled in the deliberative meeting with participants. The participants agreed that the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project was about cluster development by businesses. Spatial quality was not their concern. Other societal actors were not needed for these sorts of innovation. The Innovation Network had acted as parrhesiastes and criticized more frozen government discourse. In the course of the project, their interpretation of cluster development, innovation and scenarios from a deliberative governance perspective had been excluded.

**Step 3: Boundary transcending continued in collaborative inquiry**
In Creative Competition in the Bijlmerpark there was no third step of boundary work. The project had ended. In the Protein Highway project, the interpretative conflict resulted in a collaborative inquiry into cluster development by businesses and governmental actors. They agreed that government had to stimulate business entrepreneurship. Participants believed that a “seductive perspective,” a desirable scenario that included cluster development by businesses had to be developed and communicated to other businesses. *Governance* discourse by entrepreneurs had become credible. This case demonstrates that innovative policy formation was possible but also limited. Governmental actors and businesses considered network governance as a form of entrepreneurship. First and foremost, this businesslike policy innovation (Innovation Ltd./Innovatie B.V.) had to benefit agrobusinesses in the region.

Hence, in both Dutch cases, it appears as though participants avoided conflict as long as possible. First, politicians and civil servants turned to experiments with deliberative governance to avoid political struggles in the normal policy formation process about building in a park or about cluster development. Second, when the experiments started, the change coalition and participants blurred interpretations of the proposals regarding the experiments and the boundary concepts in them. This enabled a continuation of the experiments. However, at some point in the second stage, an interpretative conflict about the boundary concepts entered the conversations. These became fracture line concepts. Interestingly, in both cases a potential conflict about the content did not evolve. In the case of the Bijlmerpark, a possible conflict about building in the park remained off the table. In the Protein Highway Project participants did not discuss the potentially controversial concept of cluster developments (which earlier on also had been referred to as agroparks and piggery apartments). This was markedly different in the U.S. case.

**Dairy Gateway project: credible deliberative governance**
In the Dairy Gateway project I constructed three additional steps of boundary work. My analysis reveals a different credibility struggle.

**Step 1: Demarcating dialogue from conflict and enactment of stewardship**
In the Dairy Gateway project, the first step consisted of three elements. First, the consultants introduced dialogue or learning and demarcated them from conflict. They did so at almost all meetings. Second, at most meetings, participants also enacted dialogue or learning, for example, by sitting in a circle and sharing stories. The mediators applied several strategies that I recognized as strategy of indirection (Forester 2000; 2009), to encourage dialogue and learning. Third, to gain credibility for the concept *stewardship*, farmers immediately wanted to prove they could be stewards of the land. They demonstrated their willingness to improve their environmental performance either through hands-on solutions, the development of an EMS, or the development of standards for a generic EMS. They invited citizens or environmental organizations to deliberate on these concepts of stewardship.

**Step 2: Reflective conversations about demarcations**
In the second step participants engaged in conversations mostly about stewardship. In some instances these conversations developed into a conflict, especially when a manure spill or some other incident had occurred in the recent past. The facilitators were able to return the conversations to normal or reflective ones by re-enactment of dialogue and learning. In the reflective conversations participants talked about the differences between their normal adversarial relations and the new cooperative relationships. Moreover, this led them to cross boundaries around their subdiscourses, which are part of government discourse, and to interpret farmers as stewards of the land, environmentalists as potential partners to improve farming practices, and government as a facilitator rather than inspector.

**Step 3: Boundary spanning continues in collaborative inquiries**
In the Dairy Gateway project, it was only after the first two steps that participants engaged in a collaborative inquiry into several forms of stewardship. Neighbors of farmers suggested to farmers how they could improve their environmental performance, for example, with help of straw covers or a digester. At the farmer-to-farmer meetings, farmers and governmental actors engaged in an inquiry into Environmental Management Systems that would be acceptable to both actors. In statewide deliberations, environmental organizations and farmers’ representatives elaborated on environmental standards that could be used in the EMS’s. Moreover, as a final step at these meetings, the participants collaboratively set the agenda for the next steps to be taken to further develop stewardship.
Deliberative governance discourse had become credible. Table 6.2 summarizes the patterns of boundary work in the second stage of the three projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC in Bijlmerpark</td>
<td>Collaborative inquiry into boundary concept for feasible pork</td>
<td>Conflict and government interpretation of feasible and expertise “wins.”</td>
<td>Credible government discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario building in PH</td>
<td>Collaborative inquiry into boundary concept cluster development. Discussion about scenarios.</td>
<td>Continued collaborative inquiry (government and business) into cluster development.</td>
<td>Credible government discourse by entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.2. Boundary work in stage two of the three projects**

**CONCLUSIONS: BOUNDARY WORK AND CREDIBLE DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE**

The empirical results demonstrate that the introduction of boundary concepts, such as the concept of feasibility and stewardship, created a sphere of engagement for participants. It is in this sphere that participants explored the boundary spanning ideas and demarcated their conflicting interpretations to gain credibility for them. These demarcations made visible the potential fracture lines between discourses and thus between different interpretations. The analysis also demonstrates that without an interruption by facilitators, these fracture lines led to conflict. Moreover, conflict made it impossible to change frozen discourse but when facilitators redirected demarcations toward reflective conversations this enabled alternative discourse to become credible.

As we saw in the two Dutch cases, conflict about interpretations of boundary concepts prevented deliberative governance discourse from becoming credible. In Creative Competition for redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark this conflict occurred at the end of the experiment. The alderwoman no longer considered citizens to be experts that can produce feasible plans. She demarcated government discourse in which professional planners are the only experts. At this moment, government discourse regained credibility. In the Protein Highway Project, a conflict about interpretations of the concepts scenarios and innovation surfaced almost at the end of the project. In this case, businesses and a majority of governmental actors argued against the Innovation Network and its deliberative governance interpretation of these concepts. They believed that one desirable scenario that government, academic experts and businesses had developed for the region had to be promoted, and that innovation meant product and process innovation rather than innovation of the way actors interacted. In this case, the conflict led to credible governance discourse. However, the Dairy Gateway project demonstrates that with help of specific facilitation techniques — of which participants’ enactment of deliberative governance discourse at the start of meetings is a part — a facilitator can redirect demarcations and make them part of reflective conversations. For example, one of the neighbors of a large farm questioned the stewardship of the farmer. The farmer responded with a demarcation of government discourse and argued that it was not possible to prove that he had contaminated the water. At this point, the facilitator asked both to engage in a dialogue about possible solutions rather than to sustain conflict. This is when they started to reflect on their conflicting interpretations of stewardship, and engaged in a dialogue to explore possible solutions. In this case deliberative governance discourse gained credibility.

Hence, a comparison of two Dutch cases and one from the U.S. demonstrated that it is through boundary work and participants’ responses to it that government discourse, governance discourse, or deliberative governance discourse became credible. It also demonstrated that it was only in the Dairy Gateway project that deliberative governance discourse gained credibility, including the idea to include environmental organizations and citizens in a dialogue on the development of stewardship and environmentally friendly farm practices. It was only in this experiment that participants engaged in reflective conversations about government and deliberative governance discourse, for example, about the meaning of dialogue and of stewardship, and about the subdiscourses of farmers, government and environmentalists. The introduction of boundary concepts and a reflective quality of the conversations among participants contributed to a gaining of credibility of deliberative governance discourse. Innovation of government discourse was limited but possible. From the analysis of boundary work, I conclude that the credibility of policy innovation varied with the implementation of the deliberative design.

**6.2. INNOVATION LTD.: BOUNDARY WORK, DELIBERATIVE DESIGN AND DEMOCRACY**

The comparison of boundary work in three policy innovations leads to three general observations that result in practical and theoretical recommendations. Finally, as the most significant result of this study, I will discuss the democratic promises of deliberative governance theory.

**OBSERVATION 1: FACILITATORS DETERMINE THE FATE OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE**

My first observation is that in the three cases a change coalition and participants interpreted the innovative forms of governing from a deliberative governance discourse, a government, and a governance discourse. The experiments in themselves were boundary concepts.
These innovative forms of governing were multi-interpretable and this enabled coalition formation. However, I also demonstrated that the interpretation of the change coalition — and the facilitators part of that — turned out to be crucial for credible deliberative governance discourse. It was important to have a discursively undivided change coalition that interpreted boundary concepts from a deliberative governance discourse. At the same time, this coalition needed to stimulate facilitators to create reflective conversations about various critical interpretations of the boundary concepts.

As we saw, the implementation of each experiment was determined by — in the Dutch cases — a hidden, well embedded, almost frozen, interpretation. In the Dairy Gateway project the change coalition contested and negotiated deliberative governance discourse. After these negotiations they formed a broad and united coalition that included farmers and environmentalists that believed in farmers’ stewardship. In stage two of the Dairy Gateway project, this united change coalition enabled facilitators to guard deliberative governance discourse. This meant that the facilitators were able to stimulate reflective conversations about the boundary concept stewardship. In this case, at several critical moments when conflict occurred, the facilitator was able to redirect adversarial participants and asked them to speak fearlessly about their critical interpretations of stewardship. At the same time they encouraged participants to engage in a dialogue.

In both Dutch cases, a hidden dominant interpretation of the experiments limited the possibility to alter government discourse. For example, in the case of the Protein Highway, a dominant governance interpretation of the proposal and of the boundary concepts in it led to a governance implementation of the deliberative design. This interpretation excluded other possible interpretations, for example, of innovation as systems innovation, of cluster development as a spatial and environmental improvement, of scenarios as technique to foster deliberation and reflections. In this case, the boundary concepts that addressed the procedures, for example scenarios and innovation, were also interpreted from a governance rather than deliberative governance discourse. This dominant interpretation led environmental and animal welfare organizations to exclude themselves.

At critical moments, the facilitators were unable to guard deliberative governance discourse. For example, when members of the change coalition started to fight about the interpretations of the boundary concepts, the facilitators were unable to redirect the conversation to a reflective collaborative inquiry. The facilitators had become part of the conflict and were defending the dominant interpretation of the experiment. As a result, the change coalition, in alliance with participating businesses, imposed their interpretation of cluster development, scenarios and innovation. They promoted it as the desirable future for the region. This limited the discursive deliberative space in which others could contest or reflect on the interpretations of boundary concepts.

**Observation 2: Deliberative Design Facilitates Reflective Conversations**

A second observation is that the differences in deliberative designs induced different patterns of boundary work. These patterns influenced the quality of the conversations. In the Dairy Gateway project, facilitation techniques, such as sharing stories, and strategies of indirection, enabled reflective conversations about different interpretations of boundary concepts. For example, participants explored the meaning of stewardship. With help of the deliberative design and its implementation, the change coalition made room for arguments about stewardship. Participants were able to demarcate their subdiscourses. The change coalition did not impose their interpretation of stewardship. They suggested it and created a sphere of engagement to explore whether this was a credible idea. In this case, these disagreements did not turn into conflict. The facilitators were able to induce participants to reflect on their conflicting interpretations.

The Dutch proposals included a deliberative design that consisted of rules of conduct and it prescribed how many meetings were to be held, with whom and with what agenda. However, it lacked facilitation techniques and in both Dutch cases parts of the design were altered when they were implemented. In these cases participants did not negotiate the meaning of boundary concepts such as cluster development or a feasible plan. Participants started to draw plans for the park and think about ways to develop agro-clusters. They were not assisted to demarcate their interpretations of the boundary concepts, nor to engage in a struggle about possible conflicting interpretations. In these cases conflict occurred at moments at which members of the change coalition tried to impose their interpretation of the boundary concepts. The members of the coalition started to fight. The facilitators were unable to redirect this conflict. They had no facilitation techniques to fall back on, nor could they re-enact an agreement to engage in dialogue or a learning process. In these cases, dominant discourse was not altered.

Hence, the empirical findings suggest that a deliberative design can contribute to the reflective quality of the conversation if, and only if, this process is well facilitated. Subsequently, the reflective quality of a conversation leads to credible deliberative governance. A practical implication for experiments with deliberative governance is that deliberative settings can be staged in such a way that they enable participants to reflect upon and demarcate their discourses and subdiscourses. Through an “active manipulation of the setting” facilitators can influence how participants behave in this setting (Hajer, 2005a, p. 626). A setting can encourage participants to engage in reflective collaborative inquiries. Hence, it is a convening of the process but also a facilitation of reflective conversations that can be considered. In other words, in experiments with deliberative governance a design should specify who should participate, at what moments, and with what agenda. A design can also include facilitation techniques, such as sharing stories or signing a document with conversations rules. These facilitation techniques stage the setting and enable participants to engage in a collaborative inquiry and, in case of conflict, enable a reflective conversation about interpretations of boundary concepts to occur (see also below).

**Observation 3: Collaborative Discourse Should Emerge, Not Be Imposed**

A third observation, which complements the previous one, is that a quick move toward a collaborative inquiry that lacks reflectivity makes it difficult to alter relatively frozen discourse. In other words, if there is no room to contest new ideas they will not be accepted.

Conflict and reflectivity were avoided especially in the Dutch cases. In contrast to the Dairy Gateway project in Wisconsin, the Dutch did not apply techniques to facilitate demarcations that might lead to conflict of interests or interpretations. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that participants also did not evoke these struggles. In both Dutch cases, the change coalitions successfully applied a pragmatic approach that aimed at solutions.
They wanted participants to focus on a development of feasible plans for the Bijlmerpark, and on instruments for cluster development in the Protein Highway Region. That is what participants did. However, this pragmatic approach also limited the possibility for deliberative governance to become credible. An avoidance of conflict made it harder to gain credibility for deliberative governance discourse. The boundary concepts of scenarios, innovation and cluster development were interpreted from a dominant discourse. This excluded alternative interpretations.

The contrasting case, which the Dairy Gateway turned out to be, demonstrated that conflict does not need to be avoided. Moreover, it shows that conflict — including demarcations of discourses — contributes to change of dominant discourse. In this case two things happened: facilitators redirected conflicts about interests to struggles over interpretations, and they invited participants to reflect upon and speak fearlessly about their conflicting interpretations. In this case, conflict was on the table, but it was redirected to a reflection on differences and possible agreement on interpretations. The boundary concepts and a deliberative design that paid attention to facilitation techniques enabled this reflective collaborative search. In the Dairy Gateway project, rather than being antagonists, participants turned into agonists (Mouffe, 2008). They agreed to disagree at some points and to collaboratively try to improve the environmental performance of farmers.

Hence, experiments with deliberative governance should not immediately move to “collaborative discourse” (Rosenberg, 2007a, p. 132). This is what happened in the Dutch cases. In other words, tension and a facilitation of the emergence of conflict need to be part of the conversations. New forms of governing and the alternative solutions can become more credible if differences in interpretations and positions, and consensus in outcomes are facilitated.

A winning team: deliberative design, boundary work and good facilitation

A practical implication of the three observations is that a deliberative design and facilitators that make boundary work possible are crucial to bring about credible deliberative governance. The deliberative design should stage settings for reflective conversations in which participants can demarcate their interpretations. To become part of credible discourse, the meaning of boundary concepts should not be imposed but negotiated and reflected upon. Hence, credible deliberative governance discourse can be achieved when three conditions are taken into account. First, a change coalition interprets the experiment from the perspective of a deliberative governance discourse. Second, the experiments with deliberative governance are organized and facilitated. This means that facilitators apply a process design and a design for techniques and strategies to alter the type of conversation in which actors engage. Third, the facilitators (in cooperation with a change coalition) try to induce the following ideal pattern of boundary work:

Step 1: Boundary concepts: a united change coalition that introduces boundary concepts that provide different interpretations of a (policy) problem.

Step 2: Boundary concepts “proven”: a powerful actor, for example, a farmer, demonstrates that he or she indeed can span boundaries (at this stage credibility can also be gained by a demarcation of expertise or experience).

Step 3: Reflective conversations: in these conversations among a broad range of actors there is room for demarcations of subdiscourses. Participants contest and explore the meaning of the boundary concepts in a reflective way. They can be both critical and empathetic of dominant discourse.

Step 4: Reflective collaborative learning: enactment of the boundary concepts through a collaborative inquiry and a communal agenda setting for a followup of the deliberations.

REFLECTION 1: FLUID AND FROZEN POWER IN THE ANALYSIS OF BOUNDARY WORK

In chapter 1, I argued that the analysis of boundary work adds a dimension to the study of experiments with deliberative governance: the study of fluid power in language. I believed this was necessary because in the experiments that I had been part of participants followed the procedures of deliberation, but in their language (and actions) they did not necessarily seem to believe and enact deliberative governance discourse. It was hard to alter “frozen” discourse and practice. Therefore, I argued that we need to study the discourse and practice of experiments with deliberative governance. In addition to pushing back the consequences of these more frozen power differences through deliberative designs (cf. Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Fung, 2006, p. 5; Zijdle, 1998; Bekkers et al., 2007b; Rosenberg, 2007b; Hendriks, 2009; Dodge, 2009; Metze, 2009), this study sought to demonstrate that fluid power differences embedded in language need to be taken into account as well. For example, in the case of the Protein Corridor: Make it Happen project, participants agreed to continue to refer to animals as “protein.” Even though animal welfare organizations and environmental organizations had been invited to deliberate, this more frozen discourse of the agro-sector (self-) excluded them from this project.

The analysis of boundary work demonstrated that indeed, even though all actors accepted the participation of non-governmental actors in decision making, they continued to struggle over the interpretation of the quality of this participation. In other words, in all three cases participants accepted and implemented procedures of deliberative governance. However, at the same time routine frozen discourse determined interpretation of these procedures, for example, whether citizens’ local knowledge was considered expertise, or if innovation included interactions between all sorts of actors. Both through procedures and through discourse people and ideas were included and excluded in these experiments with deliberative governance. The study of boundary work made visible how discourse (hence, content) became credible, and how other discourse was discredited. This also implied that certain ideas and actors were included and others were excluded from the experiment with deliberative governance. Therefore, an analysis of boundary work complements a study of procedural elements such as number and scope of participants, the assembly of a change coalition, the type and number of deliberative venues organized, transparency in information and procedures.

However, there are some limitations to the study of boundary work that need to be further explored. Important questions, for example, are how it relates to number and scope of participants? How boundary work relates to the number of deliberative venues, and what the impact is of changed discourse on people that did not participate in these experiments? It might be relevant to know how many and what type of people participated and started to believe in the discourse. Another important question is how boundary work relates to, for example, the status and charisma of people who draw and span boundaries. A question is whether boundary work by more charismatic, authoritative or original people would be
more easily accepted. The empirical results suggest that a politician, a professional planner, or a farmer that proves to be a good steward, had more impact on a change of discourse than a random citizen. Actors that speak authentically and upright might be powerful in experiments with deliberative governance. They need to set an example before others will believe a new discourse, in this case deliberative governance. Hence, it is interesting to find out if matters who transcends boundaries or demarcates them, as this can also limit or enable change of discourse.

To sum up, knowledge about the assembly of the change coalition, the number and scope of participants, the number of deliberative venues and conditions under which they participated reveal how big the “movement” was. The analysis of boundary work tells us what discourse changed. However, we also learned that there are still challenges to better appreciate the interplay between the content of boundary work in relation to the procedural aspects of experiments with deliberative governance. Hence, a follow-up study that further investigates connections between fluid power and static power of actors, organizations and institutions would contribute to knowledge about how deliberative governance discourse becomes credible.

REFLECTION 2: THE DEMOCRATIC AMBITIONS OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

In the introduction I argued that governing through deliberative governance promises to improve the democratic quality of government decisions through an enhancement of the quality of the conversations: learning and change are stimulated and decisions become more credible. To conclude, I will revisit these claims of deliberative governance theory.

Learning and change

Deliberative governance theory builds on the idea from deliberative democracy theory that exchange of arguments and reflectivity enable better informed decision making and collaborative learning and change. It is the communicative style in interactions that needs to be improved to facilitate learning and change. In chapter 1, I introduced the concept parrhesia – critique of dominant discourse — as one way to induce reflectivity. Moreover, empathy with other interpretations is how participants engage in reflective conversations. In the empirical studies of the three experiments I concluded that in reflective conversations participants were able to contest routinized government discourse and were empathetic with other conflicting interpretations. Through reflective conversations, deliberative governance discourse indeed became credible, whereas conversations that did not reach this quality merely reproduced dominant discourse. In reflective conversations, participants interacted differently than before, and they became convinced of a deliberative governance interpretation of concepts. For example, they started to believe that industrial farmers could be stewards of the land, or that environmentalist could help farmers to be good stewards. Hence, reflective conversations enabled learning and change. This promise of deliberative governance theory was kept in the policy practice due to an active involvement of participants in a negotiation on the meaning of these innovations. Moreover, these participants immediately also implemented this change: they started to interact differently.

The empirical results demonstrate that in all three experiments, the ideas of learning and change are convincing. A demarcation of the concepts of expertise, experience and learning persuaded participants and made deliberative governance discourse more credible. For example, when the change coalition argued that an environmental management system or a digester had been tried out in the Netherlands or by another farmer, this was a convincing argument, for environmentalists as well, to further explore these ideas. In all three projects, it was the usual academic experts and all sorts of other actors who successfully demarcated their expertise, experience, or learning of others. In the three projects, what I have called learning discourse was a successful way to gain credibility for interpretations and to alter solutions. Moreover, it was a way to include all sorts of knowledge in the deliberations, including that of lay people. As we saw in the introduction, this is what deliberative governance theory aims for: the inclusion of citizens as experts to improve decision making (cf. Mansbridge, 2007; Funtowicz, 2003; Jasanoff, 2004; Fischer, 2000, p. 2; Dryzek, 1990, p. 131 &132). Hence, a learning discourse in this case was a “democratized form of science” (Woodhouse, 2001) in which other forms of knowledge are considered as important as scientific knowledge. It includes a variety of actors as experts, and their knowledge and experience as expertise and knowledge.

However, from the cases we also find that the learning discourse is convincing too. It is a relatively frozen discourse that cannot easily be rejected. This is also why it is a discursive resource to change other discourses. To address citizens and other actors as experts is a powerful way to both make actors that usually are excluded more easily accepted as equal partners in deliberations, and to have participants engage in a collaborative inquiry rather than in negotiations or a conflict of interests. To demarcate a learning discourse can be a strategy of change. As we saw in the Blijmerpark and in the Dairy Gateway, the labeling of a variety of participants as experts contributed to more equal deliberations. Due to this labeling these actors were included and their arguments were considered in these experiments. Moreover, a demarcation of a learning discourse was a powerful way to convince participants of deliberative governance discourse. For example, in the Blijmerpark the consultant convinced governmental actors and planners to regard citizens as experts that could co-determine the feasibility of the plans. In the Dairy Gateway project and in the Protein Highway Project otherwise adversarial professional organizations were able to cooperate as experts.

Hence, the learning discourse in experiments with deliberative governance is a democratization of expertise. It allows for inclusion of expertise and experience other than merely academic. At the same time the labeling of citizens and non-governmental actors such as businesses and animal welfare organizations as experts is a powerful way to make them, their interpretations and their arguments more acceptable to actors in power. Deliberative governance theory promotes a learning discourse, and at the same time this discourse promotes deliberative governance. It is crucial, however, to facilitate a meaningful exchange among various actors. A mutual questioning of assumptions is necessary for deliberation rather than power to prevail.

Credibility on the line

Deliberative governance theory, as developed in this thesis, promises credible decisions. In deliberative governance theory, the concept of credibility means the enactment and acceptance of discourses in interactions. This is different from legitimacy and authority that is granted through formal and legal positions, procedures and procedural aspects, such as transparency. In this thesis, I did not explain acceptance of dominant discourse.
by looking at its formal legitimacy or authority, rather, I studied the discursive dynamics by which participants started to believe in or reject, in our case, deliberative governance discourse. This is in line with the ideas in deliberative democracy theory that argue, for example, that: “Without deliberation, democratic choices are not exercised in a meaningful way. If the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us. Deliberation is necessary if the claims to democracy are not to be de-legitimized” (Fishkin, 1991, p. 29; cf. also Dryzek, 2001, p. 65; Renhlabib, 1996, p. 69; Cohen, 1986, p. 145-146; Besette, 1994; Hajer, 2009). I introduced boundary work in deliberations as the way by which credibility of discourse, and I introduced that democratic choices and procedures, comes about or does not. For example, participants in deliberations contested boundary concepts that were part of new discourse. Sometimes participants started to believe in these new solutions and sometimes they did not. It is a dynamic process through which new discourse gains credibility, or fails.

The empirical results also demonstrate that the formal and legal positions, procedures and procedural aspects, by which we legitimize authority of government, for example, can gain credibility in deliberations. For example, in the Dairy Gateway project government’s normal role to inspect farmers gained credibility among deliberating farmers. They negotiated and reflected on this role and started to believe that government’s authority in this case was credible. They concluded that they did not want to police each other, but that government was the best actor to inspect them. In this way, the farmers re-enacted government’s authority as an inspector. In deliberations they confirmed the role of government, which was already formally legitimate. This empirical example shows that it is a misunderstanding that deliberative governance theory considers authority, or legitimacy derived from formal rules, procedures and institutional arrangements as obsolete. On the contrary, this example validates the idea of deliberative governance theory that it is in deliberations that the credibility of formal rules, procedures and institutional arrangements is often substantiated. It is the enactment of credibility of these formal arrangements in conversations that makes sure that legitimate authority of governmental actors stays legitimate. It is also in these interactions that it can become discredited and through that, perhaps in the long run, illegitimate.

**Credible democratic deliberative governance**

Finally, I will discuss the pragmatic approach of deliberative governance theory. This interest means that it promotes collaborative inquiries into solutions for the common good. This is a better way for decision making than ideological debate and bargaining about interests. For example, Parkinson argued that interactions should be deliberative and not as “irrational as bargaining and strategic action” (Parkinson, 2006, p. 4). Settings for learning and change should be staged for credible decision making. This implies that deliberative governance theory does not take a normative stance as is sometimes emphasized in critical policy analysis. Scholars in this tradition — Fischer, Fung and Wright, and Dryzek, among others — argue that policy analysts should deliberately take a stand in democratic debate. They should be normative and support those who are not in power, for example, environmental organizations or citizens’ groups. Political scientists should be normative and stand side by side with powerless citizens or organizations and empower them. Otherwise policy analysis is always at risk of reproducing the status quo. Deliberative governance theory is on strained terms with this type of standpoint reflectivity. It is exactly the normative standpoints that experiments with deliberative governance try to avoid, as these hinder collaborative learning and change. Deliberative governance theory does not want to start from such premises as, for example, that farmers or other businesses are always the polluters, or that government and environmental organizations are trying to ruin businesses. On the contrary, it argues that these conflicting standpoints can be overcome when actors engage in reflective collaborative inquiries into solutions for the common good. When political scientists take a normative stance in these deliberations, a pragmatic approach of finding credible solutions in a collaborative inquiry will be impossible.

However, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that standpoint reflectivity is necessary in experiments with deliberative governance: the “low” road is always alluring for both governmental actors or others that initiate these experiments, and for participants in experiments with deliberative governance. First, the Dutch cases demonstrate that initiators of the experiments can pay lip service and interpret and implement deliberative governance as an experiment with network governance, or even disregard the results and return to normal policy making procedures as soon as possible. From the study of boundary work in these cases we learn that experiments are boundary concepts in themselves. People who initiate these experiments, whether governmental actors, business leaders, consultants, or academics, interpret them from different discourses. As we have seen, the initiators’ dominant interpretation of the experiment determines what discourse becomes credible. The most conservative interpretation that leads to the least change for powerful actors tends to become the most credible. This is one low road that is attractive. The experiments can easily become isolated incidents of credible deliberative governance, or they can turn into a case of credible (network) governance that reproduces the power of networks already established, for example, between government and businesses. In a pragmatic point of view, this would not be a problem, since problems are getting solved. However, alternatively I may argue that these experiments are still too exclusive. Through dominant and routine discourse, too many participants and forms of expertise are excluded.

The empirical results from the Dairy Gateway project also demonstrate that there are at least two ways to guard the democratic ambitions of deliberative governance theory. First, as we have seen in this case, the initiators of the experiment reflected on their conflicting interpretations. This enabled them to cross discursive boundaries and further promote credible deliberative governance discourse. Second, academic experts, consultants, facilitators, and governmental organizations that convene and facilitate the experiments can be watchdogs of a deliberative governance interpretation of the experiment. They can point out when interpretations of these experiments are leading toward a low road. At these moments they can use facilitation techniques to push an interpretation of the experiment from a deliberative governance discourse.

A second way in which pragmatic deliberative governance can become naïve pragmatism is when it does not take into account the low road that is alluring for participants. Actively engaged citizens or businesses can easily become passive consumers or entrepreneurs. For example, it is tempting for farmers to be free riders in voluntary programs (Delmas and Keller, 2005; Stijn Darnall and Carmin, 2005; Rondinella and Vastagh, 2000; Tanescu, 2006). The analysis of the three cases demonstrates that the low road is alluring indeed. For
example, in the Protein Highway Project governmental actors, consultants and businesses did not mind that environmental and animal welfare organizations excluded themselves. Even though they were invited, these organizations did not want to participate since they refused to think of animals as protein. In fact, this self exclusion was encouraged by a demarcation of government discourse. For example, businesses and some governmental actors successfully referred to governmental reconstruction plans to gain credibility for the exclusion of animal welfare and environmental organizations. They agreed that these organizations did not need to be included as they already had co-established the zoning plans. Moreover, in this case business leaders, again together with some governmental actors, interpreted cluster development as cooperation between businesses to benefit the business case. They excluded the alternative deliberative governance interpretation that considered cluster development a way to improve land use and spatial quality in the region. In two ways these actors agreed to take the low road rather than the high road. Even though procedurally the “marginalized voices” (Christiano, 1996, p. 259) were included, through boundary work and dominant discourses they still were excluded. Moreover, businesses were not encouraged to be actively involved and accountable for problem solving for the common good. Governmental actors and businesses agreed that businesses did not have to actively contribute to an improvement of land use or the spatial quality in the region. Hence, when dominant government discourse can be demarcated to exclude marginalized voices and ideas, the democratic promises of deliberative governance theory are no longer kept.

Again, the example of the Dairy Gateway project demonstrates that this low road can be avoided. In this case, participants used the (exceptional) Green Tier Law as an argument to continue to explore the credibility of a marginal discourse. This law made it possible for governmental actors to give businesses incentives for voluntarily going beyond environmental rules and regulations. Moreover, it stimulated businesses to deliberate with citizens and organizations that normally would oppose them. This law helped to maintain a deliberative governance interpretation of the Dairy Gateway project. Subsequently, the deliberative design of the Dairy Gateway project stimulated participants to speak fearlessly and bring their objections to the table. They were invited to contest the boundary concept of stewardship, and in that way test its credibility. By doing so, environmental organizations, citizens, and governmental actors started to believe that farmers can be good stewards. In this project adversaries were stimulated to engage in reflective conversations to resolve their conflicts and create an outcome that was credible to all participants.

Moreover, in the Dairy Gateway project it was through rules and regulations — routine government discourse — that environmental organizations, citizens and government created urgency for businesses to voluntarily do good for the environment. In this project farmers felt the need to improve their environmental performance. They wanted to participate in the Dairy Gateway project to acquire a social license to operate. They felt hindered or were afraid to be hindered by society in their farming businesses. In this case, the incentive to actively participate and feel accountable for problem solving for the common good was a threat of conflict with their neighbors and environmental organizations. Through rules and regulations, citizens and environmental organizations might be able to limit the farming businesses. Hence, fearlessly giving voice to normative positions in experiments with deliberative governance, in combination with existing governmental rules and regulations, can stimulate collaborative learning and change. In the case of the Dairy Gateway, both conflict in deliberations and the threat of court action, were necessary incentives for many participants to change dominant discourse. Farmers became convinced that they wanted to “do well by doing good.” Environmentalists, citizens and governmental actors started to believe in this stewardship of farmers because they were able to confront them with doubts and conflicts of interests in settings that resulted in reflective conversations.

Credible democratic deliberative governance needs conflicting standpoints for two reasons. The first is to empower citizens and organizations that participate in experiments with deliberative governance. Without conflict and struggle it is easy for powerless actors and powerless ideas never to be empowered, even though all procedures of deliberation are taken into account. Frozen discourse remains dominant. There is no incentive to learn and change. Conflict and debate are ways to create urgency for powerful actors, such as businesses, to feel more responsible for the common good. Conflicts encourage initiators and participants to take the high road in experiments with deliberative governance. Second, conflict as part of the deliberations makes deliberative governance discourse credible. If actors cannot discuss their doubts, express their interests and demarcate their subdiscourses, it will be hard for them to believe the newly proposed solutions. Participants need to be engaged in an empathetic and critical way in explorations of boundary concepts.

The study of boundary work demonstrates that credible democratic deliberative governance is limited: it occurs only in experiments that stage reflective conversations. To be more than an “innovation business”, participants have to be encouraged — by the setting and by the incentives from rules and regulations — to transcend boundaries around frozen discourse. Moreover, a deliberative design and facilitators that are able to redirect conflict into reflective conversations are of great value. They enable critique and empathy in conversations and consensus in outcomes. These are vital ingredients to create credible, innovative and democratic decisions.
ATTACHMENT 3.1.
Timeline for Creative Competition

PM = public meeting, WC = work-conference, WA = work-atelier

ATTACHMENT 3.2.
Interviewees in the Creative Competition in Bijlmerpark

Interviews held in 2003, 2004

- Geert Teisman (EUR)
- Maureen Linthout (project secretary)
- Jeroen Saris (project manager)
- Hans Hofstede (public administrator Stadsdeel Zuidoost)
- Hester Gleijm (public administrator Stadsdeel Zuidoost)
- Ruwan Aluvera (DRO, urban planner)
- Jan Verheijden (head of REO, after Bart Bux Stadsdeel Zuidoost),
- Severine Loef (intern stadsdeel Zuidoost, straat van duizend culturen)
- Henk Lutchman (project leader)
- Hannah Belliot (stadsdeel alderwoman, at the time of the interview
  alderwoman of the central city Amsterdam)
- Renske Peters (head of the department DRO)
- Bart Bux (head of the REO)
- Johan Eckhart, chair of citizensgroup Vogeltjeswei
- Geert Timmermans (DRO)
- Ronald Jansen (chair of the district)
ATTACHMENT 3.3.
Planned meetings CC

ATTACHMENT 3.4.
De Kringels, de Stad bv

ATTACHMENT 3.5.
The visualization of the plans
ATTACHMENT 4.1.
Timeline of Dairy Gateway project

ATTACHMENT 4.2.
CAFO’s in Wisconsin

Wisconsin's WPDES Permitted
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations

A total of 194 WPDES permits for animal feeding operations are in effect in Wisconsin as of June 2010. CAFOs owned by Tenney-O Turkey Store ( ) are permitted jointly under a single WPDES permit. All other CAFOs ( ) are permitted individually.
**ATTACHMENT 4.3.**
Farms and milk production Wisconsin 1930-2009

**WI Dairy Farms & Milk Production, 1930-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Farms</th>
<th>Milk Production</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Preliminary estimate. Source: USDA/NASS, Milk Production)

**ATTACHMENT 4.4.**
Project structure of Dairy Gateway project

- **Joyce Foundation**
- **Investors Club**
- **Design Team**
  - FEI, FEI, FEI, FEI, FEI, FEI, FEI, LNRP
  - **FEI Statewide mediation**
  - **LNRP Regional mediation**
  - **FTF**
  - **FTN**
  - **Grants**

**ATTACHMENT 4.5.**
Respondents and meetings

**Round 1 2004**

- **Matt Joyce**
  - 20th of October 2004
  - Milk Marketing Board
- **Don Nielsen**
  - 20th of October 2004
  - Pagel’s Ponderosa
- **John Pagel**
  - 20th of October 2004
  - DATCP
- **Timm Johnson**
  - 22nd of October 2004
  - Collaborative Initiative/WEI
- **Harry Wehr-Behrman**
  - 22nd of October 2004
  - Lafollette School
- **Jerome Viste**
  - 25th of October 2004
  - Door County Environmental Council/Geen opname
- **Lonnie Finneidael**
  - 26th of October 2004
  - Farmer – geen opname
- **Rick Paye**
  - 26th of October 2004
  - Niet doorgegaan
- **Andy Wallander and Jennifer Keunig**
  - 26th of October 2004
  - Conservation agent and WU Extension
- **John Bobbe**
  - 27th of October 2004
  - OFarm (organic farmers)
- **John Kappelman**
  - 27th of October 2004
  - Farmer
- **Karl Klaska**
  - 27th of October 2004
  - Farmer
- **Ken Bealow**
  - 28th of October 2004
  - Farmer
- **Laurie Fascher**
  - 28th of October 2004
  - DBA
- **Fam. Schuknecht**
  - 28th of October 2004
  - Retired teachers
- **Karen Raymore**
  - 29th of October 2004
  - Chamber of Commerce
- **Renards Cheese Factory**
  - 29th of October 2004
  - Mediator LNRP
- **Nancy Skadden**
  - 29th of October 2004
  - Mediator LNRP
- **Wienke’s farm market**
  - 29th of October 2004
  - Cheese factory chilton
- **Howard Bellman**
  - 1st of November 2004
  - Mediator
- **Andrew Hanson**
  - 1st of November 2004
  - MEA
- **Sonya Newhouse**
  - 1st of November 2004
  - Meg
- **Jeffrey Smoller**
  - 1st of November 2004
  - Special assistant to the DNR state secretary
- **Thom Eggert**
  - 2nd of November 2004
  - Project care taker
- **John Roberts**
  - 3rd of November 2004
  - LNRP
- **Ralph Bergman**
  - 4th of November 2004
  - Town planner
- **Tom Wilson**
  - 4th of November 2004
  - Vice president Greenstone Farm Credit Service
- **Marc Mc Dermid**
  - 20th of November 2004
  - DNR CEA head
- **John Shebang**
  - 29th of December 2004
  - Project manager
- **William E. Schuster**
  - 25th of November 2005
  - Door county soil and conservation department
Round 2 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karl Hakanson</td>
<td>5th of October 2005</td>
<td>WU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Pagel</td>
<td>5th of October 2005</td>
<td>Pagel’s Ponderosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Carla marc and Jeff</td>
<td>6th of October 2005</td>
<td>DNR-CEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Selk</td>
<td>6th of October 2005</td>
<td>Trout Unlimited / criminal prosecutor / deputy district attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caryl Terell</td>
<td>6th of October 2005</td>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarett O’Dell</td>
<td>7th of October 2005</td>
<td>Joyce Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thom Eggert and John Shetot</td>
<td>10th of October 2005</td>
<td>Project managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Miller</td>
<td>10th of October 2005</td>
<td>State senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Wallander and Jennifer Kenning</td>
<td>12th of October 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denny Canef</td>
<td>13th of October 2005</td>
<td>River Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Frame</td>
<td>14th of October 2005</td>
<td>Discovery Farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Podziba</td>
<td>17th of October 2005</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Laws</td>
<td>18th of October 2005</td>
<td>MIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt Amengual</td>
<td>20th of October 2005</td>
<td>MIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ian Finkley</td>
<td>20th of October 2005</td>
<td>MIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonya Newhouseisen</td>
<td>13th of November 2005</td>
<td>MEG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email</td>
<td>State senator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observed meetings

Kewaunee Ag and environmental stewardship
21st of October 2004
Farmer to farmer
21st of October 2004
Manitowoc
Interview met county representative 21st of October 2004
Dan Fischer (county official), Lauren Reed, Scott Gunderson (WU extension), Tom Boswell (county conservationist)

Farmer to neighbour
3rd of November 2004
John’s presentation
20th of June 2005
UK
Bustoer WEI
3rd of October 2005
Bustoer WEI
4th of October 2005
Wis extension Manitowoc
11th of October 2005
Scott Gunderson and Lauren Reed
EMS DATCP Cleveland
12th of October 2005

Unfortunately I did not have access to transcripts of the statewide meetings. WordWorks and the facilitator Webne-Behrman took notes. For this site of interaction I analyzed several reports (DNR-LNRP, 2004; Webne-Behrman, 2005a, 2005b; WEI-Imes, 2004; DNR-CEA, 2006; Amengual and Laws, 2004).

ATTACHMENT 4.6.
Participants in FN5 meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbors invited</th>
<th>Neighbors present</th>
<th>Government officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Door County small farm (100 cows) Meeting 1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting 2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5 from previous 4 new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewaunee County Medium (400 cows)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewaunee County CAFO (1400 cows) Meeting 1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting 2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1 from previous 2 new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting 3 (2004: observed)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitowoc County farms medium sized farm (450 cows)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (LNRP, 2004c) and one observed meeting.

ATTACHMENT 5.1.
Timeline Protein Highway: Make it Happen
ATTACHMENT 5.2.
Participants in arenas for the KLICT project

Arena meat by-products (organized by Arcadis (consultant))
WUR (Alterra); Sonac; Pingo Poultry; gebroeders Bouwens; Nepluvi; gemeente Apeldoorn; Fibroned; C.P.C. Fievo; Vartech; Alterra; PVE; TNO-Mep; A&F; Oost NV; Harimes; MeMon.

Arena veal production (organized by Arcadis)
Alpuro; Denkavit; GLTO; LNV; Gemeente Barneveld; Van Drie Groep; Programmabureau Veluwestroom; Gemeente Apeldoorn; Oost NV; WUR (LEI).

Arena knowledge distribution (organized by Arcadis)
A&F; Oost NV; AOC Oost; Animal Sciences Group-Praktijkonderzoek; PCC/WUR; PPO; PTC+; EC-LNV; Imagro; Countus: accountants; GLTO; Department of Ecological Agriculture; Province of Overijssel; Knowhouse BV; Province of Gelderland; AGRO management; GLTO-Advies; Alterra.

Arena Logistical Optimization (organized by Buck Consultants International)
This Arena took place at the end of October 2003 and the list of participants was not available.

Steering Committee Rural Park
Initiative: Province of Gelderland, Province of Overijssel, Oost NV, Arcadis, Buck Consultants International, Rijnconsult, WUR, GLTO. Participants from the corporate world: Koepon holding, Van Rijsingen Beheer BV, Farm Dairy/Frites, CoopCodis supermarkten, V&D La Place Restaurants en de Groenbank van de Rabobank.

Source: three position papers bundled in ‘Zoeken naar het ei van Combus’ (WUR, 2003)

ATTACHMENT 5.3.
Pilot projects under the umbrella of Protein Corridor: Make it Happen

- Valorization of meat by-products: building of digesters and collection of meat byproducts
- Poultry centre: cooperation in poultry chain between competing businesses to share knowledge and innovations.
- Agro chains: a platform of government and businesses to enhance the agro-chain in the area with help of spatial planning of business parks.
- Family farms plus: spatial clustering of four pig farms each with a size of approximately 2800 pigs.
- Rural Park: production, processing and sales of agro foods in one location
- Optimizing feed streams
- Knowledge distribution: erection of knowledge centre
- Calves cluster: development of calves-cluster in intensifying areas of reconstruction plans.
- Keratin collection from chicken feathers to use in biopolymer
- Easy slurry: digesting of animal/agro waste for energy.
ATTACHMENT 5.4.
Project structure of Protein Highway: Make it Happen project

ATTACHMENT 5.5.
Respondents, observed and attended meetings

Round 1 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jans Hoekmans I</th>
<th>8th of September 2004</th>
<th>Oost NV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fons Goseling</td>
<td>6th of October 2004</td>
<td>Provincie Gelderland, landelijk gebied</td>
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| Herman de Boon | 11th of July 2005 | InnovatieNetwork, steering committee member |
| Jeroen Verver  | 24th of August 2005 | Rabobank |
| Lucie Wassink  | 16th of August 2005 | LNV, trade and industry (Platform Agrologistics) |
| Jochen Pleijisier | 16th of August 2005 | LNV, trade and industry, platform agrologistics |
| Jan de Wilt II | 5th of September 2005 | Innovation Network |
| Cathy van Dijk | 9th of September 2005 | GLTO (gezindheden plus) |
| Henk Aalderink | 11th of January 2006 | Gedeputeerde |
| Ger Vos        | 17th of January 2006 | Chair Innovation Network |
| Jos Roemans     | 19th of January 2006| Van Drie Group |
| Hennie Swinkels | 10th of July 2006 | Stichting Wukker Dier |
| Xandra Asselberg| 24th of November 2006| Varkens in Nood |
| Hans Buijs      | 26th of December 2006| Centrum voor Milieu en Landbouw, zat ook in de staten voor Gelderland voor D66 |
| Bert van der Schans | 7th of January 07  | Dierenbescherming |
| Piet Jansen     | February 2007       | Gedeputeerde |

Presentations of preliminary results

| Discussion Hoekmans and Shenot, Oost NV | 6th of April 2005 | Deventer |
| LNV expertise centre | 7th of April 2005 | Ede |
| LNV Trade and industry | 25th of May 2005 | The Hague |
| Innovation Network | March 2006 | Utrecht |
ATTACHMENT 5.6.
Participants in the plenary sessions

Only two direct representatives of the businesses participated in the plenary sessions. Most of them were represented by the consultants and academics from Wageningen University Research (WUR). At the first plenary session that was connected to Protein Highway: Make it Happen at the 16th of December 2003, 12 people participated of which two of the province of Gelderland, two of Oost NV, two people from Wageningen University Research, three consultants from the agrosector, and one person who had worked for the KLiCT project. Three people had to cancel their participation (Provincie Gelderland, 2003). None of the actual agrobusinesses participated. At the second meeting at the 25th of May 2004 eight people participated, three consultants, one representative from WUR, one from Oost NV, one civil servant from the province of Gelderland and one of the province of Overijssel. At this meeting one business leader from ABCTA a cooperative feed-processor was present (Provincie Gelderland, 2004b). The last plenary session that was connected to the Protein Highway: Make it Happen project took place in August 2004. At this meeting, twelve people participated, including three guest from the national Ministry of Agriculture (also representing the Platform Agrologistics) and me. Two business-leaders were present (one of ABCTA and one representative of the agrarians’ association (GLTO)), two consultants participated, and one person from the province of Gelderland and one of the province of Overijssel, and, finally, one representative of Oost NV (Provincie Gelderland, 2004a).

ATTACHMENT 5.7.
Participants in the scenario workshop

The consultants and one employee of Oost NV, two civil servants of the two provinces, and an employee of the Innovation Network prepared the one-day scenario workshop. With hindsight I can reconstruct that the consultants in their mobilization of stakeholders applied three selection criteria to select participants for the scenario meeting. They decided to include:

1. people that had a “stake” (Interview-Van Waes, 2004) in the area and
2. that “represented a mix of the agrosector and the demand-supply chain”;
3. and to exclude people and organizations that might “obstruct” the process (Interview-Van Waes, 2004). The consultants decided not to include for example Milieudefensie, the Dutch Friends of the Earth.

In the application of these three criteria, the consultants decided to invite four landscaping architects, one nature conservation agency, a sustainable bank (Triodes), a financial consultant, one representative from the Rabobank, one tourist representative, two animal welfare agencies, two WUR related researchers, one environment and agriculture advisor Centrum voor Landbouw en Milieu (CLM), three representatives of the agrofoodsector (e.g. Cebeco (a feed producer), employee of ABCTA, and the Dutch Organization for poultry-farms), and three representatives from the provinces (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). Initially, the consultants invited 20 stakeholders (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). The final list consisted of 22 possible participants (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003). These included the organizing parties Oost NV and Rijnconsult. At the one-day scenario workshop approximately 17 people participated. Both the nature conservation agency and the animal health care service (Natuurbescherming en Gezondheidsdienst voor Dieren, a governmental agency for animal health care) decided not to participate; neither did CLM the research, nor did Cebeco or the Poultry representatives. One of the animal welfare organizations refused to participate. They thought the name ‘protein’ was hideous in its reference to living animals (Transcript SWPL3, 2004). So, formally these actors had been invited, but due to the name they self-excluded from the project. Of the other invited actors, one out of the four landscaping architects participated. At the last minute a farmers’ representative (LTO) was invited and participated (Bunt and Rijnconsult, 2003).
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1 The original excerpt spoke not of government in general but of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. See chapter 4.

2 In 1997 and 1998 I supported citizens’ groups in a participatory planning project. Since 1998 I also have worked for a consultancy agency, de Stad bv, that organizes these type of experiments at the local, regional and national level.

3 For now I will define reflectivity as: “being empathetic with the plight of others; more considered; more far-reaching in both time and space” (Goodin 2003, p. 7). In chapter 2 I will include in the definition criticism of dominant discourses and of actors – including oneself – that utter these discourses. Moreover, I will use the concepts reflective rather than reflexivity as reflexivity refers to reflex’ and has a connotation of being something that happens in action. In this dissertation I am interested in the rather cognitive type of reflectivity that can be facilitated or organized.

4 Government discourse is not to be confused with discourse of governmental actors! Government discourse is the ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories that are produced and reproduced in practice (Hajer 1995, 44) about the hierarchical ways in which governmental actors can make policy decisions and command those. All sorts of actors can utter government discourse.

5 Credibility is introduced as an alternative to the concepts ‘legitimacy and authority’ in policy analysis and builds on the three concepts of credibility, legitimacy, and authority that Gieryn applied in his conceptual work on boundary work (Gieryn 1999).


7 The theoretical models of scholars can be considered to be the (re)production of these discourses in the scientific practice and this is intertwined with other type of practices, such as the policy practice, in society.

8 Governance in the literature means many things, sometimes it refers to New Public Management (Rhodes 1996 and 1997; Hodges 2005). I will leave NPM out of the discussion, as that is a shift on the organizational level within governmental organizations. I am interested in governance as experimentation in interactions between government and society.

9 Hajer refers to this as the classical modernist way of governing (2009, p.23-26, 177)

10 Research into “government” models demonstrates a great variety in democratic models, regulatory models, and decision-making styles. Countries vary in the way formal responsibilities, procedures, legislation and so on are arranged. Broadly speaking, the United States has a pluralistic style of decision-making and a liberal model of democracy. The Netherlands has a neo-corporatist style of decision-making, a consensus-oriented and social democratic model of democracy (cf. Hallman, 2005; Held, 1999; F. Hendriks, 2006; Innes and Gruber, 2001; Lijphart, 1999; Renn, 1995; Vogel, 1986).

11 Literature in (urban) planning, environmental studies, and, for example rural sociology, also addresses (a shift to) network governance or decision making in networks. Even though I study cases that can be related to these research traditions — participatory planning in the case of the Bijlmerpark, and environmental studies and rural sociology for the two other cases, I will not give an overview of this literature at this point. However, in the chapters on these cases I will refer to the relevant bodies of literature.

12 Many more meanings of governance have been identified, for example governance as a structure, a process or an analytical framework (Pierre, 2000, p. 23-26). Hajer prefers the term “network governance” to distinguish it from the process of governing (Hajer, 2009, p. 30-31).

13 In STS this plurality, diffusion and the negotiation of knowledge in decision making are demonstrated empirically, for example by Epstein (1993; 1995) , Jasanoff (1987; 1994), Shackley and Wynne (1995) and Nowonty (2003).

14 Various reasons are given for this. For example, Hajer speaks of a “triple deficit in the authority of classical modernist institutional politics” and describes the three as a problem of implementation, of the challenge to create learning within policy making, and a legitimacy problem (2009, p. 29-30).

15 Hence, a “shift to governance” does not mean that government completely disappears. Kjaer (2004) for example argued that it is premature to conclude that
Credible decisions have become credible as they are received form formal and legal positions and based on procedural aspects such as transparency, and on the other hand the acceptance of arguments and discourses that is gained in interactions.

The difference between dominant and hegemonic discourse is that the latter is even more forceful and less visible in its disciplining of subjects (cf. Gram, 2006, p. 797; Gnyos and Howarth, 2007, p. 5 and 106).

In STS for example, Funstonwicz and Ravetz proposed to include non-experts in knowledge-making in a process of “extended peer review” (Funstonwicz and Ravetz, 1992) when there is high political salience combined with uncertainty about the knowledge. Other examples: Gibbons, 2000; Funstonwicz, and Liboratoare, 2003; Durant, 1999; Caron-Flinterman, 2006. See also on inclusion of lay knowledge in deliberations, for example, Grin and Graaf, 1996a and 1996b) and Hendriks (2006).

Although, at least in the Netherlands, it is argued that the organization of these deliberative spaces has become a “common phenomenon in decision-making especially at the local level” (Edelenbosch and Moomnikof, 2003, p. 9), it fit perfectly in the Dutch consensus tradition (Duyvendak, 2003, p.39; Kickert, 2004). Some even argue that these interactive settings should replace some elements of the formal structures (Edelenbosch and Moomnikof, 1998b, p.133).

Forester also speaks of strategies that can be part of a deliberative design, for example the strategy of indirect or humor (Forester, 2000; 2004; 2009).

I would like to stress that I constructed the category “deliberative governance.” Many of the scholars and practitioners that developed these criteria and techniques may not have considered their approach part of this category.

A special thanks to Etienne Wenger for introducing this difference between convening and facilitating in a master class about Communities of Practice organized by Habiforum in 2007.

I understand practice to consist of several elements. First, action and Knowing. “Practice is a coherent, and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity” (MacIntyre, 1981, p.187 cited by Wagenaar and Cook 2003). It is “habitus” (Bourdieu in Wagenaar and Cook 2003). Moreover, practice is constitutive meanings, it cannot be separate from language; and practice is a theory of action or an “activity system” (Wagenaar and Cook, 2003, p. 144-48). Hence, practice and discourse are intertwined.

For other examples of the turn to practice in the third face of political science see, for example, Toergerson, 1985, p. 243. In social studies a similar turn to practice took place to bridge theory and knowing, and action and knowledge. For example, Anselm Strauss (Strauss, 1993), Jean Lave (Lave, 1988) and Etienne Wenger (Lave and Wenger, 1991) pointed out that in social studies the inclination is to focus on the rational aspects of social phenomena, for example “work” (Straus 1993) or on the cognitive aspects of learning. However, other aspects, for example routines and tacit knowledge and knowing (Polanyi, 1951), are also an important part of these phenomena and the learning process.

For other examples of a turn to practice in STS see (Giryn, 1983; Mol, 2002) and for an overview (Hagendijk, 1996).

This point is often raised as a critique on discourse analysis. It is argued that discourse analysis cannot explain how certain discourses have become dominant but can describe only that they have done so. Boundary work is a way through which discourse becomes dominant or remains dominant.

The definition of boundary work as given by Halffman also speaks of “disciplining” in the sense that these demarcations “define proper ways of interaction” and “prescribe proper behaviour” (Halffman 2003, p. 70).

Giryn applied the concept “cultural repertoires” rather than discourse. In 2003, Kinsby and Kleinman pointed out that the acceptance of a demarcation of a cultural repertoire needed a theoretical notion of discourse to explain the (tacit) acceptance of specific demarcations of cultural repertoires.

This assumption is supported by research that demonstrates that the governmental models of governing are better accepted and institutionalized than deliberative and interactive forms of governing, see for example Klijn and Koopman (1998) and Prøpper and Steenbeek (1998).

In 2000, the anthropologist Fredrik Barth argued for a similar study of how groups draw boundaries and categorize as opposed to anthropologist that draw these boundaries between groups (Barth, 2000, p. 34).

Although Giryn later on explained that they all had been part of a linguistic turn in science studies (1999, p.5 footnote 8), in the 1980s he was strongly opposed to the discourse approach that Gilbert and Mulkay introduced. He claimed that “in the analysis of discourse we learn how scientists make their stories seem ‘objective’ but we can learn little of why such a story becomes the preferred one” (Giryn, 1982-92).

In the Netherlands, examples of these boundary organizations are: Scientific Council for the Government (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR)) Advisory council for research on spatial planning, nature and the environment (Raad voor Ruimtelijk, Milieu en Natuuronderzoek (RMON)), National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM)), Central Planning Agency (Centraal Planbureau (CPB)), Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS)) (cf. Hoppe and Halfman, 2005; De Wit, 2005).

This was also a central struggle in Foucault’s work: how individuals could be liberated from dominant discourse.

Empirical findings of studies of the role of scientific knowledge and expertise in decision making also demonstrate that scientific research and expertise are not always used or applied. Scholars in political science and public administration, most importantly Carol Weiss (Weiss, 1977, 1980; cf. in the Netherlands also Kliben and Tromp (1999), studied knowledge utilization in policy practice. Weiss demonstrated that there are limitations to the production of knowledge and that there are limitations to the use and production of knowledge in a political context (Weiss 1977). Next to being not used at all, extensive research in STS on the production and use of knowledge on, for example, HIV and AIDS (Epstein 1995) or climate change (Shackley and Wynne, 1995), demonstrated that there is an ideological bias in research, that research has social and political consequences, but also that scientific research can be produced and used strategically by scientists, social movements, politicians etc.. Moreover, a recent study of rhetoric in first year writing courses also demonstrates that science remains a minuscule part of rhetoric (Zerbe, 2007).
37 Other concepts to explain change of dominant discourse are, for example, “crisis” (Hajer and Uitermark 2008) or “dialocation” (cf. Laclau, 1990, p. 39–41; Howarth et al., 2000, p. 13; Paul, 2008). At these moments dominant discourse no longer holds as a stable categorization and new meanings need to be negotiated. But in this dissertation I study a more incremental type of change of dominant discourse in deliberations that at some points resemble the formation of discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995, p. 58), as we will see in the section on boundary concepts.

38 In STS there is an ongoing discussion about the possibility of reflectivity through scientific knowledge or of reflectivity in knowledge production (cf. Woolgar, 1988; Ashmore, 1989).

39 As Foucault acknowledged, an escape of disciplining powers does not mean that power disappears. It signifies that power is more dynamic than presumed and that actors can bring about new power-divisions as “individuals are the vehicles of power, not its application” (Foucault, 1980/98).

40 Foucault warns for “bad” results from parrhesia “Because parrhesia is given to even the worst citizens, the overwhelming influence of bad, immoral, or ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into tyranny” (Foucault, 2001, p. 77). Foucault tells the difference between a good and a bad orator “does not lie primarily in the fact that one gives good while the other gives bad advice. The difference lies in this: the depraved orators who are accepted by the people only say what the people desire to hear (Isocrates calls this ‘flattery’)” (Foucault 2001:81).

41 Often these different interpretations of reflectivity relate to different philosophical tradition that discuss the possible liberating or destructive effects of reflectivity (or in Ashmores words “reflexivity as self reference”) for rationality (Ashmore 1988, xxix). The debate is whether or not reflexivity can or should be separated, according to Habermas they can (cf. Schmidt, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 1998). However, a pragmatic way out of these philosophical disputes, which I do not claim to solve, is to understand ideal speech situations, and reflectivity and parrhesia in it, as ways to liberate from dominant discourse and to introduce new disciplining powers. Hence, parrhesia that can lead to reflexivity does not mean that individuals or groups are free from disciplining powers.

42 Dewey defined reflective though as: “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusion to which it tends” (Dewey, 1933, p.3).

43 Michael Lynch differentiated three levels of reflectivity: the macro, meso and micro level (Lynch, 2000). At the macro level of society, Beck and others speak of “reflexive modernization.” This means that modernity has become “a theme and a problem for itself” (Beck, 1994, p. 8). Beck uses “reflexivity” rather than reflectivity to emphasize that this condition emerges as opposed to being created. At the macro level, the experiments with deliberative governance in our case are attempts to be less reflexive and more reflective about this transition toward a reflective modernity. At the meso level, Lynch argues, theorists of reflectivity discuss how science can produce or evoke reflectivity in practice. Deliberative policy analysis can be understood to have the objective of enhancing this type of reflectivity. For example, Douglas Torgerson argued that “reflexive policy discourse” could be initiated to make “it […] increasingly possible to contest the meaning of policy and draw it closer into association with politics — particularly democratic politics at odds with a technocratic policy discourse” (Torgerson, 2003).

44 Malcolm Ashmore distinguishes three forms of reflectivity: r-awareness (self knowledge), r-circularity (mutual construction), and r-reference (self reference) (Ashmore, 1989, p. 32).

45 In organizational learning, this articulation of routine — or theory in use — that might lead to a change of it, is considered double loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978; Argyris 1982).

46 As we will see below, boundary transcending between subdiscourses can be considered to enable a reframing of policy problems (Rein and Schön, 1993).

47 The problem is this can only be established with hindsight. Conflict or reflectivity need to follow parrhesia in order to have come across indeed a boundary between dominant or alternative discourse. Otherwise, parrhesia has not been uttered (but dominant discourse has been enacted).

48 Another question would be: after the contestation and reflective conversation, how does a boundary around alternative discourse get accepted? It has become dominant discourse, or as Jasannot in 1994 “ripeness” is important in negotiations over regulatory science, otherwise closure of debate will fail (Jasannot, 1994, p. 233). This is where Bourdieu speaks of “closure.”

49 Gieryn in 1983 also mentioned the possibility of boundaries being “obscured” or “dissolved” as different (“subtle and complex”) forms of boundary work (Gieryn 1983, p.79).

50 Unidentified Political Objects (UPO’s) as introduced by Hush Djistelbloem are somewhat similar to boundary objects as they also sit on the boundaries between domains. According to Djistelbloem, UPO’s are policy problems that manifest themselves at the nexus of (policy) domains. There is a difference between boundary objects and UPO’s: in Djistelbloem’s thesis, UPO’s are “wicked problems” that are always technical, scientific, medical or ecological problems in need of a reaction from public administration or politics ((Djistelbloem, 2007, p. 8). In the field of organizational studies, boundary objects also have been studied, for example, by Carlile, 2002).

51 Similar notions have been introduced in STS. For example, the boundary organization is considered as an organization that sits on the science-policy nexus and mediates between these two realms (Hellstrom and Jacobs, 2003; Guston, 1999a, 1999b). In public administration public-private partnerships has also been described as “crossover arrangements” (Montfort, 2008, p. 57).

52 In STS, especially Bruno Latour and Michael Callon stressed that these boundary objects are of influence on subjects and the way they interact (cf. Latour, 1987; Callon, 1986). I understand these objects or concepts indeed to co-determine the way subjects interact. As we will see, these concepts create a sphere of engagement.

53 Literature on framing stands in yet another argumentative tradition. In this tradition, different forms of framing (frame alignment, frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, frame transformation (cf. Snow and Benford, 1992; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996; Diewulf et al. 2004) have been developed mostly as analytical categories to understand the manners in which new social movements can or do mobilize actors. It goes beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of the differences between “frames” and “discourses,” but frames are usually considered to be related to individual beliefs (schema of interpretation) than to discourses. Hence, frame transformations take place at the level of the individual and not of the group. Thus frames have a less “political” notion than discourses that discipline (Brink and Metze, 2006; Brink, 2009).

54 I will call them gate-keepers and a change coalition rather than boundary people to be able to specify that some boundary people enable change through protection of elements of dominant discourse in conversations with a change coalition. The change coalition is the ‘parrhesiastes’ I introduce the concept subdiscourse to describe “discursive ordering devices” that can be part of a broader discourse, in our case government or governance discourse and at the same time are uttered and formed by actors. Other research has defined these subdiscourses as “frames” (Hajer and Lave, 2006, p. 232; Brink, 2009, p. 43) to make a distinction between on hand discourse as structures that construct and discipline agencies, and frames as discursive structures that agencies generate (see also Brink and Metze, 2006). I do not wish to make this distinction and consider discourses both to construct and be constructed by agencies. Participants in experiments will not refer to these concepts as boundary concepts. It is more likely that they will talk of vision, solutions, opportunity and so on. It is an analytical and interpretative process to indicate what the boundary concepts are and how they are dealt with in experiments with deliberative governance.

55 This tradition follows in the footsteps of Dewey’s pragmatism (see for example, Dewey, 1939, 1984) and Lasswell’s democracy theories (Lasswell, 1951b).
This is different from starting research with ethnographic research on local governance (Hulst, 2008) or in intrinsic case studies (Stake, 2005, p. 445).

This type of reflectivity created by theory is quite common in the scientific realm. What is less common is that the results of the empirical analysis feed back into the theory and method, and that I engaged in a dialectic process with practitioners about my interpretations of their projects through the framework of boundary work.

This case was suggested by practitioners from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality when I asked them to help me find a case to match the Dairy Gateway project. A special thanks to Jurgen van der Heijden, David Laws, and the people from what now is called Directie Kennis and Directie Landelijk van de Ministry of Agriculture.

Stake argues that it is difficult to learn from these cases as they shift focus to the comparison rather than to the specificities of the case (Stake, 2005, p. 458). He considers the intrinsic interest in a case and the interests in the results of a comparison to be mutually exclusive but they might be complementary.

This is both "typical case sampling or homogenous sampling" as well as "criterion sampling" (Patton, 1990, p. 173 and 176).

A synecdoche is a rhetorical figure: “we use part of something to refer the listener or reader to the whole it belongs to" (Becker 1998, p. 67). Synecdoces as rhetorical devices in political life can also be studied in themselves (Stone, 2002, p. 137–8). In this case, I understand the cases to be synecdoces of experiments with deliberative governance.

Chapter 3, 4 and 5 all include a more extensive description of the goals of the projects, the important events, what organizations participated at what moments and in what way.

In the proposal, five more meetings with stakeholders had been planned, but as we will see in the empirical chapter, these were never organized. This limited my data; however, I decided to consider this as a result of this often happens. Personal communication with one of the project leaders at the start of the project in 2004. The meetings, documents, and other sorts of interactions that were part of these sites did not all have a deliberative design. I did include interactions that were not part of the deliberations in order to understand how boundary work takes place, not only in the especially designed and facilitated meetings but also throughout the project. Change of dominant discourse might also have taken place outside the especially designed deliberative venues.

Business and government interactions were not studied in the Bijlmerpark as they did not take place.

In later work, Gieren summarizes these three literary devices as a way to expulse or protect autonomy and as styles of demarcation that put “disreputant claimants outside (or at least at the margins)” (Gieren 1999, p. 16).

The analysis of demarcations seems similar to the analysis of "othering," see for example Sacks and Schegloff (1980) or "positioning," see for example Harré and Van Langenhove (1990).

The demarcation can consist of one element of government or governance discourse, a combination of elements of these discourses (what Gieren calls a repertoire), or of government or governance discourse. I constructed these discourses beforehand. To facilitate reading I refrain from referring to “elements of discourses and will speak of a demarcation of discourses. Moreover, other types of discourses and even subdiscourses can be constructed with help of these devices. I interpreted whether a subdiscourse or other discourse was being demarcated.

This interpretation was not as organized as this section might suggest: some sort of tacit knowledge and intuition is part of the interpretative process.

Thanks to Alan Cienki for this suggestion in the discourse reading club of the Amsterdam Discourse Center.

In all three cases, the role of the researcher is eminent. As Dvora Yanow states in reference to constructing categories: “Interpretative category analysts identify (“collect”) the set of terms and then seek to explicate the logic according to which these terms order the world” (Yanow, 2003).

See also: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/figures/categorization.htm (accessed on 30th of June 2008)

What is discourse or subdiscourse, or macro and meso discourse depends on the choice of the focus of the research (Dryzek, 2006; C. Hendriks, 2006). I study government and governance discourse of which entrepreneurship can be a subdiscourse.

The function “Episode clips” in Transana Software 2.21 enabled me to establish patterns of boundary work. This function gives an overview of the order of the "collections" that holds a group of key words per coded document. I coded demarcations, boundary concepts and responses. These came out in a specific order. Moreover, the option in Transana to visualize key words in different colors also helped to establish these patterns.

Parts of this chapter were published as (Metze, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Brink and Metze 2006). I would like to gratefully acknowledge all the editors for their comments and suggestions;

A study in 1989 concluded that this had been caused by an enormous “contradiction between the values of planners and the preferences of citizens” (Mentzel, 1986, p. 248).

Since 1990 Amsterdam has been divided into fifteen districts of which Bijlmermeer, later called Amsterdam Zuidoost is one. From May 2010 onward there are seven districts. Each district has its own district government but is also governed by the city government.

The reconstruction of the Bijlmermeer did not only have consequences for the built environment but aims to increase “the socio-economic status of the residents” and to advance “the position of Bijlmer housing on the housing market and strengthening the Bijlmermeer as a whole” (Reijndorp, 1997).

In October 2001 the draft of the Final Plan of Conduct proposed to demolish another 3,400 houses. The total share of high-rise decreased from 53% to 45% (Heelman, 2001).


The analysis is based on a study of documents and interviews. See attachment 3.2 for an overview of the interviewees.

This was a project bureau in which the central city, the district and the housing corporation “Nieuw Amsterdam” participated.

This procedure contains seven phases: Phase 0 = Initiative (initiatief); Phase 1 = exploration (verkenning); Phase 2 = List of Guidelines (Nota van Uitgangspunten); Phase 3 = Urban Developmental
In Dutch: Creatieve Concurrentie is een methode die in this second round of Creative Competition new ontwikkelingen in ICT, mondige burgers, crisis in beleidsopgaven door o.a. Europese wetgeving, inzichtte toegenaomen complexiteit van de beleidsgroepen door o.a. Europese wetgeving, ontwikkelingen in ICT, mondige burgers, crisis in representatie door politieke partijen, […] er niet meer van het probleem is uit te gaan.

In Dutch: De jongeren moeten betrokken worden bij de verdere uitwerking van het plan.

In Dutch: Het belangrijkste probleem, het verkeer op de Gooseweg, moet niet vergeten worden.

Kwakoeftestival is a multi-cultural festival that lasts for six weeks and includes music, foot races and a soccer competition.

In Dutch: Meer functies in het parkontwerp betrokken.

In 2004 65% of the residents of Amsterdam Southeast were of non-Dutch background (Afdeling, OEN, 2004).

Members of Bijlmerpark Naturally were mainly white, middle class residents that lived in the houses at the fringes of the park. Stonfutu members were mostly lower and middle class Surinam women living in the high rise. The competition between these two groups made visible that the conflict about building houses in the park might be considered a class and even race conflict: houses for the “poor black people” and trees for the “rich white people”. Interesting was that this central issue was kept out of the deliberations (see conclusions of chapter 3).

In Dutch: sport niet alleen voor teams en clubs maar ook voor individuele recreanten.

In Dutch: We willen graag de plannen afmaken. Groen Links zal aandacht besteden aan de milieu issues. Het park moet in de vorm van een compromis gehandhaafd blijven.

In Dutch: We moeten eerst uitrekenen of zoiets [een stichting voor het parkonderhoud] financieel haalbaar is.

In Dutch: We moeten voorstellen bevatten voor een ontwikkelingsstructuur voor het park, zoals het parkbeheer en een verbinding van een basis hoeft aan een stichting verder te worden ontwikkeld. We kunnen bijvoorbeeld de DRO die goede studies kunnen uitvoeren.

In Dutch: We moeten nadenken over een constructie waarin consortia en bewoners kunnen deelnemen naast het stadsdeel en experts.

These two actions were hardly visible for citizens. To them decision making about the Bijlmerpark became relatively quiet (Crézina, 2000).

In Dutch: Ik ben afgestudeerd aan de Technische Universiteit Delft op een plan met de naam: Bijlmerpark Boulevard of broken dreams. Het Bijlmerpark was onderdeel van dit plan. Het is samen met Stofnuf verder ontwikkeld.

The alderwoman Hannah Belliot had asked for a black project manager. The project had become too “white” and this was a political concern (Interview-Lutchman, 2004).

In Dutch: In deze geest verder te gaan. […] Ik stel voor om bureau Stad bv te vragen een zwarte project manager aan te stellen die als een werknemer van dit bureau, het proces kan managen. Ik bevel planner LH aan.

In Dutch: Voor het planologische deel zorg te dragen.

In Dutch: Creativity and commitment van de professionals en bijstanders in de gekozen thema’s.

In Dutch: Voor de transformatie van het park in een stadspark.

In Dutch: Deze naamsverandering betekent een beweging op drie punten […] de ambitie om het park een surplus te geven […] de cultuur en de emancipatie en het perspectief van de Bijlmerbewoners. Ten tweede, een versnelling van de herontwikkeling […] Tot slot zal het plan van aanpak voorstellen bevat voor een ontwikkelingsstructuur die samenhangt met de wensen en competenties van de verschillende partijen, het stadsdeel en externe partijen.

In Dutch: De ontwerp Nota van Uitgangspunten is geen stedelijk plan maar meer een ontwikkelingsstrategie, een document dat de meest
In Dutch: The organization of the “third track,” the exploration of Public Private Partnership for the park maintenance had started but never developed fully, as the district council thought it was not useful (Mz-4, 2000; Nz-15, 2000). At this point, Luchtmann, the project manager, also was fired (Vz-22, 2000; Vz-26, 2000a), these thematic workshops investigated possibilities and feasibility of the desires per theme. As a preparation the planning department developed three developmental models and applied New York’s Central Park as a source of inspiration (Fax2-1, 2000). DRO attempted to gather as much information as possible on each theme. This information varied from “you should not put certain sports clubs in one canteen. Just as you should not put sheep and dogs in one cage” (Vz-22, 2000) to “can a roundabout (kloverbadaanlating)” be replaced with a “Haarlemmermeerwarnaantaling” (Vz-23, 2000). The planners translated this information into three drafts for development models.

In Dutch: Deelname tot nu toe was erg goed en betekent dat er bijna niemand kan begrijpen waar het over gaat. Een goed geregisseerd en van tevoren al besloten. De bobo’s moeten worden. Er is nog niet besloten over het type huizen, alleen dat er gebouwd gaat worden. […] Saris heeft niet het laatste woord. De raad beslist. Houdt vertrouwen.

In Dutch: In Dutch: Ik moet even bekijken dat ik ook niet onze scenario’s terug zie in de modellen. Maar, dat is de domheid van u en ik, dat wij dat niet kunnen zien. In Dutch: Deelname tot nu toe was erg goed en betekent dat er bijna niemand kan begrijpen waar het over gaat. Een goed geregisseerd en van tevoren al besloten. De bobo’s moeten worden. Er is nog niet besloten over het type huizen, alleen dat er gebouwd gaat worden. […] Saris heeft niet het laatste woord. De raad beslist. Houdt vertrouwen.

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Command and control is jargon for government top-down steering and inspection. This new approach also creates urgency to introduce new approaches, for example Environmental Management Systems (EMS). These numbers created urgency to introduce new approaches.

Endnotes

The Green Tier concept not only applied to agribusinesses but to all other sorts of industry. Moreover, this law, the Dairy Gateway project and concepts in both initiatives, such as dialogue and learning, did not come about in a vacuum. The idea that consensus building and voluntary compliance for sustainable agriculture are connected to debates in, for example rural sociology, about policy networks, network governance, and experiments with participative policy making for sustainable agriculture (cf. Daugbjerg, 1998; Grudens-Schuck, 2000; Beuvers and Taillieu 2004; Beuvers, 2004; Tatenhove, 2003; Montpetit, 2003; Bulkeley, 2003; Bulkeley and Mol 2003; Lachapelle, 2003; Fish et al., 2006; Goodman, 1999; Marsden, 2004). However, in this thesis I do not try to place this unique case within this debate about network governance within rural sociology, environmental studies or planning. In the introduction, I established that in literature in politics and public administration a shift from government to governance is assumed in the form of policy fields. I study if this shift is enacted by participants of experiments with deliberative governance. Again, the body of literature also in rural sociology demonstrates that experimentation is taking place also within rural areas and especially in conflicts between agriculture and the environment, but again the question is if, and if so, how participants enact it in the policy practice.

Usually State government "cost shares" or compensates agribusinesses for measures to prevent pollution. For example, the non-point source rules in 2001 ruled that farmers only had to prevent polluted runoff if 70% was cost shared by government (NR 151 section on cost sharing). Moreover, "voluntary" in this approach does not mean without government interference or control. This new approach also implies new ways of being held accountable (Sabel, 1999).

Members of the committee: Wisconsin Paper Council; Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce; Alliant Energy; SC Johnson; International Paper; Wisconsin Energy Corporation; Beck Carton; Quad Graphics; Community Health Center; Sierra Club; Citizens for a Better Environment; Competitive Wisconsin; Mayor John Antaramian (City of Kenosha); Ray Taftora and Linda Bochert (lawyers); Dan Poulson (http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/environ/ environmental/background/advisory/members.htm accessed on 21st July 2008)

An EMS is an environmental management system (EMS) that aims to improve the environmental performance of businesses. In Europe an accredited EMS, an ISO 14001 is often required in business-transactions. An EMS reflects the environmental goals of the specific business and aims at a continuous improvement of environmental performance; for more on EMS see Karapetrovic and Willborn (1998). EMS’s are examined in for example: McLain and Lee (1996); Rondinella (2000); Delmas (2002); Delmas and Keller (2005).

The DNR CEA was erected in 1996 when the management team of DNR thought that "a 'home' was needed for three types of activities that didn’t fit well within other organizational boundaries". These activities included (1) "cross-media" issues, for example mercury pollution in air emissions that impact water resources that needed waste management as a solution; (2) "pollution prevention" (as opposed to ‘end-of-pipe’ pollution control); and (3) "outreach to businesses and collaboration on voluntary and innovative programs" including the development of environmental management systems ((Email_John Shenot, 2007)).
Resources for the analysis of boundary work in this stage were two proposals of LNRP (LNRP, 2004e, 2004f), one document by Wehbe-Behrmann (WEI and Collaborative Initiative) (Wehbe-Behrmann, 2004a), two documents of the design team (MIT and mediation experts together with DNR) (Design Team, 2004a, 2004b) and the two proposals of DNR-CEA (2006e) and the two proposals of DNR-CEA to the Joyce Foundation. I constructed this boundary concept based on the data-analysis (see Chapter 2). Stewardship in this thesis is not further contextualized. I study how this concept is multi interpretable in the policy practice and as such enables a crossing of discursive boundaries. However, I am aware of its history, for example in the Netherlands it has a Christian Democratic connotation (cf. Metze, 1993; CDA, 1990) and in the United States (cf. Wunderlich, 2004q). Moreover, there is a great body of literature in rural sociology and rural geography about farmers' stewardship (cf. Rickenbach and Scott Reed, 2002), and more specifically on several ways by which farmers try to express their stewardship through for example, Environmental Management System’s (cf. Darnall and Carmin, 2005), or “farm-specific environmental action plans” (cf. Smithers and Furman 2003). Moreover, there are several studies on conflicts in rural areas, and what challenges are they resolve those (cf. Hall et al., 2004; Gruden-Schuck, 2000; Beierle and Konisky, 2000), or other public voluntary schemes and negotiated agreements (covenants) between state and business that have been applied in the formation of environmental policies (cf. Higley et al., 2001; OECD, 2003).

All meetings were deliberations between government and society, except for the farmer-to-farmer meetings. These were deliberations of government and businesses. I decided not to organize this chapter according to these two sites of interaction as I proposed in chapter 2. These f-t-f meetings made up a small part of the deliberative venues. This interpretation of an EMS helped to convince a very critical environmental organization that at first opposed the Dairy Gateway project and the EMS of its credibility: “But it is a tool, because it’s system-based, and environmentalists are very interested in natural systems and they understand the feedback loop. They are learning and adjusting after you have feedback. So, continued improvement is not a foreign concept [laughs]. So, any business that has an environmental management system that is audited by somebody is sort of trapped in a system of continued improvement” (Interview-Terrel 2003).

It is hard to tell if they did so tacitly or strategically. I can merely conclude that this is what they did, as seen from the conceptual framework.

DNR is very careful not to attribute these results to the Green Tier program. They argue it is still too early to tell and it is difficult to measure these performances. Moreover, as this figure also demonstrates in 2007 there was a slight increase under green tier companies in their hazardous waste.

Green Tier participants increased their hazardous waste generation in 2005, but have since decreased generation to just 20 percent of their 2004 level. All other reporting sites have slightly reduced their hazardous waste generation since 2004 by about 10 percent (WDNR 2009, p. 91.)

In Dutch: Als de agrosector van Gelderland ook op langere termijn een rol van betekenis zal blijven spelen dan zullen de bakens verzet moeten worden. It was in this step that consultants and administrators from the Knowledge Centre of the ministry of Agriculture renamed the Protein Corridor as the Protein Highway.

The provinces erected economic development agencies to stimulate that activity.

The provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel (the departments of Economic Affairs and Agriculture, respectively) contributed a total of approximately €62,000. The province of Gelderland directly contributed additional financial resources. The province of Overijssel financed the project indirectly through the development agency Oost NV. The national Innovation Network contributed €50,277.50. The resources covered the secretary and administrators from the Knowledge Centre of the ministry of Agriculture renamed the Protein Corridor as the Protein Highway.

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233 Paying members of the steering committee included two elected officials, deputy Piet Jansen of Agriculture in the Province Overijssel and deputy Henk Aaldink of economic affairs in the province of Gelderland; and Herman de Boon, a member of the board of directors of the Innovation Network. De Boon was also involved in a national program, "Transition Sustainable Agriculture."

Non-paying members were Frans Tielrooy, the chair of the Platform Agrologistics and Sjors Kruiper, a member of the board of directors of the Rabobank, a cooperative bank with strong ties in agriculture.

234 The Shell Oil Company was the first to work with scenarios that describe possible future images that are based on certain and uncertain developments. These scenarios prepared Shell for unknown but thinkable futures, see, for example, Heijden, (2003), Schwartz (1996).

235 In Dutch: Verbreden van het aantal stakeholders, ook van buiten de landbouw.

236 In Dutch: Het is van belang trekkers te vinden die gericht zijn op nieuwe oplossingen en niet op ‘meer van hetzelfde’.

237 The boundary concepts innovation, scenarios and cluster development have a history in Dutch planning and land use. I did not look into this history but I constructed these boundary concepts based on the data construction and analysis (see chapter 2) from the events leading to the project and from the offer that the consultants wrote. A discourse analysis of these concepts might elaborate their historical meaning and strength.

238 Unknown which and how many businesses participated this meeting.

239 In Dutch: Dit krispscenario [...] dat kan ertoe leiden dat de (intensieve) veehouderij binnen enkele decennia uit het gebied is verdwenen. Daarmee een belangrijk deel van de verwerkende- en voedingsmiddelenindustrie meesleurdien in de economische neergang.

240 In Dutch: Er is nog altijd een spanningsveld tussen economische belangen en de invulling van het landelijk gebied. We moeten die twee werelden bij elkaar brengen. Deze groep kan daar een rol in vervullen.

241 In Dutch: Het initiatief moet van de industrie komen. Politiek is de grootste bedreiging van de landbouw in Nederland.


243 In Dutch: Maar er verandert wel wat. In Gelderland denkt men over een ontwikkelingsmaatschappij voor het landelijk gebied. En we willen ondernemerschap stimuleren.


245 In Dutch VanDrieGroup: Het staat los van de reconstructie? OOM: De reconstructie is geen aanleiding geweest, dat staat er feitelijk los van. Wij richten ons primair op de industrie.

246 In Dutch: Bij visieontwikkeling, in onze beleving begin je dus zo breed mogelijk. Je probeert de omgeving erbij te halen, je probeert andere partijen erbij te halen, probeert echt een beweging te creëren. Je gaat niet vanuit de agrosector proberen de rest van de wereld te overtuigen dat je zo goed bezig bent. Dan wordt het echt een soort promotieverhaal en je moet er echt op in durven te gaan. Daar kan ook best de conclusie uitkomen dat het helemaal niet zo handig is om te clusteren, maar laat de mensen dat gewoon zelf met elkaar maar bedenken.

247 In Dutch: En dan die ambtzaak regt ja, want die werden gedurende moeten ermer kunnen scoren.

248 In Dutch: [Innovatienetwerk] dat had het idee dat Rijnconsult werd gezet op de bedrijven. En te weinig oversvouw had over belangrijke stakeholders en andere belangen.

249 In Dutch: Nou, Gelderland zag niets in een visie. Zag wel wat in de concrete projecten daaronder. Maar die overkoepelende visie, dat vinden ze veel te vaag en dat was met name Aldink, die daar gedeputeerde was. Die had hele slechte ervaring met ICES KIS projecten waar heel veel [consultants] bij betrokken waren. Hij vond dat er toch al veel te veel consultants waren: waar zijn de bedrijven?

250 In Dutch: Elementen die uitgewerkt moeten worden betreffen onder andere: een duidelijke visie op de ruimtelijke, economische en sociale ontwikkeling van het gebied, resulterend in onder andere een ‘wenkend perspectief’ waarin ook de bewoners en overige gebruikers van de ruimte zich kunnen herkennen, een goede inbedding en afstemming met huidige initiatieven en beleidskaders en een goede afbakening van het geografische gebied, de activiteiten en de betrokkenen.

251 In Dutch: Het doel is vooral om gezamenlijke beursaarding te creëren over wat zich zou kunnen voordoen in de A1 corridor, wat plausibel is, niet uit te sluiten valt, wat wellicht te verzeven valt. In de scenario’s wordt primair gekeken naar ontwikkelingen waar actoren maar weinig invloed op hebben (de zaken waar men wel invloed op heeft komen aan de orde in de volgende stap). Feltelijk dus probleemerkenning en probleemherkenning maar vanuit een veel breder perspectief.

252 In Dutch: Het aantrekkelijke van scenario’s is dat het er niet over gaat of men er mee eens is of niet. Het zijn dingen die zouden kunnen gebeuren.


254 In Dutch: Van veel belang in deze uitwerking is ook dat de visie en voorgestelde activiteiten een hoog innovatief gehalte hebben. Onkeren andere ten aanzien van ruimtelijke, technologische en institutionele aspecten. Voorkomen moet worden dat alleen geadverteerd wordt dat er een ‘meer van hetzelfde’ aanpak wordt gekozen. Er is echte vernieuwing nodig met duurzame oplossingen zodat de huidige problemensituatie kan worden omgebogen in een strategische voorsprong met internationale uitstraling.

255 In Dutch: De hypothese achter de A1 eiwitcorridor is dat je niet bij de pakken neer moet gaan zitten dat je dus niet een soort koude sanering moet gaan krijgen, maar dat je door innovatie op gang te brengen nieuwe kansen voor die sector kunt bieden, waardoor die sector weer tot groei en bloei kan komen.

256 In Dutch: Dat vraagt in feite een vorm van netwerkbestuur met andere spelregels, systemen en competenties dan gebruikelijk.

257 The complete steering committee participated in none of the meetings. At every meeting, one or both of the deputies were replaced by their administrators. The Food and Agro CEO of the Rabobank was also replaced at least two out of the four meetings. A lack of time was always given as a reason.

258 This indicates that a shift to governance did not become credible among steering committee members. Moreover, deliberative governance remained limited to one a day workshop scenario.

259 In Dutch: Wat kenmerkt de A1 Corridor, wat is het onderscheidende vermogen? Om vervolgens de bestaande competenties gebruiken vernieuwing. In Dutch: Geen delen van de reconstructieproces over te willen doen. Het reconstructieplan is nu een gegeven. Het project A1 Eiwitcorridor moet binnen ketens dynamisch genereren om de binnen de reconstructie gewenste doelen (zoals fysieke verplaatsing van functies) te helpen realiseren.

259 In Dutch: Als trekker optreedt van de vernieuwing.

260 In Dutch: Aan de basis van het project A1 Eiwitcorridor ligt een rapport van de WUR ten grondslag, waarin op basis van statistische gegevens een aantal zogenoemde opspanningen (scenario’s) zijn ontwikkeld. Ook binnen het huidige traject is veel aandacht voor scenario-ontwikkelingen en – daaraan gekoppeld – mediale verbeelding.

261 In Dutch: Houd het platform los en meen en organiseer het volledig rond de projecten.

262 In Dutch: ‘Het gaat er natuurlijk niet om, de meeste stemmen gelden, want dat is irrelevant […] Jullie zijn allemaal deskundigen […] Het gaat erom, stel je eens voor dat we die kant uit gaan, wat dan?

263 In Dutch: Waar beginnen we zo? We beginnen om te kijken of we een sprong in de toekomst zouden kunnen maken. Hoe zou het er over een
fif or ten year uit kunnen zien? Dat doen we vanochtend. Waarom? Wie de toekomst kent, wordt schatrijk. Maar ook, er zijn een heel aantal sectoren in Nederland, de scheepsbouw, de textielindustrie, waar een hele hoop buitengewoon verstandige mensen in zaten [...] toch als het ware, al lopend met elkaar de fiets ingestort en zij zijn verheven of in heel andere vormen teruggekomen. Het nadenken over wat er in dit gebied zou kunnen gebeuren [...] daarom van belang.

In Dutch: Het is een zaak van dat jullie samen zeggen: dit kan gebeuren. Wij willen jullie niet overtuigen.

Ge Backus WUR/LEI (facilitator and participant); Dick de Jager Provincie of Gelderland, Economic Affairs, Runt Pandirin H+N+S landschapsarchitecten, Jos Roesmaat (LTO), Herman de Boon (Innovation Network and steering committee member), Jeroen Verver Rabobank. I observed, recorded, transcribed and analyzed this session.


De reconstructie was over de volle breedte en het traject A1 richt zich echt op de primaire sector en de verwerkende industrie. Daar moet een aantal opzien gegeven kladborden worden die uiteindelijk wel zullen helpen om dan in die extensieverspreidingen natuur en milieu te helpen. In Dutch: De verandering en de mobiliteit moeten bewerkstelligd worden primaire vooral in de primaire sector en de verwerkende industrie. Daar moet je op en in het achterhuis houden wat dan die andere sectoren, wat interne meningen. De hoeven zich er dus niet voorheksen in te herkennen en er voortdurend bij zijn. heel badinerend: over een jaar zouden zij terug kunnen vragen en kunnen vragen: dit hebben we gedaan en wat vind je ervan? En dan kennen we hen goed genoeg om te weten dat
In Dutch: Coalities daar zijn een aantal voorwaarden voor en een hele belangrijk is in ieder geval als je coalities in de primaire sector tot stand wilt brengen, dat er verderop in de keten, bijvoorbeeld bij de slachterij, of vooraan in de keten, bijvoorbeeld bij de toeleverancier, iemand is die dat afdwingt, tussen aanheffingstekens.

Government discourse is not to be confused with discourse of governmental actors! Government discourse is the ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories about the hierarchicial way in which governmental actors from a top down position can make policy decisions, command and control and regulate. Other actors can also utter government discourse.

These EMS’s are rather conventional instruments; however, the way they were a boundary concept and created a sphere of engagement for farmers, citizens, environmental organizations fits a discourse of deliberative governance.

That includes me: I interpreted the proposals as proposals for experiments with deliberative governance.

Even though there is not one concept to address the experiments, except for the concept I used: deliberative governance. In STS these experiments and their proposals might be considered to be “objects” (see below).

Hence, boundary concepts or even objects and actors interpreting and using those are mutually constructive: they influence each other. For example, in all the projects participants were “disciplined”, in Creative Competition to design a park, in the Dairy Gateway project to explore farmers’ stewardship, and in the Protein Highway Project to develop instruments for cluster development. This confirms the ideas in Actor Network Theory in STS that objects (or in our case concepts) and actors are mutually constructive (cf. Latour, 1987, 2005; Callon, 1986).

This also means that facilitators are part of this coalition and as such are subjected to dominant discourse. In all three cases they were not “independent” or “neutral” as is often claimed is necessary in mediation, consensus building or joint fact finding (cf. Fuller, 1971; Fischer and Ury, 1981; Otsawa and Suskind, 1985; Healey, 1988; Innis and Booker, 1999; Suskind et al., 1999; Karl and Turner, 2003). From a discursive perspective, I demonstrated that all three change coalitions were “disciplined” by a discourse. As we saw, the facilitators interpreted the proposals from the perspective of that discourse and implemented those accordingly.

Not only a change coalition or consultants can induce reflective conversations. Participants in deliberations can also apply strategies of indirectness, for example humor, to redirect conflict and facilitate a reflective conversation. Participants can also create conflict if they do not want to get involved in reflective conversations.

This can be considered a neo-consensual style of Dutch decision making in which struggles about possible conflicting interpretations are avoided and agreement or support of societal actors for instruments is aimed after. It builds on Arend Lijphart’s famous argument from 1968 in which he claimed that the success of Dutch decision making is a pilarization of society in which struggles about objectives can be avoided and an elists’ agreement on instruments is sufficient for decision making (Lijphart, 1968, 1988). This thesis demonstrates that in the Netherlands, perhaps due to its history of a pilarized society, a consensual style in the conversations rather common. In the Dutch tradition, support (drugs/cola) of other network partners, for example elite members of other societal groups, is necessary to make decisions. This tradition already resembles network governance. This makes it more difficult to engage in deliberative governance. The Dutch tradition of keeping struggles of the table and trying to reach agreement on instruments is continued in the experiments with deliberative governance. For example, in the Blijmerpark the conflict of interests to build in the park versus keeping the park green was kept of the table, but also a reflection on different interpretations of what makes a feasible plan.

This is also what is advised in consensus building, conflict resolution and mediation the advice (cf. Fischer and Ury (1981); Suskind, and Cruikshank (1987); Suskind and Field (1996); Suskind et al. (1999); Podolz (1999). Or, as Rein and Schön argued: from a cooperative view, an analysis of (conflicting) frames makes it possible to reframe and thus to find new solutions. Whereas in a conflict of interests (from a political view), the interests cannot be reframed (Rein and Schön 1993).

It might be that in a more adversarial context and style of decision making the change coalition and facilitators had to think of ways how to redirect and deal with this conflict.

In this case discourse means debate or speech. This is also what scholars in deliberative democracy theory argue should be aimed after (cf. Benhabib, 1988,1996; Forester, 1996; Young 1990).

Governmental actors do not necessarily have to take the initiative to form a change coalition. Moreover, a deliberative design or strategies of indirectness can also be developed by participants in experiments that feel the need to, for example, gain credibility for an interpretation of the experiment from a deliberative governance perspective.

These results can be used as a set of criteria to evaluate experiments with deliberative governance to establish whether a credible shift to deliberative governance discourse was established or not.

Or scholars in STS that argue that participatory knowledge production leads to better knowledge through the inclusion of lay or local knowledge (Fischer, 1990; Funtowicz and Liberatore, 2003; Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, 2003; Shackley and Wynn, 1995; Kip et al., 1993).

This is how some scholars in STS but also political science refer to an ambition in participatory problem solving. They argue that science and scientific knowledge is not free from political judgments, especially when it is applied in a policy context. Knowledge is always contested and negotiated. Therefore, these scholars argue that other types of knowledge such as lay expertise and local expertise should be taken into account (cf. Woodhouse and Strom, 2001; Torgerson, 2003; Jasanoﬀ, 2004).

In research on rhetoric and argumentation “experience” is a well-known rhetorical device: to draw on “example, or story that might be real cases or invented fables” (Hood, 1998, p. 175). This device is also referred to as ‘argument by example’ that can include both factual facts but can also be made up “fables” (Gottweis, 2006). Further research on this rhetorical dimension of boundary work that includes argumentation by example needs to be further explored, see also (Holmquist, 1990, p. 239). Further research to connect boundary work to linguistics is necessary.

Studies of authority also include other aspects, such as charisma or media performance, to explain for authority (cf. Hajer 2009). However, in studies of democratic legitimacy, the legal and procedural aspects of what legitimatizes, for example governmental authority, are often emphasized.

You can consider me part of deliberative governance discourse that facilitates pragmatic but democratic problem solving.

Some scholars in deliberative democracy theory have also pointed out this danger, for example Dryzek (2006), Parkinson (2003) and Dodge (2009).

This is a slogan of the Wisconsin Environmental Initiative that promotes sustainable businesses.

ABCTA was a cooperative feed processor and is since 2003 part of ForFarmers U.A.

In Dutch: Nederlandse organisatie voor pluimveehouders.
SUMMARY

Deliberative governance of land use planning is a form of governing in which government interacts with businesses, non-governmental organizations and citizens to collaboratively solve problems. Deliberative governance theory builds on literature in which more horizontal forms of decision making are advocated. Moreover, deliberative governance theory promises more credible decisions due to an improvement of the quality of these interactions between interdependent actors.

This thesis answers the question if these more horizontal forms of governing become more credible to participants. I studied three experiments with this deliberative approach: Creative Competition as a case of citizens participation for redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark in Amsterdam (the Netherlands), the Dairy Gateway Project for sustainable regional development in Wisconsin (USA), and the Protein Highway Project for sustainable agroclusters and regional development in the Middle-east of the Netherlands. These experiments had a deliberative design that consisted of rules of conduct and strategies of interaction. I selected the American case as a countercase to the two Dutch cases. In this thesis, I established whether participants in these experiments engaged in reflective conversations through which they started to believe in deliberative governance as an alternative to hierarchical government steering.

BOUNDARY WORK AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

To establish if deliberative governance gained credibility, I studied if participants in experiments with it enacted it. Therefore, I first of all, understood government and deliberative governance as two competing discourses, e.g. two sets of ensembles of ideas, concepts, and categories that were being produced and reproduced in practice. Second, I considered the experiments to introduce a deliberative governance discourse into a context in which the government discourse was dominant. Third, I introduced boundary work as a conceptual framework to study how these two discourses in the communication of participants struggle for dominance and credibility. Boundary work is the discursive way by which actors change or maintain a more frozen dominant discourse. It is both a transcending of meaning in boundary concepts and a demarcation of discourses. Boundary concepts align, in this case, elements of government and governance discourse. This creates a sphere of engagement for participants in which they can collaboratively investigate new meanings of a discourse. In contrast, demarcations are a way to maintain the credibility of a discourse. An actor can claim that something does or does not belong to a discourse. This way a discourse can become stronger or weaker.

Fourth, I studied the participants responses to these two types of boundary work. Did they accept, contest or reflect upon the boundaries transcended or drawn? Based on the responses I established what sorts of conversations evolved from boundary work. When boundaries were accepted, a normal conversation evolved. When participants contested boundary objects and discursively demarcated their subdiscourses either a conflict occurred or a reflective conversation developed. Last but not least, I established the results of these three different types of conversations: was dominant and more frozen government discourse disrupted? Did deliberative governance gain credibility?
CREDIBLE DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE?

All three projects aimed at a more horizontal and deliberative way of governing. Only in the Dairy Gateway project this form of governing became more credible. In the Protein Corridor project governance discourse gained credibility. In Creative Competition participants enacted the deliberative governance discourse during the project but in the end believed in a hierarchical way of governing.

In addition, I found that the offers that consultants wrote for these experiments were boundary concepts. Governmental organizations, consultants, experts, businesses, citizens and environmental organizations interpreted the experiments in various ways but were able to cooperate. However, in the course of the experiments struggles for a dominant interpretation of these offers and concepts in it occurred. These became visible by looking at boundary work of participants. The pattern of boundary work that evolved was related to the deliberative design of the experiment. Such a design includes the agenda of the experiments, the rules of conduct and the strategies for interaction. This design influenced the moments at which and the way participants were able to inquire the new deliberative governance discourse. For example, on some occasions consultants were able to stimulate participants to reflect on the various interpretations they had of the project or concepts part of it. The combination of a deliberative design and the pattern of boundary work that evolved from it enabled deliberative governance to become credible.

In the two Dutch project, Creative Competition and the Protein Corridor project, a coalition of experts, consultants and civil servants introduced the boundary concepts such as a feasible plan, experts, innovation, scenarios, and cluster development. The different interpretations of these concepts remained unspoken but as a researcher I could reconstruct those. For example, feasibility to some participants meant a financially and technically robust plan only, and to others it was also a democratically feasible plan. In both Dutch projects the members of the coalition and other participants demarcated their interpretations in the course of the projects. In the redevelopment of the Bijlmerpark this happened at the last meeting. At this meeting the alderwoman and members of the city council demarcated their government-interpretation of expertise as academic experts and a feasible plan that meant a technically and financially feasible plan. In the Protein Corridor project two members of the change coalition entered a conflict about the interpretation of cluster development, innovation and scenarios. They included other participants of the scenario development meeting. A governance interpretation gained credibility: participants agreed that businesses and government were able to cooperate to initiate cluster development that benefits the agrosector in the region.

In the American project, the Dairy Gateway project, a different pattern of boundary work evolved. Possible members of the change coalition entered into a conflict about the interpretation of one of the boundary concepts stewardship. One of the environmental organizations questioned whether industrial farmers were able to be stewards of the land. They demarcated their interpretation that these farmers could not be stewards. A fracture line occurred. The environmental organization left the coalition but others continued, including some environmental organizations. In the deliberations with farmers, their neighbors, farmers’ representatives and environmental organizations, facilitators created settings in which participants enacted the deliberative governance discourse. For example, participants had to sign a document to commit to dialogue and chairs were rearranged into a circle rather than a theater setting. In addition, facilitators — or others — created a sphere of engagement by introducing the boundary concept stewardship. Participants were invited to contest this concept and reflect on its meaning. Indeed they openly interpreted it from a government discourse, or sub discourses that are elements of it, such as a farming subdiscourse, environmental discourse. These demarcations did not result in conflict but led to reflective conversations. At the end of these conversations, participants together decided how to proceed a collaborative inquiry into the meaning of stewardship and ways to implement it.

The study of boundary work in this thesis demonstrates that credible democratic deliberative governance is limited: it occurs only in experiments that stage reflective conversations. To be more than an “innovation business”, participants have to be encouraged — by the setting and the incentives from rules and regulations — to transcend boundaries around frozen discourse. Moreover, a deliberative design and facilitators that redirect conflict into reflective conversations are of great value when they do so. They enable critique and empathy in conversations and consensus in outcomes. These are vital ingredients to create credible, innovative and democratic decisions.
SAMENVATTING

Deliberatieve netwerksturing (deliberative governance) in de ruimtelijke ordening is een vorm van probleemoplossing waarin de overheid samen met bedrijven, burgers en niet-overheidsorganisaties maatschappelijke problemen tracht op te lossen. Deliberatieve governance theorie bouwt voort op ideeën uit de governance literatuur waarin al aandacht wordt gevraagd voor meer horizontale vormen van besluitvorming. Deliberatieve governance voegt daaraan toe dat in netwerksturing de oplossingen van maatschappelijke problemen geloofwaardig worden omdat de kwaliteit van de communicatie tussen de interdependente actoren verbetert.


GRENZENWERK ALS CONCEPTUEEL RAAMWERK

Om geloofwaardigheid van deliberative governance vast te stellen, bestudeerde ik of deelnemers deliberatieve netwerksturing in de praktijk toepassen (enacted). Daartoe vat ik, ten eerste, government en deliberative governance op als twee discoursen die strijden om geloofwaardigheid. De discoursen zijn sets van samenhangende ideeën, concepten en categorieën die geproduceerd en gereproduceerd worden in de praktijk. Ten tweede beschouw ik de experimenten als een manier om een deliberatieve governance discours te implementeren in een situatie waarin het government discours dominant, meer geïnstitutionaliseerd is. In beide landen is een meer hiërarchische en topdown manier de gebruikelijke vorm van interactie tussen overheid en samenleving. Ten derde introduceer ik grenzenwerk als een conceptueel raamwerk waarmee ik bestudeer hoe de twee discoursen in de communicatie tussen deelnemers aan de experimenten strijden om dominantie en geloofwaardigheid.

Grenzenwerk is de discursieve manier waarop actoren het dominante, meer bevoren, discours veranderen of haar geloofwaardigheid behouden. Grenzenwerk is zowel een grensoverschrijding van betekenis in grensconcepten als een demarcatie van discoursen. Met behulp van grensconcepten verbinden actoren (elementen van) discoursen aan elkaar. Op die manier creëren grensconcepten een ruimte waarin deelnemers nieuwe betekenis in discoursen kunnen verkennen. Daarentegen zijn discursieve demarcaties een manier om geloofwaardigheid voor een bepaald discours te behouden. Een deelnemer kan claimen dat iets wil of niet tot een bepaald discours behoort. Deze afbakening is een
manier om het discours te versterken of verzwakken. Ten vierde bestudeer ik de reacties van de overige deelnemers aan de experimenten op deze twee vormen van grenzenwerk: accepteren zij deze grensoverschrijdingen en demarcaties, maken zij bezwaar en trekken zij nieuwe grenzen, of reflecteren zij erop? Op basis van de reacties kan ik de kwaliteit van het gesprek bepalen: als participanten de grensoverschrijdingen of demarcaties zonder meer accepteerden dan volgde een “normaal” gesprek en waren de grensoverschrijdingen en demarcaties al geloofwaardig en deel van het dominante discours geweest. Wanneer deelnemers de grensoverschrijdingen of demarcaties aanvochten dan was dat nog niet het geval en er konden twee soorten gesprekken volgen: een reflectief gesprek of een vijandig gesprek waardoor dominant discours al dan niet veranderd kon worden. Tot slot stelde ik vast wat de resultaten waren van deze drie soorten gesprekken: was het dominante government discours veranderd en had het alternatieve deliberatieve governance discours aan geloofwaardigheid gewonnen?

**GEOLOOFWAARDIGE DELIBERATIEVE NETWERKSTURING?**

Bij aanvang van de projecten was het doel bij alle drie om het discours van deliberative governance te verspreiden. In de praktijk bleek dit moeilijk voor elkaar te krijgen. Alleen in het Dairy Gateway project vond een verschuiving plaats naar het deliberatieve governance discours. In het A1 Eiwitcorridor project vonden deelnemers een governance discours geloofwaardig. In Creatieve Concurrentie werd tijdens het project wel het deliberatieve governance discours toegestempeld, maar na afloop van dit project verdedigde de wethouder hun interpretatie niet van het dominante governance discours. Er was expliciet ruimte om dit rentmeesterschap aan de kaak te stellen. Er volgden demarcaties van het government discours en van subdiscoursen die daarin passen, zoals een milieudiscours of boerendiscours. Deze afbakeningen leiden niet tot conflict, maar tot reflectieve gesprekken. Na deze reflectie constateerden de deelnemers samen hoe zij verder zouden kunnen gaan in een gezamenlijk zoektocht naar de verdere invulling van rentmeesterschap.

De studie naar grenzenwerk in drie experimenten met deliberatieve netwerksturing laat zien dat innovatie van het government discours exclusief en beperkt is: het vindt alleen plaats in experimenten waarin reflectieve gesprekken geïnsceneerd worden. Deelnemers moeten aangemoedigd worden, middels een specifieke setting en prikkels uit wet- en regelgeving, om grenzen van bevroren discours te overschrijden. Op die manier is deliberatieve netwerksturing meer dan een innovatiebusiness. Een deliberatief design en facilatoren die conflict kunnen omvormen tot reflectieve gesprekken zijn hierbij van grote waarde. Zij maken het mogelijk dat deelnemers op empatische wijze kritiek uitwisselen en toch tot consensus in de uitkomsten komen. Het zijn vitale ingrediënten om geloofwaardige, innovatieve en democratische beslissingen te genereren.

In de twee Nederlandse projecten introduceerde een coalitie van experts, consultants en ambtenaren de grensconcepten, zoals een haalbaar plan, experts, innovatie, scenario’s, en cluster ontwikkeling. De verschillen in interpretatie van deze grensconcepten bleven onuitgesproken. Als onderzoeker kon ik wel meerdere interpretaties bloot leggen. Zo betekende “haalbaarheid” voor sommige deelnemers alleen een financieel technisch robuust plan, en voor anderen ook een democratisch gedragen plan. In beide Nederlandse projecten demarceerden deze coalitieleden, en ook andere deelnemers, hun interpretaties in de loop van de projecten. In de herontwikkeling van het Bijlmerpark gebeurde dit tijdens de laatste bijeenkomst waarop professionele planners hun plannen voor het park