Innovation Ltd. Boundary work in deliberative governance in land use planning
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Citation for published version (APA):

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“Decision makers may gain as much from labeling the issue as "policy" as may scientists by labeling the issue as "science"” (Jasanoff, 1987, p. 198).

1. A TURN TO PRACTICE

Deliberative governance theory assumes that credibility of governments’ and other actors’ arguments and decisions, that is, discourse, is gained in interactions in practice. Actors need to believe in a discourse — and actors and arguments part of it. This way they enact its legitimacy and authority. Thus, to be credible, “politics constantly needs to be enacted” (Hajer, 2006). To study the gaining credibility for new discourse — in this case that of deliberative governance — demands a research approach that studies the policy practice and that studies the way actors deliberate in this practice.

The study of the discursive interactions in which actors enact the credibility of discourses is a turn to practice. As Wagenaar and Cook summarized in the field of policy analysis in 2003, a turn to practice is a turn to action that demonstrates that people “negotiate the world by acting on it” and that “what is known can be embodied in action” and is “inherently improvisational” but not random. In practice, the negotiation of the world takes place discursively when people interact “by telling stories about their and other people’s actions within the various elements of their community” (Wagenaar and Cook, 2003, p. 149 and 151). In the study of practice as a “dramaturgical act” (Turner, 1974; Hajer and Uitermark, 2008) the rational and emotional can be understood to be intertwined in the act. The cognitive and emotional aspects of enactment no longer necessarily need to be separated.

This turn to practice has taken place in several scientific disciplines in order to transcend dualist thinking, for example the dichotomies between science and politics, between rational and cognitive on one hand and the emotional, routine and tacit actions on the other, and between the discursive and extra-discursive (Schatzki et al., 2001). For example, in STS and the policy sciences the turn to practice has been a way to demonstrate empirically that scientific knowledge is not free from ideologies. It can “demystify” science by opening the black box of the production of scientific knowledge in action. Gieryn in particular studied how academics and others drew boundaries around science to gain credibility for their argument as well as for the discourse and practice of science within deliberations (Gieryn 1983; 1995; 1999). He concluded that these demarcations were an enactment, a reproduction, of dominance of science and scientific expertise (Gieryn, 1999, p. 84). He argued that science is what “sellers proffer truth and buyers choose to use/believe” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 12).

In this thesis, the dichotomy that the turn to practice transcends is the division between discourse and practice. In more everyday language I consider a study of practice at the same time a study of “words and objects” and “speaking and acting”. Although the turn to practice might suggest that the act becomes more important than the speech, this turn — at least in this thesis — has to be understood in the context of discourse theoretical thinking in which these dichotomies between the material and discursive world have been the subject of discussion for quite a while. Most often, discourse theorists refuse
to make these distinctions as they assumed that “all objects are objects of discourse, as their meaning depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 107). Or as Hajer in 1995 argued, discourse is “produced and reproduced in practice” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). The turn to practice, and as such the study of enactment (cf. Weick 1988, Mol 2002, Hajer 2009) can be considered an attempt to do justice to these theoretical assumptions, and as a researcher not only to construct discursive structures based on a discourse analysis of documents and speech, as is often the case, but also to include the material world and indeed analyze text as the intertwinement of words and objects, discourse and practice.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the details of these discussions. For now, it is important to know that I do study the policy practice and the enactment of government and deliberative governance discourse in it. Thus, government and deliberative governance are both understood as discourses that actors can enact and grant credibility in deliberative governance settings. In addition to being models in the analysis by policy scientists, I will empirically understand “government” to mean the dominant discourse that has been institutionalized in organizations and practices, and “deliberative governance” as the alternative discourse that actors attempt to enact in experiments with deliberative governance. I understand the process through which enactment takes place as a process of boundary work.

ROADMAP TO THIS CHAPTER

In this chapter I will first introduce boundary work as a discursive mechanism to gain credibility for a discourse. I will argue that boundaries are political frontiers that include and exclude meaning, knowledge, and actors. In this dissertation, in a Foucauldian tradition, the power of drawing boundaries around elements of discourse is derived from the power of dominant discourse. Second, I will argue that even though I consider the credibility of demarcations of discourse often to come from a tacit demarcation of dominant discourse, change of dominant discourse and of interpretations of concepts is still possible. Reflectivity allows for an alteration of dominant discourse through a transcending of boundaries in boundary concepts. Conversations that are of a deliberative nature are of a deliberative nature. Reflectivity allows for an alteration of dominant discourse through a transcending of boundaries in boundary concepts. Conversations that are of a deliberative nature are not only to construct discursive structures based on a discourse analysis of documents and speech, but also to include the material world and indeed analyze text as the intertwinement of words and objects, discourse and practice.

In 1999, Gieryn attempted to shift attention to these negotiations of boundaries around discourse. This means that I study the negotiation of political frontiers of discourses. For example, with help of discourse analysis a dominant neo-liberal or market discourse has been reconstructed (Fairclough, 2000; Storey, 2000) or is demonstrated how language constructs women or women’s “issues” such as menstruation and sexual harassment (Wilkonson and Kitzinger, 1995)⁸. However, I will study the struggles between a dominant and a alternative discourse through a study of boundary work. This means that I study the negotiation of political frontiers of discourses. In 1999, Gieryn attempted to shift attention to these negotiations of boundaries around discourses through boundary work⁸ as he emphasized when he cited Foucault: “the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analyzed not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception or forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power ... deployed through....demarcations, control of territories and organization of domains” (Foucault, 1980, p. 70-71,79; quoted by Gieryn, 1999, p. 20).
Gieryn stressed that he wanted to shift attention to the study of resilient boundaries between discourses, for example in reference to the feminist thought of Donna Harraway. Gieryn agreed with Harraway that it is necessary to go beyond the “radical historical contingency and modes of construction for everything” (Harraway 1991, p. 184-87). According to Gieryn, “a better account of the social world begins with an appreciation for the contingent, constructed, and contested character of boundaries that demarcate legitimate knowers from illegitimate, fact from hope, science from politics” (1999, p. 5 footnote). Gieryn was interested in the resilience of boundaries between discourses.30

The study of resilient boundaries between discourses enables me to focus on actors’ attempts to change historically contingent and dominant discourses, such as a government discourse.31 In this study, I engage in a detailed analysis of the negotiation over boundaries, in other words boundary work, to study how actors attempt to disrupt dominant government discourse by the introduction of a less common deliberative governance discourse. As such, I will deviate from Foucault’s genealogies, and I will engage in a detailed conversation analysis, something Foucault famously refused to do (Wetherell et al., 2001, p. 383). Thus, I combine a Foucauldian theoretical notion of discourse as a discursive system that disciplines with an analysis of the enactment of these discourses through boundary work in conversations and interactions.

In sum: I understand boundaries to be discursive. They are drawn around systems of meaning that include and exclude. To be able to analyze how dominant discourses such as government discourse can be disrupted, I turn to the study of boundary work. Boundary work is the negotiation of political frontiers between discourses. Actors that draw boundaries around a discourse attempt to gain credibility for this discourse and exclude other meanings, actors and objects. Actors can also transcend boundaries between discourses to attempt to alter the discourses and to include what had been excluded or vice versa.

1.3. THE POWER OF DRAWING BOUNDARIES

In this thesis, I am interested in the possibility of gaining credibility for an alternative discourse. Therefore, I develop boundary work in a way that enables a study of the negotiation of boundaries around discourse. This includes an explanation of the power of demarcations of discourse when they resonate with dominant discourse. Such demarcations limit change.

In this section, I will first give an overview of explanations for the power of drawing discursive boundaries that have been given in recent years in studies on boundary work. Second, I will argue that even though Gieryn aimed to analyze resilient boundaries between science and society, his work and more recent research on boundary work still have a bias toward obdurate boundaries. More specifically, these studies in science and technology empirically have a preference for analyzing obdurate boundaries between science and policy or between scientific disciplines.

EXPLAINING THE POWER OF BOUNDARY WORK

The power of drawing discursive boundaries in conversations has been explained in at least four ways:

- The style of boundary work: a rhetorical act
- The content of boundary work: contextual cultural repertoires
- The content of boundary work: “frozen” institutions
- The content of boundary work: “frozen” discourse

The style of boundary work: rhetorical demarcations

The first explanation of the power of discursive boundaries was given by Gieryn in his early work. In this, he introduced the rhetorical style, “the pattern in the symbolic formulations and figurative language” that explains the power of demarcations (Gieryn, 1983, p. 782-3). Subsequently, Gieryn formulated a neo-Marxist sociological theory on interest-driven sciences that explains why scientists and others would want to contextually demarcate science. Inspired by Steve Woolgar and building on the work of Elliot Freidson (1970, 1986) and Magali Sarfati (1977) on interest-driven, rather than merely functionalist professions, Gieryn argued that science in itself is not unambiguously professional. Gieryn understood scientists as interested ideological actors and professionals. Just as Freidson and Larson had visualized the first contours of a “power approach to professions” (MacDonald, 1995, p. 4 and 5), Gieryn demonstrated that scientists and others act ideologically to protect the interests of sciences and scientists. He formulated a “power approach” to science. He considered boundary work the rhetorical act by which actors pursue the interests of science.

In Gieryn’s work, boundary work is a drawing of context-dependent and cultural demarcations of science to “upgrade” science and to maintain or gain its “occupational control” (Gieryn et al., 1985, p. 393). Gieryn claimed that scientists and others adapt the way they draw boundaries around science to the context in which they are acting. This makes the demarcation a rhetorically more powerful statement that protects the interests of science.

Based on a study of these rhetorical demarcations, Gieryn was able to construct context-dependent cultural repertoires about science and he illustrated that there was not one ideology-free story about science. For example in a discussion about religion, scientists and others emphasized the empirical grounding of sciences; in discussions about mechanics, scientists brought forward its theoretical character (Gieryn 1983). In Gieryn’s work, the process of contextual demarcating of science in interactions with others explains why science is the preferred cultural repertoire. These repertoires are cultural classifications. In later work, Gieryn compares these to maps that we draw to help us navigate (1999, p. 7). The cultural repertoires were a research result and not an analytical scheme or explanation for the audiences’ acceptance of the boundaries.

Other scholars in a similar tradition of science and technology studies — for example, Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, and later on Andrew McKinley and Jonathan Potter — also argued that it was the contextually uttered repertoires on science that made clear that science is interest-driven. Like Gieryn, these scholars studied the construction of science in culture and not the production of scientific norms. They all studied how science is defined culturally and in interactions. This was to demonstrate that science is divided and
political and that it is not a universal story. Gilbert and Mulkay accentuated that they wished to “set free” the “different voices in science” (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, p. 2). However, Gilbert and Mulkay argued that a specific variety of repertoires on science made it possible to “warrant” scientific beliefs (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1982).

The content of boundary work: contextual cultural repertoires

This insight offers a second explanation for the power of boundaries drawn around science: the context-dependent content of the cultural repertoires. Gilbert and Mulkay applied discourse analysis to be able to tell an inside story about science to demonstrate that science is essentially political in character. According to Gilbert and Mulkay (1982, 1984) and later on, McKinlay and Potter (1987), scientists try to warrant scientific beliefs with various accounts of science that make up several “repertoires” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1982). Gilbert and Mulkay studied how in scientific culture some scientists or scientific results are excluded or included with the help of certain repertoires of accounts of what makes up good science. More specifically, they studied how biochemists working on oxidative phosphorylation justified “theoretical errors” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1982, p. 385), both their own and those of others. In interviews they looked for interpretative accounts by the biochemists. What Gilbert and Mulkay found was that the accounts scientists gave were not stable but depended on the requirements of the social situation. This is similar to what Gieryn found: boundaries around science were drawn in relation to the context. However, in Gilbert and Mulkay’s work they use the content of the repertoires to explain why scientists in interaction with other scientists tell a winning story. In certain situations scientists claim that scientific results are theoretical faults and in others the empirical work is not done properly.

Gieryn explicitly wanted to stay away from explanations for the power of science that included the content of science. He was hesitant to define science as a category; he wanted to study how it was defined. Throughout his work he emphasized the negotiated and contextual character of credibility, legitimacy and authority of science. In 1999 he argued that:

“the epistemic authority of sciences exists only in its local and episodic enactment [my emphasis] as sellers proffer truth and buyers choose to use/believe” (Gieryn 1999, p. 12).

Although in more recent studies Gieryn puts less emphasis on boundary work as a means to protect the interests of science and considers that boundaries are drawn around science to protect its “cognitive authority” (1995) or “epistemic authority” and “credibility” (1999), in all of his studies boundary work is defined as a means to empower science. Gieryn repeatedly argued that science as a category does not exist: it is “empty until its insides get filled and its borders drawn amidst context-bound negotiations over what is scientific” (Gieryn, 1995, p. 403). All authors — Gieryn, Gilbert and Mulkay, and McKinlay and Potter — grounded the definition of science in empirical research and considered science not to be a fixed category but to be dynamic, culturally defined, and negotiated. However, there was a difference in focus: whereas Gilbert and Mulkay attempted to construct “categories of accounts” that scientists applied to gain support for their research result Gieryn focused on the localized and contextual demarcations and compared what accounts were given in what interactions with whom. Gieryn did not reconstruct the repertoires. Instead, he studied the rhetorical act of drawing boundaries, and the rhetorical character explained and was a method to look for the constant negotiation of the power of science, and an ongoing process of defining what science is.

Even though Gieryn shifted attention to practice and focused on the process of boundary work in interactions, he also spoke of “cultural repertoires” of science. At several places in his work Gieryn referred to a cultural or discourse theory interpretation of these “culturescapes” or “cultural maps” as he called them in reference to Geertz’ cultural analysis (Gieryn 1999, p. 4-6). Gieryn argued that to demarcate elements of these maps of science in conversations and interactions not only defined what science is, at the same time the demarcations of these elements were to be understood as attempts to gain or maintain credibility for the argument and for a “discourse on science.” Gieryn further argued that “any of the real sciences may be used to legitimate the next new map as accurate, but always tenuously so […] “it is always possible in principle to challenge the pertinence or applicability of some previous authoritative cultural map to the immediate credibility contest at hand” (1999, p. 20). Gieryn did not consider these maps to be discursive resources that the boundary workers are aware they have; the maps can only be interpreted as such. Hence, these maps or culturescapes can only be constructed with hindsight. They have to be understood as the constructions of science that analysts of boundary work can compose. With an exception of the mention of this type of “second order boundary work,” Gieryn stayed far from a deductive approach that might have been an explanation for the power of the demarcations based on their content.

However, it was the concept of repertoires that evoked discussion on the explanation of the power of drawing boundaries. If science as a category is empty and boundaries are drawn contextually, what explains the acceptance or rejection of certain boundaries around certain repertoires? Gieryn might have been able to explain why scientists and others draw boundaries, that is, to protect the interests of science, but not why these demarcations were accepted. Two explanations were given: a discourse theory one that I further endorse in this dissertation and a neo-institutional explanation that I will briefly discuss first as it has taken up a large part of research on boundary work in recent years.

The content of boundary work: “frozen” institutions

The third explanation of the power of drawing boundaries was given in a neo-institutional approach. In this approach, next to a study of resilient boundaries between science and religion or mechanics, scholars started to engage in a study of the more frozen boundary between science and politics or between scientific disciplines (Indyk and Rier, 1993; Bal and Halfmann, 1998; Guston, 1999b; Hoppe, 2002; Halfmann, 2003). In this approach it was assumed that the institutionalized boundaries between science and politics gave boundary work in interactions its power. As Halfmann argued, “boundary work needs an institutional counterpart ‘boundaries’” (Halfmann, 2003, p. 69). Theoretically, this institutional counterpart explains the acceptance of demarcation of science in specific regulatory regimes or settings. It is due to the way the boundaries have been institutionalized in different countries or styles of decision-making that specific demarcations are accepted.

The main reason for these shifts was that it was no longer the main objective to demonstrate that scientists act politically, that they pursue their interests, and that they protect their autonomy or epistemic authority. The objective was to demonstrate that science has normative or political features, especially when applied to or developed for policy. The objective of many of these scholars in science and technology studies and public administration was to demonstrate that scientific judgment in a policy-making context is necessarily normative, in other words “political.” These scholars argued that
demarcations between science and politics always include normative judgments with political consequences about what is “fact or value, what is objective or subjective, rational or emotional” (Turnhout et al., 2006, p. 17). These studies attempted to refrain from what Halffman typified as the “seamless web model” in which the distinction between science and politics is not made at all, and these studies at the same time aimed to not reiterate the “cage model” nor to draw the boundaries to purify science and or politics (Halffman 2003, p. 45).

The boundaries between politics and science, or as Hoppe calls it, the “science-policy nexus” (Hoppe, 2005) have been studied in several ways. First of all, several scholars in science and technology studies analyzed boundary work of scientific advisors or experts in a specific policy problem or policy field. For example, Willem Halffman studied boundary work by ecologists and toxicologists, but also by scientists and regulators in formulating regulations to control and prevent aquatic chemical hazards in three countries (Halffman 2003). Second, boundary work about scientific models was analyzed. Examples are boundary work in the development of ecological indicators in the Netherlands (Turnhout et al., 2007), in European air pollution policies (Tuinstra, 2006), or in econometric policy advice to the Dutch government (De Vries et al., 2010). Third, recent studies of boundary work in the science-policy nexus focus on the advisory organizations and committees that give advice to government. These so called boundary organizations (Guston, 2000; Hellstrom and Jacobs, 2003) sit on the science-policy nexus and have to make sure not only to operate as credible scientific experts but also as credible political advisors.3 A fourth way in which the boundary between science and politics was studied was an approach in which Hoppe tested whether analytically constructed arrangements of the science-policy nexus were present in the empirical reality of policy-making (Hoppe, 2005; 2008).

All of these studies were conducted to better describe and understand the relationships between science and politics, and how boundaries between them have been institutionalized in regulatory styles that include specific boundary configurations (Halffman, 2003, p. 27-57), or boundary arrangements (Hoppe and Halffman, 2005), or images of science-policy interactions (Hoppe, 2005, p. 201). These studies demonstrate that not only social conventions and culture, but also regulatory styles play an important role in how these boundaries and the labordivision between politics and science have been institutionalized.

By making the boundaries between politics and science the object of empirical study either of policy problems or boundary organizations the scholars in science and technology studies were able to demonstrate that the boundaries between science and politics are real and can be studied in their institutionalized shape in organizations or, for example, in labor divisions. Moreover, in comparisons of these institutionalized boundaries, it becomes clear that these divisions, these boundary arrangements, vary according to policy field and country (Halffman 2005).

The content of boundary work: “frozen” discourse

In 2003, Abby J. Kinch and Daniel Lee Kleinman gave a fourth explanation for the power of boundary work. They argued that the content of boundary work — Gieryn’s cultural repertoires — can explain why demarcations go unchallenged. Kinch and Kleinman introduced “resonance” that they defined as the “taken for granteddominant discourse” as a notion from discourse theory that explains for the acceptance of demarcations (Kinch and Kleinman, 2003, p. 871). They argued that “these historically resonant discourses are

powerful resources in debates over the appropriate boundaries of science” (Kinchy and Kleinman, 2003, p. 871). As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, discourse includes and excludes people and behavior. In dominant discourse, certain things are unthinkable, unsayable, or unnecessary to be asked or uttered while others are more acceptable and considered appropriate or true. What Kinchy and Kleinman argued was that the demarcations of “science,” as Gieryn described in his empirical work, are powerful since they are drawn around a dominant discourse.

To explain the power of dominant discourse, discourse analysis in a Foucauldian tradition draws on concepts of bias; see for example Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Discourse analyses often describe how certain discourses have become hegemonic and sustained their hegemony through the mobilization of bias in dominant discourse (Schattschneider, 1960). For example, the analysis of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization aims to describe these structure-like, “frozen” features of discourse (Hajer, 1995, p. 60 and 61). It is the resonance of demarcations with dominant discourse that explains the acceptance of demarcations. When a discourse is dominant, demarcations of this discourse are accepted and in their turn sustain its dominance. In other words: the winning discourse wins by being demarcated because it is winning. Hence, boundary work can be considered a rhetorical act that draws on dominant discourse as a discursive resource. With the help of demarcations of elements of dominant discourse, actors, in the case of Gieryn, reproduce the credibility of science. It is due to dominant discourse that these demarcations are tacitly accepted, and reproduce dominant discourse.

As we saw in the first section of this chapter, I do understand boundaries to be discursive and boundary work as a political act of demarcating discourses that include and exclude. In the same line of reasoning as Kinchy and Kleinman, I apply the Foucauldian notion of dominant discourse to explain why participants in deliberations tacitly accept some demarcations of discourse and as such reproduce its credibility, and limit change toward an alternative discourse. However, since I am interested to study change of dominant government discourses through boundary work, I also need to explain how dominant discourse can be disrupted. Therefore, in the next sections I add to this theoretical explanation of reproduction of dominant discourse, the theoretical explanation of a change of dominant discourse. Moreover, I will abandon the study of science as a dominant discourse. I will develop an additional theoretical framework to explain how participants in experiments with deliberative governance can disrupt dominant discourse, in our case government discourse, with boundary concepts.

1.4. EMPATHY AND CRITIQUE: CHANGE OF FROZEN DISCOURSE

Gieryn and others who analyze boundary work have a bias toward the study of the dominance of science. This is due to their theoretical and empirical focus. For example, Gieryn’s theoretical assumptions are based on sociological theories on the pursuit of interests and epistemic authority of science. Their assumption is that science reproduces its credibility, legitimacy and authority through boundary work. This is also the outcome of
1. Boundary work to study credibility contests

1. Boundary work to study credibility contests

their empirical studies. Gieryn did not want to prove this assumption wrong. His research reiterates the idea that science reproduces its epistemic authority in interactions. This is not a problem, as his goal was to empirically demonstrate that science as an objective profession does not exist. Gieryn did not look into the possibility that actors can draw boundaries around other discourses that might challenge the dominance of science, as Jasanoff’s quote at the start of this chapter illustrates. Moreover, in the work of Gieryn and others, the possibility that the audience contests, rejects, or reflects upon the rhetorical demarcations of science, or other discourses, is underexposed.25 Therefore, I develop boundary work as discursive demarcations that actors can conduct to empower science. However, actors can also demarcate other discourses to attempt to gain credibility for them in competition with the science discourse or other discourses. The analysis of boundary work as a mechanism applies to all sorts of empirical problems that entail a struggle between discourses and not just the credibility struggles between science and policy.26 To be able to study challenges to dominant and more frozen discourse, I will have to explain the possibility of changing dominant discourse through boundary work.

This explanation can be offered in two ways. First, as we saw, it entails a turn to practice. It is in practice that discourses are produced and reproduced. To remain dominant, discourse needs to be enacted. Discursively drawing a boundary around it, is a way to do this. However, it is also in practice that an audience can contest, reject, or reflect upon dominant discourses or even produce new discourse. In this section I will argue that through reflectivity on dominant discourse in the policy practice, this more frozen discourse might be contested. I will build on the concept of reflectivity from deliberative democracy theory and STS, as it is reflectivity that enables learning and change.

Second, I need a theoretical explanation of how change of dominant discourse is possible through boundary work. How is it possible for actors to contest a discourse that is relatively frozen? The explanation for dissonance and change of dominant discourse are underexposed but present in the concept of parrhesia in discourse theory.27 It is through parrhesia that actors can transcend boundaries around discourses. In line with the previous section, I will first describe this theoretical explanation of change and then link it to the concept of reflectivity.

PARRHESIA

Foucault was mainly interested in discourses at the macro level of society. He demonstrated how these inescapably discipline individuals, limit their individual freedom, and make change of these discourses almost impossible. Foucault argued that the “Truth” does not exist outside these discourses and it cannot liberate us from dominant discourse (Taylor, 1984, p. 160).28 However, by the end of his life he introduced parrhesia as an “individual quality” that could disrupt dominant discourse (Foucault, 2001, p. 85). In “Fearless Speech,” a series of lectures, Foucault described how change and escape from dominant discourse is possible for an individual through parrhesia (Foucault, 2001). A parrhesiastes says what is on her mind. This is not without the danger of rejection, or of being considered strange, ill, or undisciplined (Foucault, 2001, p. 16). Parrhesia is to speak boldly. Parrhesia is “frankness in speaking the truth, it is free or fearless speech. [...] Parrhesia is a form of criticism, either toward another or toward oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor” (Foucault, 2001, p. 12, 17-18).29 To break the disciplining power of a particular discourse, to be able to dissonant rather than to resonate, actors have to speak freely. Fearless speech can disrupt dominant discourse and change power relations.30 Parrhesia as a concept from Foucauldian discourse theory makes it possible to study individual escape — at least for the time being — from the disciplining powers of discourse through fearless speech. Parrhesia makes it possible to introduce boundary transcending concepts.

REFLECTIVITY

I am taking the liberty of connecting the concepts of parrhesia and reflectivity, which reside in different philosophical and research traditions31, to help explain how groups of people can alter dominant discourse. In doing so, I may not be fully doing justice to these notions. However, it is in theories on reflectivity (cf. Lynch, 2000) that not only individual change of disciplining discursive powers can be studied — as Foucault attempted to demonstrate —, but it links this individual (temporarily) escape to a possible change of tacit understandings of groups.

Anger, frustration or sorrow may be reasons or ways to try to alter dominant discourse, but in this thesis I will focus on individuals and groups that reflect on dominant discourse in an attempt to alter it in a more cognitive way. Reflectivitiy in deliberative democracy theory is defined as being “empathetic with the plight of others; being more considered (more informed and more stable); and as more far-reaching in both time and space, taking fuller account of more distant times, more distant places and more distant people through long term goals and consequences” (Goodin, 2003). This kind of reflectivity presupposes the ability to articulate and think about one’s own interpretations and approaches and on that of others. Hence, reflectivity is also to: “criticize the tacit understandings that have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice, and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or uniqueness which he may allow himself to experience” (Schön, 1983, p.61).32 Reflectivity includes “problematization” and “critical thinking” at the individual level, group level and about society33 (Lynch, 2000). A problematization, of one’s own presuppositions but also of the group you belong to is necessary to be able to be empathetic with other groups, to be able to be more considered and to take a “fuller” account.34 Reflectivity as Lynch argued, can be considered the opposite of routine, repetition and tacit knowing, or in this thesis, as the opposite of discourse that is taken for granted. Reflectivity is understood to mean thinking about or knowing in action. It is the articulation of rules and procedures — and in our case meanings — that we usually apply tacitly (Lynch, 2000).35 Reflectivity concerns the possibility to “talk back” to oneself and to others with help of the articulation of the unsayable, or through a contest of interpretations that are part of a discourse. A situation, actors, and discourses can “talk back” in a way and through this cause dissonance (cf. Bröer, 2006, p. 50-62). It is “talk back” and dissonance that can lead to change.

REFLECTIVITY AND PARRHESIA

Through the idea of dissonance, reflectivity can be linked to the concept of parrhesia. A parrhesiastes can articulate tacit understandings to once mind, but also out loud. To articulate and critique a tacit understanding is causing dissonance. Not only to an individual tacit understanding, but also to a group’s understanding, or discourse. In Foucault’s "Fearless Speech" (2001) he distinguishes between moral parrhesia and political parrhesia to separate this individual level of reflectivity on one hand from the group and societal
level on the other. On the societal level, e.g. political parrhesia, you tell the "king or demos" the truth even if it costs you your head. With moral parrhesia you admit to yourself even if it can cost you your self-image (Flynn, 2002). Political parrhesia can be considered one way among other to encourage the reflectivity of a group. A parrhesiastes can articulate understandings that are tacit, taken for granted. These assumptions discipline not only individuals but also groups. Parrhesia, and the articulation of these taken for granted understandings, can evoke dissonance. This can induce reflectivity of a group and might lead to reflective conversations by the members of this group on these disciplining forces, e.g. dominant discourse.

However, dissonance can also cause conflict. Parrhesia concerns the possibility of speaking freely. This can change dominant discourse, either through conflict or reflectivity. But, a parrhesiastes always runs the risk of being ignored and excluded. Dominant discourse does not have to change. Foucault pointed out that a parrhesiastes must run the risk of being excommunicated. If this risk is not present the utterances must have been part of dominant discourse. In other words: when speaking freely results in a collective rejection of the utterance or exclusion of the individual, dominant discourse remains dominant. When parrhesia is ignored and the parrhesiastes is excluded, dominant discourse is being reproduced. It is only when conflict or a deliberative conversation that includes group reflectivity occur that an opportunity for change has been created by parrhesia.

In the study of boundary work in this thesis, this means that as soon as a demarcation of alternative or subordinate discourse is ignored or rejected, participants reproduce dominant discourse. Only when conflict occurs — as an overt and resisted attempt to exclude and dismiss the parrhesiastes — or when a reflective conversation takes place after a boundary has been drawn, is subordinate discourse indeed enacted and dominant discourse can be altered. In all other situations dominant discourse is enacted. Hence, I can recognize reflectivity in the conversations that I study in two ways: first, when a demarcation of an alternative discourse, in our case deliberative governance, is overtly contested but is accepted; and when participants overtly contest but also accept a dissolving of boundaries in boundary transcending concepts. Moreover, as a result, participants will start to further explore the boundary concepts collaboratively. Based on the quality of the conversation and its outcome, I will be able to conclude if new discourse — in this case, deliberative governance — became credible and dominant discourse was challenged.

To sum up the above, boundary work is an attempt to achieve credibility for a discourse. This can solely be successful when the audience accepts the boundary. Historical and cultural resonant discourses explain this acceptance. At the same time, boundary work is a way to explain change of dominant discourse. Fearless speech is a transcending or demarcation of boundaries that can both cause reflectivity (on a group level). This creates the possibility for the audience of contesting or rejecting boundaries that are drawn around dominant discourse, or, as we will see below, concepts that transcend these boundaries. Moreover, it enables an alternative discourse to become credible. Hence, boundary work is considered a mechanism of productive power through which participants in deliberations can reproduce existing power relations but they can also reflect upon and change these. The study of boundary work enables me to study the credibility contests between dominant government discourse and alternative deliberative governance.

Now that I have given a theoretical explanation for the change of dominant discourse and a way to study it in practice, I will elaborate the second way in which boundary work can be conducted: actors can dissolve or transcend boundaries to introduce new discourse.  

**CHANGE THROUGH A TRANSCENDING OF BOUNDARIES**

Boundary work as I have defined it to this point is concerned with the drawing of political frontiers around discourses that include and exclude. The boundaries around discourses are drawn to gain credibility for a specific discourse. In other words, to make a specific discourse win. As we saw in the previous section, whether the demarcated discourse keeps on winning depends on the resonance or dissonance, and on the type of conversation that evolves after the demarcation. In addition to change through struggle between subordinate and dominant discourse, change can also occur through “seduction.” Theoretically, this seduction is still a political act and can be considered a means to gain credibility for a discourse. As Jasanoff argued, “boundary-defining language not only serves the immediate interests of social and political groups, but, through the creation of new conceptual categories, opens the way for extending those interests in larger or new domains” (Jasanoff, 1987, p. 199). However, empirically this seduction can be studied as attempts to cooperate and coordinate across boundaries. My dissertation studies this type of change as a transcending of boundaries in concepts situated between discourses. These concepts are multi-interpretable and align different discourses.

Scholars in STS have studied coordination and cooperation across boundaries between science and politics in several ways (cf. Star and Griesemer 1983; Bal et al. 2002; Halfman 2003; Gieryn 1999). For example, in his conceptual work on boundary work, Halfman considered “coordination” between practices to be a result of demarcations (e.g., the demarcation establishes what is appropriate behavior in what practice). Demarcations make interactions between different practices possible and conceivable (Halfman, 2003, p. 70). Gieryn saw cooperation and coordination not so much as a result of demarcations, but as a strategy to gain “jurisdictional control over a contested domain” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 16). Gieryn described it as the “expansion of a boundary” or the “expansion of frontiers.” Halfman and Gieryn consider the demarcations more as political and adversarial acts to protect interests and autonomy, rather than as cooperative acts. According to Halfman, cooperation or at least coordination can be the result of demarcations, not the theoretical explanation for these demarcations.

Other researchers in STS, for example, Star and Griesemer opened the door to the possibility of understanding a crossing of boundaries as a way to cooperate and coordinate between different social worlds. Star and Griesemer studied how through boundary objects “coherence” and “cooperation” were possible among different scientific disciplines, and among scientists and others (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 391). whereas Halffman considered coordination as a result, rather than an intention (let alone a theoretical understanding) to coordinate and cooperate across boundaries. Star and Griesemer demonstrated that at least at the organizational level it is possible for actors to coordinate and cooperate through a transcending of boundaries around social realms in boundary objects. They defined boundary objects as:

"objects which are both plastic enough to adapt the local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured..."
Boundary work to study credibility contests

in individual use" (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393).

Boundary objects are interpreted differently in different social words “but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation” (1989: 393). These boundary objects transcend boundaries between social worlds, for example science and politics, as they are multi-interpretable to actors from different discourses. Star and Griesemer gave the example of fossils in Mongolia, considered valuable by natives since these fossils are used in feng shui (human spirit meets with the spirit of the earth), and by paleontologists who consider these fossils equally valuable but for different reasons. Star and Griesemer demonstrated that the creation and management of boundary objects, next to a clear set of methods of discipline, is “a key process in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds” (1989, p. 404). These objects act as “anchors” or “bridges” across boundaries (Star and Griesemer, 1989). Thus, next to demarcations, a bridging of social worlds is possible in a transcending of boundaries between these social worlds. Translated into a discourse vocabulary, I consider this object to be a boundary concept that possibly relates to an object, for example a fossil, but that can also relate to a model or a plan. These concepts sit at the boundary between two discourses. Next to the demarcation of discourse that can result in coordination between discourses, a transcending of boundaries in a boundary concept enables change in the relations between discourses, and within a discourse.53

In discourse theory, the possibility to cooperate or to coordinate discourses, and to form discourse coalitions or even to enable change of dominant discourse have been theoretically developed and empirically studied with the help of linguistic-oriented concepts, for example, story lines (Hajer, 1995, p. 56), and on a sociological level, “empty signifiers” (Lacoue, 1996). These concepts explain coherence in discourse and at the same time the possibility of change. As is the case with boundary objects, their multi-interpretabiliy is key to enabling this coherence within a discourse as well as the coordination with other discourses. This ambiguity makes a boundary concept, whether a story line or an empty signifier, both empty and filled with meaning. It is the emptiness, or as Star and Griesemer call it, the “weakly structured in common use” and the fullness, the “strongly structured in individual use” (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393) that enable concepts to sit at the boundary between social worlds or, in our case, discourses.

The boundary concepts in this dissertation are understood to be very similar to the study of story lines or empty signifiers in discourse theory; however, I focus on the interactions, the ongoing struggles between different discourses. To express this focus, I prefer the term boundary concept. It draws attention to the boundaries between discourses. I would also like to emphasize that a boundary concept is different from several other boundary devices introduced in STS. As I already established, a major distinction is that whereas I study boundary concepts discursively and understand them to sit at the boundary between discourses, in STS boundary objects, boundary organizations, and boundary people54 (Halffman, 2003) have been introduced mainly to study the interactions between politics and science or between scientific disciplines that are understood to be social worlds, practices, realms, institutions or actors. Moreover, boundary text, objects and people have been introduced as boundary devices that are not considered to be boundary transcending but more as devices that can be applied to demarcate practices (Halffman, 2003, p. 64-65). Rather than sitting on boundaries, boundary texts, objects, and people in Halffman’s work “mark” the boundary (Halffman, 2003, p. 60). An example would be an academic journal that marks and protects the boundaries around science. In this dissertation, I am interested in boundary concepts that are not applied to demarcate but that transcend boundaries. However, sometimes a boundary concept represents demarcation to gain credibility for transcending in the boundary concept.

In this study, I consider boundary concepts to enable a demarcation of discourses and at the same time to permit a transcending of discursive boundaries. For example, stewardship as a boundary concept can transcend the boundaries between the subdiscourse of environmentalism and the subdiscourse of entrepreneurship.55 At the same time the concept stewardship can mark a deliberative governance discourse and distinguish it from government discourse. This ambiguity enables coordination and cooperation between discourses. The multi-interpretability creates a sphere of engagement in which actors can ignore, reflect upon, or contest boundaries between discourses. It is through interactions in this sphere of engagement that discourse can be produced or reproduced. At the same time, the boundary concept can be one element of a discourse demarcated from other discourses to attempt to gain credibility for the discourse. Boundary concepts in this dissertation are considered a form of parrhesia. They provide an alternative interpretation of the boundaries between discourses to participants in experiments with deliberative governance. It is in conversations where consultants in collaboration with governmental actors often introduce the boundary concepts.56 Other participants ignore, reflect upon, or contest these concepts. Depending on the outcome, the boundary concept is enacted and a different interpretation of the boundary is accepted. The reaction is important to establish if the boundary concept is credible. When participants contest it, it can easily start to function as a “fracture line” concept that no longer transcends boundaries but exposes the irreconcilability of discourses. For example, in the Netherlands a governmental organization, the Innovation Network introduced a “piggery apartment.” This concept aligned environmental discourse and entrepreneurship discourse. However, at the end of the 1990s it turned into a fracture line concept. It drew out the boundary dispute and made the environmental discourse less reconcilable with the entrepreneurship discourse.

Hence, boundary concepts create new discursive horizons that are multi-interpretable and as such can transcend boundaries between subordinate and dominant discourse. Participants can demarcate these concepts to gain credibility for the subordinate discourse. Moreover, participants can reflect upon, contest, and reject the concepts and by this means disrupt dominant discourse.
1.5. CONCLUSIONS: BOUNDARY WORK AS A MECHANISM OF PRODUCTIVE POWER

In this chapter, boundary work is defined as a discursive mechanism through which participants of deliberations demarcate dominant discourse to gain credibility for it, as a demarcation of alternative or even subordinate discourse to disrupt dominant discourse, and as a transcending of boundaries between discourses by participants to alter dominant discourse. The result of boundary work depends upon the reaction of other participants who can tacitly accept, reject, contest or reflect upon the boundaries drawn and transcended.

I developed boundary work as a theory to explain the power of demarcations of discourse and a transcending of discourse in boundary concepts. Theoretically, the power of the discursive demarcations is explained by Foucauldian power that is embedded in dominant discourses. As soon as a demarcation resonates with this dominant discourse it is accepted and the dominant discourse is reenacted. However, as I am interested in the study of change of dominant discourse, I also developed the possibility that actors demarcate subordinate discourse, and reflect upon or reject demarcations. The concept of parrhesia in Foucault’s work allows a change in dominant discourse by a parrhesiastes, someone who is willing to take the risk of being excommunicated by speaking freely. I connected this concept to studies on reflectivity and argued that reflectivity might be induced by parrhesia. When this occurs, a conversation with a deliberative quality can take place. This means that taken for granted discourse is articulated and discussed. I can study this empirically when the demarcation of a discourse is contested. This contestation can lead to conflict but also in reflective conversations. Subsequently, I introduced the possibility of transcending boundaries as a way to introduce new discourse. Participants can transcend boundaries between discourses in boundary concepts.

In the empirical study of the reenactment or change of dominant discourse, the reaction to the demarcations or boundary concepts is crucial. Are they contested, reflected upon or rejected in conversations and other types of interactions? See table 1.1 for an overview of theoretical possible forms and outcomes of boundary work in conversations and interactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boundary work</th>
<th>Reaction in interaction</th>
<th>Type of conversation</th>
<th>Result on site of interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation of dominant discourse</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse is reproduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>Change in direction of subordinate discourse is possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse wins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarcation of counter discourse</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>Change in direction of subordinate discourse is possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Dominant discourse wins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcending of boundaries in boundary concept (elements of alternative discourse are altered)</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Change is accepted: was already dominant discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>Change is possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>“normal”</td>
<td>Change is accepted: was already dominant discourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1. Possible forms and outcomes of boundary work in conversations and interactions

In this chapter, I made the following theoretical changes to boundary work:

- I explain the power of demarcations in a Foucauldian tradition (and not institutionally) and consider a demarcation powerful when it resonates with dominant discourse and is accepted without contestation. Demarcations can also be ignored or contested.
- Powerful demarcation of subordinate discourse as well as contestation of demarcations of dominant discourse theoretically became a possibility with the concepts of parrhesia and reflectivity. Parrhesia might be accepted or contested. When it is contested, a deliberative conversation or conflict might occur.
- I no longer exclusively focus on the reproduction of dominant science discourse; therefore, I can study the struggles between dominant and alternative discourse.
- I no longer exclusively study the reproduction of dominant ‘science’ discourse; therefore, we are able to analyze the production of new discourse that transcends boundaries between discourses.

Thus, with boundary work, I will study how government or deliberative governance discourses are enacted, are challenged and protected in interactions between actors. I focus on the dynamics of the interaction of discourses, the actions by which they are enacted. It is in these interactions that change of dominant discourse might take place. In this case, I study how a “freshly” injected deliberative governance discourse challenges the dominant government discourse in experiments with deliberative governance, and how the dominant discourse is protected or changed. Boundary work enables the study of these contests between dominant and subordinate discourse and to establish what discourse become credible.
Boundary work enables the study of alteration and reinforcement of discourse. It elicits the following question:

*Can boundary work explain when and how deliberative governance discourse gains credibility in innovative forms of governance in land use planning in the Netherlands and the United States?*

Sub-questions are:
- What boundary concepts transcended boundaries between government and deliberative governance?
- Did these concepts gain credibility?
- What demarcations of government and/or deliberative governance discourse took place?
- At what moments did these demarcations take place?
- What are similarities and differences in boundary concepts and demarcations in the two projects with innovative forms of deliberative governance?
- What does this tell us about the possibilities of mainstreaming innovative forms of deliberative governance?

In chapter two I will further define the sub-questions with help of the methods by which I constructed the data (see section on research steps).